

**A. COMMUNITY
COMMON MARKET
LIBRARY**

Class.....**2.1 KEN**
 Date.....**19-6-72**
 Acc. No.....**4707**

85-1193
7 DEC 1942

CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraph</i>
INTRODUCTION	1
PART I—REASONS FOR FOOD SHORTAGE AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE THEREOF	9
Chapter I—Interpretation of this Term of Reference	9
Chapter II—Scope and Extent of Food Shortage	12
Chapter III—Rainfall	14
Chapter IV—Short History of Maize in Kenya	20
Chapter V—Increased Production Drive	26
Chapter VI—Warnings by K.F.A. of Coming Maize Shortage	29
Chapter VII—Organization	33
Section A : Controls	33
Section B : Production, Consumption, Distribution and Rationing of Foodstuffs	43
Chapter VIII—Causes of Food Shortage	52
Section A : No Encouragement given to European Farmers to Produce Maize	54
Section B : Less Planting of Maize in Certain Native Areas in 1942, due to the Low Price of Native Grown Maize in 1941	56
Section C : Increased Consumption of Maize	57
Section D : More Maize Fed to Stock	59
Section E : Heavy Buying and Selling of Maize Immediately Prior to the Institution of Maize Control	61
Section F : Potato Blight, Mainly in the Central Province	64
Section G : Prolonged and Heavy Long Rains in 1942	66
Section H : Larger Profits Obtainable by not Delivering Maize to the Control	67
Section I : Lack of Agricultural Machinery and Spare Parts Therefor	69
Section J : The Foregoing Reasons do not Account for the Shortage of Maize	70
Section K : Native Views on Reasons for Shortage of Maize	71
Section L : Main Causes of the Shortage of Maize	78
Section M : Shortages of Other Foodstuffs	87
Wheat	87
Beans	88
Fowls and Eggs	89
Ghee	90
Bacon	91
Meat	92
Sugar	99
Butter	100
Potatoes	101
Rice	102
Fresh Vegetables	104
Chapter IX—Measures to be Taken to Prevent a Recurrence of a Food Shortage	105
Chapter X—Nutrition and Dietetics	142
Chapter XI—Effect of Food Shortage on Native Labour and the Native Reserves	146
PART II—MAIZE CONTROL	154
Chapter XII—Difficulties of any Maize Control Scheme	154
Chapter XIII—The System of Maize Control	160
Chapter XIV—Administration and Operation of Maize Control	175
Chapter XV—The Maize Controller	194
Chapter XVI—Suggestions for the Improvement of Maize Control	213
PART III—SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION	216

CONTENTS—*Contd.*

APPENDICES

- A. List of Witnesses.
- B. List of Persons Submitting Memoranda.
- C. Graphical Representation of Rainfall for the Year 1942, and also for the Short Rains, 1942, as Compared with the Average Rainfall for a Number of Years.
- D. Graphical Representation of Rainfall for the Year 1942 at Certain Stations, as Compared with the Average Rainfall for a Number of Years.
- E. Graphical Representation of Rainfall for the Period, October to December, 1942, as Compared with the Average for a Number of Years.
- F. Plan Showing Maize Harvesting Seasons in Kenya Colony.
- G. Interim Recommendation on Native Rationing.
- H. Government's Reply to Interim Recommendation on Native Rationing.
- I. Written Note dated the 10th February, 1942, from Lt.-Col. Griffiths to the Secretary, Kenya Supply Board.
- J. Circular Instructions by Maize Controller to Registered Traders.
- K. Maize Controller's Memorandum to the Maize Board on Depots versus Agents.
- L. Suggestions for Simplifying Maize Control while Retaining its Essential Functions.

INDEX

TO HIS EXCELLENCY SIR HENRY MONCK-MASON MOORE, G.C.M.G.,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Colony and Protectorate of Kenya.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the undersigned Commissioners, have the honour to submit herewith our Report.

INTRODUCTION

1. Our terms of reference were published under Government Notice No. 351 in the Official Gazette of the 13th April, 1943, which was followed by Government Notice No. 398 in the Official Gazette of the 27th April, 1943, announcing our appointment by name.

The full terms of our appointment by Your Excellency under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (Cap. 25 of the Revised Edition) were published in the Official Gazette of the Colony under Government Notice No. 432 of the 30th April, 1943, and the following are our terms of reference:—

“To inquire into the present food shortage with a view to ascertaining and reporting on the causes thereof and to make recommendations to prevent a recurrence.

To inquire into the system of control of maize which has been in operation since the 1st of July, 1942, and to report whether it has been administered efficiently and in the best interests of the country.”

2. We assembled on the 8th May, 1943, for preliminary discussions and to settle procedure. Our sittings commenced in Nairobi on the 10th May, 1943, and, with short adjournments, continued until the 21st August, 1943. In order to obtain as great a knowledge as possible of the problems awaiting us and an insight into the matters to which we would be required to direct particular attention, we sat in Nairobi from the 10th to 28th May, 1943, and heard the evidence of officials and non-officials intimately concerned with the subjects connected with our terms of reference. The information obtained from the evidence heard at these sittings proved invaluable when we came to hear evidence in other parts of the Colony.

The public were notified of our intention to hold sittings at various places and of our desire to obtain evidence. We visited every Province, except the Northern Frontier District, the Masai District and the Turkana District, and in addition to Nairobi, heard evidence at Nakuru, Kisumu, Kitale, Eldoret, Mombasa, Nyeri, Machakos and Kiambu, finally completing our sittings in Nairobi. At these final sittings we recalled certain witnesses who had given evidence previously so that they would have full opportunity of answering any criticisms arising out of the evidence we had heard at other centres. Each witness so recalled was acquainted by us beforehand with the subjects on which he would be required to give further evidence so as to have time in which to consider them.

A complete list of the sittings, in the order in which they took place, is as follows:—

Nairobi: 10th–13th, 17th–20th and 25th–28th May, 1943.

Nakuru: 1st–8th June, 1943.

Kisumu: 17th–21st June, 1943.

Kitale: 23rd–25th June, 1943.

Eldoret: 27th–29th June, 1943.

Mombasa: 8th–13th July, 1943.

Nyeri: 19th–20th July, 1943.

Machakos: 22nd July, 1943.

Kiambu: 23rd July, 1943.

Nairobi: 4th–13th and 16th–21st August, 1943.

3. During the course of our travels throughout the Colony for the purpose of hearing evidence one, or other, or all, of us took the opportunity of visiting the new rice scheme at Kisumu, the Kitosh area where large quantities of maize are grown by natives for sale, a meeting of the Uasin Gishu District Production and Man Power Committee at Eldoret, the reconditioning plant for maize and other agricultural produce in Mombasa, part of a native reserve near Nyeri to see the effects of soil erosion, the Masai wheat scheme, the Abattoir in Nairobi and the statistical section of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board.

4. Government was represented before us by Mr. H. E. Stacey, Crown Counsel, at all the sittings except those held at Kisumu and Kitale when he was unfortunately indisposed. At the final sittings in Nairobi from the 16th to 21st August, 1943, the Kenya Farmers' Association (Co-operative), Limited, was represented by Mr. H. Slade, Advocate.

Two copies of the verbatim evidence were supplied as transcribed during the course of the inquiry to Crown Counsel representing Government, one copy for himself and the other for the use of Government.

5. Altogether 272 witnesses have been heard on oath, of whom seven were recalled to give further evidence, and 118 memoranda were presented. We are impressed by the number of witnesses who have given much time and effort to the memoranda which they presented to us.

The evidence amounts to 1,386 pages of single-spaced typescript and the memoranda to 1,137 pages. Of the total of 272 witnesses, 147 were Europeans, 24 Indians, 1 Arab, and the remaining 100 were natives. From these figures it is clear that the opinion of the natives throughout the Colony was fully represented before us.

Lists of witnesses and the persons who presented memoranda will be found at Appendices A and B of this Report.

6. The terms of reference imposed two distinct duties on us. First to inquire into the reasons for the food shortage and make recommendations to prevent a recurrence thereof, and, secondly to inquire into the system and administration of maize control. As these are separate and distinct issues this Report is divided into three parts, the first part dealing with the food shortage, the second part with the control of maize and the third part contains a summary of our recommendations.

7. In this Report we have used the term "European-grown maize" as distinct from native-grown maize. We have not used the term "non-native-grown maize" because the amount of maize grown by Asians in the Kibos-Chemilil area close to Kisumu is very small compared with that produced by the European farmers. In the original estimates of the Maize Board the Asian-grown maize crop was not taken into account and it was only on the 21st October, 1942, that the Board estimated that 9,000 bags of maize might be obtained from that crop.

8. The expression "native reserves" and similar expressions describing lands reserved for the occupation of Africans are used colloquially in this Report and should not be interpreted in accordance with the special meaning which has been assigned to them by the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, 1938, or the Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1938.

PART I

**REASONS FOR FOOD SHORTAGE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE THEREOF**

CHAPTER I

INTERPRETATION OF THIS TERM OF REFERENCE

9. At the preliminary discussions prior to our first sittings we gave considerable thought to the interpretation of this first term of reference dealing with the food shortage and the measures which should be taken to prevent its recurrence. We came to the conclusion that if our recommendations to prevent a recurrence, assuming they are accepted by Government, are to be of lasting benefit, we should make such recommendations on long-range planning rather than for the immediate future. In addition, we realized from the beginning of our labours that problems of food cannot be treated in a watertight compartment. Whatever plans are made by Government affecting food and whatever measures are taken to implement food plans, then inevitably agricultural policy and nutrition come into the picture, in addition to all the problems arising out of the production, distribution and rationing, and consumption of foodstuffs. We felt that unless we gave consideration to all these aspects of the problems confronting us we should not only be failing in our duty but that much of the value of this Commission would be lost. In this view we were fortified by the contents of many memoranda presented to us and also by the evidence given by witnesses in various parts of the Colony, because it was clear that many of them, including senior Government officials, had taken the same wide view of our terms of reference as had we ourselves.

10. We must make it clear that at no time during our inquiry did we consider that this term of reference justified us in going into the proportion of foodstuffs allocated to the Armed Forces and the proportion allocated to the civilian population. The Chairman of the East African War Supplies Board, with the permission of the Naval and Military authorities, placed at our disposal in a secret file detailed figures which fully acquainted us with the amount of foodstuffs consumed by the personnel of the Armed Forces in the Colony. It is unnecessary for us to discuss those figures in this Report because we only considered it our duty to take cognisance of the fact, obvious to everyone, that the presence of Armed Forces in the Colony had the effect of increasing the consumption of food, just as any other increase in the population would have done. In a memorandum accompanying the secret file the Chairman of the East African War Supplies Board stated:—

“I desire to record here the co-operation, assistance and sympathetic appreciation of the position which has been unfailingly given by the Military. To meet the emergency, agreement was obtained to a temporary reduction of certain items of the ration scales; Military reserve stocks have been reduced and in some cases exhausted in order to carry over the period of shortage; Military supplies have also on more than one occasion been released to the civil authorities to meet an urgent situation either on payment or on return at a later date; the Military have shared with the civil Governments in the imported cereals and have not, as they might well have done, laid exclusive claim to any of the incoming consignments. The taking over and recording of imported cereals and the temporary storage of them has been undertaken by the Military free of all charge and their representatives have served on an allocation sub-committee under my chairmanship, which was established to handle imported cereals, and their assistance has been invaluable.”

11. With these objects in view, it became apparent at our first sittings that that part of our first term of reference relating to the future would cause considerable difficulties, one of the main being that of obtaining the complete picture of the organization relating to the production, distribution and rationing and the consumption of food on an inter-territorial as well as a territorial basis. This difficulty was accentuated by the fact that amongst the witnesses intimately connected with the inter-territorial and territorial organizations there was no unanimity of opinion as to the exact functions of the various East African and Kenya bodies and the manner in which such bodies are correlated and co-ordinated. The absence of clear evidence regarding the background on which the organization of the production, distribution and rationing and consumption of foodstuffs is built handicapped us throughout our inquiries. As will be seen later in this Report we are still not clear as to the exact layout and functions of the various bodies on an inter-territorial and territorial basis, in spite of the amount of evidence devoted to this matter and the number of questions asked by us in an endeavour to get a clear picture.

CHAPTER II

SCOPE AND EXTENT OF FOOD SHORTAGE

12. From the evidence we have heard we are left in no doubt that, although there has been a serious food shortage amongst the natives, the shortage did not amount to a famine except in a few isolated areas. We are also left in no doubt that although there has been a shortage in some commodities (wheat, beans, fowls, eggs, ghee, bacon, meat, sugar, butter, potatoes, rice and fresh vegetables) for several months, the non-natives of Kenya have been no more than inconvenienced. The natives are the only section of the community who have been at all seriously affected, mainly because of the shortage of maize, and on that account maize will predominate over all other foodstuffs in this Report.

Having made full allowance for some of the native evidence being exaggerated, on comparing their evidence with that given by Administrative Officers, there is no doubt that many thousands of natives were short of food to the point of distress and that a few deaths did occur in some of the native reserves. It appeared that these deaths occurred mostly amongst elderly natives, and although there is no evidence that they are directly attributable to starvation, yet on the evidence before us we are of opinion that but for the serious shortage of food in some of the native reserves, such deaths would not have occurred. With the exception of one native child and one native youth, who showed signs of emaciation, and who were brought before us by a European witness, none of the native witnesses who appeared before us showed signs of starvation, nor did the individual natives in the crowd at Machakos awaiting food being issued to them by the District Commissioner on the day of our visit to hear evidence in that district.

13. Early in January, 1943, the Government set up a Reserve Foodstuffs Committee. This Committee was able to purchase, amongst other foodstuffs, a certain amount of cassava, dried bananas and wimbi. These supplies were distributed by the Reserve Foodstuffs Committee direct to District Commissioners on the advice of the Chief Native Commissioner. By this means some relief was brought to districts which were suffering the most, and there is no doubt that this action on the part of Government did much to prevent more distress amongst the native population.

CHAPTER III

RAINFALL

14. Kenya is of unique interest in world meteorology owing to its geographical situation within the tropics and the effect of its topographical features, such as the large water mass of Lake Victoria Nyanza, the Great Rift Valley, and the fact that its shores are washed by the Indian Ocean. With the sun nearly vertical and its effects modified by the varying altitude, a large part of the Colony in consequence is an area of intense convection, giving rise to wide local variations and instability of seasonal rains. The peak of these convective rains sweeps from north to south between December and June and from south to north from June to December, with the result that two rain seasons occur in most, but not in all, areas.

15. For the purposes of this Report the Colony may be divided into the following climatic zones:—

(1) *Coastal*.—Here the climate is largely influenced by the monsoon currents over the Indian Ocean. The principal rainfall takes place during the months of April, May and June when the south-west monsoon is at its maximum and the sun's declination is increasing northerly. A smaller but distinct rainy season occurs in November and December when the north-east monsoon wind is blowing and the sun is in its most southerly declination.

(2) *Highlands East of the Rift*.—In this area the Great Rift Valley modifies the movement of the two main monsoon air masses but this modification has less effect on the eastern side than on the area west of the Rift. The eastern side being more exposed to these two main air currents, has two markedly different rainy seasons. The period of maximum intensity is from the end of March to the end of June which is known as the period of the long rains, and a period of lesser intensity commencing towards the end of October and continuing through November, usually called the short rains, and so referred to in this Report.

(3) *Lake and West Highlands*.—Around Lake Victoria Nyanza afternoon showers prevail all the year round and when the sun is overhead afternoon rains become very heavy, often in the form of violent thunderstorms. The influence of the two seasonal monsoon wind currents is of less effect in these areas than in other parts of the Colony, with the result that the rainfall is distributed throughout the year, but with a rainy season of maximum intensity from March to May.

It will thus be seen that Kenya, owing to its variations in distribution of rainfall, coupled with the occurrence of two distinct rainy seasons in some areas, is able to grow practically every type of agricultural produce harvested in two crops every year, spread over several months in accordance with the different rainfall areas.

16. Turning now to the density and distribution of the rainfall for the period leading up to the time when the food shortage became acute, the three charts, included as Appendices to this Report, prepared by the Director of the East African Meteorological Services (now seconded as Chief Meteorological Officer to Air Headquarters, East Africa Command) show the rainfall for the year 1942 over the main agricultural districts of the Colony and compare it with the average rainfall for a number of years previously. Rainfall statistics are compiled and recorded by the Meteorological Service in seven separate areas covering the climatic zones briefly described above. The rainfall areas are—

- (1) the coffee area comprising Kiambu, Thika and Ruiru;
- (2) east of the Rift, mainly covering the Central Province;
- (3) west of the Rift, comprising the Songhor and Mau districts;
- (4) the Rift Valley, including Nakuru, Naivasha and Gilgil;
- (5) the Coastal area;
- (6) Kavirondo; and
- (7) Trans Nzoia.

Appendix C to this Report gives the rainfall in the above areas for 1942, over the whole year, and also for the October-December short rain period, and compares it with the average for the same periods. It shows that the annual rainfall recorded for 1942 at 69 meteorological stations covering the seven rainfall areas mentioned above was up to normal, with two minor exceptions, but that the totals recorded in these areas during the short rain period were in most cases as much as 50 per cent below average, and, as regards the Nyanza and Central Provinces, which have two maize crop seasons annually, the deficiency was most marked.

17. Evidence was given before us that the failure of the short rains was more severely felt in the Kavirondo and east of Rift areas, thus contributing to the shortage of maize and other food crops grown in these areas. In a normal year these crops would have been harvested in January or February, 1943, which were the months when the food shortage became acute. Appendices D and E have been prepared with the object of illustrating in detail the actual recorded rainfalls at certain selected stations in these two areas for the whole of the year 1942 and for the short rain period when compared with the average. An examination of these Appendices reveals that, although the yearly total of rainfall in the Kavirondo and Central Provinces compares favourably with previous years and was generally up to average, subject to minor variations of increase and decrease (*vide* Appendix D), the short rains for the October-December period were very considerably below normal. Thus, whilst all stations recorded falls below average, it was most severe at Rumuruti and Nyeri in the Central Province and at Kakamega, Kaimosi, Kisii, Muhoroni and Koru in the Nyanza Province (*vide* Appendix E). The shortfall in October-December was about counterbalanced by the increased falls which occurred during the long rains.

The extent of this short rain failure in the Nyanza and Central Provinces was estimated by the Director of Meteorological Services, when he gave evidence before us, to be about 50 per cent below normal for the mean of the stations in those provinces, and this fact is clearly illustrated in Appendix E.

As advance information of the probable failure of the short rains would have been very helpful to the authorities in charge of the food supplies of the Colony in planning to meet such a contingency, we closely questioned the Director of Meteorological Services on this point when he gave evidence before us. We were informed that by a system of weekly forecasts such information is transmitted confidentially in war time in accordance with a list containing officials and others connected with agriculture, including members of the Maize Board, and that the following specific information, as quoted from the record of the evidence, was given:—

“We gave information to the Agricultural Department (I am speaking from memory) on the 15th October that there was every evidence that the rains would be either normal or below normal; there was no reason to suppose they would be above normal. Towards the end of October we then told them that they would be definitely below normal; and when the period for the monsoon currents had passed some time in the middle of November we informed them that we must consider that the short rains had failed. It was about the middle of November, or towards the end of November.”

From this it is clear to us that these forecasts were made too late to be of value to the Maize Board or the Controller.

The effect of the excessive long rains and of the short rains failure on agricultural production was stated by the Director of Agriculture when he gave evidence on this point to be as follows:—

“*Question*: It has been stated that in some areas the main rainfall of 1942 was so heavy as to reduce the maize crop by flooding the soil, or similar causes; did that have any serious effect in any part of the country?”

“*Answer*: That was so in certain areas. The effect was certainly to reduce the crop to some extent, in the Kitosh district, for instance, and it was more

particularly affected in the European areas of Koru, Fort Ternan, where the crop was a very poor one, entirely owing to excessive rains. Last year the yields in that area were very low in comparison with average.

Question: What I was leading up to was the possibility that these several factors, taken together, might have resulted in a marked diminution in the saleable surplus of maize, quite apart from and before the failure of the short rains?

Answer: That is so, but although I think they all had their adverse effect, I do not consider that the total effect of all these factors was very much on the main maize crop of the Colony."

"I can remember during my time in this country four or five occasions on which there has been a failure of the short rains, in so far as Nairobi and the Central Province were concerned. That is by no means uncommon. It has generally resulted in a food shortage or some difficulty over food supplies in that area which it was always in my time possible to make good by importing foodstuffs from the European or other native areas. But in no year since I have known this country has there been a failure of the short rains at the end of the year in the Nyanza Province."

18. We agree that the erratic rainfall during 1942, particularly in the Nyanza and Central Provinces, seriously reduced the quantities of food crops harvested early in 1943, especially of maize and fresh vegetables, but for the reasons which we give in Chapter VIII of this Report, we do not consider that the excessive rainfall recorded during the period of the long rains in some agricultural districts, coupled with the widespread failure of the short rains, was the main cause of the food shortage, although there is no doubt that these factors hastened and accentuated a shortage which, as stated in the above-mentioned Chapter, was inevitable for other reasons.

19. With regard to the dissemination of meteorological information to agriculturalists, we would stress the importance of farmers being supplied with weather forecasts as speedily and accurately as possible, because the forecasting of seasonal rains is a problem closely linked with the progress of agriculture. We realize the many difficulties in achieving this, due primarily to the fact that accepted methods of forecasting weather in temperate zones with their ordered progression of cyclonic and anti-cyclonic systems do not apply in equatorial regions. Further, we were informed by the Director of Meteorological Services in evidence that under the most favourable conditions it is impossible to forecast more than ten days ahead and that for security reasons the secrecy which is at present attached to meteorological matters renders this service practically useless to farmers during the war.

For those reasons we realize that any improvement of the Meteorological Service to farmers cannot be achieved now, but we recommend that when more normal times return the whole subject of seasonal forecasts should be investigated with a view to utilizing the best scientific methods for obtaining accurate weather forecasts and for making them available to agriculturalists by the quickest possible means.

CHAPTER IV

SHORT HISTORY OF MAIZE IN KENYA

20. From an early stage in the history of the Colony maize has been regarded as a main staple food of the native population. By 1908 there was a talk of "increased demand" for maize meal and a steady local market became established. The crop was being grown by natives, who planted yellow and mixed varieties. Yellow maize commanded a slightly higher price in the early years as it was more popular with the native and Indian consumers. After the European farmer had displayed interest in the production of maize the policy of concentrating on the white variety followed on account of its greater suitability for export.

Up to the 1914-18 war the progress of the maize industry is indicated by the following values in rupees of maize exported:—

1907-08	Rs. 1,154
1908-09	Rs. 40
1909-10	Rs. 46,740
1910-11	Rs. 106,742
1911-12	Rs. 332,541

During the 1914-18 war the export of maize practically ceased due to military demands, but after the war export was resumed.

In 1922 the Economic and Financial Committee, generally known as the Bowring Committee, recommended the encouragement of increased production of both European- and native-grown maize, primarily with a view to stimulating the export trade in this commodity. By 1926 a conditioning plant was brought into use at the Coast.

21. The three main districts for the cultivation of European-grown maize are Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia and the following figures show how the last named district rose to be the principal district for the production of European-grown maize, a position which it still maintains at the present time:—

	Nakuru	Uasin Gishu	Trans Nzoia
	<i>Acres</i>	<i>Acres</i>	<i>Acres</i>
1919-20 ..	14,086	8,753	2,490
1924-5.. ..	63,701	25,813	17,901
1928-9.. ..	71,288	43,949	66,575
1933-4.. ..	34,328	20,368	47,021

After 1934 the agricultural census tabulations were based on natural regions instead of administrative districts and consequently comparable figures are not available. The area under European maize expanded rapidly until it reached a peak of 233,973 acres in 1929-30, after which it decreased, as the following figures show:—

	Area Harvested	Yield	Average Yield
	<i>Acres</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags per Acre</i>
1919-20 ..	32,167	317,488	9.87
1920-1.. ..	30,846	164,722	5.34
1921-2.. ..	57,131	338,837	5.93
1922-3.. ..	74,747	517,877	6.23
1923-4.. ..	108,556	833,640	7.68
1924-5.. ..	129,647	893,108	6.89
1925-6.. ..	155,751	926,614	5.95
1926-7.. ..	177,987	1,314,643	7.39
1927-8.. ..	177,009	1,088,706	6.15
1928-9.. ..	204,945	1,099,317	5.36
1929-30 ..	233,973	1,858,586	7.94
1930-1.. ..	200,926	1,649,728	8.21
1931-2.. ..	160,546	762,622	4.75
1932-3.. ..	164,018	1,139,616	6.94
1933-4.. ..	112,949	746,893	6.62
1934-5.. ..	(No census)		
1935-6.. ..	117,848	1,011,863	8.58
1936-7.. ..	(No census)		
1937-8.. ..	113,103	968,076	8.56
1938-9.. ..	(No census)		
1939-40 ..	93,517	618,341	6.61

In 1941/42, according to figures given by the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, the acreage under European maize had dropped to 63,100 acres and in 1942/43 81,561 acres were planted by European farmers, from which 623,731 bags of maize were produced, with a yield of 7.6 bags to the acre (minimum district average 1.1 bags per acre and maximum district average 11.4 bags per acre). Of this, according to the evidence of the Chairman of the Maize Board, 355,000 bags were delivered to the Maize Control.

22. The Kenya Farmers' Association (Co-operative), Limited, hereinafter in this Report referred to as the K.F.A., is a co-operative association which collects and markets the produce of a large proportion of European farmers. The following figures taken from the K.F.A. memorandum submitted to us show that part of the European-grown maize delivered to the K.F.A. for the crop years 1927-28 to 1941-42:—

	European Deliveries to K.F.A. Pool	K.F.A. Pool, including Bag		<i>Per Ton</i>
	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Sh. cts.</i>		
1927-8.. ..	633,037	11	22	
1928-9.. ..	499,451	12	40	
1929-30	1,219,014	7	87	88.1
1930-1.. ..	1,233,798	6	19	69.3
1931-2.. ..	466,915	6	50	72.8
(Locusts) ..				
1932-3.. ..	710,694	3	50	39.2
1933-4.. ..	432,419	6	95	77.8
1934-5.. ..	717,041	5	68	63.6
1935-6.. ..	896,005	4	32	48.4
1936-7.. ..	665,235	7	20	80.6
1937-8.. ..	751,813	7	20	80.6
1938-9.. ..	583,310	6	33	70.9
1939-40	469,319	7	32	82.0
1940-1.. ..	532,212	5	88	65.9
1941-2.. ..	310,914	6	34	71.0

Average pay-out over 15 years—Sh. 6/86 per bag.

23. As the Colony developed, with more native labour employed by the various industries which sprung up from time to time, the local demand for maize increased because it became the main staple diet of the natives, whether resident in the reserves or employed in the settled areas. This was commented on by the Agricultural Indebtedness Committee in their Interim Report dated the 23rd December, 1935, which stressed the importance of European-grown maize to East Africa in the following terms:—

“We are also satisfied of the importance to Kenya and neighbouring territories of the European maize industry. We agree with the view of the Economic Development Committee that the preservation of the present organization and structure of the maize industry justifies a ‘national effort to assist it and safeguard its interests’ (*vide* Economic Development Committee Report, paragraph 613), and with the further opinion of the same Committee that ‘Maize must be regarded as an essential crop. Its production in Kenya is one of the Colony’s greatest safeguards against famine, for it is now a staple food of most of the native population and, apart from famine considerations, it is required in large quantities as a basic factor in other local industries. We regard the maize industry as of vital importance to the economic welfare of the Colony.’ Native-grown maize is not sufficient to meet local requirements and, in times of famine, European-grown maize has to be imported into the reserves. Uganda and Tanganyika would also rely on Kenya maize to supplement internal shortage, and if European maize production proved inadequate the only alternative would be, as has been done in the past, to import from abroad at great expense.”

In the meantime the production of native-grown maize had increased considerably, mainly on account of the issue by the Agricultural Department of improved maize seed to natives, the increase in the number of Agricultural Officers in the native reserves, the setting up of native markets, the general encouragement to grow cash crops and also because it is an easy crop to grow. But even up to the present time the production of native-grown maize usually has been less than the internal needs of the Colony.

The collapse of export values in 1929 resulted in a revaluation of the prospects of maize cultivation on European farms. The f.o.r. value of K.2 maize for export fell from some Sh. 12 per bag in 1929 to below Sh. 4 in 1930, fluctuating afterwards between Sh. 2 and Sh. 8. The total amount of maize put on the market in the Colony continued to exceed the amount required for local consumption, and hence the local price was determined mainly by export parity. With a free market and the predominant proportion of the supply coming from native sources the European growers were unable to peg prices at anything like the pre-1930 level. Hence European production, which had increased year by year to 233,973 acres in 1929-30, declined by 1933-34 to a level of less than 120,000 acres, a point which it had previously passed as early as 1924-25.

24. With regard to the native, he was able during most years to find a ready market for his maize at a price which was profitable compared with that of other crops available to him, and this is the reason why the production of native-grown maize has increased considerably.

Before quoting figures relating to native-grown maize it must be appreciated and constantly borne in mind that there are many difficulties in estimating the extent to which native-grown maize is planted in the native reserves and also how much of the native-grown crop will come on to the market outside such reserves. These difficulties are mentioned generally now and are referred to in greater detail in paragraph 114 of this Report.

The number of natives growing maize in a large producing centre such as the native reserves in Kavirondo runs into hundreds of thousands and many of these native growers are illiterate. They have no idea as to the acreage of their crops. It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the acreage planted with maize in the native reserves, and the only figure which can now be ascertained with certainty is the amount of maize which comes out of the native reserves for sale on the market. Hence the following figures should be treated with reserve, even the figures of maize relating to inspection, as the inspection system has not been uniformly applied during the period for which the figures are given.

In 1920 the total native production of maize was estimated at 750,000 bags. In 1930 the agricultural census put the total native crops at 1,387,104 bags from 386,310 acres. As to the amount of native-grown maize actually marketed in the Nyanza and Central Provinces for the years 1936 to 1940, some indication is given by the following figures of maize which passed through the inspection centres:—

	Nyanza Province (Inspection Returns)	Central Province (Sales Out- side the Districts)	Total
	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
1936	157,000	180,406	337,406
1937	247,000	193,132	440,132
1938	314,000	383,507	697,507
1939	400,000	326,079	726,079
1940	556,000	175,536	731,536

25. With regard to the periods at which maize comes on to the market, Kenya is fortunate in this respect, as the crops from the various maize producing areas are spread over several months of the year, with the result that in a normal year there are only about three or four months of the year when maize is not being harvested.

In certain parts of the Nyanza and Central Provinces there are two crops a year: the long rain and the short rain crops. Crops from the various maize producing areas come on to the market as follows:—

District	Month Crop Begins to Come on to the Market
LONG RAIN CROPS—	
Nyanza	Middle to end of August.
Central Province, including Machakos..	Same as Nyanza though in some years about three weeks later.
Kericho-Kisii Highlands	Mid-September.
Kitosh Area	Mid-October to November.
European Crop	November-December.
Higher Kikuyu Reserve Crop	March.
SHORT RAIN CROPS—	
Nyanza	February.
Central Province, including Machakos..	March.

(For plan representation of the above, see Appendix F to this Report.)

A certain amount of maize is produced in the Coast Province which is consumed locally and supplies coastal markets through the medium of dhows.

CHAPTER V INCREASED PRODUCTION DRIVE

26. We heard a considerable amount of evidence criticising the Government for not instituting a drive for the increased production of maize and also for not guaranteeing its price prior to December, 1941. As evidence on this matter was widespread, we consider that we should examine this particular criticism in some detail and record our finding as to whether such criticism of Government is justified or not.

The line generally taken in the evidence criticising Government is that in war time the production of foodstuffs is of primary importance and that any amount surplus to internal requirements was bound to be required sooner or later in the Middle East or elsewhere.

27. When war broke out a large number of farmers immediately joined the Armed Forces and a group farm management scheme embodied in the Compulsory Service Ordinance, 1939, enacted on the 4th September, 1939, provided, *inter alia*, for the supervision and management of those farms whose owners had joined the Armed Forces. When Italy entered the war in 1940, Kenya was faced with the threat of Italian invasion and under such circumstances there was no alternative but to place the needs of the Armed Forces before that of the production of foodstuffs. Until the Abyssinian campaign was completed, about the middle of 1941, with the consequent removal of the threat of invasion from Kenya, it was only right and proper that man power for the Armed Forces should have priority over production. Further, early in 1940, the then Financial Secretary of Kenya, one of the European elected members of Legislative Council and the present Maize Controller, visited England and whilst there endeavoured to dispose of maize, bacon and butter surplus to local needs. Although successful as regards the disposal of bacon and butter, they were unable to negotiate any sale with regard to maize. In view of their unsuccessful efforts to dispose of the surplus maize overseas, it is not reasonable to have expected Government to adopt a policy of encouraging increased production, with the assurance of guaranteed prices, for maize.

After the Abyssinian campaign had ended, a contract for the sale of 40,000 tons of maize was executed with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation in Cairo on the 13th October, 1941. That only just over 6,000 tons was actually

exported under this contract is immaterial to the issue discussed in this Chapter, which is that in 1941 the problem was to dispose of an estimated surplus of maize overseas.

Further, the Director of Agriculture has given evidence that with regard to the 1941 maize crop, the Kenya Government had been warned by the Home Government to go slow on account of the acute shipping position. In view of all these circumstances we are of opinion that the Government's policy throughout 1940 and 1941 with regard to the production of maize was understandable, but had the ever-lessening margin between production and local consumption been appreciated (as to which see paragraph 80 of this Report) steps should have been taken to guard against a local shortage resulting from drought, locusts or other adverse factors.

The position changed in November, 1941, with the announcement by the Minister of State in the Middle East, when he said, *inter alia* (see *East African Standard* of the 3rd December, 1941): "East Africa can produce maize, wheat, barley, rice, potatoes, groundnuts, copra, sugar, etc. All these are wanted in the Middle East group of countries. Produce to the utmost and save our ships. All you can produce will be taken."

Following this announcement by the Minister of State in the Middle East the Kenya Government acted with promptitude with a view to increasing the production of both non-native and native-grown maize.

With regard to non-native-grown maize, the Chief Secretary made the following statement in Legislative Council on the 18th December, 1941—see Hansard of that date, column 551:—

"Government is fully alive to the necessity of assuring European producers as to the returns which they will receive if increased production is to be obtained and also as to the urgency of the matter. The object of Government will be so to arrange the marketing of the 1942-1943 crop as to obtain for European-grown maize a payment of Sh. 9 per bag f.o.r., but should this object not be achieved Government undertakes to invite this Council to vote as a subsidy from the public funds such amount as may be necessary to provide a guaranteed minimum payout of Sh. 8/50 per bag. This undertaking is given because Government is satisfied that such action is immediately necessary as a war requirement."

This authoritative statement assured the European maize growers of a guaranteed price of at least Sh. 8/50 per bag.

As regards native-grown maize, the Director of Agriculture held a meeting with the Provincial Commissioners of the Nyanza and Central Provinces and certain Agricultural Officers on the 9th December, 1941, and at that meeting a programme was discussed and agreed to for increasing the production of crops in the Nyanza and Central Provinces, with specific plans for the increased production of maize in the native reserves. These plans were circulated to the Provincial Commissioners and to the Agricultural Officers of those Provinces on the 12th December, 1941. It is true that no definite price was then fixed at which native-grown maize would be purchased (as to which see paragraph 118 of this Report), but when the plan for the increased production of maize was made known to the natives they were assured they would get a better price for their maize than they had received for the previous year's crop.

28. Having reviewed all the evidence referred to above, we are of the opinion that, with the exception of our remarks contained in paragraphs 27 and 118 of this Report, Government's actions and policy with regard to the increased production of maize were correct and that once the Minister of State in the Middle East had made his announcement in November, 1941, Government wasted no time in taking action to stimulate the production of both native and non-native-grown maize.

CHAPTER VI

WARNINGS BY THE K.F.A. OF COMING MAIZE SHORTAGE

29. In their memorandum submitted to us the K.F.A. stress that through their Chairman and Directors, Government had been warned that the shortage of maize which occurred in 1942 was bound to occur. Two separate and distinct warnings are quoted in that memorandum and as much evidence has been devoted to these warnings we feel they should be quoted *in extenso* and dealt with as such.

30. The first warning arises out of a conference held on the 15th May and the 4th June, 1941. This conference was convened to discuss the advisability or otherwise of introducing some form of maize control in Kenya and was attended by representatives of:—

The Executive Committee of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board.

The Kenya Farmers' Association.

The Coffee Board of Kenya.

The Kenya Sisal Growers' Association.

The Pyrethrum Board.

The Kenya Tea Growers' Association.

The Stock Owners' Association of Kenya.

The East African Timber Co-operative Society.

The Railway Administration,

and, on the 4th June, 1941, by—

The Chief Native Commissioner.

The following resolutions were passed, the Chief Native Commissioner dissenting in regard to them all:—

"1. That this Conference on the evidence placed before it and taking into account the urgent necessity of conserving what remains of the fertility of the land and of adopting reasonable principles of soil utilization, has come to the conclusion that in the not distant future supplies of maize available for sale may not suffice to meet local requirements within the East African Customs Union.

2. That to guard against such an undesirable contingency (especially undesirable under war conditions) this Conference considers that some measure should be introduced whereby availability of a necessary contributory quota to internal requirements of maize will be ensured from European sources.

3. This Conference considers that such measure should take the form of an annual Government guarantee of a suitable economic flat rate per bag f.o.r., based on costs of production agreed upon jointly by the Maize Growers and the Director of Agriculture, for a specified quantity of European-grown maize. Native-grown maize should be left to find its own price level on a free market."

During the course of the discussions the K.F.A. representatives—the Chairman, one Director and the then General Manager—put forward the following views, with special reference to the fact that a shortage of maize might occur in the future:—

"Mr. Trench said that as Chairman of the Kenya Farmers' Association, which controlled the greater proportion of the maize industry of the Colony, he had been deputed to put forward the point of view of the producer.

The Kenya Farmers' Association, he said, maintained that the consumer was vitally concerned in the future welfare of the industry. In the past the consumer had had no interest in the industry on account of the surplus quantity of maize always available. For reasons pointed out, maize production in the native reserves must decline and could not therefore be relied upon. To-day the European production was less than half of what it was, and as the producer could turn to other alternatives such as wheat, flax, butterfat, etc., he

would not grow maize unless it were a paying proposition. He did not agree that anyone present really believed that no steps should be taken or remedial measures attempted until a shortage occurred, as when that happened prices would have actually risen to import parity."

"Col. Griffiths" (the then General Manager) "pointed out that as many farmers were changing over to dairy farming a greater proportion of their maize would be used for stock feeding and the quantity coming on to the market would be less and less. He again stressed that as soon as a shortage appeared likely the value of internal maize would rise to import parity; that if import parity was Sh. 14 then the internal price would be Sh. 14."

"Col. Griffiths again pointed out that if the native was allowed to continue, even for a short time, to produce the quantity of maize he was producing to-day his yield would decrease to three bags per acre and, if native production alone was relied upon, one single bad year would suffice to reduce native production to below the country's requirements. As soon as it was known that there was any possibility of a shortage the price of all maize would at once rise to import parity which was now Sh. 14 per bag."

"Mr. Trench said that last year there was a margin of only 107,000 bags, so that if there was a serious drop in European production and a bad year in the native reserves there would be nothing at all in hand."

31. The second warning, which was dealt with in detail by the mover of the motion in Legislative Council for the appointment of our Commission (see columns 109 and 110 of Legislative Council Debates of the 22nd March, 1943), is contained in the address of the Chairman of the K.F.A. at the Annual General Meeting of that Association held on the 19th December, 1941, and is reported in the *East African Standard* of the 9th January, 1942. At that meeting the Chairman said, *inter alia*:—

"As a result of both Government and unofficial opinion not accepting this maize question as a 'national' problem, my Board asserts that the country is being allowed to drift into a crisis in the near future, when the Colony will not grow enough maize for its own consumption and that required by adjoining territories.

The European producer continues to be steadily driven out of production by a perpetual uneconomic price, which price is worse to-day than it has been for some years, especially so when the increased costs of production are taken into account. He is seeking and finding other sources of income which give him a reasonable profit. Steady deterioration of the fertility of the soil in the native reserves continues to take place as a result of uncontrolled maize production. The native population is increasing, and therefore it is becoming a bigger consumer of the maize it produces.

It is generally agreed by those who are in a position to know the facts, that native production for export outside the reserves has reached its peak and is on the decline. In fact, the Director of Agriculture stated he considered reduction should take place in the reserves in order to preserve the proper balance as between arable and stock farming.

Now with the inevitable development after the war throughout the Colony, and with the knowledge of the facts about European and native production, it is obvious that a crisis is slowly but surely looming up ahead and may well come much sooner than anticipated, should drought conditions assume serious proportions at any time."

At the same meeting and in the same address the Chairman of the K.F.A. said:—

"The K.F.A. Board and the Government were very worried indeed about the maize position and what was to be done about the surplus over and above local requirements. . . . The Kenya Government, after ascertaining the possible exportable surplus, got into touch with the Middle East and the position was discussed by the K.F.A. Board. It was agreed that unless the sale was made to

some Government department, there was not the slightest chance of obtaining shipping space and if no shipping space were obtained for the maize, then quite obviously the price for local maize would be Sh. 2 or Sh. 3 per bag

The Board then, on the recommendation of Government, agreed that the General Manager proceed to Egypt to try and get the sale finalized and Government wired to the Colonial Office asking them to do their best to press authorities in the United Kingdom to try and finalize the sale. On arrival, the General Manager went very carefully into the whole position and discovered that contracts for maize had been made with South Africa and with South America where some maize had been purchased at Sh. 13/9d. per quarter.

Prior to the General Manager's departure, the form of contract and the price of Sh. 17/9d. was again confirmed by the Finance Committee and Directors. In Egypt the General Manager discovered that they were still anxious to make a purchase and succeeded in getting an increase in the price to Sh. 18/6d., at which figure the sale was finally concluded. The contract was not finally signed until October, 13."

32. In view of the expression that the K.F.A. were worried about the disposal of surplus maize, the only logical and reasonable interpretation to be placed on these two sets of warnings is that they were general in their nature and cannot be construed as warnings of an immediate nature. They were made in 1941 and could not have been construed as being warnings of an imminent shortage.

In our opinion these warnings only constitute the expressions of similar views held by many officials and unofficials alike, as is borne out in the minutes of the conference referred to above, that unless the price of maize were increased the production of European-grown maize would gradually decrease until the country would be dependent solely on native-grown maize, and that with regard to native-grown maize, optimum production in the native reserves has been reached and the output will decline as mixed farming methods become more general in the native reserves, or alternatively, owing to bad farming methods, yields will be bound to decline. We are supported in our opinion that the above warnings were meant to be general by the Chairman and one Director of the K.F.A., both of whom admitted in evidence that such warnings were not made with regard to the immediate future but were only general warnings.

CHAPTER VII

ORGANIZATION

Section A—Controls

33. In this section we consider it appropriate to describe, as far as we possibly can (we have already stated in paragraph 11 of this Report the difficulty in which we were placed in ascertaining the exact lay-out and the functions of the various bodies on an inter-territorial and territorial basis) the many bodies and controls responsible for the production, distribution and disposal of foodstuffs throughout East Africa and Kenya.

EAST AFRICA

34. Dealing first with the East African picture, on the entry of Italy into the war in June, 1940, the East African Economic Council was formed under the chairmanship of the Deputy Chairman of the Governors' Conference. The only part of its functions relative to foodstuffs was its power to review the production of the four territories to meet war needs to the fullest extent. This Economic Council has not met since January, 1941, and we presume it is defunct.

35. About September, 1940, the East African War Supplies Board was established to plan and organize over the four territories supplies for the Armed Forces. This Board still functions and the Director of Produce Disposal, East African Production and Supply Council (*infra*) is Chairman of it.

36. In January, 1941, the East African Civil Supplies Board was established and as far as foodstuffs are concerned its functions were to execute policy regarding the acquisition, distribution and movement of commodities and the disposal of export surpluses. It should be noted that although this Board had power to acquire, distribute and dispose of foodstuffs, it had no power to deal with production on an East African basis.

At a meeting of this Board on the 25th May, 1942, it was decided to set up an East African Production Committee to consider the East African production programme for 1943. As a result of that meeting an East African Production Committee was set up comprising the Economic Adviser to the Governors' Conference as Chairman, the Directors of Agriculture and Veterinary Services of the four territories, the Chairman of the Kenya Agricultural Production and Settlement Board and other members. This Committee continues to function under the same Chairman in his present capacity as Director of Native Production, East African Production and Supply Council.

37. In July, 1942, the East African Civil Defence and Supply Council was established by Your Excellency, Their Excellencies the Governors of Uganda and Tanganyika, and His Excellency the British Resident of Zanzibar. Its establishment was notified for public information in the Official Gazette by Government Notice No. 668 of the 24th July, 1942. Its functions were concerned with civil defence as well as with production and supply. Certain of its members officiated as Directors. The origin of this Council can be traced first to the establishment of the Kenya Defence and Supply Council by Government Notice No. 315 of the 4th April, 1942, and secondly to the formation of the Kenya and Uganda Civil Defence and Supply Council by Government Notice No. 415 of the 1st May, 1942. These two Councils were abolished when the East African Civil Defence and Supply Council came into existence in July, 1942.

38. In December, 1942, the Chairman of the Governors' Conference, after consulting the Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, established, with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the East African Production and Supply Council. Its establishment was notified to the public by Government Notice No. 1132 of the 17th December, 1942. With the setting up of this Council the East African Civil Defence and Supply Council was abolished and the functions of the new Council are primarily concerned with production and supply, the question of civil defence having largely lost its importance.

Thus, without considering the various committees of one kind or another, there now exist on an East African basis the East African Production and Supply Council and the East African War Supplies Board.

KENYA

39. The original Settlement and Production Board was established by Government Notice No. 795 of the 30th September, 1939, and the Board was reconstituted by Government Notice No. 184 of the 21st February, 1941. Under neither of these Gazette notifications were any specified terms of reference given to the Board, which was advisory only.

On the 28th February, 1942, the Defence (Increased Production of Crops) Regulations, 1942, were promulgated by Government Notice No. 193 and under that notice the Board, re-named "The Agricultural Production and Settlement Board", was given extensive powers in relation to the non-native production of certain agricultural crops. With the promulgation of that notice the Board was reconstituted on the 2nd March, 1942, by Government Notice No. 191. In addition to reconstituting the Board that Gazette notice gave it, for the first time, specific terms of reference which, so far as agricultural production was concerned, were:—

- (i) To prepare organized plans for directing and increasing the Colony's agricultural production so as to meet to the fullest extent possible the urgent civil and military requirements of the war situation.

- (ii) To exercise such executive powers as may be conferred upon it by law to give effect to such plans.

On the 4th May, 1942, the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, which replaced the above-mentioned Regulations, became law and the present extensive powers of the Board in relation to directing non-native agricultural production throughout the Colony are derived from the provisions of that Ordinance.

The relation of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board with the District Production and Man Power Committees and sub-committees established throughout the Colony in planning production programmes is described in paragraph 125 of this Report.

40. The appointment and powers of the various controls in the Colony flow from the provisions of the Imperial Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940, as applied to Kenya by the Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) Order in Council, 1939, and the Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1940.

With the promulgation of the Defence Regulations, 1939, the Kenya Supply Board was established on the 1st September, 1939, with extensive powers, one of which was the power to establish controls by Defence Orders.

Thus all the Kenya controls are now established direct by Defence Regulations under the powers mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph (Maize Control is an example of this), or by means of a Defence Order promulgated under the signature of the Chairman of the Kenya Supply Board (an example of this is the Potato Control).

41. The commodities mentioned in paragraph 12 of this Report, regarding which there were shortages, are controlled to a greater or lesser degree. The method of control takes various forms. In some cases, maize for instance, the whole quantity coming on to the market can only be purchased by the Controller. In other cases, such as beans, the produce must be offered first to the Controller and if he does not wish to buy it the seller may dispose of it as he wishes. Yet again, as for example rice, quantities over a certain fixed maximum can only be sold by permission of the Controller.

The legislation governing these controls is numerous, involving many amendments, and we do not propose to make specific reference to it.

42. With regard to the distribution of foodstuffs to the public, Commodity Distribution Boards were set up in Nairobi and Mombasa in October, 1942, prior to the establishment of the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board. In January, 1943, the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board was established and its duties and functions are defined in Government Notice No. 57 of the 16th January, 1943, as follows:—

- (i) To recommend to the Governor the areas for which it is considered desirable to appoint Distribution Boards and the personnel of such Boards.
- (ii) To co-ordinate and direct the activities of such Distribution Boards in accordance with any inter-territorial policy laid down from time to time by the East African Production and Supply Council.
- (iii) To recommend to the Governor items for addition to or deletions from the schedule of commodities controlled under the said Regulations.
- (iv) To collect such statistical data in connexion with the requirements of consumers as may be requested by the Director of Produce Disposal.
- (v) To recommend to the Governor the initiation of such measures as may be necessary to ensure the fair and orderly distribution of essential commodities.

Thus in Nairobi and Mombasa local Commodity Distribution Boards were established prior to the setting up of the Central Board, and at the end of January, 1943, Commodity Distribution Boards were established throughout the Colony.

By Regulation 4 of the Essential Commodities (Control of Distribution) Regulations, 1943, contained in Government Notice No. 70 of the 16th January, 1943, the local Commodity Distribution Boards must act subject to the general or special directions of the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board. They have extensive powers over wholesale and retail traders as to what controlled commodities (i.e., commodities specified in the schedule to the Regulations) may be sold to the public and in what amounts, and a system of rationing of some of the scheduled commodities followed.

Section B—Production, Consumption, Distribution and Rationing of Foodstuffs

43. In this section we deal with the planning of the production, consumption, rationing and distribution of foodstuffs, emphasising the importance of estimates of production and consumption, more especially relating to maize which is the main staple food of the native population. We also deal with certain complaints made in evidence as to distribution and rationing.

We are not an East African Commission and therefore have not had the advantage of viewing the complete picture over all the four territories. But from the evidence we have heard we are left in no doubt that the production and distribution of foodstuffs can only be approached and planned on an East African basis. In that connexion it must be borne in mind that the Kenya Controllers of various foodstuffs have no legal powers outside the Colony and the East African Production and Supply Council can only plan production and distribution provided it receives accurate statistics, tabulated in the same way, from all four territories, followed as far as possible by distribution from a common pool on a fair and equitable basis. If this is being achieved—being solely a Kenya Commission we cannot give any conclusive opinion as to this—we have nothing further to say as regards the East African Production and Supply Council except that it appears there is still a doubt whether it fully appreciates the importance of collecting accurate statistics. In support of this we quote from a memorandum submitted to us by an official who has been charged with the duty of obtaining statistics on an East African basis. He concludes that memorandum with the following passage:—

“The position therefore suggests that the whole of this important question of statistical organization requires from top to bottom deeper attention than it has yet received, and that it must be based district by district on a uniform system throughout the four territories, and incidentally not excluding consideration of essential import requirements. The fact that this may prove even more of a post-war necessity than a war-time expedient demands sound planning at the earliest stage.”

44. In order that the Colony may play its part in producing its share of foodstuffs to satisfy East African needs, let alone provide a surplus to export to other countries, it is essential that statistics as to the amount necessary to satisfy those consumption needs should be available, and unless such statistics are produced the Colony can never be sure that another shortage will be foreseen in time.

In our view the responsibility for the collection of statistics of production and consumption in a uniform manner should be clearly defined as well as the responsibility for increasing production if it should prove necessary. The main difficulty under the present organization, it seems to us, is that the responsibility for carrying out specific functions is not clearly defined and that, whilst overlapping takes place in some cases, in others there are gaps which have yet to be bridged.

The Director of Produce Disposal, East African Production and Supply Council, emphasized before us that he must be in direct touch with the various controllers. With this we agree because each controller of foodstuffs is the person who should have in his possession the latest information regarding the amounts which will be available for distribution.

On the wider view, the persons in charge of production—the Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board in respect of non-native production, and the Director of Agriculture as regards native production—are the persons responsible for supplying information of what are the future prospects of

production. In this respect the Director of Agriculture has the more difficult task because, as pointed out in paragraph 114 of this Report, the proportion of the total native production of foodstuffs which comes on to the market is very uncertain. As regards non-native production, we are not satisfied that all farmers are rendering returns promptly and would point out that there are adequate powers under the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, for enforcing the rendering of these returns. It is no use having such provisions in an Ordinance and not enforcing them, especially when the information contained in such returns affects the whole welfare of the Colony.

Accordingly we recommend that the provisions of that Ordinance relating to the rendering and collection of statistics should be strictly carried out so as to obtain returns from farmers as near as possible to the dates on which they are required to be rendered.

45. Turning now to statistics of the consumption of foodstuffs, we would point out that very little appears to have been done during 1942 to obtain these. In fact, until the various Commodity Distribution Boards were set up there was no organization which could effectively attempt to obtain such statistics. As already mentioned in paragraph 42 of this Report, one of the functions of the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board, established on the 16th January, 1943, is to collect such statistical data regarding the requirements of consumers as the Director of Produce Disposal, East African Production and Supply Council, requires. As will be seen from paragraph 82 of this Report, the lack of these statistics prevented the food shortage being foreseen in time, and that being so, we cannot emphasize too strongly that adequate statistics must be collected at the earliest possible opportunity. This in our view should be achieved by the various Commodity Distribution Boards throughout the Colony collecting detailed statistics as to the requirements of consumers and forwarding them to the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board, so that the total requirements of consumers in the Colony are known.

The system of rationing maize meal to natives outside the reserves and the individual rationing of starch foods, butter, ghee, etc., to Europeans and Asians, now introduced in the Colony, should enable accurate statistics of all consumers' requirements outside the native reserves to be maintained and kept up to date. It should be the duty of the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board to do this through the District Commodity Distribution Boards. In the native reserves the Commodity Distribution Boards, of which the District Commissioner is usually Chairman, should obtain all possible information of consumers' requirements, particularly of foodstuffs which require to be imported into the reserves.

46. Thus, provided the Director of Produce Disposal is kept constantly informed by—

- (a) the Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board and the Director of Agriculture regarding the prospects of non-native and native production respectively;
- (b) the Controllers regarding the quantities of foodstuffs available for distribution;
- (c) the Chairman, Kenya Commodity Distribution Board regarding consumers' requirements;

there should be less difficulty in seeing the complete picture and planning ahead to meet all requirements.

But this ideal can only be arrived at provided responsibilities are clearly defined and the best possible system of co-ordination achieved. It is no use having responsibility expressly or impliedly duplicated because this leads either to wasted effort or to responsibility being shelved. For instance, the distribution of all commodities (of which maize is one) specified in the schedule to the Essential Commodities (Control of Distribution) Regulations, 1943, is a responsibility placed by law on the Commodity Distribution Boards; yet, at the same time, by Regulation 6 (c) of the Defence (Control of Maize) (No. 2) Regulations, 1942, the Maize Board *shall* (that word makes it mandatory) regulate or restrict the sale of maize

and maize products to persons in the Colony where it is satisfied this is necessary. All divided responsibility, legal or otherwise, such as that just quoted, should be done away with, leaving only single and undivided responsibility with as perfect co-ordination as possible.

Accordingly we recommend that the East African and Kenya organizations should be constituted from the Colony point of view to ensure that the responsibility for the production of foodstuffs, and the satisfying of consumers' requirements, and also the responsibility for obtaining statistics, should be undividedly fixed.

We have pointed out the difficulties of estimating native production and that adequate powers are contained in the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, to obtain returns of non-native production.

47. We now turn to the subject of the rationing of Africans in townships.

Early in our sittings we discovered that the ration of maize meal allowed per day to an employed native and his family in the Nakuru District was—

(a) for himself	1½ lb.
(b) for his wife	½ lb.
(c) for each member of his family	½ lb.

This differed from the ration of maize meal allowed in Nairobi, which was 1½ lb. per day each for the employed native and for his wife, and a slightly smaller ration for each child.

Without waiting to see what standards were in force in other parts of the Colony we made an interim recommendation to Your Excellency, a copy of which appears at Appendix G to this Report. A copy of Government's reply to that interim recommendation will be found at Appendix H.

Later we found that different standards of rations for natives were in force in other parts of the Colony which we visited. Having made such an interim recommendation, there is no necessity to pursue this matter further.

48. In Mombasa we had a great deal of evidence, not only by native but also by European witnesses, expressing dissatisfaction with the present system of rationing for the natives there. There is no individual registration for the rationing of natives as there is in Nairobi. Only those natives in permanent employment are certain of getting rations for themselves, their wives and families. For instance, labourers in permanent employment at the Port are issued by their employers with rations. The remainder of the native population are not registered and, except casual labourers working at the Port on a daily basis who are issued with rations on the days they work, have to depend on selected shops for obtaining their food requirements. A casual labourer at the Port obtains from his employer rations for himself, but not for his wife and family, each day he is fortunate enough to obtain employment. On other days on which he is unable to obtain employment his only recourse is to the selected shops. These shops have been selected by the authorities and are supplied with a certain amount of foodstuffs for sale to the native population. At the time we took evidence in Mombasa only sufficient food for one day was sold to each native, so that natives of each sex and all ages had to apply in person daily to a selected shop to obtain food. Such a system involves standing in long queues, even in wet weather, and sometimes the shops have sold out their foodstuffs before all the natives waiting in the queue have been able to purchase their requirements. A native who has been unable in the early morning to obtain work as a casual labourer at the Port must wait in a queue at the selected shop in the hope of being able to obtain food for the day, which means that he is prevented for several hours from searching for employment. There is nothing to prevent the wives of natives in permanent employment, who are assured of their rations, from obtaining extra rations by purchasing additional foodstuffs from the selected shops which they can either consume or sell on a ready black market. The final objection is that there is nothing to prevent natives resident on the mainland coming into Mombasa daily—this traffic is fairly heavy—and obtaining supplies from the selected shops in Mombasa, thereby decreasing the amount of foodstuffs available for distribution to the natives for whom the selected shops are intended.

We were told by many officials there that the question of registration had been considered but had not been adopted on account of various difficulties, the main ones being the absence of defined native locations in Mombasa; the absence of any accurate statistics as to the native population; the difficulty of identifying casual labourers; the small number of native headmen and the lack of staff to carry out registration.

We are not impressed by the weight of the difficulties raised, especially that relating to the lack of staff to carry out registration. On this aspect of the problem we took evidence from the Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi, and the Chairman of the Nairobi Commodity Distribution Board. In Nairobi employed natives, their wives and families, were all registered individually, which ensures a fair distribution of foodstuffs to them all. Such registration in Nairobi, covering over 30,000 natives, was completed in about a fortnight. We see no reason, in spite of the difficulties enumerated, why similar registration should not be completed in Mombasa within the estimate of two months given by the Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi, and are certain that until such registration is effected, distribution of foodstuffs amongst the native population of Mombasa will continue on its present unsatisfactory and inequitable basis.

Accordingly we recommend that urgent steps should be taken to register the natives resident in Mombasa for the purpose of rationing foodstuffs there on as fair and equitable a basis as the system in force in Nairobi.

49. Another complaint we had in Mombasa was from Indian witnesses regarding the amount of ghee available in Kenya compared with that available in both Tanganyika and Uganda. At the time such evidence was given, ghee was rationed in Kenya amongst the Asian population at half an ounce per head per day. The allegation made to us was that whilst ghee was being distributed in Kenya on this rationed basis, in both Tanganyika and Uganda ghee was in free supply amongst the Indian population there. We have no knowledge of what the position is in Tanganyika and Uganda and therefore cannot give any conclusive finding on this allegation. On our return to Nairobi we questioned both the Director of Produce Disposal, East African Production and Supply Council, and the Kenya Ghee Controller about the matter. The former stated that even in normal times Kenya is dependent to a considerable extent on Tanganyika for its supplies of ghee, and that whereas in Kenya ghee is rationed, in Tanganyika it is not. He further stated that he thought the complaint must be directed against the producing areas in Tanganyika where there is no control.

The Kenya Ghee Controller said that if the allegation referred solely to butter ghee, which is the quality normally required by the Asian community, then, in his opinion, the amounts available in Tanganyika per head of population are similar to those in Kenya.

50. The Executive Officer of the Trans Nzoia Commodity Distribution Board referred to the difficulty as regards the rationing of butter in that district owing to the uncertainty of the supplies of farm butter. The biggest supplies of butter are made available to him from the Creamery at Eldoret and in addition a varying quantity of farm butter is also available. Sometimes there is a glut of farm butter, which means that a quantity of butter is left over after the population has been supplied on a rationed basis, and the difficulty is the disposal of this surplus butter before it goes rancid. We raised this matter with the Controller of Dairy Produce on our return to Nairobi and he informed us that he had heard about the complaint at the time we took evidence at Kitale in the Trans Nzoia District and that it had now been remedied.

51. One final matter before closing this Chapter; complaints were made by one or two witnesses that inadequate supplies of foodstuffs were made available to African boarding schools, particularly one African girls' boarding school in Kavirondo. We took evidence from the Director of Education who explained to us the policy of Government with regard to making supplies of foodstuffs available to schools during the shortage. It is clear from his evidence that although the opening of one or two schools had to be postponed for a short time owing to the shortage of food, there was no question of any schools remaining closed

for a long period. However desirable it may be to keep schools continually open, it was inevitable that some schools should suffer a certain amount of inconvenience during the acute shortage, but we are satisfied that the policy adopted with regard to the distribution of foodstuffs amongst African schools during the shortage was a right policy and that, generally speaking, the amount of inconvenience caused was small.

CHAPTER VIII

CAUSES OF FOOD SHORTAGE

52. The evidence before us discloses that certain witnesses were by no means satisfied that the failure of the short rains in 1942 was the main reason for the food shortage. They advanced other reasons, the principal ones being—

- (a) no encouragement given to European farmers to produce maize;
- (b) less planting of maize in certain native areas during 1942, due to the low price of native-grown maize in 1941;
- (c) increased consumption of maize;
- (d) more maize being fed to stock;
- (e) heavy buying and selling of maize immediately prior to the institution of maize control;
- (f) potato blight, mainly in the Central Province;
- (g) prolonged long rains in 1942;
- (h) larger profits obtainable by not delivering maize to the Control;
- (i) lack of agricultural machinery and spare parts therefor.

In Section K of this Chapter the native views on the shortage are summarized.

53. Crown Counsel representing the Government submitted to us that the shortage of maize was due almost entirely to the failure of the short rains throughout the country in 1942. As will be seen later in this Chapter we are unable to agree with that submission. With regard to the various reasons enumerated above, these are discussed *seriatim* in the following sections. That a shortage of maize was bound to occur whether the 1942 short rains failed or not will be seen from Section L of this Chapter.

Section A—No encouragement given to European farmers to produce maize

54. This has been discussed to a certain extent in Chapters IV, V and VI of this Report, where it has been pointed out that the production of European-grown maize dropped from 233,973 acres in the crop year 1929/30 to 63,100 acres in 1941, due to the prices obtainable being uneconomic.

From the table set out in paragraph 22 of this Report, it has been seen that in 1932/33 the European farmer only got Sh. 3/50 per bag of maize, whereas in 1928/29 he had received Sh. 12/40 per bag. The period of low prices began in 1930 and from then the acreage of European-grown maize declined year by year.

When the export parity prices as submitted to us by the K.F.A. for the period 1934 to 1942 were examined they revealed that the highest price per bag was Sh. 7/35 in 1939/40 and the lowest price was Sh. 2/05 in 1935/36.

From the evidence before us, especially that of farmers, both maize growers and others, there is no doubt that many European farmers ceased to grow maize for sale solely because it did not pay them to do so. Of the farmers who continued to grow maize, many did so only to supply their own needs, for example to feed their native labour and stock, and of those who still continued to grow maize for sale a number did so only because they had not the capital to turn over to other types of farming, even though the yield of maize per acre on their land decreased year by year.

55. As to this lack of encouragement, further evidence was directed to the question of the grants payable by Government for the production of maize by way of guaranteed minimum returns per acre and also for breaking and clearing land to be planted with maize. The tenor of this evidence was that even up to December, 1942, the amounts payable to farmers by Government for the produc-

tion of maize were much less than those for other crops, notably wheat, and that being so, not only was there little incentive for European farmers to grow maize, but the farmers interpreted the smaller amounts payable in respect of maize as an indication that the policy of Government was that maize was not really required.

From the beginning of 1942 (after the announcement by the Minister of State in the Middle East in November, 1941—see paragraph 27 of this Report—and also Government's pronouncement of a guaranteed price for maize—see the same paragraph) the sums payable by way of guaranteed minimum returns per acre, breaking and clearing grants, have been as follows:—

(a) Regulation 4 of the Defence (Increased Production of Crops) Regulations, 1942 (Government Notice No. 193 of the 28th February, 1942, at page 79 of the 1942 subsidiary legislation), provides—

(i) guaranteed minimum return per acre—

	<i>Sh.</i>	<i>cts.</i>
Flax	50	00
Wheat	40	00
Rye	37	50
Maize	35	00

(ii) breaking and clearing grant per acre—

	<i>Breaking</i>		<i>Clearing</i>	
	<i>Sh.</i>		<i>Sh.</i>	
Wheat	20	..	30	
Rye	15	..	nil	
Maize	10	..	nil	

(b) The above rates, which were identically reproduced in section 4 of the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, continued in force until the 18th December, 1942, when by the Increased Production of Crops (Guaranteed Minimum Returns and Grants) Rules, 1943 (Government Notice No. 45 of the 18th December, 1942, at page 11 of the 1943 subsidiary legislation) the amounts now payable for maize are Sh. 40 guaranteed minimum return per acre, still Sh. 5 less than for wheat, together with breaking and clearing grants of Sh. 20 and Sh. 30 respectively per acre, the same as for all other crops.

But when those increases set out in sub-paragraph (b) above were announced in the Official Gazette of the 5th January, 1943, it was too late for the European farmer to break and clear new land as he must plant his maize crop about March to May. Hence such increased grants cannot have any appreciable effect on production until the main European crop is harvested about November to December.

Section B—Less planting of maize in certain Native Areas in 1942 due to the low price of native-grown maize in 1941

56. We had considerable evidence from officials and unofficials alike that the natives in the area of Kericho did not grow as much maize in 1942 as they did in 1941 because of the very low prices prevailing in 1941. An Administrative Officer, an Agricultural Officer and an unofficial, all with considerable experience of this area and of the natives living there, gave evidence to the effect that the 1942 crop of native-grown maize in the Kericho area was only half of the 1941 crop, due entirely to the natives being discouraged on account of the low prices they had received in 1941. The prices prevailing in this area in 1941 were round about Sh. 2 to Sh. 3 per 200 lb of maize, which included the trader's commission and cost of transport. Hence in some cases the native maize growers could not have received more than Sh. 1/50 for 200 lb. of maize. This being so, it is little wonder that they were discouraged from planting as much maize in 1942 as they did in 1941.

The shortfall in this area, and probably in other native areas too from this cause (see Section K of this Chapter) had no serious effect on the shortage but it does show that the native maize farmers, like the European farmers referred to in Section A of this Chapter, also decrease their production of maize when the price they receive is an uneconomic one, and this is a factor which must be borne in mind in dealing with future policy as regards the price of maize.

Section C—Increased consumption of maize

57. As one of the reasons for the shortage of maize between July and September, 1942, the Maize Controller stated that the consumption of maize was higher than had been contemplated. It is admitted on all sides that there were no accurate figures of the consumption of maize, and on this point the Director of Agriculture when giving evidence regarding the abolition of the post of Government Statistician said:—

“Whether in the past when the Statistician to the Governors’ Conference functioned he had any figures I do not know, but there were no figures available so far as I am aware as to what the normal consumption of maize for instance was.”

That there had been no figures in the past of the consumption of maize in the Colony is due to the problem of maize having been considered as one of the disposal of surpluses rather than of production.

There is no doubt that the Maize Controller, when he was General Manager of the K.F.A., was puzzled with regard to the civilian consumption of maize at the beginning of 1942. For instance in a statement prepared by him early in January, 1942, and which was included in his memorandum to us, he stated: “There is greatly increased local consumption which frankly it is difficult to explain.”

58. No causes for this increased local civilian consumption have been given in evidence before us and we ourselves called for and have been supplied by the Registrar of Natives with the figures of registered natives in employment from January, 1940, to August, 1943. The following are the figures for that period:—

	1940	1941	1942	1943
January	181,880	No figures available	231,662	254,810
February	181,459	196,861	231,923	257,917
March	183,347	200,993	233,998	248,343*
April	185,968	203,941	236,470	245,728
May	188,551	206,605	238,827	247,104
June	185,443	205,520	241,509	240,963
July	181,862	205,092	242,502	242,258
August	181,598	203,527	242,111	245,272
September	181,436	203,958	243,415	—
October	195,593	208,588	245,011	—
November	197,277	216,944	247,528	—
December	196,944	220,015	250,445	—

*Sudden decrease due to repatriation of labour back to the Native Reserves.

The whole set of these figures reveals that although during the period from the 1st January, 1940, to the 1st January, 1943, the increase was 72,930 registered employed natives, i.e., an increase of about 40 per cent over and above the total employed on the 1st January, 1940, yet the increase was on a gradual scale taken over the whole period.

We are of opinion that during 1942 the increase in the consumption of maize by employed natives could not, by itself, have caused a shortage, yet the significance of the cumulative effect of the increase over the whole period 1940 to 1943 was not fully appreciated, probably because, as stated above, the problem with regard to maize has always been looked upon as one of disposal of surpluses. The cumulative effect of this increase will be referred to again in Section L of this Chapter.

Section D—More maize fed to stock

59. There was a considerable amount of evidence from many European farmers that the production of pigs steadily increased from 1941 onwards, with the result that an increasing amount of the European-grown maize crop was retained by farmers for feeding to their pigs and other stock. On this point the

Director of Agriculture gave evidence that for many years past it had been the policy of his Department to advocate a reduction in the growing of maize and that maize should be disposed of by stock and in the form of bacon and other secondary products. As a consequence of this policy the Director of Agriculture went on to say that he had no doubt that a good deal more maize was fed to pigs than had been previously. In fact he said it paid the farmer better to feed the maize he produced to pigs rather than to sell it. This was so even after the increased price of European-grown maize was guaranteed at Sh. 9 per bag at the beginning of 1942. According to the Director of Agriculture, the value of maize fed to pigs worked out at Sh. 14 to Sh. 15 per bag, which is even higher than the price of Sh. 12 for European-grown maize guaranteed in January, 1943.

60. In his evidence the Controller of Pigs and Dairy Produce agreed generally with the evidence of maize farmers that there had been increased feeding of maize to pigs, and gave the following figures of pigs slaughtered:—

Year ending—	Pigs slaughtered—
30th June, 1941	18,300
30th June, 1942	29,985
30th June, 1943	45,850

(Note.—The large increase in the last year is due to the forced slaughtering of pigs on account of the lack of pig food.)

The Controller of Pigs and Dairy Produce went on to give evidence that the number of pigs slaughtered in a year is about equivalent to the number of pigs in existence, not taking into account breeding sows. He also stated that he has always worked on 3½ bags as being the average amount of maize feed to baconers and porkers. Thus, working on 3½ bags of maize being fed to each pig, the amount of maize used for pig feed increased from about 64,000 bags for the year ending 30th June, 1941, to about 105,000 bags for the year ending 30th June, 1942, and finally to about 160,000 bags for the year ending 30th June, 1943.

On the above evidence we are of opinion that the increase in the number of pigs bred in the Colony, with the resulting increase in the amount of maize fed to them and to other stock, had some effect on the shortage of maize, but the above figures show that such effect by itself was not great.

Section E—Heavy buying and selling of maize immediately prior to the institution of Maize Control

61. In his evidence the Maize Controller gave it as his opinion that immediately prior to the institution of Control there had been heavy purchases of maize by consumers. No figures were put forward to verify this opinion, presumably because the only method of doing so would have been an examination of all the books of maize traders and millers. The Maize Controller bases his opinion on the stocks declared by maize traders and millers as at the 30th June, 1942, under Regulation 21 of the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, promulgated on the 1st May, 1942. Regulation 21 reads as follows:—

“Every trader, miller or any other person who, on the 30th day of June, 1942, has in his possession any stocks of maize or maize products shall, not later than the 7th day of July, 1942, submit to the Controller a return, in such form as the Controller may specify, of such stocks in his possession on such first-mentioned date.”

Crown Counsel representing Government suggested that under this Regulation the words “or any other person” meant that consumers with stocks of maize were liable to declare such stocks as at the 30th June, 1942. On the advice of our Chairman we are unable to agree with that suggestion from the legal standpoint and, in any event, the Maize Controller stated in evidence that he looked only to traders and millers to declare their stocks as at the 30th June, 1942.

62. When returns of the stocks declared under the above Regulation were examined it was found that there were only 72,000 bags in the hands of all traders and millers in the Colony, of which 56,000 bags were taken over by Maize Control. On this point the Maize Controller said:—

Question: I presume the fact that traders only had 56,000 bags in their hands on the 1st July must have been a real surprise to you?

Answer: Yes, I was surprised it was so low. You must realize the figure of 56,000 has been used all the time in connexion with this and perhaps it is as much the fault of Control as anybody's because they put that forward. It was the figure that went through the Control books, but there were 22,000 odd bags of maize also in the hands of the K.F.A. and other people which was released back to them and did not come through the Control books at all, because, if you remember, Control decided that anybody that had a fixed contract and had maize in hand to fulfil that contract should fulfil it at Sh. 7/75. So in addition to the 56,000 there was another 22,700. The figure actually was 72,000.

Question: Would you say that was low?

Answer: It was lower than I expected it to be."

This was a surprise to the Maize Controller and on account of this figure being so low he considered that some stocks had not been declared. He advised the members of the Maize Board in a written appreciation of the maize position dated the 13th June, 1942, of the small amount of the stocks in the hands of traders and millers. In that written appreciation he stated:—

"In view of the fact that normal monthly consumption is estimated between 95,000 and 100,000 bags, we are likely to be faced on these figures with a very serious shortage. How serious the shortage will be it is impossible to estimate at the present time, because unquestionably many consumers have large stocks of maize for their own use and the actual demand during the next month or six weeks may be much less than normal, owing to the holding by consumers. . . . I have been in negotiation with the Provincial Commissioners, Nyanza and Central Provinces, and at the present time they are doing their utmost to encourage the natives to deliver maize. It is possible, however, as you will see from the schedule attached hereto, that we will be faced with a shortage of maize during the next month to six weeks. The position of course will right itself very quickly as soon as the Kavirondo crop comes in in bulk towards the middle of August, and with increasing deliveries from the Central Province."

Following this warning of what the Maize Controller thought would be a shortage of maize for a maximum period of about six weeks, the Maize Board came to the following decisions:—

- (1) Instructed the Controller to notify the Uganda and Tanganyika authorities of the shortage and to ration exports to those territories.
- (2) That no action should be taken to reduce the quantity of maize meal adulterant in wheat flour.
- (3) That the Controller should arrange with the Military and Railway authorities to use their reserve stocks of maize and maize meal and should ration these authorities accordingly.
- (4) That it was inexpedient to advise the public of the shortage, mainly on the grounds that it would encourage hoarding.

63. We pursued this opinion of the Maize Controller that there had been heavy sales to consumers just prior to the institution of Control when we heard the evidence of a number of Indian maize millers in Kisumu. All these Indian millers produced figures from their stock books which showed that they had sold practically all their stocks of maize and maize meal just prior to the introduction of Control. The reason given for this was that they did not know until the end of June, 1942, the price at which Control would take over their stocks of maize, and prior to this there had been rumours that on the introduction of Control the price to be paid for the stocks in the hands of traders and millers might be less than that at which they had bought the maize. These Indian millers were of the

opinion—they produced no figures to support it—that more maize and maize meal had been exported from Kisumu to Tanganyika and Uganda in May and June, 1942, than was normal during those months in preceding years.

To check up on this, we obtained from the Railway and Customs authorities at Kisumu the export figures of maize and maize meal to Tanganyika and Uganda by both railway steamers and dhows, for the years 1940, 1941 and 1942. These figures are:—

	1940		1941		1942	
	May	June	May	June	May	June
BY DHOWS—	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
Tanganyika :						
Maize	—	—	—	—	—	—
Maize Meal ..	1,331	817	946	1,478	728	1,740
Uganda :						
Maize	—	—	—	—	—	—
Maize Meal ..	1,538	211	5,492	3,656	2,944	1,747
BY RAILWAY STEAMER—						
Tanganyika :						
Maize	851	—	1,243	112	—	—
Maize Meal ..	168	392	1,534	1,333	3,741	3,674
Uganda :						
Maize	11	—	—	—	—	—
Maize Meal ..	851	1,064	1,064	1,389	1,456	1,512
	4,750	2,484	10,279	7,968	8,869	8,673
	7,234		18,247		17,542	

The above figures reveal that the exports of maize and maize meal to Tanganyika and Uganda for 1942 were less than for 1941 and therefore the opinion of the Indian millers in Kisumu, advanced in all good faith, is disproved. This leaves us with the opinion of the Maize Controller that consumers in Kenya made heavy purchases of maize and maize meal prior to the institution of Control. As stated above, this opinion appears to us to be based solely on the low stocks in the hands of traders and millers declared on the 30th June, 1942. Such opinion must of course presuppose that sufficient maize was in circulation, which, as will be seen later from Section L of this Chapter, was not the case.

Accordingly we have grave doubts whether the Maize Controller is on firm ground in advancing this as a reason for the shortage and in any case such maize, if it was in the hands of consumers, would be bound to be consumed at some time or other, and on that ground could not have had any bearing on the shortage throughout the Colony.

Section F—Potato Blight, mainly in the Central Province

64. In the early part of 1942 there was a potato blight in the Colony for the first time in the history of Kenya, with the result that practically the whole of the potato crop then under cultivation was destroyed. This particularly affected the Central Province where most of the potato crop is grown. The actual extent of this blight will be referred to again in Section M of this Chapter.

65. The natives, particularly in the Central Province, in addition to growing potatoes for sale, also grew them for their own consumption, and when their potato crop failed suddenly, due to blight in 1942, they naturally kept back more maize for their own consumption, with the result that less maize came on to the market from the Central Province. This is the opinion of the Maize Controller, Administrative and Agricultural officers, and we agree with them that the potato blight had some effect in reducing the amount of maize coming on to the market in the Central Province.

Section G—Prolonged and heavy long rains in 1942

66. As will already have been seen from Chapter III of this Report, the long rains in 1942 were heavier than usual. The Director of Agriculture gave evidence that this reduced the crop to some extent in the Kitosh and other areas in the Nyanza Province, but the Director went on to say that he did not think these heavy long rains in 1942 had any marked effect on the decrease in the main maize crop of the Colony and, on this aspect of the question, we agree with the view of the Chairman of the Maize Board that the cold and wet weather in July and August, 1942, had only delayed the harvesting of the crop.

Section H—Larger profits obtainable by not delivering maize to the Control

67. This is really a criticism of the scheme of Maize Control, but at the same time it was put forward in evidence as a reason why more maize had not come into the possession of the Control, and hence to the consuming public. The argument put forward was that a maize trader pays the native producer Sh. 8/96 for 200 lb. of maize and then, according to the law, the trader must sell this maize to the Maize Control at Sh. 10/68, the difference of Sh. 1/72 being accounted for by the trader's commission of 50 cents and the cost of a bag Sh. 1/20, which the trader must supply for bagging the maize prior to delivery to the Control. (This leaves 2 cents unaccounted for and the reason for this is that the native maize producers usually sells his maize by the *debe* and seven *debes* are equivalent to one bag of 200 lb. net weight. Hence Sh. 8/96, and not Sh. 8/98, was fixed as the price of 200 lb. of native-grown maize because Sh. 8/96 is divisible by 7.) Then, if the trader requires maize for his own customers, he must buy back the maize from the Maize Controller at Sh. 12 per bag and sell this maize to his customers at Sh. 12/50 per bag. Thus, if the trader obeys the law, he can make only 50 cents profit on each bag of maize he handles and, when the Controller allows the trader to buy back the maize to sell to his own customers, this profit of 50 cents is increased to Sh. 1 per bag. If, however, the trader indulges in black marketing and does not report all his maize transactions to the Control, he can buy 200 lb. of maize at Sh. 8/96, bag it at a cost of Sh. 1/20, which brings his total expenditure to Sh. 10/16 per bag, and then sell it on the black market at just below the selling price of Sh. 12/50, which would allow him a larger margin of profit than if he dealt with the maize legitimately through the Control.

68. There is no doubt that on the figures quoted above there is an incentive for traders not to declare all their transactions in maize to the Control, but here again the maize would still be in the Colony and would be bound to be consumed sooner or later and on this account could not have had any effect in helping to create a shortage of maize.

Section I—Lack of agricultural machinery and spare parts therefor

69. Witnesses were divided on the question of whether the difficulties of obtaining agricultural machinery, and spare parts therefor, had reduced the production on European farms and thereby contributed to the food shortage. Those witnesses who put forward the view that production had been hampered by lack of machinery were few and the general consensus of opinion was that although there had been difficulties, agricultural machinery had been in sufficient supply. The ordering of machinery was taken over by the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board in July, 1942, and bulk indents dispatched. The Machinery Controller informed us that Kenya has been fortunate over its importations of agricultural machinery and that before the end of 1943 all the known requirements of machinery will probably have been met.

In addition to meeting individual requirements, the pooling system for agricultural machinery amongst farmers has worked well.

Although there have been cases where individual farmers have not been able to procure spare parts for their agricultural machinery and this interfered with their farming activities, yet, by and large, we are of the opinion that the production of foodstuffs has not been unduly hampered by any lack of agricultural machinery.

Section J—The foregoing reasons do not account for the shortage of maize

70. Having discussed and examined all the above reasons, except that of the failure of the short rains, the effect of which, as already stated in paragraph 53 of this Report, will be dealt with in Section L below, we are of the opinion that neither each of the above reasons, nor the cumulative effect of them all, account for the serious shortage of maize. As will be seen later in Section L of this Chapter, where, in our opinion, the main reasons for the shortage are set out, the cumulative effect of increased consumption over a period of years is the all-important factor.

Section K—Native views on reasons for shortage of maize

71. From the numerous native witnesses who gave evidence before us, it was clear that they had given much time and thought to assigning reasons for the shortage. They did not simply attribute the shortage to the failure of the short rains. Indeed, they invariably put forward other reasons for the maize shortage before they mentioned the failure of the 1942 short rains.

72. There was general unanimity amongst the native witnesses that the low prices for native-grown maize prevailing in 1941 had discouraged the natives from planting maize, with the result that they did not plant as much in 1942 as they had planted in 1941, and in some parts of the native reserves this left them very short of maize. This factor has already been referred to in Section B of this Chapter.

73. With regard to the Kiambu Reserve, it was stressed that, over a number of years, many native farmers there had gradually decreased their production of maize and had turned their attention to the production of wattle bark, vegetables and other cash crops on a commercial basis.

There is no doubt that the natives in the Kiambu Reserve have increased their production of vegetables because they are close to Nairobi where they have a ready market for them. Similarly, they have a ready sale for the wattle bark which they produce. The effect of the production of cash crops other than maize has been that the Kiambu Native Reserve year by year has been increasingly relying on imported maize to feed its native population. When, therefore, maize became scarce and the first call on the already depleted maize stocks was for employed labour, the natives in the Kiambu Reserve were caught short of maize.

Chief Koinange, the Senior Native Chief in the Kiambu Reserve, when he gave evidence before us at Kiambu, summed up the reasons for the shortage of food in that reserve as follows:—

- (1) insufficient planting of drought-resisting crops;
- (2) the natives had sold their food during the times of plenty and had no food reserves left;
- (3) the natives, tempted by money, planted cash crops to supply the Nairobi market.

74. It should not be inferred from the above that we are opposed to the production of wattle bark, vegetables and other cash crops in the Kiambu Native Reserve. On the contrary, this is the logical outcome of the development of the native on progressive lines in that area and, in our view, they should not be discouraged from the production of those agricultural products which they are able to dispose of on a commercial basis. On the other hand, as will be dealt with more fully in Chapter IX of this Report, when we discuss the measures which we recommend should be taken to prevent a recurrence of a food shortage, we agree with Chief Koinange that more attention should be paid in the Kiambu Reserve, in fact in all native reserves, to the planting of drought-resisting crops of food-stuffs.

75. Particularly in Nyanza, evidence was given by several natives that too many natives had left the reserves to join the Armed Forces and to take up employment in industries, with the result that mostly old men and the womenfolk were left to carry on the cultivation and production of foodstuffs.

In war time it is inevitable that a considerable number of the younger men should leave the native reserves to join the Army and also to work in essential industries. The Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, gave evidence on this matter and assured us that the question of how many natives could be spared from the reserves in Nyanza for the Armed Forces and civilian employment had been very carefully gone into at the beginning of the war; that the numbers agreed on had not been exceeded; and that in his considered opinion the number of natives who left the reserves for both the Armed Forces and civilian employment had had no material effect on production.

76. Under section 3 of the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance (Cap. 135 of the Revised Edition) the Governor in Council may, by Proclamation, prohibit the export, and the purchase for re-sale or export, of native foodstuffs from any district or area which is suffering from, or threatened with, a food shortage. Proclamations covering the whole of the Colony, except the Northern Frontier and Turkana districts, were gazetted on the 25th March, 1943, prohibiting the movement of native foodstuffs from districts, except with the permission of the District Commissioner. Particularly in Nyanza, the natives in their evidence complained that such prohibition had prevented them from taking food from districts which had not been seriously affected by the shortage to districts where the shortage was most acute.

77. The Acting Provincial Commissioner and the Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza, explained to us that the movement of maize between districts was allowed by headloads (60 lb.) and that it was only for a few days, due to a misunderstanding, which was promptly rectified, that the movement of foodstuffs from district to district had been completely stopped. We are satisfied that this prohibition on the movement of native foodstuffs between district and district was a wise step taken by Government in view of the food shortage and, but for such step, much more maize would have found its way on to the black market and there sold at exorbitant prices.

Section L—Main causes of the maize shortage

78. As already stated in paragraph 27 of this Report, on the 13th October, 1941, a contract was entered into between the War Supply Board of Kenya (sic) and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, in the Middle East, for the sale of 40,000 tons of maize, deliveries to take place between October, 1941, and April, 1942, both months inclusive. On the 10th February, 1942, the Maize Controller, then in the position of General Manager, K.F.A., sent a written note to the Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, Nairobi, which was placed before the Chairman of that Board. A copy of this note, which is Appendix 9 of the Maize Controller's memorandum to us, is reproduced at Appendix I to this Report. That note was prepared solely for the purpose of showing that it would be impossible, on account of the insufficiency of maize, to fulfil that contract, but, at the same time, it stated that the maize position was considered safe. On the information contained therein the Secretary of the Kenya Supply Board, in his position as Secretary, East African War Supplies Board, informed the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation to that effect. Only a total of 6,080 tons were delivered under the contract.

We should stress that this written note was prepared by the then General Manager of the K.F.A. solely to show the impossibility of fulfilling this 40,000-ton contract and also was viewed solely in that light by the Chairman and Secretary, Kenya Supply Board. Not one of them looked upon the figures in that note as a means of revealing that at that time, in February, 1942, a serious shortage of maize was imminent. During the hearing of the evidence we devoted considerable time to questioning the Maize Controller, the Chairman and Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, and other witnesses on the significance of the figures in Appendix I, and then we ourselves directed a great deal of attention to an analysis of those figures.

79. In this paragraph we give in full our analysis of the figures contained in that Appendix. It is a lengthy analysis, but necessarily so, because in our view it shows that there was in that written note of the 10th February, 1942, from the then General Manager, K.F.A., to the Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, a warning of an approaching shortage of maize. Following our analysis will be found

appended the main causes, in our opinion, of the shortage arising out of the analysis of the figures contained in that Appendix and also an indication of what action could have been taken to deal with that approaching shortage, if it had been foreseen in time. Our analysis is as follows:—

1941-1942 MAIZE CROP

I.—MAIZE POSITION AS DISCLOSED IN A LETTER OF THE 10TH FEBRUARY, 1942, TO THE SECRETARY, KENYA SUPPLY BOARD, FROM LT.-COL. G. C. GRIFFITHS, IN HIS POSITION AS GENERAL MANAGER, K.F.A.

PRODUCTION—	<i>Total Bags</i>
Actual and estimated production, 1st August, 1941, to 31st July, 1942 (actual for first six months and estimated for last six months)—	
	<i>Bags</i>
Kavirondo	574,802
Central Province and other Native Areas ..	304,699
European	336,685
	1,216,186

CONSUMPTION—	
Actual and estimated East African, including Zanzibar consumption (actual 525,058 bags for first six months and estimated at 95,000 bags per month for last six months), i.e. 525,058, plus 570,000 bags	1,095,058
Expected surplus over East African requirements	121,128 (a)
Railed for export up to 31st January, 1942	113,128 (b)

EXPECTED SURPLUS—	
Therefore, as on the 10th February, 1942, the expected surplus on the 31st July, 1942, over East African requirements, provided no further maize exported during last six months (but see II below), was	8,000

On the estimated East African consumption of 95,000 bags per month (see above), 8,000 bags was a two-and-one-half days' supply for East Africa.

II.—MAIZE POSITION AS IN I, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MAIZE THAT WAS EXPORTED DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS AFTER 31ST JANUARY, 1942—	
Actual maize exported from 1941-1942 crop, including (b) above (figures supplied by K.F.A.)	136,755
Expected surplus over East African requirements—see (a) above	121,128
	15,627

III.—ACTUAL PRODUCTION FROM 1941-1942 CROP—	
(NOTE.—These are actual figures for native crop, Nyanza and Central Provinces, and also European crop, but estimated as regards other Native Areas, for which there are no actual figures.)	
European (figures supplied by K.F.A.)	310,914
Native maize, Nyanza and Central Provinces	808,738
Add other Native Areas (Lt.-Col. Griffiths estimated this at 50,000 bags, but the Director of Agriculture stated it might be as much as 100,000 bags). Higher figure taken so as to put actual production as high as possible	100,000
Total actual production	1,219,652

This figure of actual total production shows that the figure of actual and estimated production given as 1,216,186 bags in I above, was exceeded by about 3,000 bags if maize from other Native Areas is taken at 100,000 bags, and was short by about 47,000 bags if maize from other Native Areas is taken at 50,000 bags. Therefore the figure of estimated and actual production in I above is practically the same as the actual production.

IV.—CONSUMPTION OF MAIZE FOR PERIOD 1ST JULY, 1941, to
30TH JUNE, 1942, **omitting** KENYA CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION

	<i>Total Bags</i>
Military (actual)	277,159
Zanzibar (actual)	25,534
Uganda (actual)	86,386
Tanganyika (actual)	142,881
Flour Diluent (figure supplied by Unga Ltd.)	33,006
Exported (<i>see</i> II above)	136,755
<hr/>	
Total Actual Consumption, not including Kenya Civilian Consumption	701,721
<hr/>	

Total Actual Production—*see* III above—was 1,219,652 bags
and therefore the amount of maize available for Kenya
civilian consumption from the 1st July, 1941, to the
30th June, 1942, was 1,219,652 minus 701,721 bags, i.e. 517,931

V.—KENYA CIVILIAN CONSUMPTION FOR PERIOD 1ST JULY, 1941,
TO 30TH JUNE, 1942—

For the whole period under review there are no actual figures of
Kenya civilian consumption and the only figures available are
those given by the Maize Controller as the minimum necessary
to supply Kenya civilian needs in February, 1943, on a reduced
ration of 1½ lb. per head per day, instead of the usual 2 lb., and
also after all steps had been taken to reduce consumption by
repatriation of natives and otherwise. That minimum figure
is given by the Maize Controller in his memorandum to us as
60,000 bags per month.

During the period under review there was no rationing and
therefore this figure of 60,000 bags per month should really
be increased to 80,000 bags per month to be on an unrationed
basis.

(NOTE.—According to the Special Labour Census, December,
1942, there were 247,401 registered natives in employment on
the 15th December, 1942, *excluding* squatters, juveniles, daily
paid labour and inhabitants of maize importing areas, such
as the Kiambu Reserve. At 2 lb. per head per day, 247,401
natives would consume 74,220 bags of maize per month and,
taking into account squatters, etc., this figure would approxi-
mate to the 80,000 bags per month quoted above.)

But, taking the Kenya civilian requirements for the period under
review at no higher than the rationed figure of 60,000 bags
per month, then the quantity required for the Kenya civilian
population from the 1st July, 1941, to the 30th June, 1942,
would have been 720,000

But the maize available for the Kenya civilian population for
this period, *see* IV above, was 517,931

Therefore shortfall for Kenya civilian requirements was at least .. 202,069

It must be borne in mind that this figure of the shortfall of
202,069 bags is arrived at by confining the above calculations
to the production of maize from the 1941–1942 crop, and does
not make any allowance for any carry-over of maize from the
1940–1941 crop. Allowing for such carry-over, the figure of
202,069 bags would be reduced.

80. We realize the difficulties which beset persons in charge of the food supplies of a country, and more particularly a country where statistics are lacking. It was stressed by many witnesses that lack of adequate statistics, especially those relating to the consumption of maize, had created great difficulties.

Irrespective of the presence of the Armed Forces in the Colony, the figures of the increasing number of registered natives in employment over the period from 1940 to 1943, set out in paragraph 58 of this Report, illustrate how the number of natives in employment outside the native reserves was increasing, which meant greater consumption of maize from that part of the maize crop which came on to the market. In other words, there was an ever decreasing margin between the production and consumption of maize which, due to the absence of statistics, does not appear to have been appreciated. The rate of such decrease was bound to be accelerated by anything which tended to keep more maize from coming on to the market out of the native reserves, and we have had evidence that, due to some extent to the remittances paid to families of natives in the Armed Forces, and also to payments for cattle by the Live Stock Control, the money wealth of the population in the reserves is much greater now than it has ever been. As opposed to this increase in wealth there is a dearth of goods, e.g., piece goods, on which the natives in the reserves are able to spend their money, with the result that they have abundant cash left over after paying their taxes, and there is decreased incentive for them to send out their maize for sale on the market.

From the figures set out in Appendix I to this Report, that surplus margin between production and consumption had ceased to exist, and on the other side of the picture a shortage margin began to appear between consumption and production which kept on increasing until by the time Control came in on the 1st July, 1942, it was found, though the real reason for it was not appreciated at the time, that the stocks of maize in the hands of traders and millers was only 72,000 bags. That these stocks were so low and that an actual shortage did not occur earlier is due to the fact that the Colony was at that time living largely on whatever reserves of maize existed in the hands of merchants, millers and farmers.

81. In July, August and from the 1st to 26th September, 1942, the deliveries of maize to the Control were only 14,117, 45,584 and 72,000 bags respectively, which were quite insufficient to keep pace with the consumption. Most employers of labour, especially the employers of large labour forces, had supplies of maize which could last them for a few months. For instance, one large employer of labour on a tea estate stated that he usually had a three months supply of maize for his labour. That an acute shortage did not occur in the months July, August and September, 1942, is due to the fact that during those months the Colony was living largely on stocks of maize in the hands of employers of labour, and those stocks of maize were gradually diminished and, in some cases, exhausted. For instance, this same employer of labour stated that at times he was down to a two days stock of maize meal for his labour. With reserves in the hands of merchants, millers, farmers and employers of labour exhausted, the long rains crops, which commenced to come into the hands of the Control in appreciable quantities about the beginning of September, 1942, helped the position but, on account of all the reserve stocks having been exhausted, the position then became one of a hand to mouth existence, with the Maize Control delivering maize as fast as it came into its hands.

82. Summarizing the reasons for the shortage of maize set out in detail above, we have no doubt that the shortage in this commodity, which has had such a serious effect on the internal economy of the Colony, was due to the fact that the rate of consumption increased to such a degree that it overtook and ultimately surpassed actual production, and this factor was not appreciated owing to the lack of sufficient information and statistics regarding the consuming requirements of the Colony. This shortage was inevitable, irrespective of the failure of the short rains; the failure of those rains made matters worse and put the Government in the position of having to import foodstuffs from overseas in spite of the steps taken for the rationing of maize.

It was suggested to us that in view of the failure of the short rains many natives had kept back from the market quantities of their long rains maize crops. The evidence on this was conflicting. In view, however, of the clear evidence that in many native reserves the shortage of maize was serious we do not think that the quantity of maize kept back by the natives from their long rains crops was considerable.

83. The Maize Controller, in his position as General Manager of the K.F.A., and both the Chairman and Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, considered that the figures in the written note of the 10th February, 1942, did not disclose an alarming position on account of the increased production drive which had been started in December, 1941, and January, 1942. In answer to a question by us on that written note, the Maize Controller replied:—

“The fact remains that if everything had come out according to plan you would have been able to carry on because you have to realize that at the time we were contemplating the benefit of the increased production drive which had been started.”

In answer to a similar question the Chairman, Kenya Supply Board, replied that he had noted that the general maize position as disclosed in that written note provided for a surplus of 17,000 bags but he was not alarmed about this when considered against the background of an enormous production drive. He further said that he considered the position safe in view of the statement in that written note which reads: “However, as I anticipate an increase in price will have the effect of bringing more maize on the market I think this is a safe position.”

The Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, when asked about the contents of that written note, said that the position would have been alarming if there had not been a background of enormously increased production being put in at that time, and he also referred to the statement just quoted.

84. With regard to this increased production drive, we have already stated in Chapter V of this Report that Government acted promptly as soon as the Minister of State in the Middle East had made his announcement in November, 1941, but as stated in paragraph 55 of this Report, the increased production drive as far as the European-grown maize crop is concerned, involving as it did the breaking of new land, could not have had any appreciable effect on the 1942/43 crop.

It is true, as stated in paragraph 21 of this Report, that the acreage under European-grown maize increased from 63,100 acres in 1941 to 81,561 acres in 1942, i.e., an increase of 18,461 acres. Such an increase cannot be interpreted as a real increased drive for the production of maize because taking the average of 7.6 bags per acre for the 1942 crop—see the Scheduled Crop Statistics published by the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board in the *Kenya Weekly News* of the 9th July, 1943—this increase only amounted to 140,303 bags. Not all of this would come on to the market because, as an experienced farmer pointed out, most of the increase was due to farmers requiring maize to feed to their stock. Giving evidence on this increased production drive the Director of Agriculture said:—

“In fact, I think the granting of Sh. 8/50 to Europeans was not done with the idea of any largely increased production of maize; the argument was advanced that the price had been too low and European maize acreage would continue to fall or disappear altogether if the price was not put higher, but I don't think the intention behind it was to stimulate a largely increased production of maize.”

When informed that the Maize Controller had stated that he was relying on an increased production drive to come into effect in 1942, the Director replied that there was an increased production drive, but the emphasis was never on maize.

As regards native-grown maize, we have already stated in paragraph 56 above that the natives were discouraged from planting maize in 1942 due to the low prices prevailing in 1941. The price of Sh. 4/90 for 200 lb. of native-grown maize was not announced until the 3rd July, 1942, and we consider it is unfortunate that Government did not announce the price earlier in the year. The effect of not

announcing the price of Sh. 4/90 earlier in the year was twofold. First, it did not encourage the natives to increase their production of maize in 1942, and secondly, when the price was declared it was done so at a time when the price of native-grown maize in many parts of the Colony was as much as Sh. 7 for 200 lb.. Naturally many natives, not appreciating that the price of Sh. 4/90 for 200 lb. of maize was an average price for the whole season, compared it very unfavourably with the higher price of as much as Sh. 7 which they were getting in June, 1942, June being one of the off-season months for the maize crop.

Giving evidence on the reason why a price for native-grown maize had not been announced in January or February, 1942, the Director of Agriculture said that he did not think it was appreciated that there was a necessity to give a guaranteed price to the native to stimulate increased production.

The above shows that the view held by the Maize Controller and the Chairman and Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, that the increased production drive would have an appreciable effect on the 1942/43 crop was a mistaken view, but, in fairness to them, we must mention that the same view was held by other responsible persons.

85. If the full significance of the figures in that written note of the 10th February, 1942, had been appreciated at the time, steps could have been taken to meet the approaching inevitable shortage of maize before that shortage became really acute.

The country could have been warned of the impending shortage and rationing started at once. Rationing itself might have been sufficient and probably would not have necessitated repatriation of natives back to the reserves and the cutting down of the labour forces of many employers, both of which measures caused a considerable amount of dislocation in industries.

Further, if the shortage had been foreseen and appreciated in February, 1942, it would have meant that, with regard to the control of maize, discussions on which had already begun, steps could have been taken to deal with a shortage instead of, as stressed by both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller, a surplus.

Also, the contract for the sale of up to 100,000 tons of maize to the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, executed on the 5th May, 1942, would never have been negotiated and thereby the Government would not have been placed in a position of being unable to fulfil such a contract, and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation would not have been put to a certain amount of inconvenience and embarrassment.

Lastly, but by no means least, the Government might have been able to weather the shortage without the necessity of importing foodstuffs from overseas.

86. In fairness to the Directors and the present General Manager of the K.F.A., it must be mentioned that with regard to Appendix I of this Report, that is the written note of the 10th February, 1942, from Lt.-Col. Griffiths to the Secretary, Kenya Supply Board, those Directors and the present General Manager gave evidence that no copy of this written note appears on the K.F.A. files and that it was never submitted by Lt.-Col. Griffiths to the Directors of the K.F.A. Board. When recalled to give evidence the Maize Controller, having been referred to the above evidence given on behalf of the K.F.A., stated—we think it best to give his evidence on this matter verbatim—as follows:—

“Question (by Mr. Slade): There were cases when you did not tell the K.F.A. Board everything you were doing. One example is Appendix 9 of your memorandum—that was the letter of the 10th February to Mr. Norton—you did not disclose that?

Answer: I did, in my opinion. I am going to deal with that question later and say I am quite satisfied about that.

Question: Did you disclose that to the Board?

Answer: Yes, I should say it was disclosed to the Board.

Question: Was a copy put on the files anywhere?

Answer: If you are going to discuss that question now, I put in Appendix 8 of mine. That was taken from rough pencilled figures I had of my own. I had not any record at all. Appendix 8 was not put before the Board of the K.F.A. apparently, because of their evidence. I have not the opportunity of checking it. It was the basis of the document put forward on the 19th February.

Question: I am discussing Appendix 9. Does Appendix 8 have any bearing on it?

Answer: Yes. I have not an opportunity to prove it was put before the K.F.A. The method of dealing with these things in the K.F.A. is that the K.F.A. have a sub-committee, and Mr. Gunson is practically the sub-committee. Every Friday Mr. Gunson comes to the K.F.A. office and goes through every individual report which has been received during the week from every depot, in which every purchase of maize, the price paid for it, etc., is shown and disclosed, and it generally refers to other traders' business as well which has been done that the depot knows of. Although he generally sits in my office he has to rely on my personal assistant for any information he wants. The question of railment or export or price or the price paid in the native reserves were all then reported to the Committee—not by me but by Mr. Gunson. Mr. Gunson had the right to call for files or information from the books and if you look at the weekly report in the minutes of the K.F.A. you will find: 'Mr. Gunson attended and reported as follows . . .' That was the policy. Now we will deal with the letter of the 10th February. That was the position with reference to the K.F.A. Board. That letter was written by me in Nairobi and I handed it to Mr. Norton. The object of that letter was to convey information to the U.K.C.C. The outcome was that a letter was written by Mr. Norton to the U.K.C.C. and submitted to the Directors of the K.F.A. for approval. Some of the figures in that letter of the 10th February appear in Mr. Norton's letter. The K.F.A. minutes record that they received that letter and agreed to it. I am satisfied at the time that letter was discussed the letter of the 10th February was in the hands of the Board, and as far as I remember it was read by Mr. Trench as Chairman. But I cannot prove it. Common sense in my opinion shows that it would be so, that they would not have accepted Mr. Norton's letter and agreed to it, knowing the Board of the K.F.A., and I am quite satisfied they saw that letter. I am also satisfied that letter was read previously by Mr. Gunson, a member of the Board, whose duty it was to report to the Board.

Question: You are prepared to say on oath they did see it?

Answer: I am saying in my opinion that letter was seen by Mr. Gunson in my office and was also I think read aloud by Mr. Trench at the meeting when the letter to the U.K.C.C. was under discussion because that was the letter on which the letter to the U.K.C.C. was based.

Question: You cannot explain why there was no copy of it on the records there?

Answer: No, I cannot."

Section M—Shortages of other foodstuffs

WHEAT

87. We had evidence regarding the efforts undertaken to increase the production of wheat. That these efforts have been highly successful is clear from the figures quoted by Your Excellency in Legislative Council on the 16th March, 1943, which showed that actual deliveries from the 1940 and 1941 plantings were 182,395 bags and 240,944 bags respectively, and that deliveries from the 1942 plantings were expected to be 400,000 bags. In fact that estimate was exceeded by 18,394 bags—see the Scheduled Crop Statistics, Kenya crop season, 1942, published in the *Kenya Weekly News* on the 9th July, 1943.

We are aware that for a time maize meal was used as a diluent in wheat flour, but in spite of that we received no evidence that there had been any unforeseen shortage of wheat.

BEANS

88. A large proportion of the bean crop is produced in the Central Province, the main varieties being Canadian Wonder, Rose Coko and White Haricot. A quantity of mixed beans is produced in the Nyanza Province.

In the crop years 1940/41 and 1941/42 the deliveries of beans in the Colony were 90,788 and 159,252 bags respectively, each 200 lb. in weight, whereas for the crop year 1942/43 the deliveries were 21,119 bags against an estimate of 84,700 bags. This shortfall was due to the failure of the short rains which reduced the total crop, and owing to the general shortage of foodstuffs in the native reserves no surplus of beans was available for sale in the latter part of the crop year.

FOWLS AND EGGS

89. It is impossible to compare the supply of these two commodities with that of previous years because no comparable figures are available. A control of eggs from the Nyanza Province was instituted in November, 1942, and of fowls from the same Province in February, 1943.

There was an acute shortage of both these commodities, due to increased consumption, to the shortage of poultry food, particularly low grade grains and pollards, and also to more fowls being eaten in the native reserves on account of the shortage of other foodstuffs.

GHEE

90. We had evidence of a serious shortage of ghee in the Colony which caused some hardship amongst the Asian population, as it is an all important item in their diet.

According to figures supplied to us by the Ghee Controller, the normal consumption of ghee in the Colony is somewhere between 6,000 and 7,000 tins per month (a tin contains 36 lb. approximately). The local production is not sufficient to meet this demand and Kenya is dependent to a considerable extent on ghee imported from Tanganyika. The Controller stated in evidence that the Tanganyika Government, as a result of the general shortage of food, had prohibited the production of ghee in the main producing areas about August and September, 1942, so as to make milk available for women and children.

Thus one of the main reasons for the shortage of ghee was the drought conditions in Tanganyika.

South Kavirondo is the main producing area in Kenya and the supply from there fell below normal for two reasons. First, the drought and secondly, the lack of spare parts for separators, the reason for this being that prior to the war separators were obtained largely from Scandinavia. We understand that steps have been taken to improve the supply of separators from other sources.

It should be pointed out that the Asian community normally consumes only the so-called "butter-ghee" and it was this quality which, for the reasons given above, was in shortest supply. Inferior qualities of ghee, usually adulterated, are not acceptable to the Asian community.

We heard evidence in Mombasa criticising the distribution of ghee on an East African basis, and this has already been mentioned in Chapter VII.

BACON

91. With regard to bacon, we have already pointed out in Section D of this Chapter that an increasing amount of maize was fed to stock, especially pigs. In this connexion it must be remembered that it takes longer to produce a baconer than it does a porker. According to the Director of Veterinary Services, five to seven months are required to produce the former, whereas the latter is produced in from four to five months. Hence more maize is consumed by baconers than by porkers.

We had evidence from both the Director of Veterinary Services and the Controller of Pigs and Dairy Produce that on account of the shortage of maize and other feeding stuff, pigs had to be slaughtered as porkers instead of waiting for them to become baconers, and this inevitably resulted in a shortage of bacon.

MEAT

92. We have had much evidence with regard to the shortage of meat, including evidence alleging that the percentages of condemnations at the Nairobi Abattoir have been too high and that frequently animals arrive there in a fevered condition, thereby causing a wastage of meat.

The Director of Veterinary Services, who is the Live Stock Controller, gave evidence that, in addition to the local supplies, cattle are obtained from Tanganyika, Uganda and Somalia. Uganda supplied 11,000 animals during the second half of 1942, but since then no more supplies have been available from there, over and above the few animals which have arrived each month at Liebig's factory. This falling off in supplies from Uganda is attributed by the Live Stock Controller to the fact that the natives there do not usually breed cattle for sale, and also to the increased consumption of meat by the Uganda natives on account of their greater prosperity.

93. From the evidence we find that the shortage of meat which occurred is due mainly to increased consumption and also to drought. We had evidence from the Live Stock Controller that the consumption of meat by the civil population in Nairobi is three times what it was prior to the war and twice as much in Mombasa, due primarily to greater consumption by the Asian and African population and also by hotels. As regards the drought, this lasted for a period of about nine months in the northern areas, with the result that supplies from such districts as the Northern Frontier, Samburu, Turkana and Elgeyo-Marakwet, were cut off, as the cattle there were not in a fit condition to be moved. In addition, the supplies from the ranching areas of Laikipia and North Kenya were severely curtailed also on account of drought.

The Live Stock Controller put forward as the third reason for the shortage of meat the difficulty in persuading natives in the Colony to sell their stock. We do not attach much importance to this as a reason for a shortage because it is well known that, generally speaking, the Kenya native has always been loath to part with his stock.

94. With regard to the high percentage of condemnations of carcasses, the main evidence, which was widespread, was directed against the Abattoir at Nairobi and hence we consider we should deal with this matter in some detail.

In the first place we should mention that at the Nairobi Abattoir the system for examining carcasses for measles is to make six uniform cuts, three on each shoulder, and if six measles are found in those cuts the carcass is condemned. The Superintendent of the Abattoir said that if, say, five measles are found in those cuts, additional cuts would be made in other parts of the carcass, but not to an unreasonable extent.

The Superintendent further stated that the test for measles has been relaxed to some extent so far as meat for civil consumption is concerned, and this has resulted in less meat being wasted. For instance, in 1942, 39,762 oxen, grade and native, were slaughtered, of which 8,232 were condemned, which is 20.7 per cent. From January to July, 1943, 30,619 oxen, grade and native, were slaughtered, of which 2,831 were condemned, which is only 9.2 per cent. These figures illustrate the effect of the relaxation in the test for measles, and according to the Superintendent, this relaxation was introduced at the request of the Director of Veterinary Services.

All the carcasses condemned for measles are cooked in a steam cooker and the meat sold to natives at 10 cents per lb. All the other condemned carcasses are dealt with in the by-product plant and converted mainly into fertilizer and bone meal. During our visit to the Abattoir in July, 1943, we were impressed by the absence of wastage.

95. With regard to the evidence relating to animals arriving at the Abattoir in a fevered condition, there is no doubt that this has been the case and it resulted in a greater percentage of condemnations. It is only since November, 1942, that 24 hours resting of animals has been instituted at the Abattoir before slaughtering.

This has already resulted in the percentage of carcasses condemned for being in a fevered condition being reduced from 2.5 per cent in 1942 to 0.7 per cent in 1943. We are not satisfied, however, that there is sufficient co-ordination and co-operation between the Live Stock Controller and the Abattoir on this question. The animals are sent to the Abattoir mainly from open stock yards on the Athi Plains, commonly referred to as bomas, where the animals are kept until sent to the Abattoir for slaughter. The ideal to be aimed at would be for the animals to be rested for a few days in those bomas, but the difficulty is the small amount of grazing available on the plains during the dry weather. Further, this would also entail a better type of boma being erected to protect the animals, especially sheep, from exposure, and on this account the Live Stock Controller is opposed to the erection of better types of bomas because they have to be moved constantly from place to place on the plains. On the other hand, he considers that the pens at the Abattoir should be covered because they are permanently sited there.

From the evidence of the Live Stock Controller and the Superintendent of the Nairobi Abattoir, it is clear that they are not agreed on this matter. The latter is definitely of the opinion that the bomas on the plains should be improved so as to permit of the animals being rested there for a few days after travelling and that this would have the effect of evening out the daily supplies to the Abattoir, which he states have been very irregular, thereby causing uneven supplies to the butchers.

The Abattoir was only built to deal with 70 oxen, 25 pigs and 350 sheep and/or goats per day, and, due to the extra pressure put on it, as many as 1,499 sheep and goats were slaughtered in one day and 285 oxen in one night. This uneven supply (we realize, of course, that there must be rush periods) not only overtaxes the resources of the Abattoir but mitigates against ensuring a regular and even supply of meat to the consuming public.

It is not for us to go into the details of how improvements in this matter can be effected, but we recommend that the **Live Stock Controller and the Nairobi Municipal Council should endeavour to improve the present system of resting animals before slaughter because this would further decrease the number of carcasses condemned on account of their fevered condition.**

96. We had evidence from several witnesses that a quantity of immature cattle are taken for slaughtering. This evidence was confirmed by the Superintendent of the Nairobi Abattoir so far as native cattle are concerned. The Director of Veterinary Services gave evidence that the purchase of immature animals by the Live Stock Control officials is against the policy laid down, but he admitted that at times, in order to supply the demand, some immature native cattle had been taken. We make no recommendation on this matter but would point out that wastage of meat is caused by the slaughtering of immature animals.

97. As regards Mombasa, all the meat condemned there is destroyed. We inquired into the reason for this and were referred to By-law 20 of the Mombasa Municipality (Inspection, Storage and Sale of Food) By-laws, 1929, which reads as follows:—

“If any such food shall appear to the Medical Officer of Health or any Sanitary Inspector or other person duly authorized by the Municipal Board in writing to be diseased or unsound or unwholesome or unfit for food such officer may detain such food for examination or may forthwith, himself or by an assistant, seize and carry away such food, and thereupon any magistrate on the recommendation of the Medical Officer of Health, Sanitary Inspector or of a Veterinary Officer may order it to be destroyed or to be so disposed of as to prevent it being exposed for sale or used for food, and may direct the Municipal Board to effect such removal and destruction or disposal.”

We also ascertained that the Municipal Board of Mombasa does not possess a steam cooker. This in our view does not preclude the cooking of carcasses condemned for measles, as we had ample evidence that it can be done in ordinary containers, e.g., empty oil drums, so as to make the meat fit for human consumption.

We do not propose to go into the question of whether the by-law set out above prohibits the cooking of condemned meat preparatory to sale for human consumption, but we are of the opinion that the present system in Mombasa leads to the wastage of a certain amount of meat. Accordingly we recommend that the above by-law should be examined by the law officers of Government and, if necessary, amended to permit of meat condemned in Mombasa being cooked and made available for human consumption. We further recommend that the Mombasa Municipal Board should endeavour to obtain a steam cooker to deal with the condemned meat and in the meantime should examine the possibility of cooking this meat by ordinary means until such time as a steam cooker can be obtained.

98. Finally, as regards examinations in force at abattoirs, the evidence we had indicates that ante-mortem examination of animals would have the effect of saving a certain amount of meat. Lack of personnel prevents this being carried out now, but no doubt it will be borne in mind when the necessary qualified staff becomes available.

SUGAR

99. There are eight sugar factories in East Africa, five in Kenya, two in Uganda and one in Tanganyika. The largest are the two situated in Uganda. We can only give our opinion as to the shortage of sugar based on the evidence relating to production in Kenya because we do not know what the conditions have been as regards the sugar factories in the other East African territories.

In the first place there is no doubt that production in Kenya was adversely affected by the drought, and the General Manager of one sugar factory gave evidence that his factory had to close down in 1943 a month earlier than usual on this account. He further stated that the sugar cane deteriorated to such an extent owing to drought that in March, 1943, it took 24 tons of cane to produce 1 ton of sugar, whereas in January, 1943, 12 tons of cane produced the same amount of sugar.

In addition to the effects of the drought, the shortage was aggravated by Zanzibar, which prior to the war largely drew its sugar requirements from the Dutch East Indies, having to be supplied from East Africa and by Government having certain small commitments overseas to countries which are short of sugar.

BUTTER

100. The consumption of butter in East Africa has increased considerably since the war and a further sharp increase took place in the middle of 1942, partly attributable to substantial quantities being taken by bakers for cakes, canteens and so on, and to increased demand due to the shortage of ghee. Steps were taken in July, 1942, to reduce consumption for what might be considered luxury uses and in September, 1942, allocations were made to each district.

The production of butter was up to the expected figure until November, 1942, when the failure of the short rains resulted in a considerable fall in production. Steps were then taken to reduce the district allocations to allow approximately $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. per head per week to consumers. Owing to the continued absence of rain, this allocation was reduced by 20 per cent in April, 1943, but on the commencement of the long rains in May it was again increased.

POTATOES

101. The effect of the shortage of potatoes on the maize position has been mentioned in Section F of this Chapter. This shortage was caused by the "potato blight" which appeared for the first time in Kenya about April and May, 1942. We had evidence that certain imported seed potatoes were diseased but that this disease did not cause the blight.

Although the blight occurred in April and May, 1942, its effect was not fully felt until several months later, as is illustrated by the following figures of deliveries of bags of potatoes (180 lb. weight) to the Potato Control:—

	Non-natives	Natives	Total
	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
1942—			
July	4,114	17,344	21,458
August	7,388	11,239	18,627
September	7,536	9,507	17,043
October	3,646	8,352	11,998
November	1,196	2,152	3,348
December	225	1,736	1,961
1943—			
January	740	820	1,560
February	565	367	932
March	159	695	854

As a consequence of the blight, such potatoes as were produced had to be used mainly for seed, with the result that potatoes remained in short supply until about August, 1943.

We should mention that the military authorities assisted in bringing about the plentiful supply of potatoes which now exists by landing 5,400 crates of potatoes for seed purposes.

As regards future steps to combat a "potato blight", we had evidence from the Director of Agriculture that, whilst spraying is possible for the European-grown potato crop, it would be very difficult as regards the native-grown crop, which is widely scattered throughout the native reserves. The Director considers that in the native reserves the best solution is to grow varieties which have the maximum resistance to disease, and already one variety, Kinongo, has been discovered which shows a considerable amount of resistance to the disease. As much seed as possible has been collected of this variety, and it is being multiplied as quickly as possible for distribution to native potato producers.

RICE

102. Kenya is dependent on imported rice, as will be seen from the following figures, which are approximate to the nearest ton:—

	1938	1939	1940	1941
	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Tons</i>
IMPORTS—				
From India	2,498	2,313	1,769	2,176
From Tanganyika	8,092	9,783	11,491	11,423
TOTAL	10,590	12,096	13,260	13,599

Hence Kenya imported annually about 10,000 tons of rice from Tanganyika. With supplies cut off from India, Kenya relied more and more on Tanganyika for its supplies of rice, and Zanzibar, which had always obtained its supplies

from the Far East, also became dependent on Tanganyika. As a result of the drought in Tanganyika, supplies from there had to be reduced, and the Produce Controller gave evidence that the Government of Tanganyika, at great inconvenience to itself, supplied Kenya with rice during the drought. The figures of the deliveries of rice and paddy to the Control from July, 1942, to March, 1943, are:—

	Kenya Paddy	Tanganyika Paddy	Tanganyika Rice	*Total in Rice
	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
1942—				
July	770	1,175	1,908	3,075
August	1,230	2,370	2,631	4,791
September	943	483	5,887	6,743
October	711	2,605	4,692	6,682
November	605	1,188	7,154	8,230
December	51	4,178	2,304	4,841
1943—				
January	—	1,423	156	1,010
February	902	—	218	759
March	322	—	1,000	1,193
TOTAL ..	5,534	13,422	25,950	37,324

*This total for rice is obtained by adding the figures in the third column to the rice equivalents of the paddy figures in the first and second columns.

103. We inspected the new rice scheme which has been started at Kisumu and were impressed by it. In addition to this, the acreage under rice in the Colony has increased from 3,800 acres to 5,500 acres in 1942.

We would point out that rice in the husk can be kept in weather- and vermin-proof stores for a considerable time, and in this respect, if its cultivation can be increased, it is a valuable crop to store against famine. Further, we had evidence that the natives like it as a food, so much so that the Director of Agriculture said that in one area in Kavirondo the difficulty is to get the rice for the market, as the natives there consume so much themselves.

We recommend that every endeavour should be made to increase the production of rice in order to make the Colony as self-supporting in this commodity as possible.

FRESH VEGETABLES

104. In discussing fresh vegetables we should mention that the main producing area is Kiambu where, according to the Agricultural Officer, 10,000 acres are at present planted with vegetables by the natives. This acreage is double what it was in 1940, and the reason for this rapid expansion is due to the greater demand on account of the increased population.

In any year the supply of vegetables decreases during the dry season and, owing to the failure of the short rains at the end of 1942, it was inevitable that the supply of fresh vegetables should be more seriously curtailed than usual.

CHAPTER IX

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF A FOOD SHORTAGE

105. We have now come to the more difficult part of our task, which involves making recommendations for future planning and, as stated in paragraph 9 of this Report, such recommendations are made with a view to long-range planning rather than for the immediate future. Our task is made more difficult by the fact that we have to cover and take into account the remaining period of the war, as well as the normal peacetime conditions which follow.

106. With regard to the measures which should be taken to prevent a recurrence of a food shortage, most of the witnesses who appeared before us stressed the obvious one of the storage of foodstuffs in the Colony as a reserve against a famine, on account of the danger of locusts or drought destroying the growing crops. We are in favour of storage to the extent stated in paragraphs 108 to 113 of this Report, but do not think that it is a complete answer to the problem, and, as will be seen from the contents of this Chapter, we have taken a broader outlook. Naturally storage looms large in the minds of many people at the present time, due to the difficulties of importing foodstuffs on account of the scarcity of shipping, but it must be remembered by those advocates of extensive storage that not only would it be costly, but it would also entail the importation of materials such as cement, iron and steel, the very materials on which the Armed Forces have, and rightly so, first call, which would involve a considerable amount of shipping space.

107. We will deal first with the question of storage, and must stress at the outset that by our terms of reference we are restricted to making recommendations to prevent a further food shortage in the Colony and are not concerned with the question of storage in relation to the exportation of foodstuffs to the Middle East in response to the Minister of State's appeal made in November, 1941, the probability of Kenya having to play its part in assisting to feed the starving populations of countries freed from the enemy's yoke, nor are we concerned with any policy which may be in the minds of Government or others for the purpose of fostering and promoting the post-war export trade in agricultural products. Such matters are mentioned only to show that they have occurred to us.

108. We had much evidence as to the necessity to erect storage in the Colony to assist in preventing a further food shortage. This evidence varied both as regards the form such storage should take and also where it should be sited. We had not the advantage of the evidence of any expert on storage and must mention that not one of us has any special knowledge of this subject.

Some witnesses advocated that grain silos, including conditioning machinery, should be erected; others ordinary weather- and vermin-proof storage together with a conditioning plant, and yet again, others advocated ordinary weather- and vermin-proof storage at high altitudes, where the temperature inhibits the propagation of weevils.

As already stated in paragraph 107 of this Report, we are only concerned with the subject of storage in so far as it is necessary to prevent an internal food shortage, and bearing in mind that the present food shortage only seriously affected the natives we only propose to deal with the storage of a reserve of foodstuffs necessary to prevent the natives going short of food in the future.

109. As will be seen from Chapter X of this Report, we have referred to the practical aspects which the subject of nutrition has in planning for the future supply of foodstuffs. The question of storage is one illustration of that practical aspect, because the type of produce to be stored has a marked effect on the type of storage to be erected.

In Chapter X of this Report we advocate a more balanced diet for the natives and point out the valuable properties of wimbi (finger millet) as a food. Also, in the same Chapter, we stress that wimbi is not prone to attacks by weevils and other insects. It can be stored safely for long periods in any type of store

at any altitude, provided the store is weather- and vermin-proof. Not only will the storage of wimbi, which must, of course, mean disposing of it annually for consumption, help in improving the diet of the native, but, on account of its resistance to weevil and other insects, expensive storage is not required, nor are the places where it can be stored restricted to those at high altitudes.

We have no evidence as to how much wimbi is at present grown in the native reserves, but we had evidence that if a demand for it is created wimbi will be forthcoming on to the market, and we have also received information that it takes a relatively short time to grow.

Accordingly we recommend that part of the reserve supply of foodstuffs against a future food shortage should take the form of wimbi.

In addition, we recommend that the balance of that reserve should take the form of maize and other suitable foodstuffs and that the whole reserve should be sufficient for the needs of the Colony for about three to four months in normal times. In mentioning such a period we cannot dismiss from our minds that in normal times foodstuffs can be imported to tide over any protracted shortage.

It may be necessary to increase the amount of the reserve during the present abnormal times, and this should be done if production is sufficient to provide a large enough surplus over internal requirements.

In order that wimbi will be produced on the market in sufficient quantities to provide a reserve stock for storage, and also in order to keep it in circulation for consumption by employed natives, it is essential that the reserve should be turned over each year. In our view the only method of doing this is for employers of labour to purchase and mix it with maize meal for issuing to their native employees. This will entail a good deal of co-operation on the part of employers and also propaganda as to the value of wimbi as a foodstuff on account of its calcium contents. **To effect this we recommend that Government should take the initiative by purchasing annually a certain proportion of wimbi from this reserve, mixing it with maize meal and issuing the mixed meal to those of its native employees who are in receipt of rations.**

We have not forgotten that until wimbi is produced in quantities sufficient to build up an adequate reserve stock, more maize will have to be stored, but it may be that the production of wimbi could be undertaken at once, so that there will be sufficient of it to provide a reserve stock before maize is again in plentiful supply to permit of a surplus for storing as a reserve against a future food shortage.

110. As to the type of store which should be erected, the weight of evidence is against expensive grain silos. We agree with that weight of evidence and consider that caution should be exercised before embarking on any scheme of expensive storage for a reserve stock of grain.

We realize the susceptibility of maize to attacks by weevil and are fully conscious of the loss in weight caused by this, but **we recommend that it is much better to spend a certain amount of money in erecting weather- and vermin-proof stores at high altitudes for storage of a reserve stock of maize rather than to embark upon an expensive scheme of grain silos which, for the purpose of preventing a further food shortage, will be unnecessary if inexpensive stores at high altitudes prove successful.**

As to the places where these ordinary stores should be erected, this is a matter for experts, and we merely point out that on the railway running through the maize-producing areas of Nyanza and Trans Nzoia the two highest points are Timboroa (9,001 ft.) and Mau Summit (8,322 ft.).

111. As a reserve stock of food is an insurance to the public and therefore benefits the whole community, **we recommend that the cost of erecting storage and all other costs ancillary to the storing of a foodstuffs reserve should be met from public funds.**

If, however, the other East African territories wish to be considered in any scheme of storage, this will affect the amount of foodstuffs to be stored, and in that case we consider it reasonable that they should bear a proportionate part of the capital and working costs of such storage.

112. We had evidence from the General Manager of the Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours that if storage is situated at smaller stations where it would be difficult to obtain return loads, the transport cost would be increased. We would point out, however, that once the reserve stocks were established, the problem in normal years would be largely one of renewal and it should be possible to arrange for many of the railway trucks bringing the new crop into storage to carry away the old crop for consumption. On this we recommend that the transportation of foodstuffs which it is essential to store for safeguarding the inhabitants of the Colony from a food shortage should be provided at special rates.

113. A final word about storage—as the native changes over to a more balanced diet the quantities and varieties of foodstuffs required by him will also change. Hence this is another reason why it is unwise to embark on any ambitious and expensive scheme of storage at the present time.

114. Having disposed of, and made recommendations with regard to the question of storage, the next matter which arises is that of assuring that sufficient crops are produced for the internal needs of the population, with a sufficient surplus for storage, and in discussing this the production of maize, which is the main staple food of the natives, must inevitably play the dominant part.

Generally speaking, the problem in the past with regard to maize has been one of the disposal of surpluses, and the exportable surplus of that commodity has been looked upon as an insurance against an internal shortage. Many witnesses emphasized the indispensability of European-grown maize to the Colony on the grounds that there have only been three years between 1927 and 1941 when the Colony has been able to do without European-grown maize, and that during the recent shortage the crop of European-grown maize proved invaluable.

It cannot be stressed too often that out of the total crop of native-grown maize only a fraction of it comes on to the market to feed the native labourers employed in industry. On this aspect of the question the Director of Agriculture, in one of his memoranda which he submitted in evidence before us, expressed his view in this way:—

“Of the total crop of native maize probably at least two-thirds are consumed by the producers within the reserves and it is only the excess one-third or less which finally comes in to the market. This in itself results in tremendous variations in the quantity available for marketing. While a reduction in the crop by 30 per cent, owing to adverse weather conditions, is a probable occurrence, in the case of the non-native it only reduces the saleable surplus by 30 per cent. In the case of the native producer, a similar reduction may wipe out theoretically the whole surplus for sale. In practice, it does not work out quite in this way, since the native will always sell some portion of his crop in order to meet his cash needs, even if he has to go shorter of food than he would like to do.”

Other witnesses put the excess of native-grown maize coming on to the market at less than one-third of the total production, which of course makes the risk of depending solely on native-grown maize all the greater.

Accordingly it would be running a grave risk to adopt a policy that the Colony should rely solely on native-grown maize to satisfy its internal needs. If the broader outlook is taken, that is that Kenya has in the past exported considerable quantities of maize to Tanganyika and Uganda, that risk becomes greater still. With regard to such a risk, it must be remembered that many industries, such as sisal, coffee, tea, pyrethrum, mining, and the various industries carried on in and around the larger towns, are dependent on maize for feeding their labour, nor must the needs of the stock industry, which relies to some extent on maize to feed to stock, be forgotten.

The importance of the European-grown maize crop to the Colony was commented on by the Economic Development Committee, 1935, in paragraph 180 of their Report, where it is stated: "The information given to us is that native production does not now and has not in the past sufficed to supply the local market."

We are left in no doubt that the risk of relying solely on native grown maize to satisfy the internal maize needs of the Colony should not be taken. From the evidence we heard and the figures we examined we feel that the annual maize requirements of the Colony could not be met safely without approximately 400,000 bags of European grown maize. **Accordingly we recommend that for the period European grown maize is indispensable to the Colony's requirements in normal times Government should enter into a contract, through the agency of the K.F.A., to purchase about 400,000 bags of European grown maize per annum at a price fixed after consulting producing and consuming interests. Consideration should be given as to the form that contract should take, bearing in mind that adequate notice of its cancellation or variation will be necessary.**

We would point out that the figure of 400,000 bags just mentioned may have to be varied from time to time, and that is one of the reasons why we have provided in our recommendation for adequate notice being given of any variation in that contract. We would also mention that the price fixed in the above-mentioned contract will probably require to be higher than the basic price referred to in paragraph 124 of this Report.

115. Having recommended that the production of European-grown maize to the extent stated in paragraph 114 should be encouraged, it is appropriate here to set out the maize problem, with all its complications, as it appears to us. That problem is—

(a) The Colony is largely dependent on maize to feed the natives in the reserves and also to feed natives in townships and those employed in industry. In addition, both Tanganyika and Uganda rely to some extent on Kenya for their imports of maize.

(b) Uncontrolled planting of maize is ruining the fertility of the soil both in the settled areas and in the native reserves, mainly because it lays the soil open to erosion, and unless steps are taken to bring such planting under control then Kenya, being primarily an agricultural country and so dependent on the fertility of its soil, will irreparably ruin its chief national asset.

(c) Since the Colony cannot safely depend on native-grown maize to satisfy its internal requirements, it must look to the European farmer to produce a certain amount of maize. The European farmer cannot afford to produce maize for sale unless he obtains a return at least equal to that obtainable from other farming activities.

(d) Experience to date shows that a price which satisfies the European farmer is one which would encourage the natives to plant maize to excess in the native reserves, thereby doing irreparable damage to the soil.

(e) In Kenya, unlike other maize-producing countries in Africa, such as South Africa and the Rhodesias, the main industries are agricultural. Industries such as coffee, tea and sisal, must export their produce to compete on the world's markets and, like most agricultural industries, are subject to considerable price fluctuations. These agricultural industries, generally referred to in connexion with the maize problem as consuming interests, have so far contended that they cannot afford to pay high prices for maize, as this would increase the prices of their own agricultural produce and so adversely affect them on the world's markets. Witnesses representing these consuming interests pointed out to us that in South Africa and the Rhodesias the problem is different from that in Kenya, as in those countries the consuming interests are mainly represented by wealthy mining concerns.

This is the problem in a nutshell as it appears to us, and is one which has perplexed the Government and the public of Kenya for many years. We cannot escape this problem, because its solution is vital to the measures which we recommend should be taken to prevent a future food shortage.

116. As already stated, the insurance against a shortage of maize in the past has been an exportable surplus, but if the recommendations we have advocated in this Chapter with regard to storage are accepted and implemented, then there would appear to be no need to rely on an exportable surplus of maize as an insurance against internal shortage. This leads us to consider whether the policy of encouraging the production of maize for export should be continued. As stated in paragraph 20 of this Report, the Bowring Committee in 1922 recommended the encouragement of increased production of European-grown maize primarily with a view to stimulating the export trade in that commodity, but at that time there was no question of storing maize and other produce against internal shortage, nor was the public of the Colony then so fully alive to the evils of soil erosion.

In view of the reduction of the acreage of European-grown maize which we believe is primarily due to the low price which it has commanded over a period of years, there can be no doubt that the European maize-grower cannot afford to compete on the overseas market by exporting maize, for which he received between the years 1934 to 1942, as stated in Section A of Chapter VIII of this Report, a maximum price of Sh. 7/35 and a minimum price of Sh. 2/05 per bag. Therefore if the internal price of maize, which exceeds the export parity price, has been an uneconomic one for the European maize-grower, it appears to us inevitable that the European maize-grower will not produce maize for the export market entailing, as several witnesses stated to us, "exporting the fertility of the soil".

Many witnesses who appeared before us expressed the opinion that the export of maize is no longer in the interests of the Colony nor of the maize-growers. As has already been pointed out in Section D of Chapter VIII of this Report, the Director of Agriculture stated that it had been the policy of his Department to advocate a reduction in the growing of maize and that maize grown by European farmers should be disposed of by feeding to stock and sold in the form of bacon and other secondary products. When recalled to give further evidence, he stated that he did not consider the export of maize to be any good to Kenya or to the maize producers because the export of maize had served its purpose in the development of the country, and that for a number of years past his Department had been urging the reduction of maize-growing for export and a change-over to what is called mixed farming, involving the introduction of stock, and also, in the case of the native reserves, had pointed out that more maize is being grown there at present than is good for the land.

117. We agree that the production of maize should be limited to producing the amount necessary for the internal needs of East Africa and for storing sufficient as a famine reserve. In doing so we realize it is impossible to produce the exact amount for those purposes, which means, for safety, planning for a small exportable surplus. **But, we recommend that such exportable surplus should be kept as small as possible and that the future policy of the Colony should be not to encourage the production of maize for export.**

Having decided that the European-grown maize crop is necessary for the internal needs of the Colony and that the production of maize for export should not be encouraged, we must now deal with the question of the price for both European- and native-grown maize on the local market, and at the same time express our views on whether the price for native-grown maize should be on a parity with that of European-grown maize.

118. Dealing with the question of price, it is convenient here for us to trace the history of the prices of European- and native-grown maize since the introduction of maize control on the 1st July, 1942.

As stated in paragraph 27 of this Report, the European farmer in December, 1941, was assured of at least Sh. 8/50 per bag for maize from the 1942-43 crop, and eventually this was increased to Sh. 9 per bag, grade K.2 maize, which was the price at which the Maize Control Board began to take over European-grown maize as from the 1st July, 1942, on the inception of Maize Control.

From the evidence we have heard, there is no doubt that this guaranteed price was fixed separately and independently of the price fixed later for native-grown maize.

With regard to the price for native-grown maize, it must first be appreciated that native maize producers in most cases sell their maize to traders loose in a *debe*. (A *debe* is a native measure equivalent to a quarter-bushel, and, as already explained, seven *debes* are calculated as equivalent to a bag containing 200 lb. of maize. Hence it is convenient that whatever price is fixed per bag of maize that price should be divisible by seven, so that an exact price can be calculated per *debe* of maize.)

As Nyanza is the main area in the Colony producing native-grown maize, the opinion of the Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza, was sought by Government before the price of native-grown maize was fixed. After he had made inquiries he recommended in January, 1942, that the price of native-grown maize from the 1942-43 crop should be fixed at 70 cents per *debe*, which, he stated, was 10 cents more than the best price which the natives had received for their maize at the well-situated market at Yala, near Kisumu, in 1941. This recommendation was accepted by Government, but was not made known to the public until the 3rd July, 1942. As stated briefly in paragraph 84 of this Report, we consider that it was a mistake not to have announced this price for native-grown maize earlier in 1942. The Chairman of the Maize Board, when recalled to give evidence, stated that it was impossible to fix a price for native-grown maize earlier in 1942 because the Maize Control scheme had not then been formulated; that the question of transport was then acute, and it was not known whether crops grown in distant places could be transported; and that on account of considering the many suggestions made for fixing the price, the price eventually fixed could not have been announced earlier. We are not impressed by these reasons, and consider that the price for native-grown maize could and should have been announced early in 1942, when it could have had the effect of increasing planting. Neither can we agree with the Chairman of the Maize Board when he stated in evidence that if the price could not have been announced in January or February, 1942, it did not matter to any extent when it was announced. We are of the opinion that if it had been announced early in 1942, when the native-grown maize was in free supply and, generally speaking, commanding a lower price than 70 cents per *debe*, the native maize-grower would have realized that he was going to get a higher price for his next crop than he did in 1941. But when the price of 70 cents a *debe*, or Sh. 4/90 per 200 lb., was announced on the 3rd July, 1942, by which time the price for native-grown maize had risen in many places to above that figure, because the middle of the year is the off-season when maize prices usually increase, it compared unfavourably with the price for native-grown maize then prevailing, with the result, as one Administrative Officer put it, the price of Sh. 4/90 when announced "went off like a damp squib".

119. After the price for European-grown maize had been guaranteed at Sh. 9 per bag and that for native-grown maize fixed at Sh. 4/90 per 200 lb., the disparity between the two prices became the subject of a certain amount of criticism. Much of it appears to us to have been ill-informed, in that it was made without adequate appreciation of the facts. In view of this criticism, Government made a comparison between the price of Sh. 9 for European-grown maize and Sh. 4/90 for native-grown maize. Before setting out the details of that comparison, the following particulars of the Maize Control scheme should be quoted:—

- (a) A native maize-grower is able to sell and deliver his maize at any time, whereas the European maize-grower has to keep it stored until called upon by the Maize Control to deliver it.
- (b) The native maize-grower, on the inception of control, was paid the full price for his maize, without any deduction for transport, delivered at any market within 15 miles of railhead, whereas the European maize-grower had to transport and deliver his maize at railhead.

(c) The European maize-grower has to deliver his maize in 10-ton lots in bags, each weighing 200 lb. net, each bag costing Sh. 1/20, whilst the native maize-grower delivers his maize loose to a trader in any quantities he pleases.

It should be pointed out that the European maize-grower receives the full guaranteed price for grade K.2 maize only, correspondingly less for inferior grades, and that any native maize-grower who is prepared to deliver K.2 maize in 10-ton lots at railhead is paid the same price as the European maize-grower. Having made this clear, we now set out the comparisons between the two prices in July, 1942, October, 1942, and January, 1943. They are as follows:—

	<i>Sh. cts.</i>
JULY, 1942—	
Price to European maize grower per 200 lb. grade K.2 maize, bagged	900
<i>Deduct—</i>	<i>Sh. cts.</i>
Cost of bag	1 20
Average transport to railhead	60
Holding expenses (storage, finance and insurance) ..	55
	2 35
Plus allowance for average difference in quality between European K.2 maize and native maize	50
	2 85

Therefore, after allowing for the above, the price of European grown maize is reduced to (Sh. 9, minus Sh. 2/85) Sy. 6/15, which is still Sh. 1/25 above the price of Sh. 4/90 for native-grown maize. This difference of Sh. 1/25 is accounted for by—

	<i>Sh. cts.</i>
Trader's commission, representing value of the marketing facilities afforded to native growers	50
Funded to Native Betterment Fund	75
	1 25

OCTOBER, 1942—	
Price to European maize grower per 200 lb. grade K.2 maize, bagged	9 00
<i>Deduct—</i>	<i>Sh. cts.</i>
Cost of bag	1 20
Holding expenses and difference in quality	1 10
	2 30

(NOTE.—Average transport not included because native grower had to bear his own transport from October, 1942.)

Therefore, after allowing for the above, the price of European maize is reduced to Sh. 6/70, which is 50 cents higher than the price of Sh. 6/20 for native maize and this 50 cents is accounted for by the trader's commission.

JANUARY, 1943—	
Price to European maize grower per 200 lb. grade K.2 maize, bagged	12 00
<i>Deduct—</i>	<i>Sh. cts.</i>
Cost of bag	1 20
Holding expenses and difference in quality	1 32
	2 52

Therefore, after allowing for the above, the price of European maize is reduced to Sh. 9/48, which is 52 cents higher than the price of Sh. 8/96 for native maize. This 52 cents is accounted for by 50 cents trader's commission, and the remaining 2 cents by the price for native maize being fixed at Sh. 8/96 instead of Sh. 8/98, because the former is divisible by seven and so allows for an exact price being fixed per *debe*.

We have set out the above comparisons in detail because we found during our sittings a great deal of misunderstanding of the position amongst the public and have no doubt that much of the criticism in relation to the difference in the two sets of prices has been made because many of the critics never fully understood the position. For ourselves, we carefully explained to two groups of natives the difference in the two sets of prices and the reasons therefor, and in each case they stated that they wished this had been fully explained to them earlier as they now appreciated the reasons for the difference. It appears to us that there had been little effective propaganda with regard to explaining the reasons for the differences in the two sets of prices, and this lack of propaganda undoubtedly led to ill-informed criticism.

120. We are of the opinion that it is unfortunate that the prices of European- and native-grown maize were ever compared in the circumstances, and consider that Government adopted the right policy in the first instance in fixing the two prices independently. Generally speaking, unless there are very special reasons to the contrary, we consider that there should be no difference in the price for the same product of similar quality, whether it is produced by Europeans or natives. But, as it appears to us that at that time Government was endeavouring to increase the production of maize so as to be able to export a large quantity for war purposes, full consideration had to be given to the fact that unless the European maize farmer was assured of a price at which it would pay him to grow maize, he would not do so, but would, if he was able, produce other agricultural crops that paid him better. This did not apply in the case of the native farmer. On the contrary, we have had abundant evidence to show that the price necessary to persuade the European farmer to grow maize would encourage the native to grow too much maize, leading inevitably to the destruction of the fertility of the soil in the native reserves.

We have had evidence and considered the effect which the high price of native-grown maize has in bringing more money wealth into the native reserves, which in conjunction with the scarcity of commodities on which the natives can spend their money, is assisting to cause inflation. But, in our view, this is a temporary wartime evil secondary in importance to the permanent damage which will be caused to the soil in the native reserves by the planting of excessive maize due to what is, to the native growers, a high price.

121. As will be seen from paragraph 124 of this Report, we are in favour in normal times of a basic minimum price for maize irrespective of the race of the producer, except, as stated in that paragraph, with regard to a limited quantity of European-grown maize for a temporary period. But during the present abnormal times, involving as they do the responsibility for feeding both the Armed Forces and the labour in essential industries, we are of the opinion that it would be impolitic to adopt any change in the policy of fixing prices for European- and native-grown maize and accordingly **recommend that no change in that policy should be made until times are more normal.**

122. With regard to the prices which should be fixed for normal times and in relation to our recommendation in paragraph 114 of this Report, we have not forgotten that an increase in the price of maize raises the costs of other agricultural industries, such as coffee, sisal, tea, etc., on account of the extra cost involved in feeding their labour, and that those industries must compete on the overseas market for the sale of their produce. We had evidence before us that ten bags of maize meal are required for feeding the native labour required to produce one ton of coffee, and that every Sh. 1 rise in the price of maize meal has the effect of increasing the cost of production of coffee by Sh. 10 per ton. But, with the experience of the present food shortage and the dependence of this Colony on the European-grown maize crop as a partial insurance against a shortage of a commodity which is the main staple foodstuff of the natives, a price, higher than the basic minimum price already referred to in the preceding paragraph, must be faced for a limited quantity of European-grown maize for a temporary period. Agreement as to the price to be paid for this European-grown maize can be reached if representatives of both consuming and producing interests get together and reasonably face the issue, bearing in mind the present

importance of the European-grown maize crop to those consuming interests, otherwise maize may have to be imported, and the memory of 1929 is not far distant when the price of imported maize was Sh. 19 per bag at Nairobi.

123. It is convenient here to summarize the recommendations so far made to prevent a recurrence of a food shortage. These relate to—

- (a) storage of crops as a famine reserve;
- (b) indispensability of a certain quantity of European-grown maize;
- (c) discouragement of the production of maize for export;
- (d) retention of the present price policy for both European- and native-grown maize until conditions become more normal.

This leads us to the next point, which is for what periods prices should be fixed.

124. We had much evidence by practical farmers that agriculture is an industry in which it is particularly necessary to plan ahead, and to do so the farmer must know, with reasonable certainty, the price which his produce will command on the market. The Rt. Hon. Lord Addison of Stallingborough, Minister of Agriculture in His Majesty's Government, 1930 to 1931, in his book entitled *A Policy for British Agriculture*, at page 74, stated as follows:—

“When a food producer is confronted by prices that make it impossible for him to continue his production and get a living, he cannot suddenly switch over to something else; nor can he cease production. In this respect agriculture differs from most other producing industries. When a manufacturer finds orders slowing down he can diminish production. When orders come in again the machinery that is still there can soon be re-started for production. Labour, of course, suffers, all the time in all cases, under our present system, but the capacity for production is still there in most industries.

It is not so with land. Cultivation must be continued in one form or other or nature will replace it by a crop of weeds that may entail a summer fallow of the land, with nothing at all being grown, before any sort of production can be resumed.”

From three to five years was suggested to us as reasonable periods during which the price of European grown maize should be fixed. As regards the native price, a number of witnesses were in favour of a fixation of price before each planting season. We agree with the desirability of fixing prices for a certain period and recommend that when times are normal a basic minimum price for all maize, other than the limited supply of European-grown maize mentioned in paragraph 114 of this report, should be fixed before each planting season, after consultation with producing and consuming interests.

125. We had a considerable amount of evidence from European farmers that if they are assured of a reasonable price for their produce, then even in peace-time steps should be taken to see that their land is farmed efficiently in accordance with the principles of good husbandry. With regard to this, reference should be made to the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942. The provisions of that Ordinance are administered by the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, which has its headquarters in Nairobi, assisted by District Production and Man Power Committees and Sub-committees established throughout the Colony. Through these Committees and Sub-committees the Board controls the programme of production of all non-native farmers in the Colony. The procedure for this is done by each farmer submitting his production programme in the first instance to the appropriate sub-committee which forwards the programme with its recommendations to the District Committee, which in turn passes it on to the Board with its recommendations. The planting programme, as submitted or as revised by the Board after considering any recommendations made by the Committees and Sub-committees, is followed by a planting order served on the farmer, who must carry out its provisions or show adequate reasons why he is unable to do so.

The Ordinance provides for the making of grants of money contingent on breaking and clearing land and the crops yielding certain minimum returns per acre, as described in paragraph 55 of this Report. It also provides, and this is the provision which we wish to discuss, for members of the Sub-committees and Committees in the various districts entering upon farms to see that planting orders are being complied with and that crops are being cultivated in accordance with the rules of good husbandry. The functions of these District Committees and Sub-committees appear to us to be analogous to those of the County War Agricultural Committees set up in England during this war. With regard to these Committees and Sub-committees, the Director of Agriculture in the debate on the Increased Production of Crops Bill in Legislative Council said (*see* Hansard, 1942, Vol. XIV, columns 37 and 38):—

“The second point was referred to by several speakers, and that is the question of sensibility on the part of the Production and Man Power Sub-committees of their responsibilities. I should like to say, Sir, that from conversations I have had with individuals and from what has transpired at various meetings I have attended when this subject has been under discussion, I believe that almost without exception these Sub-committees have a very real sense of their responsibility to Government and are out to protect the country’s finances in every way they can.”

From the evidence before us at sittings throughout the Colony we heard nothing but praise for the work done by these District Committees and Sub-committees, and we also had the advantage of attending a meeting of the Uasin Gishu District Committee at Eldoret. These Committees and Sub-committees are composed of local farmers with intimate knowledge of the land in the area over which they exercise jurisdiction and they understand the individual difficulties of the local farmers. There is no doubt that they are doing valuable work, not only for the Government but also for the agricultural industry of the Colony, and their knowledge of local conditions is of the utmost value in advising what crops should be planted in the various farming areas throughout the country.

The value to the Colony of these Committees and Sub-committees should not be lost after the war. General policy must always remain to be directed from headquarters, but when advice is required of what action is necessary to get the best out of the land in the various farming areas of the Colony, local knowledge and advice are invaluable. For this reason we consider that everything possible should be done to foster close liaison between these Committees and Sub-committees and the local Agricultural Officers on a permanent basis, because by doing so we have no doubt that this will be of lasting benefit to the agricultural industry of the Colony.

We note that the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, does not expire, unless otherwise decided by Legislative Council, until the 31st December, 1946, and if it remains in force until then it will be long enough to judge of the workings of these committees and sub-committees throughout the Colony. For ourselves, on the evidence before us, we have no hesitation now in **recommending that the authority and supervision of these committees and sub-committees should be maintained on a permanent basis in peace-time.**

126. Still dealing with the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, there is, as has already been stated, power to declare guaranteed prices for crops, and, up to the present, prices have been guaranteed for wheat, maize, rye, barley, oats and potatoes, amongst the foodstuffs crops. On this we had considerable evidence that with regard to guaranteed prices for crops, unless the production of any particular crop is so vital that it should be produced at the expense of the production of other crops, prices for crops should be so correlated to each other that each crop is put into its proper perspective. It is not reasonable to expect Committees or Sub-committees appointed under the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, to order a farmer to produce a certain crop when there are other crops which pay him better. As one experienced farmer put it to us in his evidence, commenting on the importance of the maize crop to East Africa

and the uneconomic prices paid for European-grown maize: "I consider that maize has never been put in its proper perspective as a staple food of this country, and neither has its importance in the economic structure of not only Kenya but also the adjoining territories."

Hence we recommend that in the present policy of fixing guaranteed prices for agricultural products, such prices should be so correlated that the return from any particular product, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, should not be greatly in excess of the returns obtainable from other agricultural products.

127. Under the Statistics Ordinance (Cap. 31 of the Revised Edition), as amended by the Statistics (Amendment) Ordinance, 1926, there is provision for the collection and compilation of statistics relating, *inter alia*, to agricultural, dairying, horticultural and pastoral industries, population, employment and unemployment, but owing to the war no statistics have been collected and published under this Ordinance since 1938. In 1926 the Statistical Section attached to the Governors' Conference Secretariat was established, but was abolished, according to the evidence before us, in 1932.

Both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller gave evidence that they were severely handicapped by the lack of statistics and this was especially so with regard to the figures of the consumption of maize, the lack of which, as has already been stressed in Section L of Chapter VIII of this Report, was an important factor leading up to the reasons why the shortage of maize was not appreciated earlier.

128. With regard to our inquiry, we are only concerned with statistics in relation to the matters mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Generally speaking, statistics are required for two different purposes, one for information and the other for research to throw fresh light on problems.

In this connexion it is of interest to refer briefly to the method used by the K.F.A. in estimating the quantity of non-native grown maize which they expect to come on to the market through their organization. Their system, which has been in existence for many years, is based on returns submitted to them by their members. These returns, which are sent out in September or October each year, give details of the estimated deliveries which the farmer expects to make to the K.F.A. Many farmers fail to render these returns, and as the K.F.A. usually only get them back from about 60 per cent of their total membership, they estimate what they may expect to receive from the remaining 40 per cent by taking their actual deliveries in the previous year. Having obtained a total figure of estimate in this way, they then deduct 10 to 15 per cent to off-set the optimism of the farmer. These estimates are revised in February or March, by which time harvesting is generally nearing completion. At best this is only a rough and ready method of estimating, entirely dependent on the co-operation of the farmer.

However statistics are to be kept, and this is important, there should be a system whereby statistics and estimates are readily made available to the persons who should be kept informed of them. There has been ample evidence before us illustrating the absence of the passing on of information with regard to vital statistics. For instance, with regard to estimating the non-native maize crop, this was the responsibility of the Agricultural Department up to the establishment of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board in February, 1942, and then it became the function of that Board. The Deputy Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board gave evidence that if the Board had been asked to give estimates of non-native crops it could have done so, but that it was never asked to supply such information. This shows a lack of appreciation of the value of estimates and also a lack of system for imparting such information to the persons vitally concerned.

129. With the many Controls established in the Colony during the war, dealing with production, rationing and distribution, and the consumption of food-stuffs, it appears to us that it is important that statistics, both estimates and actual, should be made readily available to the persons concerned, otherwise Controls

cannot function efficiently, and in this connexion we recommend that urgent consideration should be given as to how such statistics are to be obtained and pooled to the best advantage.

130. As to estimates of the native-grown maize crop which comes on to the market, these are made by Agricultural Officers, who by virtue of their knowledge and experience of the particular areas in which they are stationed consider, after taking into account weather and other conditions, whether the current crop is better or worse than previous crops from which actual figures are available of what amounts came on to the market from those previous crops. None of the witnesses from the Agricultural Department could suggest any better method of estimating the amount of the native-grown maize crop which would come on to the market, except that the Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza, stated that this year he proposes that certain areas in the Kitosh region, which is one of the most important native maize-producing areas as regards native-grown maize coming on to the market, should be measured. We confess that we ourselves are unable to make any useful suggestions for improving the methods of estimating the native-grown maize crop except that consideration should be given to this important matter by experts in the hope that some better methods of estimation may possibly be devised.

131. Even the recommendations we have already made do not take us far enough on long-range planning, nor do they get to the root of the real problem of food planning. This problem can only be appreciated and solved by taking the broadest possible outlook and by not trying to solve food problems in watertight compartments. We ourselves have had to deal with maize in a watertight compartment in this Report because for the present and the immediate future it is necessary to plan and make recommendations mainly to prevent a recurrence of a shortage in that commodity. But this short-term planning, which cannot prove of lasting benefit to the community, merely postpones the solution of the real problem to a later date in the not far distant future.

132. As we have already stated in paragraph 9 of this Report, "whatever measures are taken to implement food plans, then inevitably agricultural policy and nutrition come into the picture". In the remaining part of this Chapter we propose to deal with agricultural policy, devoting the next immediate Chapter to the effect and importance of the subject of nutrition in a policy planned to prevent future food shortages.

133. In one of his memoranda submitted to us by the Director of Agriculture the following statement occurs:—

"I have pointed out on several occasions since the beginning of the war and have been frequently quoted as saying that Kenya had by 1939 reached, if not passed, the optimum production of maize in the native reserves. We have now undoubtedly passed that optimum and although under present circumstances the encouragement of further production of maize and other cereals may be justified, we must return at the earliest possible moment to a reduced production of cereals and an increase in leguminous and other crops and, even more important, the use of stock as an integral part of the native farming economy. The latter is essential from the point of view of the actual foodstuffs which such stock will provide, such as meat and milk, and the value of that stock in maintaining the fertility of the crop lands. It is well known that for some years past the Department has been continuously advocating a change-over to what is generally termed 'mixed farming' in both native and non-native areas."

This statement not only sounds a warning note that the amount of native-grown maize available for consumption in the future will gradually decrease, but it also impliedly advocates that the diet of the native should be changed. It is no use advocating an increase in the production of leguminous and other crops in the native reserves unless those crops are to be consumed. This shows the importance of appreciating that a food policy depends on agricultural policy and that both are inescapably interwoven with the problem of nutrition, which, in Kenya, means first and foremost planning a food policy based on the needs of the natives, who form 98.5 per cent of the population.

134. In addition to the above statement by the Director of Agriculture, we have had much evidence, mainly from the Director and his Agricultural Officers, that the position in many of the native reserves is serious on account of the destruction of the fertility of the soil, very often due to the excessive planting of maize, and the reason why the optimum production of maize in the native reserves has been reached, if not passed, is due to the yields per acre decreasing year by year on account of this loss of fertility.

We have had evidence from farmers as well as Agricultural Officers that the same trend of events is taking place in the Settled Areas and that large areas of European maize-growing land have gone permanently out of production due to the yields per acre having decreased owing to this loss of soil fertility. In our view the yields per acre of European-grown maize quoted in paragraph 21 of this Report do not give the true picture because if the land which has gone out of maize production were still planted with maize, the average yield per acre would be very different.

Hence we must take cognizance of the warnings of both members of the Agricultural Department and farmers who, mainly on account of the loss of fertility of the soil, are unanimous in their opinion that the future for the production of maize with uneconomic yields is not very bright.

Accordingly, to make secure the future food supplies of the Colony, a policy must be adopted which will include the two essentials—agricultural planning on mixed farming lines in both native and non-native areas, and changing the diet of the native, not only because it will raise his standard of health but also because, if it is not done, there may come a time when there will be insufficient maize to satisfy the needs of the native population.

135. We have had the advantage of reading the Annual Report of the Agricultural Department for 1939, in which the Director of Agriculture lays down what he considers should be the agricultural policy for both the European farming community and also for the native reserves. As regards native agriculture, the Director stated as follows:—

“A policy for native agriculture in the present stage of the development of the native must make provision for the following matters in the order given:—

- (a) a sufficiency of food to maintain life;
- (b) maintenance of fertility to enable an agricultural life to continue on a non-diminishing scale, and to provide the essential constant factor for improvement;
- (c) adequate nutrition to ensure a healthy and energetic population;
- (d) the production of a proportion of products which are saleable to enable him to make money for his small needs.

The whole has to be made into a policy tending towards an improved standard, which in turn will create demands for further improvement. . . . The general lines which are advocated to put such policy into effect are:—

- (a) suitable main food crops adapted to the circumstances of the particular area under consideration, and, in areas where mixed farming is possible, stock husbandry as an integral part of this farming with a sufficient variety of subsidiary crops from the nutritional aspect. These crops have to be fitted into a rotation suited to the area concerned which will enable fertility to be maintained;
- (b) the adoption of measures necessary to maintain fertility additional to those provided by good farming practice, such as the contour ridging of cultivated lands, the preservation of grazing areas by rotational grazing, the closing of slopes which are too steep for this purpose to cultivation, prevention of cultivation up to the banks of rivers, streams and roads.”

We agree with the views of the Director, which accord with much of the evidence we have heard. We would stress that in our view mixed farming is essential in the native reserves if the fertility of the soil is to be recovered and if the diet of the natives is to be changed, making him less reliant on maize.

136. We heard much evidence on the necessity for planting crops such as cassava, finger millet (wimbi), sweet potatoes, pigeon pea and other drought-resisting and famine reserve crops in the native reserves. We agree that this should be done, and there is power to do it under the Native Authority Ordinance, 1937, by Local Native Council resolutions.

137. Before making the recommendation in the following paragraph, we would point out that the importance and utility of the agricultural industry to any country has come to be realized more in this war than ever before and has brought the public to a greater realization of the value of the land. In this connexion we cannot do better than quote the following extract from the Report of the Committee on Land Utilization in Rural Areas presided over by the Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Scott, P.C., in England in 1942:—

“It is clear that the impact of war has not only brought agriculture into the front line of essential services for the purpose of national defence, but has stimulated a movement within the industry itself which is already creating a new outlook. There is now rapidly emerging, partly due to the stimulus of war, not only among the farmers themselves, but among the general public, a lively appreciation of the importance of our oldest industry and a determination to make proper use of the land which is one of our greatest national assets.”

138. Having stressed that the problem of food cannot be divorced from agriculture and nutrition, we recommend, on broad principles, the formulation and adoption of a long term policy for agriculture, containing the following essentials:—

- (1) **Regard for the needs of the population, with particular reference to improving the diet and raising the standard of health of the natives;**
- (2) **The encouragement of mixed farming both in the settled areas and the native reserves;**
- (3) **The raising of the efficiency of both native and non-native farming, with particular emphasis on the fact that the fertility of the soil is the Colony's main asset.**

139. It was brought out in evidence that continuity in carrying out policy is essential to the success of a properly planned agricultural economy in native areas, and with this end in view many Administrative and Agricultural Officers, as well as some non-official witnesses, expressed themselves in favour of the establishment of Provincial Development Boards with official and non-official representation.

We agree with the views put forward and recommend that Government should give consideration to the establishment of such development boards, which would be charged with the duty of carrying out, inter alia, agricultural development schemes within the framework of the general agricultural policy.

140. We should make reference to the fact that several witnesses mentioned the problem of land tenure in native reserves and stressed the urgent need of an early solution to this problem, without which it is difficult to make any real progress in permanent agricultural planning. In this connexion, the Director of Agriculture, in one of his memoranda submitted to us, stated:—

“It is not for me to suggest here what is the type of land tenure at which we should aim in the future, but I am very certain that before the improved type of agriculture to which we must look forward can become general, a policy of land tenure has to be thrashed out and adopted so that agriculture can be fitted in with the type of land tenure agreed. It is not suggested that the type of land tenure should be the same throughout the Colony or through-

out a Province. While in favourable areas clearly the mixed farming small-holding is the ideal at which to aim, in the less favoured areas agricultural development on a more communal type of ownership will be the aim."

141. There is one other matter which remains to be considered before ending this Chapter, and this concerns the Coast Province. We had evidence from the Senior Agricultural Officer of that Province that the average native is particularly prone to sell more maize than he can spare to get money for his various needs, which very often necessitates his buying back deteriorated maize at a much higher price than that at which he sold his own maize.

The Senior Agricultural Officer advocated, and in this he was supported by other senior officials with considerable experience in the Coast Province, that the sale and export of maize from a district should be prohibited until such time as it is seen that the prospects of the next crop are assured.

As has already been stated, under the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance (Cap. 135 of the Revised Edition), the Governor in Council may prohibit the purchase of maize and other native foodstuffs for export and also their export from a district when there is a danger of a famine occurring in that district. This procedure, the Senior Agricultural Officer of the Coast Province submitted to us, means that by the time the closure takes place, which is when there is a possibility of a famine, most of the maize has been exported from the district and the damage has been done. He submitted that it is much better in the interests of the natives that the procedure should be the other way round and that maize should not be allowed to be exported from a district in the Coast Province until it has been ascertained with reasonable certainty that the next succeeding harvest will not fail.

We are in agreement with this suggestion, which the Senior Agricultural Officer informed us has been followed for some time, in so far as the Coast Province is concerned, and recommend that, so far as that Province is concerned, the law should be amended to permit of this being done legally by the Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province, instead of by the Governor in Council.

We have recommended that this power should be vested in the Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province, because, in our view, this is a local matter which at times may require urgent action.

CHAPTER X

NUTRITION AND DIETETICS

142. We make no apology for emphasizing again that any plans with regard to food must include consideration of agricultural policy and nutrition.

European and Indian diets are governed by special considerations which place them outside the scope of our inquiry. We would say, however, that the agricultural policy of the country should be such as to provide adequate quantities of the foodstuffs required for the dietetic needs of these communities.

With regard to the native population, we had valuable evidence from the Director of Medical Services and officers of his Department, and the benefit of perusing many memoranda produced by them. We have also had evidence from an independent medical man of long experience in this country. In all this evidence there is complete unanimity that both in regard to natives in the reserves and those in employment outside the reserves there is a marked degree of malnutrition resulting from an unbalanced diet; too much emphasis being placed on starch food, particularly maize, with a corresponding deficiency in foods providing the necessary quantities of protein, mineral salts and vitamins.

With regard to the question of protective foodstuffs, we quote the following passage from a memorandum on the *Preliminary Investigation into Measures of a National or International Character for Raising the Standard of Living*, published in 1938 by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations:—

“In the field of nutrition, the evidence provided by recent research into the subject among African and Asiatic peoples tends to the conclusion that food deficiency is more qualitative than quantitative, though real hunger and semi-starvation before the harvest are not unknown in some areas. As in Europe, the deficiencies are in respect of the ‘protective’ foods which supply the protein, mineral and vitamin elements essential to the attainment of health and the prevention of specific diseases.

The economic problem therefore is how to develop these people and the land to the point where they can make good the deficiencies.”

We have had evidence that the undue prominence of maize in the native diet (and therefore in his agricultural economy) has been a development of the last 30 years or so. From the early days of European settlement the practice has become established of giving 2 lb. of maize meal per day as the basic ration for employed labour. Although some employers, realizing the importance of a better balanced diet, do now issue some additional food, the tradition of the 2 lb. of maize meal still persists.

The increasing number of natives in employment resulted in an increasing demand for maize. The native thus found that he had a ready market for maize grown surplus to his own requirements and reacted by growing more maize to the exclusion of other food crops in many areas. He could always sell maize to meet his cash requirements. Surpluses of other foodstuffs had not such a ready market and less and less were grown.

We have no doubt, from the evidence before us, that this tendency was highly unfortunate both from the agricultural and the nutritional points of view.

Consideration of the foregoing, however, logically indicates the manner in which the position may in part be improved. If a more balanced diet were issued to employed labour the demand for other foodstuffs would be created and the demand for maize would decrease. The native farmer would find that he had as ready a market for his surpluses of other foods as for maize and he would grow them. A great step would then have been taken not only towards improving the diet of employed natives, but also of the natives in the reserves, since what they grew they would eat.

143. We had ample evidence from European farmers that one of the difficulties in the agricultural industry in the Colony is that production suffers on account of the inefficiency of native labour. This evidence from the European farmers was not confined to the period of the war and we suggest that some of this inefficiency, at least, can be attributed to malnutrition.

All industries in the country employ native labour and therefore it behoves the employers of labour in this country, in their own interests, to do everything possible to increase the efficiency of their native labourers, otherwise production of agricultural products, not to mention production generally, is bound to suffer and have an adverse effect on industrial economy. One of the principal ways of increasing the efficiency of the native labourer is to ensure that he attains a higher standard of health.

144. From the foregoing it will be seen that not only are the agricultural and nutritional policies of the native reserves inevitably inter-dependent, but far from being antagonistic in their aim they are virtually identical. The medical authorities wish the natives to eat less maize and more of other foods: The agricultural authorities want the natives to produce less maize and more of other food crops.

We recommend therefore that a concerted policy should be worked out by the Medical and Agricultural departments within the framework of a general native policy setting out in broad outline on the one hand the nutritional needs and on the other the agricultural policy designed to meet those needs. Such policy when approved should have the full support of the Government and all necessary measures taken by propaganda, administrative instructions and legislation to have it carried out.

As an illustration of the way in which consideration of nutritional needs has its effect on the practical aspects of the supply of foodstuffs and planning for the future, we would refer to our recommendation in paragraph 109 of this Report regarding the storage of wimbi. We were led to this recommendation not only by the resistance of wimbi to attack by weevil and other insects, thus allowing of a cheaper method of storage than is necessary in the case of maize, but also because of the evidence put before us that this grain is particularly rich in calcium of which the present native diet is markedly deficient.

In this respect we cannot do better than quote from a paper entitled "Nutrition in Kenya" written by an officer of the Medical Service who has carried out investigations into the nutrition of native tribes in Kenya over many years. Describing experiments in which Kikuyu school children were given a special ration of milk, he writes:—

"It was reckoned that the average basal diet of the Wakikuyu children was providing only about half of the minimal requirements of lime salts for normal growth of bone, and that the milk they received provided the other half. The results of milk-feeding in bringing about such remarkable increases in height suffice to show to what extent growth was being retarded for lack of ample supplies of lime salts. Maize is but a poor provider of calcium, its content being 1/10th of that of wheat and only 1/100th that of wimbi. Wheat and wimbi did not enter the basal diet of the school children, nor did any other rich source of lime."

"Wakikuyu women, from time immemorial have selected, without quite knowing why, the calcium-rich beans and wimbi as being essential for providing pregnant women with the wherewithal to build 'bonnie babies' (*in utero*) and to sustain them with good milk during the lactation period. They have not thought of carrying it further."

Similarly in an article by a Medical Officer of the East African Army Medical Corps printed in the *East African Medical Journal* of July, 1943, there occurs the following:—

"*Provision of Calcium.*—In a European diet, calcium is usually provided in milk and cheese. Neither of these commodities could be issued to Africans.

The addition of red millet (*Eleusine coracana*) which is rich in calcium was considered, but was found to be impracticable. It was, therefore, decided to add bone-meal in the proportion of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent to the maize meal. Recently it has been possible to obtain precipitated chalk (calcium carbonate), and this is being added instead of bone-meal."

We have ascertained that the only reason why the addition of red millet to the African diet was found to be impracticable was that the production of it was not sufficient—in other words a demand had not previously existed.

While discussing this question of the African soldier's diet it must be remembered that when the war is over many Africans on demobilization will return to Kenya as industrial labourers. During their army life they have become used to a balanced diet and in consequence, though they may not know the reason for it, they have felt fitter men. If they are suddenly put back on a single diet of maize meal they will begin to feel less fit and tend to become disgruntled. Hence, for that reason alone, this question of deciding on a more balanced diet for the native is one which should not be long postponed.

145. A further point made in evidence before us by the Director of Medical Services was that people suffering from a deficiency of the protective foodstuffs, such as meat, milk, eggs and vegetables, were less able to withstand the effects of a general food shortage when it occurred. His evidence on this point was as follows:—

“In an ordinary year there is an adequacy of cereals in the country, but in an ordinary year there is a shortage of all the protective foodstuffs—a general shortage—that is they have never been adequate. Then of course when you have your shortages of cereals due to climatic or other conditions, and you may have shortages in other things as well, if your people are on the verge of food deficiency disease at the time when the shortage occurs then the shortage will have a much more serious effect on health and efficiency than it would have if those people had already been very well nourished.”

We have not overlooked the fact that the foregoing applies particularly to the agricultural tribes and not to the pastoral tribes of the country. The diet of the pastoral people, such as the Masai, is mainly animal products, meat, blood and milk, and the little evidence we received with regard to it does not justify our making any recommendations. We would point out, however, that these tribes provide a potential source of supply of animal foodstuffs for agricultural tribes and we had evidence that there is a tendency amongst some of them towards the consumption of cereals.

CHAPTER XI

EFFECT OF FOOD SHORTAGE ON AFRICAN LABOUR AND THE NATIVE RESERVES

146. When the full effect of the food shortage amongst the natives was felt some employers in order to render what assistance they could, voluntarily retrenched their labour forces. The labourers who were discharged had to return to their homes in the native reserves, if they had homes there, because there was nowhere else for them to go as food was not available elsewhere.

As the shortage became more acute a number of native labourers, according to the evidence of the Labour Commissioner, ceased work of their own accord and returned to their reserves on account of the shortage of food.

147. In February, 1943, Government took steps to curtail the distribution of maize to certain industries and the following extract from Kenya Information Office Communiqué No. 111 of the 20th February, 1943, is quoted in this respect:—

“The present policy of maize distribution is to provide, as far as is possible, the supplies essential for employed labour and for the employed native population in towns. All supplies to traders who have no registered labour-employing customers have been stopped. The following basis of distribution in Kenya has been decided upon:—

(a) *Sisal*.—Supplies will be issued in respect of labour employed on production and cleaning but not for replanting or development work.

(b) *General Farming (including tea, coffee and pyrethrum)*.—Supplies allotted to farmers for February will be delivered in due course subject to any modifications recommended by the local Production Sub-committees.

Supplies in March will be on a reduced scale.

(c) *Quarrying, stone cutting and building construction*.—No supplies for labour employed in these industries will be issued during March, except on direct representations to the Control from the Naval, Military, Air Force or Government authorities in respect of contractors employed by them.

(d) *Timber Production*.—The position is under review and in the meanwhile certain arbitrary reductions have been made.

(e) *Road construction and maintenance*.—Supplies will not be available for road construction gangs, but reduced issues will be made as far as possible for maintenance. The appropriate road authorities should apply direct to the Control for a minimum allocation for maintenance.

(f) *Gold Mining*.—No further issues by the Control can be made in respect of labour employed in the gold mining industry except on a care and maintenance basis.

(g) *Stock and Pig Feed*.—Requirements for live stock have been drastically reduced. The position in regard to pigs has been dealt with separately. The comparatively small quantity allotted for live stock during February will require to be still further reduced in March.

(h) *Township Supplies*.—Distribution Boards have been advised as to the quantities available and have received, or will receive, instructions with regard to distribution.

(i) *Native Beer Halls*.—Supplies will be drastically curtailed.

(j) *Domestic Servants and garden boys*.—Supplies for these employees are controlled by the Distribution Boards, who are being instructed to effect drastic economies."

Certain modifications of the above steps were effected later.

Further, by the Defence (Employees' Maize Ration) Regulations, 1943, enacted on the 5th February, 1943, it was made an offence for any employer to issue a ration of maize meal in excess of 1½ lb. per day to any employee, and only employees, and not their families, were entitled to a ration.

148. About the same time as the above communiqué was issued it was decided by Government that on account of insufficient food being available to feed the natives in the towns a number of them should be repatriated to the native reserves. From the evidence of the Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi, it appears that about 10,000 natives, including women and children, were repatriated from Nairobi, about 5,000 to 6,000 being women and children. This repatriation was not carried out by legislation but, as the Native Affairs Officer expressed it, "people were moved to go back by consciousness of the shortage, and when we eventually started rationing by the fact that we were able to pick and choose whom we would ration." The movement away from Nairobi was mainly to the Kavirondo and Kikuyu reserves. In the case of the former, this was done by issuing free railway tickets and in regard to the latter reserve, which is close to Nairobi, the natives paid their own expenses.

149. Generally we agree with Government's policy of getting the natives back to their reserves, because there was more likelihood of their being able to get foodstuffs there than in the towns. But we consider that it would have been better to have adopted this policy at an earlier stage rather than to have waited until the food shortage became really acute. That it was delayed is due no doubt to a late appreciation of an actual shortage, the time the shortage would last and the seriousness of it. This probably necessitated the policy of repatriation being decided upon without adequate time being available to consider its repercussions.

For instance, we had much evidence that with regard to some locations in the native reserves, the food available was insufficient for the natives already there, without the extra burden of an increased population. Such, for instance, was the case in Maragoli in the Nyanza Province, which had been very badly hit by the food shortage, and here we quote part of the evidence of the Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza:—

Question (by Mr. Billington): We were told earlier that about 10,000 could be taken as the total repatriations. Spread over the whole of Nyanza it would not mean a very great percentage increase in the population?.

Answer: No, but I know one estate at Thika which employs natives from Maragoli which sent 200 back. Those people would have come from a small area in Maragoli, and would have an immense effect on that area when repatriated.

Question: It bore hardly on certain families and localities but did not have a great effect on the Province as a whole?

Answer: That is true."

As regards the Central Province, an Administrative Officer, whilst agreeing with the policy of repatriation of natives to the reserves, said that the reaction of the natives—and we have had ample evidence from native witnesses to support this—was that food was not sufficient and that the repatriated natives felt they were getting food at the expense of natives in the reserves who were already hungry.

150. Still with regard to repatriation, the policy was that the wives and families of natives in towns or working as squatters should be sent back to the reserves, even though the husbands remained working, and in order to implement this policy women and children were not allowed a ration of maize meal and other similar foodstuffs in the towns. We had evidence that this created hardship because in some cases the natives were either detribalized or came from places outside Kenya, with the result that their wives and families had either no home in the reserves to which they could return or else they were faced with long and expensive journeys to distant places.

We feel that many of these hardships would have been lessened, or probably avoided altogether, if the shortage had been appreciated earlier, which would have given more time to decide on a policy of repatriation after investigation had been made as to which reserves were in a position to support an increased population and also whether the natives to be repatriated had homes in the reserves to which they could return.

Accordingly we recommend that if repatriation to the native reserves should ever become necessary again on account of a food shortage, full consideration should be given as to whether the reserves to which repatriation should take place have sufficient food to support an increased population and whether the natives to be repatriated have homes in the reserves.

151. We have already made reference in paragraph 48 of this Report to the difficulty of casual labourers working at the Port of Mombasa obtaining their food on the days on which they do not secure employment. As regards conditions during the actual shortage of food, one large employer of labour at the Port gave it as his opinion that the labourers were inferior in stamina compared with their physique prior to the shortage, and he attributed this to scarcity of food. In giving this opinion, he had taken into account that many of the more able-bodied natives had joined the Armed Forces and also that he could not afford to reject many of the less able-bodied labourers presenting themselves for employment.

152. With regard to the effect of the food shortage on the native reserves, we had evidence both in Nyanza and in the Central Province that the price at which maize was changing hands in small quantities amongst the natives themselves was considerable. Prices, which work out at the rate of Sh. 80 per bag, were commonly mentioned in evidence as those at which maize changed hands in the native reserves, and the highest price mentioned was at the rate of Sh. 160 per bag in the Central Province. Three reasons were given for these high prices. First profiteering, secondly inflation on account of the shortage of commodities on which the natives in the reserves could spend their money (we have already referred to the increased wealth in the native reserves in paragraph 80 of this Report), thirdly the lack of silver coinage in the reserves, with the result that the natives were willing to pay out currency notes of the value of Sh. 5 or more to get food. This lack of silver coins occurred mainly in Nyanza but the difficulty was soon rectified by the action of the Administration in taking out silver coins to the reserves and exchanging them for currency notes.

From the evidence we have no doubt that the natives in the reserves did profiteer at the expense of their unfortunate fellow natives, and this was emphasized by the Acting Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza.

153. We had evidence from employers of labour and also from the Labour Commissioner that with the advent of the 1943-44 crop of maize, the native labourers expect that the present ration of 1½ lb. of maize meal per head per day will be restored to a 2 lb. ration immediately; that if this is not done the natives will consider it a breach of faith in view of the promises given to them by Labour

Officers, other officials and employers that as soon as the next maize harvest was reaped, which is now, the maize meal ration would be restored to 2 lb. per head per day.

We put this evidence to the Director of Produce Disposal, East African Production and Supply Council, who stated that after a meeting held in June, 1943, the Council recommended to Government that the 1½ lb. ration should be maintained until the position could be seen more clearly. The Director went on to say that he urged waiting a little longer until more definite news became available as to the Uganda maize crop.

We agree that the present ration of 1½ lb. of maize meal or mixed meal per head per day is by itself insufficient, but, against that, we consider that the present time is too early to decide on making a return to the full ration of 2 lb. per head per day. We are of the opinion that the earliest time at which a decision can be made is when the prospects of the short rain crops are known.

Accordingly we recommend that when the prospects of the short rain maize crops being favourable are certain the ration of 2 lb. per head per day should be restored, and in the meantime we recommend that every effort should be made to supplement the present ration of 1½ lb. of maize meal per head per day for employed native labourers by additional foods such as meat, wimbi, potatoes, beans and other foodstuffs.

This recommendation to return to the 2 lb. ration at an early date must not be taken as derogating from our recommendation in paragraph 144 of this Report.

PART II MAIZE CONTROL

CHAPTER XII

DIFFICULTIES OF ANY MAIZE CONTROL SCHEME

154. The collapse of the export values of maize in 1929, already referred to in paragraph 23 of this Report, had a serious effect on all maize-exporting countries. With regard to this the Maize Controller stated in his memorandum to us: "South Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia introduced legislation controlling the sale of maize and fixed the internal price of maize higher than its export parity, thereby to some extent improving the position of the maize producer."

Representations were made on several occasions to the Government of Kenya by the K.F.A., on behalf of a large body of European farmers, that similar legislation should be introduced in the Colony, but no legislation was enacted until the introduction of the present Maize Control scheme on account of the opposition of the maize consuming interests.

155. One of the reasons for such representations was that all producers of maize, European and native alike, should be compelled to share *pro rata* in the disadvantages of low-priced exports of maize as well as enjoying the advantages of the higher priced internal market. This would be achieved by the compulsory co-operation of producers of maize which would have the effect of pooling all the maize grown in the Colony. This system is concisely and clearly set out in paragraph 190 of the Report of the Economic Development Committee, 1935, as follows:—

"Under this system the Central Board which would have to be set up would undertake to buy maize through its agents at certain named centres at a price fixed from time to time. Its agents and other merchants would buy from the producers at prices based on the knowledge of the price obtainable at those places. All sales to local consumers would be at prices subject to maxima fixed by the Central Board from time to time within the limits set by legislation and the Central Board would also determine the quantities of maize to be exported. Within the limits set by legislation, the price fixed for local sales would vary with the quantity exported and the price obtainable on export so as to maintain an average price fair to all maize growers."

As will be seen from the above extract the problem with regard to maize was very largely one of export.

156. In 1935 the Maize Inquiry Committee discussed the question of a scheme for controlling the marketing of maize and gave consideration to a pooling scheme. They appreciated the difficulties of the consuming interests, mainly the coffee and sisal industries, but at the same time pointed out the value of the maize industry to the Colony. That Committee took into consideration that a pool system would have a stabilizing effect by insuring large consumers of maize against violent price fluctuations due to temporary shortages, and pointed out that such fluctuations were sometimes severe owing to the cost of ocean freight and the long haul of imported maize from the coast to up-country markets.

Eventually a sub-committee of the Maize Inquiry Committee was appointed to give further consideration to the matter, and as a result of its deliberations another scheme was embodied in a Maize Control Bill published for criticism in the Official Gazette of the 24th March, 1936, as Government Notice No. 189.

That Bill embodied a scheme based on a maize export quota applicable alike to European- and native-grown maize. The Bill does not appear to have been proceeded with and we only wish to refer briefly to the provisions of Clause 6 thereof. Under that clause the Director of Agriculture, between the 1st October and the 30th November in each year, had the duty, *inter alia*, of:—

- (a) estimating the total quantity of maize coming on to the market in the next twelve months succeeding the 30th November:

- (b) estimating the quantity of maize which would be required for consumption in the Colony for the same twelve months;
- (c) estimating the amount of maize which would be available for export during the same period.

We merely comment that with the experience of the last twelve months, which has shown the unfortunate effect of the lack of adequate statistics, especially those of the consumption of maize in the Colony, the Director of Agriculture, if that Bill had been proceeded with, would have had an impossible task.

157. In 1941 the question of Maize Control was again raised by the K.F.A. and they have supplied us with a copy of their memorandum dated the 9th January, 1941. They advocated a pooling scheme and state in their memorandum:—

“On broad lines it is proposed that the production of maize will be controlled, with the view of providing the internal requirements of these territories.” (This means the East African territories.) “Allocations will be made to Europeans and natives to cover the anticipated internal consumption and a price fixed for this maize which will be pooled. All maize produced in excess of the allocations will be pooled separately and the participants of this pool will receive the export pool price for the maize they contribute.”

And, in the same memorandum, at the twelfth line from the bottom of page 14:—

“There are two producers for the local market; the European and the native; and a definite quota must be allocated to each group.”

Giving evidence on that memorandum the Chairman of the K.F.A. said:—

“The main point about that memorandum was that it did away with the idea of producing maize for export. That had been the crux of the situation in the past, that the consumers, such as coffee and sisal, were entirely opposed to subsidizing maize for export.”

Asked whether it would be possible to fix a quota for native-grown maize his evidence is as follows:—

“*Question:* Going back to your memorandum put in, dated the 9th January, 1941, in which maize control is advocated, page 14, 12th line from the bottom. (Quoted.) That seems to imply that you have got to give a quota to Europeans of what their production must be for the internal market and a quota for the natives?”

Answer: Yes.

Question: Is it possible to give a quota to the natives?”

Answer: I think it is by price control to a very great extent and propaganda.

Question: You don't think you could give half a million to Europeans and a million to natives, to say to native producers that they have to produce a million bags for the internal market?”

Answer: You cannot or you will be down repeatedly, but having worked out what is reasonably possible between the two I suggest that by the price factor and propaganda in the native reserves you can approximately get the quota under reasonable weather conditions.”

158. We have already stated that in our view the European-grown maize crop is essential at present, and will be for some time to come, not only to the Colony, but also to the other East African territories, and we have recommended that the production of European-grown maize should be encouraged to the extent set out in paragraph 114 of this Report. We have further recommended in paragraph 124 of this Report that when a return is made to more normal times the basic price of maize, that is of all maize except European-grown maize to the extent set out in paragraph 114 of this Report, should be fixed before each planting season. This, as already stated, envisages Maize Control being continued after the war.

Apart from a direct subsidy (the relief to the Maize Industry in 1930 is an example of such a subsidy) which appears to us to be too large a burden to place on public funds, another method of maize control is by means of a pool of all the maize coming on to the market, which is the system in force in South Africa and the Rhodesias. But, as already mentioned, the difficulties there are not as great as in Kenya because in South Africa and the Rhodesias the main consumers of maize are large industrial concerns, such as the mining companies, and they can afford to pay a fairly high price for their maize. In Kenya the maize-consuming interests are largely agricultural concerns which have to compete on the overseas market for the sale of their produce. Thus, in the past when one of the main objects of maize control, if it had been introduced, was to fix a high internal price in order to off-set the low export price of maize sold overseas, there was considerable opposition from the consuming interests who saw in it an attempt to get them to subsidize the export of maize by forcing up the price of the maize they purchased on the internal market.

If our recommendation in paragraph 117 of this Report is accepted, i.e. that the future policy of the Colony should be not to encourage the production of maize for export, this objection is very largely removed because the export surplus should be small.

159. Having disposed of the difficulty with regard to the low export parity price of maize, we must now mention the difficulties involved in a control scheme for the marketing of maize locally. The two main difficulties have been, first the difference in price between European-grown maize and native-grown maize, regarding which, as will be seen from Chapter XVI of this Report, we put forward suggestions to overcome it; secondly, the uncertainty as to the amount of native-grown maize coming on to the market each year, due to the difficulty of estimation even in a normal year.

Hence, although it would be possible in any control scheme to allocate a quota to European-grown maize it would be impossible to do so for native-grown maize, because such quota might not nearly be reached in one normal year and might be far exceeded in another normal year. By normal we mean as regards weather conditions and freedom from locust infestation. Any excess of native-grown maize coming on to the market would be sold at a lesser price than that at which the Central Control could afford to sell its maize, on account of the higher price it had paid for the European-grown maize, and therefore this would upset the whole control scheme. Accordingly any control scheme must have power to control the whole of the marketable maize crop of the Colony.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SYSTEM OF MAIZE CONTROL

160. In order to understand the system of Maize Control it is necessary to describe first of all how maize was marketed prior to the institution of Control on the 1st July, 1942.

Although a certain amount of the European-grown maize crop was sold direct by maize producers to coffee planters and other farmers whose requirements exceeded their own production, it is true to say that the greater bulk of the crop was marketed through a single channel, the K.F.A.

It is difficult in a short précis to indicate the many ramifications of the marketing system for native grown maize existing prior to the institution of Control, but briefly the whole system depended on the provisions of the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935. Markets were established in the native reserves under that Ordinance in both trading centres, where most of the traders are Indians, and also at other places in a district situated at varying distances from trading centres, where the native trader is in the majority. Under the Ordinance powers exist to control and regulate the purchase and sale of any native grown produce which it has been decided should be controlled and thereupon such native produce should not be purchased by a trader unless he had been licensed under that Ordinance.

The procedure prior to Control was for the native producer to take his maize to a district market or trading centre and there sell it to a licensed trader. In district markets the licensed native traders usually resold the maize they had purchased to bigger traders at trading centres, who in turn resold it to wholesale merchants. Some of these wholesale merchants were also maize millers operating in the larger towns, and having ground the maize into maize meal they sold the meal to consumers. The larger consumers dealt direct with these wholesalers, whereas the smaller consumers obtained their requirements from retail merchants who had purchased their stocks from the wholesalers.

161. On account of the opposition to Maize Control by the consuming interests—see paragraph 115 (e) of this Report—the K.F.A. prior to the war decided to enter the native maize markets as traders, and by purchasing native-grown maize secure greater control of the maize supplies in the Colony. By this means the K.F.A. endeavoured to obtain a better internal maize price for the European producer. As to whether this policy succeeded entirely we are not in a position to say, but we would point out that the evidence before us indicates that until Maize Control was introduced the prices which European-grown maize commanded over the period of years prior to the institution of Control were such that the European maize producer did not obtain an economic return for his maize crop.

162. Before leaving the system of marketing prior to the introduction of Maize Control, mention should be made of the large number of water mills which exist, particularly in the Central Province, to grind maize grown by natives. The millers either ground the maize for a consideration and returned it to the natives for their own consumption, or else purchased the maize, ground it into maize meal and then sold the meal to their own customers.

With regard to squatter maize grown both on land alienated to non-natives and in the Forest Reserve, a proportion of it was sold at markets established for the purchase of native produce and the balance was disposed of either to the farmers on whose land it was grown or else to other consumers in the neighbourhood.

163. Soon after the pronouncement of the Minister of State in the Middle East in November, 1941, followed by the announcement of the guaranteed price for European-grown maize (reference has already been made to this in paragraph 27 of this Report) Government began to consider the question of introducing Maize Control. We had no clear and concise evidence as to the exact reasons for the introduction of Control, except that the Chairman of the Maize Board expressly stated it was not introduced because of the fear of any shortage.

There is no doubt that at the time the guaranteed price for European-grown maize was announced in December, 1941. Government had in mind increasing the production of maize in the hope that a surplus would be available for export to meet the requirements of the Minister of State in the Middle East. This is borne out by the following extract from Kenya Information Office Official Communiqué No. 1308 of the 4th May, 1942, after the first Control Regulations had been enacted:—

“As it is desirable to make available for export as early as possible all maize surplus, it is necessary under Section 20 (1) for every employer of labour who supplies maize or maize meal to his labour in excess of 100 bags per year, to send in to the Maize Controller, P.O. Box 921, Nairobi, a return showing his average monthly requirements for the next twelve months, and the name of the person who supplies him. This return must be submitted on or before the 7th June, 1942. Consumers of maize meal are warned that this return is most important as they may at a later date find themselves short of maize meal owing to their failure to submit the necessary returns.”

In addition to the hope of exporting maize overseas there was the important factor of allocating maize locally amongst the Armed Forces and essential industries. The cumulative effect of these factors pointed to the advantage which would come about by controlling the whole output of maize in the Colony, because

by that means maize could be marketed locally and overseas in the most efficient manner. From the evidence available to us, oral and documentary, we are of the opinion that the desirability of obtaining maize for export led up to the need for the marketing of maize in the most efficient manner, and constituted the primary reason for the introduction of Maize Control. We do not agree with the suggestion made to us that Maize Control was introduced merely to afford a guaranteed price to European maize growers, because if this had been the only reason it could have been achieved by a direct subsidy.

164. Having decided on the introduction of Maize Control, Government, by Government Notice No. 290 of the 26th March, 1942, appointed a Committee with the following terms of reference:—

To consider the best method of operating Maize Control, working, if possible, through existing trade channels.

This was a fully representative committee, with two K.F.A. Directors as members of it. It is important to mention the K.F.A. representation in view of their evidence criticizing the Control. The Maize Controller was also a member of that Committee.

That Committee met on two occasions, the 27th March, 1942, and the 18th April, 1942. At the first meeting the Indian representatives registered their protest against any sort of Maize Control or Pool in any shape whatsoever, as in their opinion it would prove disastrous to Indian businessmen, traders, wholesalers, retailers and exporters, and also to native producers and consumers. These Indian members eventually agreed to discuss the details of Maize Control on the understanding that it would be treated as a war-time measure.

After discussion the following proposals were agreed to unanimously:—

- “(1) Native producers will sell at prices, to be fixed by the Board from time to time, to traders licensed under the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, who in turn would deliver at the direction of the Control, being allowed a handling charge for their services.
- (2) Non-native producers would deliver through the K.F.A., who have the necessary storage accommodation and organization for its collection. The maize would thereafter be moved on the directions of the Controller.”

At the same meeting it was unanimously recommended that the control of maize should be vested in a Controller, as agent for the Government, with an Advisory Board consisting of representatives of the Production and Settlement Board, Indian merchants, the K.F.A., the native producer (preferably by an Agricultural Officer) and consumers. It was also considered that the Board should be as small as possible.

At the second meeting those unanimous decisions were opposed by certain members of the Committee. For instance, the Indian members opposed the previous decision that all non-native maize should be disposed of through the agency of the K.F.A., with the result that it was decided at this second meeting, by a majority, that the K.F.A. should be appointed agent for all European-grown maize and that Indian-grown maize should be disposed of at the direction of the Controller. The K.F.A. representatives opposed the previous decision regarding the Control being vested in the Controller, as agent of Government, with an Advisory Board, and suggested that Control should be operated by means of a Maize Control Board, working through an Executive Officer instead of through an individual Controller with an Advisory Board. This suggestion was not agreed to because it was considered that the operation of a war-time Control through a Board would not be practicable, owing to the need for giving immediate attention to the day to day business of the Control.

At this second meeting, which had before it draft Maize Control Regulations, the K.F.A. representatives made the first mention of the anxiety of the K.F.A. that the Controller might, if he wished, set up an entirely new trading organization.

This is important because of the evidence put forward by the various K.F.A. interests on this particular matter. The draft Maize Control Regulations provided, *inter alia*, that:—

“The Controller may in writing appoint servants or agents in any area within the Colony, and any such servant or agent may exercise such duties, powers and functions of the Controller as may be specified in the appointment.”

This was criticized by the K.F.A. representatives on the above-mentioned ground because it gave the Controller absolute power to appoint agents and servants throughout the Colony as he pleased. This criticism was replied to by the Maize Controller, who said that the only practicable method of working was for the Controller to be free to make his own arrangements, being able in any one centre or area to appoint agents or to set up a direct branch of the Control as experience proved necessary. He considered it would be impracticable to require that all such appointments should be in the hands of the Board.

Eventually it was decided at that second meeting to recommend the addition of the following proviso to the above-mentioned Regulation:—

“Provided that the Kenya Farmers’ Association (Co-operative) Limited shall be appointed as agent of the Controller in respect of the purchase and handling on behalf of the Controller of all maize produced by European producers.”

Government accepted this recommendation and also decided to add the following further proviso which vested the power in the Maize Board, instead of the Controller, of deciding whether an agent or servant should be appointed in any particular area:—

“Provided further that the decision as to whether a servant shall be appointed in any particular area, or whether an agent shall be appointed for such area, shall lie with the Board.”

165. The first Regulations, entitled the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, were promulgated by Government Notice No. 430 on the 1st May, 1942. Under those Regulations the sole right to buy and sell maize produced in, or imported into, the Colony was vested in the Maize Controller on behalf of Government, and no one could export maize from the Colony without his permission.

The salient points of the scheme of Control under these Regulations were:—

(a) Native grown maize could be purchased from the producer—

- (i) by a registered trader (all traders licensed under the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935, and who wished to be registered as maize buyers were automatically registered under the above-mentioned Regulations);
- (ii) with the consent of the Controller, by a person who had in the past been purchasing maize for the use of his own employees;
- (iii) with the consent of the Maize Board, by a farmer as regards maize grown on his own land by natives.

The maize purchased by traders could only be disposed of by them in accordance with the directions of the Controller. At the commencement of Maize Control the Controller directed that he would only deal in maize from registered traders in lots of 10 tons or more, and when any registered trader dealing in small lots was not in a position to deliver 10-ton lots to the Controller, that trader had to sell his maize to another trader who would, after purchasing 10 tons or more, be in a position to deal with the Controller. It is important to appreciate this because a transaction of this nature means that the trading commission must be split up between the traders concerned when the maize passes through the hands of more than one trader. That commission amounts to 50 cents per bag and all the other expenses, such as the cost of the bag and transport, incurred by the trader are refunded by the Control at an estimated actual cost.

- (b) All European-grown maize is taken over by the Control through the agency of the K.F.A.
- (c) All Asian-grown maize is purchased direct from the producer by the Controller.

166. At the first meeting of the Maize Board on the 6th May, 1942, the Board approved the appointment of agents at Kericho, Machakos and Meru, and servants of the Controller at Kisumu, Kisii, Luanda, Yala, Butere, Broderick Falls, one in the Coast area, Thika, Maragua, Fort Hall, Sagana, Karatina, and one in the Rift Valley Province, and the Board also decided that no servant should be allowed to purchase maize in quantities of less than 10 tons.

This question of servants as opposed to agents will be mentioned again in the next chapter, but we should make brief reference to it here. The effect of Control deciding to buy in not less than 10-ton lots was to ensure that the wholesale trade in maize was maintained. Later, owing to the shortage, this decision had to be abrogated and Control bought in any quantities they could obtain. It was suggested to us that the appointment of servants had interfered with channels of trade existing at the time when Control was introduced. We are unable to agree with that suggestion. Prior to Control the native producer sold to a trader and eventually the maize purchased by that trader found its way into the hands of a railhead trader, having passed through the hands of one or more intermediate traders. This railhead trader then sold and railed the maize he had purchased to one of his customers. All the Control did was to introduce another link in the transactions, because the servant of the Control became the buyer at railhead and then sold the maize so purchased to buyers situated throughout the Colony.

167. We heard much evidence from the Controller and other witnesses that it was essential for Maize Control to get physical possession of all the maize and that the Regulations quoted above were framed to that end. It is true that under those Regulations every registered trader and every agent of the Controller can only dispose of the maize he has purchased in accordance with the directions of the Controller. Although these Regulations may have been designed to give the Controller physical possession of all the maize coming on to the market in the Colony, in actual fact the Controller must rely on traders and agents advising him of all their maize purchases. The Controller does not receive all the maize and store it in stores of his own. He normally directs the traders and agents where they should consign the maize which they have purchased.

168. One further point in the Regulations should be mentioned, and that is that all existing contracts for the sale or purchase of maize and maize products were cancelled with effect from the 1st July, 1942, the date on which Control commenced to take effect.

The effect of this cancellation was to evoke criticism from the consuming interests, because it had been the custom for large consumers to enter into annual contracts with traders or millers for their annual supplies of maize. During the first few months of the year when maize is in plentiful supply the price is generally lower than the ensuing months, and as the price of maize at the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942 was fairly low the consuming interests were able to enter into contracts for their supplies of maize under advantageous terms to themselves. The Control selling price of maize was higher than these contract prices and hence the cancellation of all such contracts put the consuming interests into the position that they felt themselves aggrieved.

169. Another point in the first Maize Control Regulations is that of the treatment of maize grown by resident native labourers on land owned by non-natives. By Regulation 12 such maize was deemed to be maize grown in a native area and therefore only commanded the original price for native-grown maize, which was Sh. 4/90 for 200 lb., whether sold at a market or to the owner of the land, and this meant that the European farmer could buy maize from his resident native labourers for Sh. 4/90 for 200 lb., bag it and then sell it at Sh. 9 per bag to the Control, assuming that it was K.2 maize. In order to overcome the unfairness of a

farmer making a profit on such transactions it was decided that any farmer who bought resident native maize grown on his land should pay Sh. 2/10 per bag to the Control. This amount was arrived at as follows:—

	<i>Sh. cts.</i>
Buying price	4 90
Allowance to farmer—	
(a) Cost of bag	1 10
(b) Commission equivalent to that of a trader	50
TOTAL ..	<u>Sh. 6 50</u>

The Control selling price was Sh. 8/60 per bag, and therefore the farmer had to pay to the Control the difference between the above total of Sh. 6/50 and the Control selling price of Sh. 8/60, which was Sh. 2/10.

170. The first Regulations evoked considerable criticism, mainly directed against the wide powers vested in the Controller, the procedure regarding squatter-grown maize, the difference in price between European-grown maize and native-grown maize, and so on. Eventually new Regulations, the Defence (Control of Maize) (No. 2) Regulations, 1942, were enacted by Government Notice No. 877 on the 1st October, 1942. The principal amendments effected by those Regulations were:—

- (a) The sole power to buy and sell maize was vested in the Maize Board and taken away from the Controller.
- (b) The Maize Controller became the Executive Officer of the Maize Board instead of, as formerly, the Maize Board being in an advisory capacity.
- (c) The payment to the Control by the farmer in respect of maize purchased by him from his resident native labourers was abolished and such maize was not deemed to be native-grown maize.
- (d) The 75 cents paid to the Native Betterment Fund in the original scheme in respect of every bag of native-grown maize sold to the Control was abolished (except in Nyanza) by a readjustment of the price for native-grown maize.

These Regulations still continued in force at the conclusion of our sittings, and although they vested more power in the Board and less in the Controller, their effect, in this respect, differed little from those of the first Maize Control Regulations, because the Board delegated extensive powers to the Controller. As to this delegation, we make no comments, because under any scheme of Maize Control a Controller must be in a position to carry on the business from day to day without the necessity of consulting a Board.

171. In view of the criticisms made, many ill-informed, as regards the difference in price between European- and native-grown maize, we would point out that in paragraph 119 of this Report we have made a comparison with detailed reasons accounting for the difference in the two prices. In addition we would stress that the European maize-grower only obtained the full price for grade K.2 maize and that any native maize-grower whose maize was graded as K.2 and who was prepared to deliver it in 10-ton lots f.o.r., as called for by the Control, i.e. was prepared to deliver his maize under the same conditions as the European maize-producer, received exactly the same price as the European maize-grower. We make no excuse for stressing this because we found repeatedly during our sittings ignorance of this fact both amongst European and native witnesses.

172. With the price paid for native-grown maize being less than that paid for European-grown maize, the Control could afford to pool all the maize produced and sell it at a price less than the price paid for European-grown maize. This had the effect of evoking the criticism that European-grown maize was being subsidized at the expense of native-grown maize, but, as stated in paragraph 119 of this Report, this criticism was made largely because of ignorance of the true facts.

173. Although not expressly stated in evidence, we gathered the impression from both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Controller that the Maize Control scheme was not designed to meet any shortage of maize. We do not understand this in view of the provisions of Regulation 5 (1) (e) of the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, enacted on the 1st May, 1942, which reads as follows:—

“5. (1) The Board shall have the following powers:—

.....
 (e) where the Board is satisfied that it is necessary for the successful prosecution of the war or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, to regulate or restrict the sale of maize and maize products to persons in the Colony.”

This was reproduced in mandatory form as Regulation 6 (c) in the Defence (Control of Maize) (No. 2) Regulations, 1942, enacted on the 1st October, 1942, as follows:—

“6. The Board shall—

.....
 (c) where it is satisfied that it is necessary for the successful prosecution of the war or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, regulate or restrict the sale of maize and maize products to persons in the Colony.”

The language of these two Regulations appears to us to show that the Board had first of all full power, and later the mandatory duty, to restrict the sale of maize and maize products under certain circumstances, and the only reasons for restricting the sale could be a shortage of maize available on the internal market due to a shortage of supplies, the necessity to export quantities overseas to assist the war effort, or some other similar reason. It therefore appears to us that the Maize Control scheme as originally enacted took into account, and provided for, the contingency of a shortage and gave the Maize Board first the power and secondly the duty to meet such a contingency. This will be referred to again in greater detail in Chapter XIV.

174. As we have stressed in paragraph 82 of this Report, the main reason for the shortage of maize was the lack of appreciation of the rate of consumption of maize and the absence of any statistics in this respect. Under the first Maize Control Regulations enacted on the 1st May, 1942, the importance of some kind of statistics of the consumption of maize appears to have been appreciated on account of the provisions of Regulation 20, which reads as follows:—

“20. (1) Any person who supplies, or intends to supply, his own native servants or resident labourers with maize meal shall, if his normal requirements for such purposes exceed, or are expected to exceed, 100 bags of maize meal a year, notify the Controller of his average monthly requirements of maize meal in the twelve months next ensuing from the date of such notification, and the name of the person who, at the date of such notification, is supplying, or is proposing to supply, him with such maize meal:

Provided that, in the case of any person who is so supplying his own native servants or resident labourers with maize meal at the date of the publication of these Regulations, such notification shall be sent to the Controller on or before the 7th day of June, 1942.

(2) Every such person shall notify the Controller of any change in his consumption of maize meal, whether such change be by an increase or by a decrease in the quantity of 100 bags a year.”

This Regulation, which the Maize Controller informed us was intended to give some idea of the consumption of maize in the Colony, was reproduced in the second Maize Control Regulations on the 1st October, 1942.

That Regulation only calls for returns from persons supplying more than 100 bags of maize meal a year to their native servants or resident native labourers. The Maize Controller admitted that several persons never put in returns at all,

and that prosecutions were not instituted for the non-rendering of returns because the Control was not in a position to know how many native servants or resident native labourers were employed by the various employers. Hence the returns received under that Regulation could not give even an approximate idea of what was the consumption of maize in the Colony. Further, it does not appear to have been appreciated that the total consumption of maize by native servants and resident native labourers in lots of 100 bags or less a year was considerable. This was admitted by the Maize Controller when he said:—

“The trouble was that when I started to make my distribution to a certain extent based on that, when I did start restricting, then I found that where I was sending to a district 2,000 bags a month, the District Commissioner would send a telegram stating that he really needed 5,000 bags. A lot of people who wanted the maize had less than eight bags a month.”

Hence the Control scheme started without any accurate or even an approximate figure of the consumption of maize in the Colony. It was not until January, 1943, when the shortage had become very serious, that individual registration was effected by each consumer of maize, no matter what quantity he required, registering with a trader and the trader in turn registering with the Controller. By February, 1943, when the position had become more serious still, distribution of maize to individuals was taken over by a special person appointed to the Maize Control staff acting under the directions of the Chairman, East African Production and Supply Council. At the time we finished taking evidence on the 21st August, 1943, maize was still being distributed according to his directions, though we gathered that the question of the Kenya Commodity Distribution Board taking over the distribution of maize was under consideration.

CHAPTER XIV

ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF MAIZE CONTROL

175. In this Chapter we discuss the administration of Maize Control and also the actions of the Maize Board, and deal with the criticism made against the Controller in the next Chapter.

In the first place we would point out that many of the criticisms made against the system of Maize Control arose out of the shortage of maize for distribution, and in fairness to the members of the Maize Board and the Controller it should be borne in mind that the shortage of maize had not been foreseen, though, as stated in Section L of Chapter VIII, it should have been evident by the 10th February, 1942, i.e. the date of the written note, Appendix I to this Report, that a shortage of maize was inevitable.

176. We have already pointed out in detail in Section H of Chapter VIII that the present system of Maize Control by which traders are restricted to a commission of 50 cents per bag (which may have to be split up amongst a number of them, and is only increased to Sh. 1 if the trader is allowed to buy back the maize from the Control and sell it to his own customers) is an incentive for traders not to declare all their maize transactions to the Control, because by not doing so they can obtain larger profits and yet dispose of the maize they acquire from native producers at a price less than the Control selling price. It is impossible, without a large staff constantly visiting the various maize buying centres, to keep a check on all maize transactions, and we are forced to the conclusion that the present system under which a trader who buys native-grown maize at Sh. 8/96 for 200 lb., has to bag it at a cost of Sh. 1/20 and then, as explained in paragraph 67 of this Report, sell it to the Controller at Sh. 10/68, may lead to evasion of the law when such trader has a ready market on his doorstep on which he can make a greater profit. The Maize Controller stressed that there is a check on traders by the Agricultural Department through their inspection centres, but in spite of this check we have grave doubts that all maize which should come into the hands of Control really does so.

177. We have already explained in Chapter XIII the system under which maize was marketed prior to the institution of Control, i.e. from the producer

to the consumer through the hands of a number of traders. This system was not interfered with on the introduction of Control, so that the existing channels of trade in maize should be preserved. Power to fix the commission of maize traders was vested in the Maize Board by Regulation 5 (1) (b) of the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, and at its first meeting on the 6th May, 1942, the Maize Board decided as follows:—

“It was agreed, reference Regulation 5 (b), that in respect of native maize purchased at markets, the handling charge to be allowed should be 50 cents per bag of 200 lb. net, this charge to be an inclusive figure covering the allowance to be paid to all registered traders and merchants who handle the maize from the time it leaves the producer until purchased by the Controller f.o.r. or in go-down at railhead. The 50-cent allowance to cover normal shrinkage in store while held at the direction of the Controller by the registered trader or merchant up to a period of one month. The Controller to make a special allowance to cover shrinkage or loss in respect of maize held for a longer period.”

We would point out that the decision of the Maize Board means that traders may have to stand the loss in weight on the maize purchased by them up to a period of one month. The Deputy Director of Agriculture gave evidence that this loss of weight may amount to 1 per cent for the first month. Thus on maize purchased at Sh. 8/96 from the native producer and stored for one month there may be a loss of cents 8.96 (say 9 cents), which means that the trader's commission of 50 cents may be reduced to 41 cents. If the maize goes through the hands of a number of traders this 41 cents must be shared between them. Where traders deal in a large amount of maize this commission may be adequate, but in our view it is not adequate in places where traders deal in small quantities. As an Administrative Officer in the Central Province put it to us:—

“As far as the native traders were concerned, the 50 cents profit had to be split up with the Indians, which meant he was getting 25 cents. That may be a perfectly fair profit in Nyanza, where there is a large maize crop, but in this district where the trader deals in small quantities of maize—a bag or two at a time—he has been used, I believe, to getting between 70 cents and Sh. 1. It meant to say that we started off without the goodwill of the native trader.”

In our view this commission is insufficient in the case of many traders and is a further incentive to them to obtain more profit by not delivering maize to the Control. Any such illegal sales would obviously mitigate against the efficient working of Maize Control.

178. We had much evidence that the system of Control is too complicated for native traders to understand. In particular, one witness representing native interests on Legislative Council supplied us with a copy of the instructions to registered traders dated the 9th June, 1942, issued by the Maize Controller to all registered traders in maize. As we have already stated in paragraph 165 of this Report, all traders registered under the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935, who wished to be registered under the Maize Control Regulations were automatically registered to permit them to purchase maize. A copy of the above-mentioned instructions will be found at Appendix J to this Report.

These Regulations were typed in the English language and sent direct by post to all registered traders. There are approximately 1,700 such traders, of whom the majority are natives who cannot understand that language. A glance at Appendix J to this Report shows that those instructions would be complicated even to a person literate in the English language and that they would be completely unintelligible to an illiterate native trader. The Maize Controller stated that it was necessary to send out these instructions at the beginning of Maize Control so as to clarify the position of traders, and that he thought Administrative and Agricultural Officers had been requested to explain them to native traders. We had no evidence that any explanation had been made to native traders and, in fact, the Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, informed us that the first he knew that these instructions had been issued was that about 500 of them had arrived at the Post Office at Nyeri addressed to individual native traders and that he himself never received a

copy. We do not propose to analyse the instructions at Appendix J in detail. We merely record our opinion that the method of issuing such instructions to illiterate native traders was not such as to enlist their support in the Maize Control scheme, and no doubt resulted in their distrust of the scheme from the start.

179. Another criticism of Maize Control was that it commenced on the 1st July, 1942, which was an unfortunate time of the year to introduce it. The new crop does not begin to come on to the market until the middle to end of August, and during the immediately preceding months the only maize marketed is from the old crop, and prices usually tend to rise. The effect of introducing Maize Control on the 1st July was two-fold. First the amount of maize coming on the market at that time of the year is usually small, and secondly the price of Sh. 4/90 fixed by the Maize Control for 200 lb. of native-grown maize was in many areas of the Colony less than the price the native maize-grower had been receiving for his maize just prior to the institution of Control.

With regard to the supply of maize, the Control was under a disadvantage from the very beginning as there were only 72,000 bags in the hands of traders and millers on the 1st July, 1942. Deliveries to the Control, as stated in paragraph 81 of this Report, were only 14,117, 45,584 and 72,000 bags in July, August and from the 1st to 26th September, 1942, respectively. Hence from the very beginning the Maize Board and the Controller were in difficulties, due to some extent to Control having been introduced at the time of the year when maize is not harvested.

The price of Sh. 4/90 for 200 lb. of native-grown maize was not one which attracted either the native producer or the native trader at the time Control was introduced. On this an Administrative Officer in the Central Province said:—

“At the end of June everything was apparently still all right, but by July 4th we were in trouble. One of the reasons the traders gave us was that there had been no arrangement to take over stocks in native traders' hands. Having been buying at Sh. 5 he was then expected to sell to the Control at Sh. 4/90. That as a start off was not a great sweetener for the trader. Also the price round about July and August in this district is on the upgrade and stood round about Sh. 6 on the 30th June, and might climb to anything before the next crop comes in. It was all very well saying it was a stabilized price, but I do not believe the European farmer would have been pleased at having a stabilized price below the current market price. I do not see how any Administrative Officer could persuade the African to take something the European would not take. The maize coming out of the reserves was merely a trickle. It was a small crop, anyway.”

The Maize Controller admitted in evidence that in the light of after events the 1st July was an unfortunate date to have chosen to introduce Maize Control and considered it would have been better to have started Control later in the year, when the new crop began to come on to the market, and we agree with that view.

180. In paragraph 166 of this Report we have already briefly referred to the question of servants as opposed to agents of the Control, and we recorded there that in our view the appointment of servants by the Maize Controller had not interfered with the channels of trade existing at the time Control was introduced. In Nyanza we heard much evidence regarding the friction which existed between the K.F.A. employees and the servants of the Maize Control in the native reserves. As already mentioned in paragraph 161 of this Report, the K.F.A. prior to the war entered the native maize markets as traders in the Native Reserves in Nyanza. Most of the servants of the Maize Control in Nyanza had formerly been employees of the K.F.A. and had left that employment just prior to the introduction of Maize Control. As to the manner in which these employees of the K.F.A., mostly Asians, became servants of the Maize Control, this will be discussed in the next Chapter.

The question of whether servants of the Maize Control are preferable to agents was referred to at length when we heard evidence at Kisumu. The Acting Provincial Commissioner and all the Agricultural Officers there who gave evidence

said that they considered that Control would work better through agents rather than through servants. On the other hand, all the Indian witnesses there are of the opinion that the servants of the Control are carrying on satisfactorily. The Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza, giving evidence, said:—

“You got the position that until Control came in the stabilizing influence in maize buying there had been the K.F.A. The staff who left the K.F.A. and went over to the Control were the people who had been running the stabilizing influence before Control came in. What happened was that one day they were working for the K.F.A. and the next day they were Government employees, and it led to more or less open war in a lot of the centres. I am afraid it is mixed up with the question of the K.F.A. A lot of the produce that found its way into the go-downs of the K.F.A. which they rented from Local Native Councils went to the Control, and the natives went to the Control thinking they were the K.F.A., and the new staff of the K.F.A. accused the others of taking the natives away. The Agricultural Officers had a busy time trying to sort things out.”

This evidence is supported by two other Agricultural Officers in Nyanza, and we cannot ignore the evidence of responsible Government officers on the spot who are intimately connected with the maize trade. The position appears to have been that when Control was introduced there was no really responsible officer of Maize Control in Nyanza who could give decisions locally and try to ensure as far as possible that the Control worked smoothly.

The Maize Controller's objection to appointing agents rather than employing servants is that if there are a number of traders dealing in maize in a certain centre, the difficulty is to decide which trader to appoint as agent. This difficulty is further complicated in Nyanza by the fact that prior to the introduction of Control the traders in maize there were Indian merchants and also the K.F.A. In the case of the Potato Control, the traders in potatoes, far less numerous than those in maize, formed a syndicate and appointed one of themselves to deal direct with the Potato Controller. The trader so appointed shared his profits with the other members of the syndicate. The Controller did not consider this would work satisfactorily with regard to maize and gave his reasons in a memorandum to the Maize Board, a copy of which is at Appendix K.

Whatever may be said for or against the employment of servants of Maize Control as opposed to the appointment of agents, we cannot escape from the finding, based mainly on the evidence of responsible Government officers in Nyanza, that the relationship between the servants of Maize Control and the employees of the K.F.A. is not such as to ensure the efficient working of Maize Control in that Province, and that Control will never work to the fullest efficiency there whilst that unfortunate relationship exists.

181. As stated previously in this Chapter, the Control started with insufficient maize for distribution to satisfy the needs of the Colony, and in spite of the provisions of Regulation 5 (1) (e) of the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, enacted on the 1st May, 1942 (already referred to in paragraph 173 of this Report), which appears to us to provide for the contingency of a shortage of maize, neither the Maize Board nor the Controller appear to have ever contemplated such a contingency and therefore were not in a position to deal adequately with the situation when maize began to be in short supply.

The Maize Controller admitted in evidence that as regards traders and millers he had no statistics of their pre-Control trade in maize and that he only knew the milling capacity of each mill. This is important because prior to Control traders and millers had their clientele of customers whose requirements of maize and maize meal they had been satisfying for years. Without any statistics of the pre-Control business of these traders and millers, we fail to see how maize could be distributed by the Control on any systematic basis. (We deal with the allegations of unfair distribution in Chapter XV.) The General Assistant to the Maize Controller, formerly an employee of the K.F.A., who stated that he had a large say in how much maize should be distributed by the Control to the various traders and millers, said in evidence:—

Question: Did you find when you received those forms that they were in agreement in most cases with your own experience of the business done by such millers in maize?

Answer: I cannot say practically everyone was, but most of them were.

Question: This means that you were relying entirely on your memory in deciding whether the returns were accurate or not?

Answer: Not exactly memory.

Question: A return came in from a trader saying he wanted so much maize, you took certain factors into consideration when deciding what he should have. One was the previous trade that trader had done in the preceding years. With regard to that factor, were you relying entirely on your memory?

Answer: Yes.

Question: You relied entirely on your memory from the figures you remembered from your K.A.F. experience?

Answer: From the K.F.A. experience."

Hence we find that when the shortage of maize occurred neither the Maize Board nor the Maize Controller had taken any steps to be in a position to allocate and distribute maize in a systematic manner and this affected the efficiency of the working of Maize Control.

182. As already stated in paragraph 174 of this Report, individual registration of consumers was not effected until January, 1943, when it was followed by maize being distributed to individuals in the Colony under the directions of the Chairman of the East African Production and Supply Council. This was referred to in Legislative Council by the mover of the motion (Mr. F. J. Couldrey) for the appointment of our Commission. He said—*see* Hansard, column 114, of the 22nd March, 1943:—

"Then about January something happened, I do not know what it was, but all of a sudden on the 25th January a change was made in the person responsible for the distribution of maize. Immediately all the preparations, all the arrangements made by his predecessor were cancelled. Steps, drastic steps, were taken to prepare the country for rationing. Now I submit that that alone is proof that up to 25th January something had been wrong with the operation of the Maize Control."

In view of this allegation that something was wrong with the operation of Maize Control, we inquired closely into the reasons why the distribution of maize was taken out of the hands of the Maize Board and the Controller early in 1943.

183. We had evidence from Mr. Wollen that he was approached by the Director of Produce Disposal, East African Production and Supply Council, as to whether he would help the Maize Controller in the distribution of maize, that having agreed to do so he then received an invitation from the Maize Controller to assist him. Subsequently, after the arrival in Kenya of the Chairman, East African Production and Supply Council, the scope of Mr. Wollen's activities became more East African than Kenya, and hence he officiated as Executive Officer under the directions of the Chairman of that Council.

It is clear from the evidence that the decision to start registration of individual consumers of maize had been taken before Mr. Wollen commenced work on the 27th January, 1943. He himself stated in evidence that the Maize Controller had started a system of registration of consumers and that returns from them were due in by the 14th January, 1943, before he began work. Mr. Wollen went on to say:—

"The preliminary analyses of these registrations had been well started before I got into the office, but there was a sudden and serious falling off in supplies which made far more drastic steps necessary and far more detailed work necessary than had ever been envisaged. It became a very full-time job for the staff available in the Maize Control Office and also a responsible job in which some measure of confidence was needed."

Not only was there a serious falling off in supplies of maize but, as stated by the Chairman, East African Production and Supply Council, there arose the question of the allocation and distribution of the foodstuffs which it was hoped

would be imported into the Colony to relieve the shortage. As the Chairman said, the requirements of the Armed Forces and the employed labour of contractors on naval and military contracts all had to be considered in addition to the needs of the civilian population. This involved planning which could not be done by the Maize Controller, and hence Mr. Wollen acted under the directions of the Chairman, East African Production and Supply Council.

Mr. Couldrey, in giving evidence, said:—

Question: For the system of distribution based on consumption Mr. Wollen used the figures collected by the Control prior to his having entered the Control. This shows that it had been the Controller's and Maize Board's intention as soon as it was possible to get the information to go on to a basis of distribution based on consumption?

Answer: I think that is a fair statement.

Question: So that the decision to distribute for the future on the basis of registered consumers was not made by Mr. Wollen, it must have been taken by the Maize Board?

Answer: That is where I disagree. I said they may have had in mind that decision, but the actual position was that he decided it was essential to stop supplies. Obviously it was collected before he got there, but my submission is that the actual decision—and on this I should like you to question him—was taken by Mr. Wollen, the actual decision to cancel supplies."

When Mr. Wollen was recalled to give evidence we put to him the second answer just quoted, which he admitted was a correct statement. In order to ascertain whether the initiative as regards the decision to stop supplies came from Mr. Wollen or from the Maize Board, we questioned the Chairman of the Maize Board when he was recalled to give evidence. In reply to our questions he stated as follows:—

Question: Regarding a lot of orders made by traders on Maize Control which when Mr. Wollen took over from Col. Griffiths, or assisted him, were cancelled—we want to know whether they were cancelled by Mr. Wollen on his own initiative or on the instructions of the Maize Board.

Answer: When registration took place I think the Maize Board realized that some of these orders would have to be cancelled. Before the orders were cancelled Mr. Wollen definitely spoke to me about it and I agreed with it, and the Maize Controller agreed with it.

Question: He consulted you and the Maize Controller before he cancelled them?

Answer: He definitely consulted me and I understood he had consulted the Maize Controller."

From the above we find that the decision to cancel orders for maize on the Control by traders was initiated by Mr. Wollen and not by the Maize Board.

184. The seconder of the motion leading to the appointment of our Commission (Mr. A. Vincent) stated in Legislative Council—see Hansard, column 120, of the 22nd March, 1943:—

"To turn to the sordid side of the inquiry, and I hate to do it, it will be essential to investigate all the allegations against everybody, including those instances which have tended to wreck the efficient working of the Maize Control. As an example, I have it alleged on excellent authority that in one case 5,000 bags of maize went into a certain mill operating within the framework of the Maize Control and 3,500 bags of mealy-meal came out; what happened to the other 1,500 bags I leave you to imagine! But if this is true, and it can be proved, I say without fear of contradiction it is a case for penal servitude or worse."

We ascertained that the mill referred to was situated at Kericho and that the maize belonged to the K.F.A. We made detailed inquiries into this allegation, both from the General Manager of the K.F.A. and the District Commissioner, Kericho, from whom Mr. Vincent received, through another witness, the information on which he founded the allegation he made in Legislative Council. The District Commissioner, Kericho, gave evidence that he had mentioned that there was a shortage

of maize related to that particular mill, but that he had no recollection of having mentioned the exact number of bags of maize which were alleged to have been short. He further stated that he never was under the impression that the maize which was short was maize which should have come into the hands of Control.

The General Manager of the K.F.A. in his evidence informed us that the shortage amounted to 1,061 bags, but it had nothing to do with the Maize Control as it was spread over transactions in maize between the K.F.A. and this particular mill for the period 1939-1942. That mill gristed maize for the K.F.A., and in the gristing of maize allowance is always made for a shortage unless a higher gristing charge is paid. In these transactions the K.F.A. paid the higher gristing charge and therefore any shortage had to be met by a payment from the mill to the K.F.A.

We were supplied with a statement showing that the shortage of gristing over the period 1939-1942 was 731 bags and that the remaining 330 bags had been used by the millowners to supply their own employees with food for the same period, making a total shortage of 1,061 bags of maize, and the mill had paid the K.F.A. for that shortage. Hence we find that this was maize which in any event was no concern of the Maize Control. The shortage of 1,061 bags was due partly to the customary shortage in gristing on transactions covering a period of over three years, and the balance of 330 bags was due to the millowners using the maize to supply their own employees over the same period.

185. The Maize Controller was appointed under the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, on the 5th May—see Government Notice No. 414 of that date—whilst he was still General Manager of the K.F.A., a position which he relinquished on the 31st May, 1942.

At the second meeting of the Maize Board on the 13th May, 1942, the Maize Controller submitted estimates for the 1942/43 maize crop and also estimated costs and expenses, with three alternative sets of figures, of the amount of maize for local consumption and export. These figures are important as they are the first sets of estimates of production and consumption which appear to have been placed before the Maize Board. We quote the following extracts from those estimates:—

“ESTIMATED CROP—

	<i>Bags</i>
Kavirondo	700,000
Central Province	250,000
Other Native Areas	100,000
European	500,000
	1,550,000

RESULT INCLUDING LOCAL F.O.R. PRICE OF VARYING QUANTITIES OF MAIZE:

At 120,000 bags per month—

		<i>Sh.</i>
Government	418,400 bags	3,296,600
Local	1,021,600 bags at Sh. 8/75	8,939,000
Export	110,000 bags at Sh. 9	990,000
	1,550,000	13,225,600

At 110,000 bags per month—

Government	418,400 bags	3,296,600
Local	901,600 bags at Sh. 8/71	7,852,936
Export	230,000 bags at Sh. 9	2,070,000
	1,550,000	13,219,536

At 100,000 bags per month—

Government	418,400 bags	3,296,600
Local	791,600 bags at Sh. 8/67	6,863,172
Export	340,000 bags at Sh. 9	3,060,000
	1,550,000	13,219,772”

From the above figures it appears that on the 13th May, 1942, the Maize Controller considered that Government and local consumption, i.e. total internal consumption, was at least 100,000 bags per month and at most 120,000 bags per month, which left at most 350,000 bags and at least 110,000 bags for export from the 1942/43 crop. That 100,000 bags per month was taken as the distribution figure is clear from paragraph 7 of the Maize Board memorandum submitted to us, where it is stated:—

“Therefore the position was that the Control expected to receive 1,550,000 bags of maize and to distribute 1,200,000 bags of an average of 100,000 bags a month during the period 1-7-42 to 30-6-43, leaving a margin of 350,000 bags—

- (a) in case the Services requirements should have been under-estimated;
- (b) to provide for additional civilian consumption if found necessary as it might well be if circumstances arising from the war called for more employed native labour;
- (c) for export.”

From that extract there is no doubt that the balance for export could not in any event have been as much as 350,000 bags because a certain percentage of that balance was earmarked in case Services requirements had been underestimated and more maize than estimated was likely to be required for employed native labour.

The second meeting of the Maize Board was held only eight days after an agreement had been executed on the 5th May, 1942, between the Maize Controller, for and on behalf of the Government of Kenya, on the one part, and the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, on the other part. That agreement was signed by the Maize Controller and witnessed by the Chairman of the Maize Board. The important parts of it are:—

“Whereas the seller has agreed to supply the purchaser with the exportable surplus of K2 and K3 maize from the 1942/43 crop in Kenya:

And Whereas it is not possible accurately to estimate what that exportable surplus will be:

Now it is hereby agreed as follows:

1. The seller shall sell and the purchaser shall buy all the exportable surplus of K2 and K3 maize from the 1942/43 crop produced in the Kenya Colony and Protectorate (excluding any seed maize which may hereafter be sold to, or with the consent of, the purchaser) up to a maximum of one hundred thousand tons. Provided that the purchaser may refuse to buy the said maize under this agreement if the exportable surplus is less than twenty thousand tons.

2. If such exportable surplus is in excess of one hundred thousand tons, the seller shall notify the purchaser in writing and the purchaser shall have the option, within fourteen days of receiving such notice, to purchase such excess on the terms and conditions contained in this Agreement.

3. For the purpose of calculating whether the said exportable surplus is more than twenty thousand tons there shall be included any maize which the seller may, with the consent of the purchaser, sell to the Governments of Northern or Southern Rhodesia.

4. If by reason of any action by the King's enemies or act of God (which term shall be deemed to include an unforeseen increase in local military demand, locust damage and famine in any part of the Protectorates of Kenya, Uganda or Zanzibar or of the Tanganyika Territory or of the Colony of Kenya) the exportable surplus of the said maize shall be reduced, the seller may by giving seven days' notice thereof in writing to the purchaser's representative in East Africa reduce the quantity of the said maize which under this Agreement he has contracted to sell to the purchaser and the purchaser shall be obliged to purchase the said reduced quantity notwithstanding the fact that the exportable surplus may thereby be less than twenty thousand tons.

5. The seller shall keep the purchaser informed from time to time of the instalments of the said maize likely to become available for sale under this Agreement. The purchaser shall give the seller adequate notice to enable the

seller to convey by railway the said instalments to Kilindini Harbour in time for shipment and the purchaser shall be responsible for providing the necessary shipping space between the months of October, 1942, and April, 1943, as and when the said instalments are ready for export."

186. This agreement is referred to in detail because in our view it has a considerable bearing on the approach in May, 1942, by both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller to estimates of the production and consumption of maize in view of the figures quoted at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, which were produced at the second meeting of the Maize Board on the 13th May, 1942.

That agreement refers to the fact that the exportable surplus could not be accurately estimated and that the 100,000 tons of maize specified therein is a maximum. This was stressed by both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller in evidence. According to their evidence both of them knew that the maximum figure of 100,000 tons would not be reached, and the Chairman admitted it was a ridiculous figure if not regarded as a ceiling. The Maize Controller said that this agreement, meaning the maximum figure, was impossible of performance even before it was signed, but added: "The fact that it was a ceiling that was not likely to be reached did not affect the validity of the contract."

The Kenya representative of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, who signed that agreement on behalf of that Corporation, gave evidence before us that when he executed the agreement he expected to get 100,000 tons; that two months afterwards the Maize Controller informed him he would get 65,000 tons; that on the 2nd October, 1942, the Maize Controller informed him that he would get 25,000 tons, of which 10,000 tons should go to Northern Rhodesia. Finally, on the 21st October, 1942, the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation representative attended a Maize Board meeting and was informed that there would be no maize available for export under the agreement.

187. We are not so concerned with the non-fulfilment of that agreement, but what is important to our inquiry is that both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller should have entered into such an agreement on the 5th May, 1942, when eight days afterwards—that is on the 13th May, 1942—they both knew, on the estimates of production and consumption produced at that meeting, that the maximum amount of maize for export could not be expected to be greater than 350,000 bags (approximately 32,000 tons) and even that amount would not be available if reserves were retained to meet unforeseen requirements of both the Services and employed native labour. Neither of them appears to have taken any action to inform the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation representative of the position at that time, which in our view suggests that they did not give close and careful consideration to the estimates of the production and consumption of maize produced at that second meeting of the Maize Board on the 13th May, 1942, bearing in mind the existence of that agreement.

With regard to the other members of the Maize Board, this agreement was not made known to them until the meeting of the Board on the 13th July, 1942 (then only as to the price specified in the agreement) and it was not until a further meeting of the Board on the 24th August, 1942, that the Chairman read out to them the more important clauses of it. The relevant minute of the meeting of the Maize Board on the 24th August, 1942, reads as follows:—

"Export of Maize.—In reply to inquiries as to whether commitments existed in respect of the export of maize from Kenya, the Chairman gave particulars of the Contract signed on the 5th May, 1942, with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, relating to the exportable surplus of Kenya maize, and stated that there were no commitments by the Maize Controller or the Kenya Government in respect of export to South Africa or the Rhodesias. He added that in certain conditions which he read from the contract, it might be that no maize need be exported under the contract."

From the above it is clear that the members of the Maize Board did not receive information about that agreement in time for them to take it into account in considering the estimates of production and consumption of maize at the second meeting of the Board on the 13th May, 1942.

188. Without taking into account the figures in the written note of the 10th February, 1942—Appendix I to this Report—which were not known to the members of the Maize Board other than the Chairman, we now pass on to the estimates of deliveries of maize to the Control and also the estimates of consumption for the period 1st July, 1942, to 30th June, 1943.

189. As already stated, the first estimates for the above period were before the Maize Board at its second meeting on the 13th May, 1942. These were 1,550,000 bags estimated deliveries, with estimated consumption at between 1,200,000 and 1,440,000 bags, leaving a balance of between 110,000 and 350,000 bags for the three purposes mentioned in paragraph 185 above. On those estimates the internal position appeared to the Maize Board to be secure, though the amount available for export under the agreement referred to in paragraph 185 above could never, under any circumstances, have approximated to the maximum figure of 100,000 tons (approximately 1,120,000 bags) mentioned therein.

190. The first indication which the Board had that deliveries might not reach the estimate of 1,550,000 bags was at its meeting on the 13th July, 1942, when the Maize Controller placed before the Board an appreciation of the maize position. That appreciation revealed that stocks in the hands of traders on the 1st July, 1942, were only 48,990 bags and only 6,500 bags in the hands of the K.F.A. These stocks were eventually proved to be 72,000 bags, as stated in paragraph 62 of this Report.

As stated in the same paragraph of this Report, the Maize Controller considered that the shortage would be a temporary one for a period of about six weeks and the Maize Board decided to take action on the lines mentioned in that paragraph.

Then followed maize deliveries to the Control of 14,117 bags in July, 45,584 bags in August and 72,000 bags for the period 1st to 26th September, 1942. These deliveries were well below the consumption estimated at the Board meeting on the 13th May, 1942, of 100,000 to 120,000 bags per month. In our view these figures of low stocks on the 1st July, 1942, and the deliveries for the months July, August and September, 1942, should have indicated to the Maize Board that some action was necessary in view of the fact that they revealed that consumption, even on figures which were only estimated and not certain, was outstripping production at a rapid rate. The Chairman of the Maize Board, as is indicated by the following extract from his evidence, considered that the position then did not indicate any grounds for alarm:—

Question: You were hoping that the leeway would be made up in the future?

Answer: Yes. I do not think there was any suggestion that the small deliveries in July-September would mean a diminution of the production estimate, and the fact that we did not get as much as we expected merely meant that we should get more later

Question: Did not that give some grounds for alarm?

Answer: Not in the least. All it conveyed to me was the fact that we should get more later on."

191. The estimates of the deliveries and the consumption of maize were first revised by the Maize Board at its meeting on the 21st October, 1942. At that meeting deliveries were estimated at 1,395,000 bags and consumption at 1,448,724 bags for the period 1st July, 1942, to 30th June, 1943. At that meeting, in view of the fact that estimated deliveries of 1,395,000 bags together with stock in hand of 79,030 bags only just balanced estimated consumption and left nothing to carry over until the new 1943/44 crop might be expected, the Maize Board informed the local United Kingdom Commercial Corporation representative that nothing would be available for export under his agreement, and also decided that the Military authorities must arrange for their own supplies of maize for the period May to August, 1943. Hence on the 21st October, 1942, it was clear to the Board that consumption could only be kept pace with by eliminating the maize requirements of the Armed Forces for a period of four months.

At that same meeting of the 21st October, 1942, one member of the Maize Board suggested that rationing should be introduced and when questioned as to why this suggestion was not adopted, the Chairman of the Maize Board stated in evidence:—

“On the 21st October Major Hearle mentioned that rationing should be considered or introduced. At that time the Board, as you know from the statement in Appendix F to the Maize Board’s report on the estimates before it, had an ample amount of maize up to the end of July, 1943, not to make it necessary to cut down or to suggest that rations should be cut down.”

Questioned as to rationing by Crown Counsel representing Government, the Maize Controller said:—

“*Question*: What were the reasons in your knowledge why it was not introduced in October or November?”

“*Answer*: The Board never considered it was necessary. The supply position did not warrant it.”

In our view, leaving out of account the effect of the figures in the written note of the 10th February, 1942—Appendix I to this Report—there was a clear indication in the low stocks in the hands of traders on the 1st July, 1942, the low deliveries in July, August and September, 1942, and the reduced estimates of production at the Board meeting on the 21st October, 1942, that rationing should be started forthwith. Moreover, by Regulation 6 (c) of the Defence (Control of Maize) (No. 2) Regulations, 1942, it was the duty of the Maize Board to “restrict the sale of maize and maize products to persons in the Colony” so as to maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the community.

192. The estimates of deliveries and the consumption of maize were again revised by the Maize Board at its meeting on the 23rd November, 1942. Estimated deliveries were reduced to 1,147,700 bags and consumption to 1,305,033 bags for the period 1st July, 1942, to 30th June, 1943, and the Chairman of the War Supplies Board was then informed that there would be no supplies of maize for the Armed Forces after the 1st January, 1943, except on replacement to be effected before the end of March, 1943.

At this meeting the question of rationing was again raised by the same member of the Board who had raised it at the meeting on the 21st October, 1942, and when questioned as to why this suggestion was not adopted the Chairman of the Maize Board stated in evidence:—

“At the end of November Major Hearle raised the question again and it was discussed at great length, and still at the end of November we had sufficient maize to continue on the 2 lb. ration. It was discussed at far greater length on that occasion and it was considered that to reduce rations and possibly upset labour at that time would be disastrous because the agricultural people told us that preparing land and planting was in full swing, while I was personally aware that there were military works which could not possibly be stopped and which it would be most dangerous to upset at the time. Another point was that on the 15th December we were expecting a special labour return which would have shown us at any rate where the employed labour was, and as you know from my previous evidence it was between the 1st and 7th December that further reduced estimates came in which showed us that we would not have a surplus, and on the 7th December steps were taken to introduce rationing.”

As we have already stated above that in our view rationing should have been introduced earlier we make no further comment on this.

193. It was not until the meeting of the Board on the 7th December, 1942, that a scheme for the registration of consumers was decided upon. The reason for this, as recorded in the Maize Board minutes of that meeting, was:—

“The object was to get definite information as to estimated consumption and firm requirements, which information had hitherto never been available.”

This in our view clearly shows that at no time from its first meeting had the Board any definite information of what consumers’ requirements were and until registration of consumers was effected early in 1943 they had been working in

the dark as to the internal requirements of maize. We consider that the Chairman and members of the Maize Board and the Maize Controller, on the figures before them from time to time, had several clear warning signals of an impending shortage, and in view of those warnings they should have taken earlier steps to secure definite figures of the consumption of maize and also to have recommended to Government prior to the 7th December, 1942, that rationing should be introduced. Their failure to do so had an adverse effect on the administration of Maize Control.

CHAPTER XV

THE MAIZE CONTROLLER

194. We had evidence not only from the Chairman and Directors of the K.F.A. but also from a number of other witnesses of their lack of confidence in the Maize Controller. After this had been expressed in evidence we endeavoured to discover on what grounds it was founded because if adequate reasons were proved, this would be very relevant to the second part of our terms of reference as to whether Maize Control has been administered efficiently and in the best interests of the country. This is especially so in view of the fact that the K.F.A. represents a large proportion of European farmers and is the agent of the Control for all the European maize produced in the Colony.

So far as most of the witnesses are concerned (other than the Chairman of the K.F.A. when recalled to give evidence) their evidence on the grounds for the lack of confidence in the Maize Controller was vague, and since they adduced no solid grounds for their lack of confidence we have disregarded their evidence on this matter in our Report.

195. From the minutes of the Maize Board which were put in evidence it appears that at the meeting of the Board on the 5th and 6th January, 1943, the following resolution was discussed:—

“In view of the strongly expressed opinion of the large majority of maize consumers and in view of the resolution carried by the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board to the effect that a change should be made in the appointment of the Maize Controller, this Board recommends His Excellency to make a new appointment at the earliest possible moment.”

We questioned the Chairman of the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board as to the reasons which prompted his Board to urge the appointment of another Maize Controller and he replied:—

“If I am asked why the Production and Settlement Board passed that resolution, I should say the resolution was based on lack of confidence which was expressed with considerable unanimity actually at that meeting. There had been a great deal of discussion throughout the country about this for a long time and people got fairly easily worked up before this resolution was passed by the Production Board.”

The resolution before the Maize Board quoted above was put to the vote after considerable discussion and was defeated by a majority of one, the Chairman using his casting vote as well as his deliberative vote under Regulation 3 (6) of the Defence (Control of Maize) (No. 2) Regulations, 1942.

196. Hence prior to our Commission there appears to have been fairly widespread lack of confidence in the Maize Controller which prompted first the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board to pass a resolution urging the appointment of another Controller, and secondly a similar resolution being moved in the Maize Board which was only defeated by the casting vote of the Chairman.

Questioned on this point the Chairman of the Maize Board in his evidence said:—

“*Question:* In the minutes of the Maize Board one comes across references to lack of confidence displayed by the consuming interests in the Controller himself.

Answer: It is entirely hearsay, but it has been said to me on numerous occasions. I think the Board is firmly of opinion that lack of confidence is entirely due to his activities before he was Maize Controller."

In fairness to the Maize Controller we would point out here that during his tenure of office as General Manager of the K.F.A., a position he occupied for a number of years, he energetically devoted much of his time and efforts to furthering the interests of European maize farmers who were members of that Association. In doing so he was inevitably brought into opposition to maize consuming interests who viewed his activities as Maize Controller with a certain amount of suspicion.

197. One Director of the K.F.A. stated in evidence:—

"I am convinced a certain amount of maize was kept back because of lack of confidence in Control and a certain amount of it was because farmers were feeding more and were going to feed more to stock than they intended to."

He was questioned on this by Crown Counsel representing Government as follows:—

Question: In effect are you suggesting that the farmer members of the K.F.A. who had no confidence in Col. Griffiths deliberately sabotaged Control?

Answer: I did not say deliberately sabotaged Control.

Question: Or attempted to?

Answer: No.

Question: Or refused to co-operate?

Answer: In what way could they refuse to co-operate? I am not suggesting they refused to co-operate; it is your suggestion. I said the maize disappeared like magic. It is a curious thing to me that it should have disappeared. I wondered why it had and why it was not coming on the market. I think the reason I can give was partially lack of confidence in Col. Griffiths. I said I thought undoubtedly a considerable amount was used owing to increased requirements on the farm due to feeding stock.

Question: Do you think if there had been another Controller who had the confidence of the farmers—we will say the K.F.A.—do you think more maize would have come out?

Answer: I do.

Question: In effect the farmers did not send their maize out purely on account of personal animosity?

Answer: No; they had lost confidence and wondered what was happening."

From the above evidence it is clear that it was suggested on the one part that the European farmer had no confidence in the Maize Controller and on the other part that the European farmers who were members of the K.F.A. had not assisted the Control as much as they should have done.

On this we had no actual instances cited in evidence of the lack of co-operation of the members of the K.F.A. towards the Control, nor were any substantial reasons put forward why individual farmers lacked confidence in the Maize Controller, and, as stated in paragraph 194 above, we disregard this evidence in our Report. In addition, and for the same reasons, we make no comment on the resolution passed by the Agricultural Production and Settlement Board or the one defeated in the Maize Board on this matter, and confine ourselves to the evidence advanced by the K.F.A., through their Chairman when recalled to give evidence, during our final sittings at which the K.F.A. were represented by an Advocate.

198. At those final sittings the evidence given by the Chairman of the K.F.A. regarding lack of confidence in the Maize Controller resolves itself under two headings. First, the actions of the Maize Controller when he was still General Manager of the K.F.A., though after his resignation from that post, in entering into certain negotiations, details of which we set out later, with the firm of

Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company (East Africa), Ltd., and secondly, on account of the staff which left the K.F.A. immediately prior to the introduction of Maize Control and were employed by the Maize Controller to assist him in operating a Control scheme.

199. We deal first with the negotiations between the Maize Controller and Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd. Before his appointment as Maize Controller Lt.-Col. Griffiths had resigned from his post as General Manager of the K.F.A., and according to the evidence of the Chairman of the K.F.A., that resignation was accepted by the Board of Directors on the 6th February, 1942.. We are satisfied that after his resignation had been accepted there was nothing to prevent Lt.-Col. Griffiths from endeavouring to secure employment with any other commercial firm, whether situated in the Colony or elsewhere, even if the activities of such firm were akin to, and in competition with, the activities of the K.F.A.

Lt.-Col. Griffiths' first action was to arrange to proceed to Cairo to interview there the Chairman of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., with a view to obtaining employment with that firm outside Kenya. His intention to proceed to Cairo became known to Government and immediately prior to his departure the Chief Secretary informed him that Government was considering the institution of Maize Control and that it would be appreciated if he did not commit himself definitely in Cairo to accepting the offer of any employment which would necessitate his leaving Kenya, because if Maize Control was introduced in the Colony Government regarded him (Lt.-Col. Griffiths) as the person for the appointment of Controller. On this information being conveyed to him Lt.-Col. Griffiths undertook not to enter into any definite commitments in Cairo.

Hence from the above we conclude that Lt.-Col. Griffiths prior to his departure for Cairo on or about the 19th February, 1942, had good reasons for assuming that there was every possibility of Maize Control being introduced in the Colony and if it was so introduced that he would be the Controller.

200. At this stage we pass on to the evidence of the Managing Director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company (East Africa) Ltd., stationed in Nairobi, as to the negotiations which took place between Lt.-Col. Griffiths and the Chairman of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in Cairo. This consists of both a written note and oral evidence founded on advice which the Managing Director received from his Chairman in Cairo when Lt.-Col. Griffiths arrived back in Kenya. The gist of that evidence is that when in Cairo Lt.-Col. Griffiths made tentative proposals to the Chairman of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., which he (Lt.-Col. Griffiths) suggested would bring profit to that firm of approximately £16,000 per annum. Those tentative proposals were:—

- (1) Proposed trading in the native reserves.
- (2) The possibility of Maize Control being handled on an agency basis.
- (3) The possibility of handling the military contracts.

We must stress that both Lt.-Col. Griffiths and the Chairman and Managing Director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., clearly understood from the beginning of the negotiations that these tentative proposals must have the consent of the K.F.A. Board of Directors.

Questioned as to the exact position Lt.-Col. Griffiths would have had with his firm, the Managing Director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company (East Africa), Ltd., said he would have had an executive position on the Board of Directors if he had brought to that firm the business of trading in the native reserves, the handling of maize control on an agency basis, and the military contracts, and that his salary would have been £2,500 a year, plus perquisites such as entertainment allowance, free car, etc., and 10 per cent of the profits of his branch of the business. If the profits had amounted to £16,000 per annum, mentioned by Lt.-Col. Griffiths, his commission would have amounted to £1,600 per annum.

Dealing first with the proposals as regards Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., entering the native reserves for the purpose of trading and also taking over the military contracts, this depended on whether the K.F.A. gave

up that part of their business. The important point here is whether Lt.-Col. Griffiths had good grounds for believing that the K.F.A. were going to give up their trading in the native reserves when he made the tentative proposals mentioned above to Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd.

From the evidence before us, including the minute books of the K.F.A., there is no doubt that from 1941 onwards the K.F.A. had frequently discussed the question as to whether they should continue trading in the native reserves. This question of the K.F.A. trading in the native reserves is bound up with the fulfilment of the military contracts which, according to the evidence before us, were almost entirely operated by Lt.-Col. Griffiths in his position as General Manager of the K.F.A., though the machinery of the K.F.A. organization was utilized to operate those contracts, and the profits derived therefrom accrued to the K.F.A. Lt.-Col. Griffiths gave evidence that he regarded those military contracts as his war work, and therefore personal to himself, and on his resignation from the K.F.A. he considered that he would still continue to operate those contracts personally and accordingly they would be lost to the K.F.A.

Leading up from this, Lt.-Col. Griffiths then considered that since these military contracts and, on the introduction of Maize Control, part of their business in native-grown maize, would be lost to the K.F.A., it would not pay them to continue trading in the native reserves. The trade then remaining to the K.F.A. in the reserves would not be sufficient to justify the overhead expenses of their organization being maintained there.

201. According to the K.F.A. minutes, at a meeting of the Directors of that organization on the 5th March, 1942, Lt.-Col. Griffiths made a statement with reference to Maize Control. He was asked by the Chairman of the K.F.A. whether in his position as Maize Controller it would be possible to use the K.F.A. depots throughout the country, most of which were situated in the native reserves, and he replied that he did not think it would be possible, because as Maize Controller he would start certain depots which would do away with the necessity of using those of the K.F.A.

In addition to this there is no doubt that as General Manager of the K.F.A. Lt.-Col. Griffiths knew that this question of whether the K.F.A. proposed to remain as traders in the native reserves had been and was still under consideration at the time he made his tentative proposals to Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in Cairo. With his conviction that the military contracts were bound to be lost to the K.F.A., and his opinion that the K.F.A. could not profitably continue to trade in the native reserves, we are of the opinion that he considered he had reasonable grounds, in so far as the K.F.A. were concerned, in putting forward proposals to the Chairman of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in Cairo, regarding trading in the native reserves.

The decision as to where the military contracts should be placed lay with the East African War Supplies Board, and we have been informed that about June, 1942, it was decided by that Board that those contracts should be operated directly through Controls, which eliminated all idea of profit to any commercial firm.

202. But having found that Lt.-Col. Griffiths was justified in believing that the K.F.A. would give up trading in the native reserves, we are still left with the question, very relevant to the allegation of lack of confidence in him as Maize Controller, made by the Chairman of the K.F.A. on behalf of that Association, as to the manner in which those negotiations were conducted and as to how this first came to the knowledge of the Chairman and Directors of the K.F.A. because of their fears, mentioned earlier, that Lt.-Col. Griffiths on leaving the K.F.A. might set up a trading organization as a rival to the K.F.A. organization.

203. As to those fears and that lack of confidence, we had evidence that the first intimation which the K.F.A. received of the negotiations between Lt.-Col. Griffiths and Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., was through a third party not connected with either firm, and we have no doubt that this made

the Chairman of the K.F.A. suspicious of what was happening, because immediately on hearing of the negotiations he went to the Managing Director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in Nairobi. On this point the Managing Director in his written note submitted to us stated:—

“While waiting for something more concrete from Col. Griffiths, Mr. Trench, Chairman of the K.F.A., called on me on the 15th March, when he expressed quite forcibly that the K.F.A. Board had no intention of giving up their trading in the native reserves. This naturally came as a surprise to me, because Col. Griffiths had felt and expressed the feeling that there would be little difficulty in that direction.”

At the same time, that is the 15th March, 1942, the Managing Director informed the K.F.A. that the tentative proposals “were definitely off” and on the 16th April, 1942, gave the Chairman of the K.F.A. a letter to the effect that Lt.-Col. Griffiths would not be asked to take a seat on the Board of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., during the war.

204. Concurrent with his negotiations with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., Lt.-Col. Griffiths put forward to the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary of Government on the 4th March, 1942, the possibility of his undertaking Maize Control, Potato Control, and the military contracts through Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., but he was informed at once that this would not be acceptable to Government. Lt.-Col. Griffiths then stated that he presumed Government would not object to his accepting a directorship of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in an advisory capacity without executive duties. This also was not agreed to by Government.

Hence it is clear that Government had not the slightest intention from the outset of agreeing to any of the tentative proposals made by Lt.-Col. Griffiths as to Maize Control or the military contracts being operated by him through the organization of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd.

As to the question of Lt.-Col. Griffiths joining the firm of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in an advisory capacity, we quote the following extract from the evidence of the Managing Director:—

“*Question*: I should like to get clear how the directorship of Col. Griffiths was going to fit in with his being Maize Controller. You told us he might remain with the K.F.A. and be on your Board in an advisory capacity?”

Answer: That was one possibility.

Question: Suppose he left the K.F.A., as he was supposed to do at that time, and became Maize Controller, what sort of a position was he to have on your Board?

Answer: Entirely advisory.”

205. From the above evidence we find that:—

- (1) The way in which the Chairman of the K.F.A. heard of the negotiations by Lt.-Col. Griffiths with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., was such as to arouse the suspicions and fears of himself and the other Directors of the K.F.A. that an organization might be set up as a rival to the K.F.A., both as regards trading in maize and other produce in the native reserves, and this justified them in their lack of confidence in Lt.-Col. Griffiths as Maize Controller.
- (2) Lt.-Col. Griffiths, in his tentative proposals made to Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., favoured maize control being operated by that firm on an agency basis with their own servants in the native reserves.
- (3) Lt.-Col. Griffiths used his knowledge that he was likely to be appointed to a post under Government as Maize Controller to attempt to secure for himself a lucrative appointment with a commercial firm.

All this cannot have had any other than an adverse effect on the efficiency of the working of Maize Control, because from the start there was lack of confidence in the Maize Controller by the K.F.A., who are the Maize Controller's

own agents for handling all the European-grown crop under the Maize Control scheme, and on our findings set out above this lack of confidence was to a large extent justified.

206. Having received the letter from the Managing Director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., referred to in paragraph 203 above, the fears of the Chairman and the other Directors of the K.F.A. that an organization rival to their own might be set up appear to have been allayed. Unfortunately, the question of staff resigning from the K.F.A. to go over as servants of the Maize Controller again raised the question of the lack of confidence by the K.F.A. in the Maize Controller.

207. Under the Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942, promulgated on the 1st May, 1942, the Maize Controller had full power to appoint servants by Regulation 3 (2). That Regulation reads as follows:—

“The Controller may in writing appoint servants or agents in any area within the Colony, and any such servant or agent may exercise such duties, powers and functions of the Controller as may be specified in the appointment.”

On the question of obtaining staff for operating the Maize Control scheme, the Chairman of the Maize Board gave evidence that this was a matter for the Maize Controller. The Chairman went on to say that he had heard there was some friction with the K.F.A. in connexion with staff and that the Maize Controller had informed him that a number of K.F.A. servants were going to the Control voluntarily after resigning from the K.F.A. He informed the Controller that he would object to the staff coming from the K.F.A. if they were to be paid higher salaries than they had received with that organization, but was informed by the Maize Controller that their salaries had not been increased.

As confirmed by Crown Counsel representing Government, 26 members of the K.F.A. staff left that organization and became servants of the Maize Control. This, as stated in evidence by the present General Manager of the K.F.A., caused that Association a certain amount of embarrassment.

208. The resignation of staff was discussed at length in the Finance and General Purposes Committee meeting of the K.F.A. on the 15th May, 1942, but in order to place this matter in its proper setting and to get the background of the discussions at that meeting it is necessary to go back to what had happened earlier.

As we have stated already, at the time Lt.-Col. Griffiths made his tentative proposals to Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., in our view he was justified in thinking he had good grounds for believing that the K.F.A. would go out of trading in the native reserves. Therefore at that time he was also justified in believing that the staff employed by the K.F.A. in the reserves would no longer be required by that organization and so would be available for employment elsewhere. But in the meantime, on Lt.-Col. Griffiths' own admission in evidence, he knew, to quote his own words, “not later than April,” i.e. April, 1942, that his negotiations with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd., had fallen through. At this time it is true he did not know definitely whether the K.F.A. were to continue trading in the native reserves, but he well knew that they had objected successfully to his negotiations with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company, Ltd. Therefore he could have made a direct approach to the Chairman of the K.F.A., orally or by letter, asking whether there would be any objection to certain members of their staff leaving to undertake employment under him as Maize Controller. It is true that he did endeavour to obtain information as regards the K.F.A. staff from Mr. Bennitt, who was then Secretary to the K.F.A. and later succeeded Lt.-Col. Griffiths as General Manager of the K.F.A. As to this, Lt.-Col. Griffiths stated in evidence:—

“It is true I never asked them but I had many discussions with Mr. Bennitt, and pressed him to get a decision from the Board. I did not get a decision from the Chairman of the Board and I therefore got into a state of drift to start with. Then after it became common knowledge that I had resigned from the K.F.A., the members of the staff of the K.F.A., not only

in the Reserves but others, came to me and resigned and said, 'If you start Maize Control we should like to come and join you.' That is what happened over it."

The fact, that Lt.-Col. Griffiths had not approached the K.F.A. regarding staff is recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Finance and General Purposes Committee on the 15th May, 1942, as follows:—

"The Chairman pointed out that Col. Griffiths had not asked the Board whether it was going out of the business. He thought the correct procedure was for Col. Griffiths to put the matter to the Board, and if the K.F.A. decided to withdraw from the native trading, then he could say he would like to take over the services of so-and-so.

The General Manager said that the Board would not take him into its confidence. They had told him nothing and he had had to make his own arrangements. He felt that the supervision of the military contracts was his war work."

We do not consider that although Lt.-Col. Griffiths endeavoured to obtain information regarding staff from Mr. Bennett, then Secretary to the K.F.A., he was absolved from making a direct approach to the K.F.A. Board as to whether they still required their staff in the native reserves. Even if in May, 1942, Lt.-Col. Griffiths thought that the K.F.A. might cease to trade in the native reserves—their decision to continue such trading was made on the 3rd June, 1942—it did not in our view absolve him from making the direct approach already mentioned. The staff had been with the K.F.A. for years and were trained in their business. To lose them, especially in war-time when most commercial firms have great difficulty in finding trained staff, was a serious matter.

209. We agree with Crown Counsel representing Government that there is no evidence that Lt.-Col. Griffiths made any direct approach to any of the staff to leave the K.F.A., but on the other hand it is reasonable to assume that they would not have left their employment with the K.F.A. unless they were assured of positions in Maize Control.

If Lt.-Col. Griffiths had made a direct approach to the Board of the K.F.A. over the question of staff, which in our opinion he should have done, this unfortunate episode would never have happened. Arising in the way it did it created further lack of confidence in him by the Board of the K.F.A., and must have impaired the efficiency of the working of Maize Control because it jeopardized good relationships between the Maize Controller and his agents for the handling of the whole of the European-grown maize crop of the Colony.

210. One witness drew our attention to an article in the *East African Standard* on the 25th September, 1942, arising out of an interview with the Maize Controller. This article conveyed to the public at that time that 500,000 bags of maize would be available for export from the 1942-43 crop.

We quote the following extracts from that article:—

"The supply position of both maize and posho in certain parts of the country was poor last week owing largely to unavoidable distribution difficulties, but the respective areas had since been supplied with sufficient stocks to meet immediate needs. The position at Mombasa was serious at one stage last week, but supplies were now being provided.

Col. Griffiths emphasized that the position had largely been created not so much by under-production but by abnormal consumption. Factors and conditions arising from the war had created demands and difficulties of supply which were impossible to foresee. In fact, the demands for maize were unlimited. . . .

The total number of bags expected to be delivered from both the native and European maize crops is approximately 1,500,000 bags, it was officially stated yesterday. The estimated consumption by civil and military consumers is 1,000,000 bags, leaving about 500,000 bags for export. . . .

Maize for the Middle East is required largely by the Egyptian Government, but the position at the moment is such that only a very small quantity

is likely to be shipped to that consumer. It appears that the 500,000 bags available for export on present estimates will have to be split up among a number of Allied territories in dire need of maize. These include South Africa, which is seeking 40,000 tons to meet a serious shortage in the Union; Southern Rhodesia, which requires 10,000 tons; Madagascar, Ceylon, Zanzibar, the Seychelles and other places.

It has been suggested to the authorities that efforts should be made to cut down East African consumption of maize and posho as much as possible in order to supply greater quantities to outside consumers."

This article was published 27 days prior to the decision taken by the Maize Board on the 21st October, 1942, that there would be no maize available for export. Questioned as to this article, the Maize Controller said that he did not see it in draft before it was published and that he informed both the newspaper reporter and the Chairman of the Maize Board after its publication that it was wrong. In spite of this, no steps were taken either by the Chairman of the Maize Board or by the Controller to publish a correction and, as no correction was published (in our view, it should have been), the public could not do otherwise than assume from the article that at the end of September, 1942, the Colony's internal requirements of maize were abundantly safe, whereas, as we have pointed out in paragraph 185 of this Report, both the Chairman of the Maize Board and the Controller considered from the very commencement of Control that the export margin for safety was, in the most favourable circumstances, well below 500,000 bags.

Other statements made by the Maize Controller in the early days of Control that the shortage was only temporary were, in our view, likely to lessen confidence in the Controller when the seriousness and persistence of the shortage became apparent to the public.

211. Finally, allegations were made by the K.F.A., through their Chairman, of unfair discrimination against themselves by the Maize Controller in the distribution of maize. The Chairman of the K.F.A. particularly mentioned that four firms of Indian millers in Nairobi had received preferential treatment to themselves as regards the amount of maize allocated to them by Control.

This allegation had already been inquired into by the Maize Board and at its meeting on the 5th-6th January, 1943, the following resolution was before the Board:—

"That this Board, having inquired into the complaint made by the Kenya Farmers' Association (Co-operative) Limited of unfair discrimination against the Association by the Controller in the distribution of maize supplies during July and August, 1942, at Nairobi and Mombasa, considers on the evidence put before it that no case of such unfair discrimination has been substantiated."

At that meeting one member recorded his opinion as "not proven" and all the other members voted in favour of the resolution.

We examined the figures produced before us by the Maize Controller and the K.F.A. and the books of the four Indian millers, in addition to hearing their evidence. On that evidence and from an analysis of all the figures produced before us, we find that no case of unfair discrimination against the K.F.A. in the allocation of maize by the Maize Controller is substantiated.

212. As stated in the first paragraph of this Chapter, we have disregarded in this Report any evidence of lack of confidence in the Maize Controller for which solid grounds were not given, but we must record our view that any widespread lack of confidence must militate against the successful working of a difficult control such as Maize Control.

At the same time we should also record our view that any lack of confidence which existed prior to the introduction of Maize Control was greatly increased as a result of the many difficulties which arose owing to the unexpected shortage of maize.

CHAPTER XVI**SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF MAIZE CONTROL**

213. In Chapter XIV we have discussed some of the criticisms of the system of Maize Control arising out of the dissatisfaction, which was widespread, expressed to us in evidence. After considerable thought, we have decided to put forward some suggestions for a simplified system of Control, which we suggest should be examined by persons best qualified to judge of its merits.

Having had no practical experience in the marketing of maize ourselves, we put forward the suggestions at Appendix L to this Report with great diffidence. It may be that our suggestions as a whole may not be found to be workable, yet some of them may assist in bringing about an improvement of the present system so that in future Maize Control may have the whole-hearted support of the maize producers, consumers and traders in the Colony.

214. We have pointed out in paragraph 114 of this Report that the European-grown maize crop is essential in normal times to satisfy the internal needs of the Colony, and this is especially so at the present time in view of the increased consumption of maize. Accordingly any Maize Control scheme must take this into account, which at once raises the question of price. As stated in paragraph 120 of this Report, we do not consider that there should normally be any difference in price for the same product of similar quality, whether it is produced by Europeans or natives. But in view of the fact that the Colony cannot yet do without a certain amount of European-grown maize to satisfy its requirements, then for the cogent reasons set out in paragraph 120 of this Report we consider that a higher price for a certain quantity of European-grown maize may be necessary so long as that maize is essential to the Colony's requirements, even in normal times after the war, if the basic price of maize is fixed at a level below that necessary to secure the required production of European-grown maize.

Apart from the higher price to be paid for a certain amount of European-grown maize, the price of all other maize, whether grown by Europeans, Asians or Africans, would, as recommended in paragraph 124 of this Report, be a basic price for each crop year, fixed before the beginning of each planting season.

We are not in favour of allowing the price of native-grown maize to find its own level because this would not only mean violent price fluctuations which would cut right across any scheme to pay a higher price for an indispensable amount of European-grown maize, but also the amount of native-grown maize coming on to the market would vary considerably year by year due to the fluctuations in price, and, as stated in Section B of Chapter VIII of this Report, any year in which native-grown maize commanded a very low price would be followed by considerably less planting in the next year, thus leading to a shortage.

215. As Appendix L sets out our suggestions in some detail, we do not propose to elaborate on them further in this Chapter.

PART III

CHAPTER XVII

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

216. The following is a summary of our recommendations:—

Weather Forecasts

(1) We recommend that when more normal times return the whole subject of seasonal forecasts should be investigated with a view to utilizing the best scientific methods for obtaining accurate weather forecasts and for making them available to agriculturalists by the quickest possible means. (Paragraph 19.)

Rendering of Returns under the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942

(2) We recommend that the provisions of the Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942, relating to the rendering and collection of statistics should be strictly carried out so as to obtain returns from farmers as near as possible to the dates on which they are required to be rendered. (Paragraph 44.)

Responsibility for Production of Foodstuffs, etc.

(3) We recommend that the East African and Kenya organizations should be constituted from the Colony point of view to ensure that the responsibility for the production of foodstuffs, and the satisfying of consumers' requirements, and also the responsibility for obtaining statistics, should be undividedly fixed. (Paragraph 46.)

Registration of Natives in Mombasa

(4) We recommend that urgent steps should be taken to register the natives resident in Mombasa for the purpose of rationing foodstuffs there on as fair and equitable a basis as the system in force in Nairobi. (Paragraph 48.)

Meat

(5) We recommend that the Live Stock Controller and the Nairobi Municipal Council should endeavour to improve the present system of resting animals before slaughter because this would further decrease the number of carcasses condemned on account of their fevered condition. (Paragraph 95.)

(6) We recommend that By-law 20 of the Mombasa Municipality (Inspection, Storage and Sale of Food) By-laws, 1929, should be examined by the law officers of Government and, if necessary, amended to permit of meat condemned in Mombasa being cooked and made available for human consumption. We further recommend that the Mombasa Municipal Board should endeavour to obtain a steam cooker to deal with the condemned meat and in the meantime should examine the possibility of cooking this meat by ordinary means until such time as a steam cooker can be obtained. (Paragraph 97.)

Rice

(7) We recommend that every endeavour should be made to increase the production of rice in order to make the Colony as self-supporting in this commodity as possible. (Paragraph 103.)

Storage of Reserve Foodstuffs

(8) We recommend that part of the reserve supply of foodstuffs against a future food shortage should take the form of wimbi. (Paragraph 109.)

(9) In addition, we recommend that the balance of that reserve should take the form of maize and other suitable foodstuffs and that the whole reserve should be sufficient for the needs of the Colony for about three to four months in normal times. (Paragraph 109.)

(10) We recommend that Government should take the initiative by purchasing annually a certain proportion of wimbi from this reserve, mixing it with maize meal and issuing the mixed meal to those of its native employees who are in receipt of rations. (Paragraph 109.)

(11) We recommend that it is much better to spend a certain amount of money in erecting weather and vermin-proof stores at high altitudes for storage of a reserve stock of maize rather than to embark upon an expensive scheme of grain silos which, for the purpose of preventing a further food shortage, will be unnecessary if inexpensive stores at high altitudes prove successful. (Paragraph 110.)

(12) We recommend that the cost of erecting storage and all other costs ancillary to the storing of a foodstuffs reserve should be met from public funds. (Paragraph 111.)

(13) We recommend that the transportation of foodstuffs which it is essential to store for safeguarding the inhabitants of the Colony from a food shortage should be provided at special rates. (Paragraph 112.)

Contract for Limited Quantity of European-grown Maize

(14) We recommend that for the period European-grown maize is indispensable to the Colony's requirements in normal times Government should enter into a contract, through the agency of the K.F.A., to purchase about 400,000 bags of European-grown maize per annum at a price fixed after consulting producing and consuming interests. Consideration should be given as to the form that contract should take, bearing in mind that adequate notice of its cancellation or variation will be necessary. (Paragraph 114.)

Export of Maize

(15) We recommend that the exportable surplus of maize should be kept as small as possible and that the future policy of the Colony should be not to encourage the production of maize for export. (Paragraph 117.)

Price of Maize to Producers

(16) We recommend that no change in the policy of fixing prices of European and native-grown maize should be made until times are more normal. (Paragraph 121.)

(17) We recommend that when times are more normal a basic minimum price for all maize, other than the European-grown maize mentioned in recommendation (14) above, should be fixed before each planting season, after consultation with producing and consuming interests. (Paragraph 124.)

District Production and Man Power Committees and Sub-committees

(18) We recommend that the authority and supervision of these committees and sub-committees should be maintained on a permanent basis in peacetime. (Paragraph 125.)

Fixation of Guaranteed Prices for Agricultural Products

(19) We recommend that in the present policy of fixing guaranteed prices for agricultural products, such prices should be so correlated that the return from any particular product, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, should not be greatly in excess of the returns obtainable from other agricultural products. (Paragraph 126.)

Statistics

(20) We recommend that urgent consideration should be given as to how statistics of production, rationing and distribution, and the consumption of foodstuffs, are to be obtained and pooled to the best advantage. (Paragraph 129.)

Agricultural Policy

(21) We recommend, on broad principles, the formulation and adoption of a long-term policy for agriculture, containing the following essentials:—

- (i) regard for the needs of the population, with particular reference to improving the diet and raising the standard of health of the natives;
- (ii) the encouragement of mixed farming both in the settled areas and the native reserves;
- (iii) the raising of the efficiency of both native and non-native farming, with particular emphasis on the fact that the fertility of the soil is the Colony's main asset. (Paragraph 138.)

Provincial Development Boards

(22) We recommend that Government should give consideration to the establishment of such Developments Boards, which would be charged with the duty of carrying out, *inter alia*, agricultural development schemes within the framework of the general agricultural policy. (Paragraph 139.)

Export of Maize from Districts in the Coast Province

(23) We recommend that, so far as the Coast Province is concerned, the Native Foodstuffs Ordinance (Cap. 135 of the Revised Edition) should be amended to prohibit the export of maize from a district until such time as it is seen that the prospects of the next crop are assured and that this power should be vested in the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast Province rather than in the Governor in Council. (Paragraph 141.)

Nutrition

(24) We recommend that a concerted policy should be worked out by the Medical and Agricultural Departments within the framework of a general native policy setting out in broad outline on the one hand the nutritional needs and on the other the agricultural policy designed to meet those needs. Such policy when approved should have the full support of the Government and all necessary measures taken by propaganda, administrative instructions and legislation to have it carried out. (Paragraph 144.)

Repatriation to Native Reserves during a Food Shortage

(25) We recommend that if repatriation to the native reserves should ever become necessary again on account of a food shortage, full consideration should be given as to whether the reserves to which repatriation should take place have sufficient food to support an increased population and whether the natives to be repatriated have homes in the reserves. (Paragraph 150.)

Return to Normal Ration of Maize Meal

(26) We recommend that when the prospects of the short rain maize crops being favourable are certain the ration of 2 lb. per head per day should be restored, and in the meantime we recommend that every effort should be made to supplement the present ration of 1½ lb. of maize meal per head per day for employed native labourers by additional foods such as meat, wimbi, potatoes, beans and other foodstuffs. (Paragraph 153.)

217. During our inquiry we were particularly impressed by the number of memoranda submitted by officers of the Medical and Agricultural Departments, which were invaluable to us on the wider aspects of our deliberations. We express our thanks to the Director of Medical Services, the Director of Agriculture and to all officers of both departments who assisted us by means of their memoranda.

218. Most of Chapter IV of this Report is reproduced from data supplied by Mr. V. Liversage, B.Sc., M.S.(Wis.), N.D.A., Agricultural Economist, Department of Agriculture, to whom we are grateful for placing several of his notes and memoranda at our disposal.

219. We are very grateful for the assistance given to us by the Director of Meteorological Services and his staff in preparing the rainfall charts appearing in Appendices C, D and E to this Report and we also thank the Director of Surveys and his staff for the preparation of the crop season plan at Appendix F.

220. We thank our Secretary for carrying out his duties with industry and ability. During sittings which, with inevitable breaks, lasted about three and a half months in various places, he showed considerable foresight in not only estimating accurately the length of time such sittings would take but also in reducing to a minimum the time witnesses had to wait prior to giving evidence. In addition, he assisted in preparing a digest on many aspects of our inquiry from the evidence received, and also dealt with the correspondence necessitated by the inquiry.

221. Finally, we are very grateful to Mr. A. H. Edwards and Miss A. S. J. Bennitt who reported verbatim the large amount of evidence, very often under trying conditions. They both worked long hours to keep us abreast of the evidence. In addition, Miss Bennitt's assistance in compiling our Report and her work in typing it, involving as it did dealing with several drafts, have been invaluable.

We have the honour to be,
Your Excellency's most humble and obedient servants,

H. C. WILLAN,
Chairman

W. H. BILLINGTON,
JOHN L. RIDDOCH,
Members

G. J. ROBBINS,
Secretary.

Nairobi,
6th November, 1943.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF WITNESSES

1. Mr. R. E. Norton, East African Director of Produce Disposal, Nairobi.
2. Mr. A. B. Killick, Deputy Director of Agriculture, Nairobi.
3. Mr. G. F. Clay, Director of Native Production, Nairobi.
4. Mr. C. R. Lockhart, Chairman, East African Production and Supply Council, Nairobi.
5. Capt. F. O'B. Wilson, Deputy Chairman, Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
6. Mr. D. L. Blunt, Director of Agriculture, Nairobi.
7. Dr. G. V. W. Anderson, Nairobi.
8. Dr. C. J. Wilson, Member Representing Native Interests on Legislative Council, Kinangop.
9. Group Captain A. Walter, Chief Meteorological Officer for Air Headquarters, East Africa Command, Nairobi.
10. Mr. L. Tester, Financial Secretary, Nairobi.
11. Mr. R. S. Wollen, Deputy Chairman of Coffee Control, Nairobi.
12. Mr. A. Vincent, Member of Legislative Council, Nairobi.
13. Col. G. M. Edye, Nairobi.
14. Col. G. C. Griffiths, Maize Controller, Nairobi.
15. Mr. M. A. Patel, Nairobi.
16. Mr. A. Dalton, Superintendent of the Line, Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, Nairobi.
17. Mr. E. B. Hosking, Chief Native Commissioner, Nairobi.
18. Mr. H. R. Montgomery, Deputy Director of Man Power and Member Representing Native Interests on Legislative Council, Kiambu.
19. Mr. T. C. Colchester, Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi.
20. Major F. W. Cavendish-Bentnck, Chairman, Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
21. Gagotho s/o Kirag
22. Joseph Mbogwa
23. Ngatia s/o Gasai
24. Kanuthu s/o Thuku
25. Mwaura s/o Ngmi
26. Gachibi s/o Gicera
27. Mr. T. H. Chettle, Nakuru.
28. Mr. W. Evans, Nakuru.
29. Joel Chemirmir
30. Kimirkis arap Chirchir
31. Chepkurgat arap Chenchor
32. Frederick Mwangengi
33. Kiruku Githinji
34. Mr. F. J. Couldrey, Member of Legislative Council, Nakuru.
35. Mr. G. J. L. Burton, Chief Research Officer, Agricultural Department, Nakuru.
36. Col. A. I. Lean, Nakuru.
37. Mr. U. I. Karimbux, Nakuru.
38. Joseph Jario
39. L. C. Sumner
40. Mr. T. R. Spence, Town Clerk, Nakuru.
41. Mr. J. G. Hamilton Ross, District Commissioner, Nakuru.
42. Mr. J. A. Wolryche Whitmore, Rongai.
43. Mr. W. F. O. Trench, Chairman, Kenya Farmers' Association, Nakuru.
44. Mr. H. M. Alidina, Naivasha.
45. Major A. G. Keyser, Director of Kenya Farmers' Association, Kitale.
46. Mr. J. Butterfield, Kericho.
47. Mr. J. McKay, Director of Kenya Farmers' Association, Sabatia.
48. Mr. E. W. Pardoe, Nakuru.

} Rumuruti Natives.

} Baringo Natives.

} Elburgon Natives.

} Nakuru Natives.

49. Ngugi s/o Githuga
 50. Karari s/o Karanja } Squatters on Mr. Pardoe's farm.
 51. Mr. W. H. Gunson, Director of Kenya Farmers' Association, Rongai.
 52. Mr. W. H. F. Hughes, Thomson's Falls.
 53. Commander E. C. Ward, Subukia.
 54. Mr. B. E. A. Pockley, Ol 'Joro Orok.
 55. Mr. A. Ross, Subukia.
 56. Mr. H. F. Eckstein, Subukia.
 57. Mr. G. H. Lamb, Ainabkoi.
 58. Capt. D. P. Petrie, Nakuru.
 59. Mr. E. W. Bennitt, General Manager, Kenya Farmers' Association; Nakuru.
 60. Asumani bin Abdulla
 61. Abdulla bin Kondo } Nakuru Natives.
 62. Salim bin Asumani
 63. Capt. J. Barrah, Live Stock Control, Nakuru.
 64. Mr. E. H. Wright, Member of Legislative Council, Njoro.
 65. Capt. H. B. Barclay, Menengai.
 66. Gideon Ogude
 67. Paulo Omale
 68. Chief Elijah Bonyo
 69. Chief Amoth
 70. Chief Owili
 71. Habil Omolo } Central Kavirondo Natives.
 72. Chief Gideon Magaak
 73. Chief Paul Mboya
 74. Paul Ondieh } South Kavirondo Natives.
 75. Pascal Nabwana
 76. Habil Ndagala
 77. Rev. Jeremiah Owuor
 78. Johahna Okuma
 79. Wanzala
 80. Chief Paul Agoi
 81. Philipo Wangale } North Kavirondo Natives.
 82. Kipkoske arap Belyon
 83. Kiplongat arap Mugolil } Kericho Natives.
 84. E. O. Josiah
 85. J. M. Oumo
 86. C. Mbui } Kisumu Natives.
 87. Dr. P. C. C. Garnham, Senior Medical Officer, Nyanza.
 88. Col. G. L. Gamlen, Kisumu.
 89. Mr. F. N. Hoyt, Kaimosi.
 90. Mr. C. O. Oates, Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza.
 91. Mr. J. T. Moon, Agricultural Officer, North Kavirondo.
 92. Mr. A. W. Thompson, Agricultural Officer, South Kavirondo.
 93. Mr. B. B. Patel, Kenya Posho Mills, Kericho.
 94. Mr. F. D. Hislop, District Commissioner, Kakamega.
 95. Mr. G. V. Patel, Kisumu.
 96. Mr. Rahimtula Kasim, Member of Legislative Council, Kisumu.
 97. Mr. J. H. B. Murphy, District Commissioner, Kisumu-Londiani.
 98. Mr. G. Gamble, Assistant Agricultural Officer, Central Kavirondo.
 99. Mr. Karim Jivrah, Kisumu.
 100. Mr. P. K. Shah, Nyanza Oil Mills, Kisumu.
 101. Mr. H. I. Lakhani, Kisumu.
 102. Mr. K. L. Hunter, Acting Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza.
 103. Mr. T. Thompson, Deputy Price Controller, Kisumu.
 104. Archdeacon W. E. Owen, N'giya.
 105. Thomas Masibo
 106. Paulo Robert } Kitale Natives.
 107. Musa Were

108. Chief Kanokwang } West Suk Natives.
 109. Chief Kimei }
110. Mr. G. H. Chaundy, Education Officer, Kapenguria.
 111. Mr. Mohamed Kanji, Broderick Falls.
 112. Mr. E. N. Valpy, Kitale.
 113. Mr. H. C. Kirk, Kiminini.
 114. Mr. J. Crampton, Kitale.
 115. Mr. Oswald Bentley, Kitale.
 116. Capt. D. A. Vaughan-Philpott, Kitale.
 117. Mr. B. J. Spratt, Kitale.
 118. Rev. O. H. Knight, Kitale.
 119. Mr. A. Colin Maher, Officer in Charge, Soil Conservation Service, Kitale.
 120. Mr. R. J. Mitchell, Kitale.
 121. Mr. E. J. Lurman, Cherangani.
 122. Mr. E. J. Tyack, Kitale.
 123. Mr. J. C. Evans, Cherangani.
 124. Mr. F. J. McCall, Endebess.
 125. Col. J. G. Kirkwood, Member of Legislative Council, Kitale.
 126. Mr. E. Phillips, Executive Officer, Trans Nzoia Commodity Distribution Board, Kitale.
 127. Mr. W. Swain, Kitale.
 128. Mr. H. G. Dempster, Kitale.
 129. Mr. J. V. Winter, Endebess.
 130. Mr. H. B. Bates, Cherangani.
 131. Mr. J. E. S. Jones, Endebess.
 132. Chief Elijah } Nandi Natives.
 133. Joel arap Malel }
 134. Paulo arap Chepkwany }
135. Mr. R. W. Ball, Executive Officer, Commodity Distribution Board, Eldoret.
 136. Mr. W. Fletcher, Chairman, Uasin Gishu Commodity Distribution Board, Eldoret.
 137. Mr. K. G. Lindsay, District Commissioner, Eldoret.
 138. Chief Kipsaina } Elgeyo-Marakwet Natives.
 139. Salim Chepkaitany }
140. Kihuyu wa Manguru } Plateau Natives.
 141. Kibet arap Chepwan }
 142. Kiprondo arap Kipto }
 143. Japheth Titus }
 144. Kataka Mugonyi }
145. Hagai Wasoma } Members of Native Affairs Committee, Native Location.
 146. Hagai Ogutu } Eldoret.
147. Kibii } Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours Natives, Eldoret.
 148. Musiko }
149. Mr. J. H. Phillips, Eldoret.
 150. Mr. L. A. Johnson, Soy.
 151. Mr. L. R. M. Welwood, Kipkabus.
 152. Mr. J. W. Newton, Turbo.
 153. Mr. C. W. Watney, Turbo.
 154. Mr. W. A. C. Bouwer, Eldoret.
 155. Mr. T. A. K. Turton, Nandi.
 156. Mr. R. E. T. Hobbs, Agricultural Officer, Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu, Eldoret.
 157. Mr. Meriali Sunderji, Bungoma.
 158. Mashek } Voi Natives.
 159. Chief Nimrod }
160. Edmund Tomothy } Mombasa Natives.
 161. John Silas }
 162. Japhet Paul }
 163. Hassan Rizik }

164. Awade bin Maktubu }
 165. Shore bin Baruti }
 166. Mfewa wa Chare } Deputation from the Malindi and Kilifi Local Native
 167. Mbogo wa Konde } Council.
 168. Ezekiel Jara }
 169. Shadrack Harrison }
 170. H. G. S. Harrison } On behalf of Kenya African Civil Service Association,
 171. Matthew Henry } Mombasa.
 172. Juma Omari }
 173. Christopher Ananya } Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours Natives.
 174. Mr. H. M. Kirkland, Chairman, Railway African Welfare Committee, Mombasa
 175. Mr. Ali bin Naaman, Senior Native Headman of Mombasa.
 176. Mr. N. Humphrey, Senior Agricultural Officer, Coast Province.
 177. Rev. K. E. Stovold, Rabai.
 178. Mr. G. R. B. Brown, District Commissioner, Kilifi.
 179. Mr. S. G. Hassan, Veterinary Inspector, Coast Province.
 180. Dr. J. M. Liston, Medical Officer of Health, Mombasa.
 181. Mr. K. M. Cowley, Labour Officer, Mombasa.
 182. Mr. C. P. B. Norman, District Commissioner, Mombasa.
 183. Mr. J. D. Stringer, District Officer, Mombasa.
 184. Mbarak Ali Hinawy, Liwali of the Coast, Mombasa.
 185. Mr. J. J. Stephens, Kenya Landing and Shipping Company, Mombasa.
 186. Abdullah Juma, Kenya Landing and Shipping Company, Mombasa.
 187. Mr. S. V. Cooke, Member of Legislative Council, Mombasa.
 188. Dr. Sheth, Mombasa.
 189. Mr. Noor Mohamed, Mombasa.
 190. Mr. R. B. Pandya, Mombasa.
 191. Mr. K. R. Paroo, Member of Legislative Council, Mombasa.
 192. Mr. H. H. Robinson, Chairman of Mombasa Commodity Distribution Board,
 Mombasa.
 193. Mr. W. G. Lillywhite, Kilifi.
 194. Mr. N. A. Skipper, Executive Officer, Coast Distribution Board, Mombasa.
 195. Mr. H. S. Rupani, Mombasa.
 196. Mr. A. M. Jaffer, Mombasa.
 197. Mr. H. Amersi, Mombasa.
 198. Mr. S. O. V. Hodge, Provincial Commissioner, Coast Province.
 199. Chief Mutheithia }
 200. Chief Nderi } Nyeri Natives.
 201. Allan Weru }
 202. Johanna Kunyiha }
 203. Gideon Gatere, Tumutumu.
 204. James Beauttah, Maragua.
 205. Chief Kuria s/o Njogu, Nyeri.
 206. Mr. P. Wyn Harris, District Commissioner, Nyeri.
 207. Mr. P. S. Osborne, District Officer, Meru.
 208. Mr. C. T. Todd, Timau.
 209. Mr. E. M. V. Kenealy, Naro Moru.
 210. Mr. D. A. Smith, Thomson's Falls.
 211. Dr. C. R. Philip, Acting Senior Medical Officer, Central Province, Nyeri.
 212. Mr. J. L. Henderson, Nyeri.
 213. Mr. T. Y. Watson, Agricultural Officer, Rumuruti.
 214. Mr. W. Lyne-Watt, Senior Agricultural Officer, Central Province, Nyeri.
 215. Mr. C. Tomkinson, Provincial Commissioner, Central Province, Nyeri.
 216. Major F. H. de V. Joyce, Kilima Kiu.
 217. Mabeke wa Mbatha }
 218. Nzili wa Mkoma } Squatters on Major Joyce's farm.
 219. Jonathan Kala, Chief of Kangundo Location.

220. James Mwanthi, Chief of Kalama Location.
221. Mr. J. G. H. Hopkins, District Commissioner, Machakos.
222. Senior Chief Koinange
223. Chief Josiah
224. John Mungai
225. Josiah Magu
226. Mr. R. C. MacWatt, Kiambu.
227. Mr. John Boyes, Kiambu.
228. Gichuru s/o Gitau
229. Livingstone Warobi Kamau
230. Mr. G. J. Gollop, Agricultural Officer, Kiambu.
231. Mr. P. R. J. H. Heard, Revenue Officer, Kiambu.
232. Mr. A. T. Lacey, Director of Education, Nairobi.
233. Miss U. C. Dodge, Church Missionary Society, Kabete.
234. Stephano Kinothia, Kabete.
235. Justin Itotia, Kabete.
236. A. E. Awino
237. Isaiah Kinanjui
238. B. K. Paul
239. H. M. Waigango
240. Caleobhas Sigge
241. Major C. Steele, Ngong.
242. Mr. W. Colet Birch, Kabete.
243. Mr. F. J. Collas, Representative in Kenya of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, Nairobi.
244. Mr. S. Gillett, Agricultural Officer, Nairobi.
245. Mr. D. D. Puri, Konza.
246. Mr. M. P. Shah, Nairobi.
247. Mr. N. R. Solly, Kiambu.
248. Mr. R. F. Bellasis, Kiambu.
249. Mr. H. Parker, Ngong.
250. Mr. S. W. Sprague, Abattoir Superintendent, Nairobi.
251. Mr. R. Daubney, Director of Veterinary Services, Nairobi.
252. Mr. G. S. Hunter, Controller of Pigs and Dairy Produce, Nairobi.
253. Mr. N. R. Patel, Nairobi.
254. Mr. Z. S. Jetha, Nairobi.
255. Mr. H. A. Shukla, Nairobi.
256. Mr. B. L. Ghandi, Nairobi.
257. Mr. J. P. Hearle, Member of Maize Board, Mitubiri.
258. Mrs. O. F. Watkins, Member of Legislative Council, Kiambu.
259. Mr. W. J. Webb, Ruiru.
260. Mr. E. D. Emley, District Commissioner, Thika.
261. Mr. H. F. Bargman, Chairman, Nairobi Commodity Distribution Board, Nairobi.
262. Mr. S. H. Sayer, Nairobi.
263. Rev. L. J. Beecher, Member of Legislative Council Representing Native Interests, Nairobi.
264. Dr. A. R. Paterson, Director of Medical Services, Nairobi.
265. Mr. R. E. Robins, General Manager, Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, Nairobi.
266. Mr. P. de V. Allen, Labour Commissioner for Kenya, Nairobi.
267. Mr. J. F. Lipscomb, Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
268. Lt.-Col. C. G. Lloyd, Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
269. Mr. B. Y. Abel, Managing Director and General Manager of Victoria Nyanza Sugar Co. Ltd., Mtwani.
270. Mr. F. Crawford, Personal Assistant to Chairman of Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
271. Mr. H. B. Hamilton, Managing Director of Mitchell Cotts (E.A.) Ltd., Nairobi.
272. Mr. S. H. Fazan, Liaison Officer to Governors' Conference.

APPENDIX B


LIST OF PERSONS SUBMITTING MEMORANDA

1. Mr. A. Dalton, Superintendent of the Line, Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, Nairobi.
2. Mr. R. E. Robins, General Manager, Kenya and Uganda Railways and Harbours, Nairobi.
3. Dr. C. J. Wilson, Member Representing Native Interests on Legislative Council, Kinangop.
4. Mr. J. Forbes, Marischal Farm, Limuru.
5. Mr. E. Lord, Imports Controller, Kenya and Uganda, Nairobi.
6. Mr. D. L. Blunt, Director of Agriculture, Nairobi.
7. Mr. V. Liversage, Agricultural Economist, Agricultural Department, Nairobi.
8. Mr. H. R. Montgomery, Deputy Director of Man Power, Kiambu.
9. Mr. N. Humphrey, Senior Agricultural Officer, Coast Province.
10. Mr. C. R. Lockhart, Chairman of East African Production and Supply Council, Nairobi.
11. Chief Philip K. James, Dagoretti.
12. Mr. S. V. Cooke, Member of Legislative Council, Mombasa.
13. Mr. W. Colet Birch, Nairobi.
14. Mr. R. H. Walker, Hon. Secretary of Songhor Farmers' Association.
15. Mr. T. C. Colchester, Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi.
16. Mr. A. B. Killick, Deputy Director of Agriculture, Nairobi.
17. Mrs. Symes, Kitale.
18. Rev. L. J. Beecher, Member Representing Native Interests on Legislative Council, Nairobi.
19. Mr. D. A. Smith, Thomson's Falls.
20. Kenya African Civil Servants' Association, Kisumu.
21. Commander E. C. Ward, Subukia.
22. Mr. P. S. Osborne, District Officer, Meru.
23. Mr. J. S. Moon, Agricultural Officer, North Kavirondo.
24. Col. G. C. Griffiths, Maize Controller, Nairobi.
25. Mr. W. G. Patten, Ol Kalou.
26. Mr. G. Colvile, Gilgil.
27. Mr. Umardin I. Karimbux, Nakuru.
28. Mr. G. J. L. Burton, Chief Research Officer, Agricultural Department, Nakuru.
29. Col. A. I. Lean, Nakuru.
30. Mr. J. Butterfield, Kericho.
31. Mr. H. Eckstein, President, Subukia Farmers' Association.
32. Mr. A. W. Thompson, Senior Assistant Agricultural Officer, Kisii.
33. Mr. T. Thompson, Deputy Price Controller, Kisumu.
34. Col. G. L. Gamlen, Kisumu.
35. Mr. W. Swain, Kitale.
36. Mr. Oswald Bentley, Kitale.
37. Mr. T. A. Cairns, Labour Officer, Kisumu.
38. Mr. H. Parker, Ngong.
39. Mr. S. M. Shah, Thomson's Falls.
40. Mr. E. D. Emley
41. Mr. W. J. Webb
42. Mr. T. A. K. Turton, Songhor.
43. Capt. H. M. Harries, Njoro.
44. Mr. J. W. Newton, Turbo.

} For Nairobi District Council.

45. Mr. Colin Maher, Officer in Charge, Soil Conservation Services, Kitale.
46. Mr. J. V. Winter, Kitale.
47. Mr. C. O. Oates, Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza.
48. Chief Koinange, Kiambu.
49. Mr. R. C. MacWatt, Kiambu.
50. Mr. R. Harrison, Hon. Secretary, Kenya African Civil Service Association, Mombasa.
51. Mr. H. M. Kirkland, Chairman, Railway African Welfare Committee, Mombasa.
52. Chief Josiah Njonjo, Kabete.
53. Mr. W. Lyne-Watt, Senior Agricultural Officer, Central Province.
54. Mr. L. Tester, Chairman of the Maize Board, Nairobi.
55. Mr. W. G. Lillywhite, Kilifi.
56. Mr. H. B. Bates, Kitale.
57. Mr. C. T. Todd, Timau.
58. Dr. C. R. Phillip, Acting Senior Medical Officer, Central Province.
59. Mr. T. Y. Watson, Agricultural Officer, Rumuruti.
60. Mr. L. R. Solly
61. Mr. R. F. Bellasis } For Kiambu Association.
62. Major C. Steele, Ngong.
63. Mr. S. Gillett, Agricultural Officer, Nairobi.
64. Mr. A. E. Awino, Native Advisory Council, Nairobi.
65. Mr. W. F. O. Trench, Chairman, Kenya Farmers' Association, Nakuru.
66. Mr. E. W. Bennitt, General Manager, Kenya Farmers' Association, Nakuru.
67. Miss U. C. Dodge, Church Missionary Society, Kabete.
68. Mr. S. W. Sprague, Abattoir Superintendent, Nairobi.
69. Mr. P. de V. Allen, Labour Commissioner, Nairobi.
70. Mr. J. V. Lewis, East African Production and Supply Council, Nairobi.
71. Mrs. H. J. Paton, Changamwe.
72. Mr. Peter Mwangombe, Voi.
73. Mr. A. K. Nganga Munyua, Kijabe.
74. Capt. L. A. Spiers, Njoro.
75. Mr. A. J. Okwemba, Kakamega.
76. Mr. G. Sandbach Baker, Thomson's Falls.
77. Mr. A. Stanway, Church Missionary Society, Mombasa.
78. Mr. E. N. Valpy, Kitale.
79. Mrs. O. F. Watkins, Member of Legislative Council, Kiambu.
80. Mr. Samuel Akolo, Bukura.
81. Mr. G. H. Nutting, Tanganyika.
82. Lt.-Col. A. Sutcliffe, Nairobi.
83. Mr. K. R. Paroo, Member of Legislative Council, Mombasa.
84. Dr. Sheth, Mombasa.
85. Mbarak Ali Hinawy, Liwali of the Coast, Mombasa.
86. Mr. H. T. Lloyd, Assistant Agricultural Officer, Thomson's Falls.
87. Mr. A. Ross, Subukia.
88. Mr. R. S. Wollen, Kiambu.
89. Mr. T. H. Chettle, Nakuru.
90. Mr. F. N. Hoyt, Kaimosi.
91. Dr. J. M. Liston, Medical Officer of Health, Mombasa.
92. Mr. E. H. Wright, Member of Legislative Council, Njoro.


93. Lt.-Col. J. G. Kirkwood, Member of Legislative Council, Kitale.
 94. Major A. G. Keyser, Kitale.
 95. Lt.-Col. C. G. Lloyd, Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
 96. Mr. B. J. Spratt, Kitale.
 97. Mr. R. Fletcher, Fort Ternan.
 98. Mr. J. G. H. Hopkins, District Commissioner, Machakos.
 99. Mr. E. G. Mayers, Songhor.
 100. Mr. E. Phillips, Executive Officer of Trans Nzoia Commodity Distribution Board, Kitale.
 101. Mr. H. F. Bargman, Chairman of Nairobi Commodity Distribution Board, Nairobi.
 102. Archdeacon W. E. Owen, N'giya.
 103. Mr. F. J. Couldrey, Member of Legislative Council, Nakuru.
 104. Mr. G. R. B. Brown, District Commissioner, Kilifi.
 105. Mr. M. Njoroge, Kikuyu.
 106. Mr. F. Lodge, Naivasha.
 107. Dr. A. R. Paterson, Director of Medical Services, Nairobi.
 108. Group Captain A. Walter, Chief Meteorological Officer for Air Headquarters, East Africa Command, Nairobi.
 109. Mr. R. E. Norton, Director of Produce Disposal, Nairobi.
 110. Capt. F. O'B. Wilson, Deputy Chairman of Agricultural Production and Settlement Board, Nairobi.
 111. Mr. G. F. Clay, Director of Native Production, Nairobi.
 112. Mr. J. Jairo, Nakuru.
 113. Mr. J. H. B. Murphy, District Commissioner, Kisumu-Londiani, Kisumu.
 114. Mr. P. K. Shah, Kisumu.
 115. Mr. J. H. Phillips, Eldoret.
 116. Mr. J. L. Henderson, Nyeri.
 117. L. W. Kamau
 118. J. S. Gichuru
- } Dagoretti Natives.
-




APPENDIX C

(Rainfall for 1942 shown in red on graphs)

AVERAGE ANNUAL RAINFALL		
Region	No. of Stns.	Inches
COFFEE AREA	14	36.78
EAST RIFT ..	8	33.84
WEST RIFT ..	8	49.65
RIFT ..	12	35.22
COAST ..	10	37.65
KAVIRONDO	9	60.90
TRANS NZOIA	7	55.35



AVER. RAINFALL OCT.-DEC.	
Region	Inches
COFFEE AREA ..	11.56
EAST RIFT ..	10.09
WEST RIFT ..	7.44
RIFT ..	6.24
COAST ..	7.88
KAVIRONDO ..	11.66
TRANS NZOIA ..	6.66




GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RAINFALL FOR THE YEAR, 1924, IN CERTAIN AREAS, AS COMPARED WITH THE AVERAGE RAINFALL FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS

RAINFALL FOR 1942 IN REGIONS CONCERNED	
Selected Stations	Inches
Makuyu, Thika (3), Fort Hall, Nairobi, Ruiru, Kiambu, Kikuyu, Athi River, Ngong, Donyo Sabuk, Machakos, Limuru	40-96
Rumuruti, Nanyuki, Nyeri (2), Kabage Forest Station, Naro Moru, Tumutumu, Embu	33-77
Songhor, Kapsabet, Timboroa, Londiani, Fort Ternan, Molo, Lumbwa, Mau Summit	49-12
Ravine, Ol Ngarua, Subukia, Njoro, Elburgon, Sabatia, Thomson's Falls, Elmenteita, Nakuru, Naivasha, Gilgil, Kijabe	36-21
Kipini, Lamu, Mackinnon Road, Mariakani, Kilifi, Samburu, Malindi, Kilindini, Kwale, Mombasa	34-06
Kakamega, Myanga, Kaimosi, Kisii, Miwani, Kisumu, Kericho, Muhoroni, Koru, Chemelil .. / .. .	59-96
Endebess, Kitale, Cherangani, Lugari, Turbo, Kaptagat, Eldoret	47-70


GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RAINFALL FOR PERIOD, OCTOBER, TO DECEMBER, 1942, IN CERTAIN AREAS, AS COMPARED WITH THE AVERAGE RAINFALL FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS

RAINFALL, OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1942	
Region	Inches
COFFEE AREA ..	6-52
EAST RIFT ..	6-50
WEST RIFT ..	2-37
RIFT	1-84
COAST	6-83
KAVIRONDO ..	5-34
TRANS NZOIA ..	1-97

Selected Stations as above.



AVERAGE YEARLY RAINFALL	
Station No.	Inches
89-3601	26.79
89-3603	24.48
90-3617	36.69
90-3630	39.80
90-3640	27.05
90-3702	42.16
90-3708	41.26
90-3724	32.47
89-3401	76.52
89-3407	52.32
89-3409	73.80
90-3401	67.73
90-3404	45.10
90-3406	61.08
90-3516	62.78
90-3517	60.04
90-3547	45.51




RAINFALL FOR 1942		
Station		Inches
D.C., Rumuruti		20.75
Avontuur, Nanyuki		22.09
P.W.D., Nyeri		35.71
Kabage, Nyeri		43.81
Sirrima, Lamuria		30.60
Tumutumu, Karatina		46.06
D.C., Embu		43.72
Kiberire, Nyeri		27.45
D.C., Kakamega		72.93
K.U.R. & H., Myanga		52.10
F.A. Mission, Kaimosi		63.93
D.C., Kisii		67.30
P.C., Kisumu		40.03
Asumbi C. Mission, Kisii		65.68
K.U.R. & H., Muhoroni		63.16
Ngirimori, Koru		70.92
K.U.R. & H., Chemelil		51.24


GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RAINFALL FOR THE YEAR 1942, AT CERTAIN STATIONS, AS COMPARED WITH THE AVERAGE RAINFALL FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS

(Rainfall for 1942 shown in red on graph)

APPENDIX D



AVERAGE RAINFALL, OCTOBER-DECEMBER	
Station No.	Inches
89-3601	6.33
89-3603	5.82
90-3617	10.80
90-3630	11.25
90-3640	9.31
90-3702	12.77
90-3708	14.44
90-3724	10.00
89-3401	12.16
89-3407	10.50
89-3409	12.96
90-3401	14.93
90-3404	9.65
90-3406	11.70
90-3516	12.57
90-3517	10.34
90-3547	9.16




RAINFALL FOR OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1942		
Station		Inches
D.C., Rumuruti	1-64	1.64
Avontuur, Nanyuki	1-39	1.39
P.W.D., Nyeri	9-40	9.40
Kabage, Nyeri	5-69	5.69
Sirrima, Lamuria	3-72	3.72
Tumutumu, Karatina	10-31	10.31
D.C., Embu	12-10	12.10
Kiberire, Nyeri	7-72	7.72
D.C., Kakamega	4-85	4.85
K.U.R. & H., Myanga	5-48	5.48
F.A. Mission, Kaimosi	5-40	5.40
D.C., Kisii	7-81	7.81
P.C., Kisumu	5-58	5.58
Asumbi C. Mission, Kisii	10-79	10.79
K.U.R. & H., Muhoroni	3-02	3.02
Ngirimori, Koru	4-63	4.63
K.U.R. & H., Chemelil	7-80	7.80

GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF RAINFALL FOR PERIOD,
OCTOBER TO DECEMBER, 1942, AT CERTAIN STATIONS, AS
COMPARED WITH THE AVERAGE RAINFALL FOR A
NUMBER OF YEARS

(Rainfall for 1942 shown in red on graph)

APPENDIX E



APPENDIX G
INTERIM RECOMMENDATION OF THE FOOD SHORTAGE
COMMISSION

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

We, the Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (Cap. 25 of the Revised Edition):—

“To inquire into the present food shortage with a view to ascertaining and reporting on the causes thereof and to make recommendation to prevent a recurrence.

To inquire into the system of control of maize which has been in operation since the 1st of July, 1942, and to report whether it has been administered efficiently and in the best interests of the country.”;

have the honour to submit the following interim recommendation.

2. On the 2nd June, 1943, two African witnesses gave evidence before us alleging that the rationing scheme is unfair to the Africans. In particular they stated that such scheme is unfair in that—

- (a) That an African who has had his wife and family in Nakuru for a long time is allowed maize meal per day on the following scales:—
- (b) even though an African may, like certain Asians, have been a consumer of rice as the staple food of his normal diet, he is not allowed any rice in the Nakuru District at the present time.

3. The Executive Officer of the Nakuru Commodity Distribution Board and the District Commissioner, Nakuru, both gave evidence on the same day and stated—

- (a) That an African who has his wife and family in Nakuru for a long time is allowed maize meal per day on the following scale:—

(i) for himself	1½ lb.
(ii) for his wife	½ lb.
(iii) for each member of his family	½ lb.

- (b) That Africans, even though consumers of rice as the staple food of their normal diet, are not allowed to buy rice.
- (c) That the ration of 1½ lb. of maize meal per day for a male adult African is based on a 30-day month, with the result that in a 31-day month such an African does not receive any ration on the 31st day.

4. In his evidence before us on the 27th May, 1943, the Municipal Native Affairs Officer, Nairobi, said:—

“*Question*: The first ration was 1 lb. posho, later increased to 1½ lb., to each male?

Answer: To each consumer unit. Male and female are both units, and we had a system of rationing children by adding their ages and dividing by a factor, and those particulars were entered on the women’s ration cards, so that the rationing of every child was assured.

Question: Every married native got an issue for himself, another for his wife, and another slightly smaller for his children?

Answer: If a man had a child ten years old and another two, we added the ages up and counted them as one unit; if four, we added the ages and divided by a factor. Four children might get three units if old or two if younger children.”

5. We are unaware to what extent rations vary to Africans in different parts of the Colony, but on the evidence heard in Nakuru we are of opinion—

- (a) that the ration of maize meal to Africans, their wives and families should be standardized throughout the Colony;
- (b) that there is no reason why Africans should not receive rations for the 31st day of a 31-day month;
- (c) that Africans, who can prove that they have been habitually consumers of rice as the staple food of their normal diet, should be allowed a rice ration on parity with Asians.

6. We attach to this Interim Recommendation copies of the evidence of—

- (a) the two Africans in question;
- (b) the Executive Officer of the Nakuru Commodity Distribution Board;
- (c) the District Commissioner, Nakuru.

We have the honour to be,
Your Excellency's most humble and obedient servants,

H. C. WILLAN,
Chairman

W. H. BILLINGTON,
JOHN L. RIDDOCH,
Members

Nakuru,
7th June, 1943.

APPENDIX H

THE SECRETARIAT,
P.O. Box 621, Nairobi.
2nd July, 1943.

AGR.10/23/4/17/145.

*The Chairman,
Food Shortage Commission of Inquiry, Nairobi.*

I am directed to refer to the interim recommendation of the Food Shortage Commission dated the 7th of June, 1943, addressed to His Excellency the Governor, and to inform you that in the early stages of distribution of meal, quantities of meal assessed to be sufficient for a ration of one and a half lb. for each usefully employed African male were sent under the direction of the Chairman of the East African Production and Supply Council for distribution by the local Commodity Distribution Boards. The quantities were assessed pending more accurate information as to the locality's requirements and there were necessarily some anomalies arising from the variation in the proportion of Africans which it was found possible to return to the reserves from the various townships. In the case of Nakuru the local Commodity Distribution Board has always been supplied with the quantities which it stated it required.

The recently re-organized Kenya Commodity Distribution Board is now examining the extent to which complete standardization on the lines of the ration scale referred to in paragraph 4 of the Commission's communication referred to above is possible.

2. In regard to paragraph 5 (b) of your interim recommendation, the Government shares your opinion that there is no reason why the Africans concerned should not receive rations for the thirty-first day of a thirty-one day month and all Commodity Distribution Boards which have raised the point have been instructed accordingly.

3. In regard to paragraph 5 (c) of your interim recommendation, all Commodity Distribution Boards have been authorized to use their discretion in granting to Africans a ration of rice where it can be established that such Africans were habitually rice eaters and sufficient rice has been available.

F. M. FORD,
for Chief Secretary.

Copies to:—

The Executive Officer, Kenya Commodity Distribution Board, Nairobi.

The Chairman, East African Production and Supply Council, Nairobi.

APPENDIX I

NAIROBI, 10th February, 1942.

*To the Secretary,**Kenya Supply Board, Nairobi.*

NOTES BY COLONEL G. C. GRIFFITHS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DIFFERENCE IN THE ACTUAL POSITION AS COMPARED WITH ESTIMATED POSITION AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER, 1941

The Schedule attached hereto gives figures in detail.

The heavy rain during November/December, particularly in native provinces, had the effect of retarding delivery of maize, so the position was somewhat obscure and it was not until January when Europeans had started to reap maize that the actual position could be clearly visualized.

It is true that the Military indicated their requirements of maize meal, at the end of November, as being considerably higher than during 1941 but then Military figures very often bear absolutely no relation to original estimates and in fact the figure of 26,000 bags monthly estimated requirements November has already been reduced to 18,000 bags monthly.

The European crop for the year ended 31st August, 1941, was 529,655 bags. This was a drought year and the yield per acre was low.

Planting in 1941 was recognized as being somewhat less than in 1940 but the very favourable weather conditions which prevailed until the end of September indicated high yield per acre and it was generally considered that the actual yield even with the smaller acreage would be something like the figure for the year ended August, 1941.

The figure of 400,000 bags which was taken at the end of September was in fact a conservative one.

The estimated consumption of 70,000 bags monthly, or total local consumption, this includes Military, was based upon the sales which had normally been made until June.

It was not until after that date that the Military increased their demand for posho. With increased Military demand there was the demand which arose as the result of our having to adulterate flour with maize meal and, as the figures show, the total local consumption during the months August/January amounted to a total of 87,509 bags per month or an actual increase of 17,000 bags.

The civil consumption which had normally been taken at 57,000 bags increased to 65,000 bags. Only 5,000 bags of this is accounted for by mill requirements.

The Schedule now turns to the future position. So far as can be estimated at the present time, local requirements will be:—

Flour mills for adulteration	8,000	bags
Zanzibar	8,000	„
Military	18,000	„
Civil	61,000	„
			<u>95,000</u>	bags per month.

You will see that for the months February/April the total estimated deliveries are:—

165,000 bags ; 69,000 bags ; 95,000 bags = total of 329,000 bags.

From this I think it is safe to export 65,000 bags, leaving a balance of 264,000 bags for local consumption.

Actual local consumption on the basis of 95,000 bags will be 285,000 bags, so there will be an apparent shortage of 21,000 bags. However, as I anticipate an increase in price will have the effect of bringing more maize on the market I think this is a safe position.

This 65,000 bags is the ultimate balance we have for export and of this amount I doubt very much whether more than 20,000 bags will be K.2 or K.3 maize.

We are in hopes that some of the new crop native maize coming in will be K.2. If the whole of this comes in as slightly weevily then the balance of K.2/K.3 available for export will be lower than that indicated.

Taking the position May/July. The estimated deliveries amount to 249,000 bags and on basis of consumption of 95,000 bags there will be a shortage of 36,000 bags. Here again I anticipate that increased price will have the effect of increasing arrivals of native maize coming on the market.

Now let us review the position at the present time compared with the position in September. The estimated figures for September were:—

Kavirondo	Other Native Areas	European	
600,000	450,000	400,000	
	Actual and Estimated		
574,802	304,699	336,685	
This means a shortage from Kavirondo ..			25,198 bags
Other Districts ..			145,301 "
European ..			63,315 "
Total ..			<u>233,814</u> "

The actual figures taken as consumption for the year was twelve months at 70,000 bags or 840,000 bags, in fact the position is:—

First six months of the year actual consumption ..	525,058	bags
Estimated for the last six months	570,000	"
	Say ..	1,095,058 "
A difference of ..	255,058	"

It might be argued that the position should have been clarified earlier but the Europeans do not seriously start reaping crops until after Christmas and it was only then the actual position became known.

The demand from Zanzibar did not arise until about 20th January and the increased consumption required for adulteration of flour did not actually come into operation until the beginning of February.

The increased civil consumption is extremely difficult to estimate or arrive at. From time to time it has been attributed to various causes, such as bumper coffee crop and increased agricultural activity in order to produce more sisal and other crops.

It was only as late as a week ago that the Agricultural Officer in the Kavirondo Reserve indicated a fall of 30,000 bags in the native crop now coming on the market.

These are the facts so far as can be ascertained with reference to the maize position.

The export position is as follows, taking into consideration the quantity at present at the Coast for export:—

57,474 bags to Egypt.

45,772 bags to Beira.

Actually, 22,700 bags of K.2/K.3 have been shipped to Beira and of this only 1,392 were K.2., the whole of the balance to Beira being slightly weevily and not acceptable to Egypt and no further maize will be shipped to Beira excepting slightly weevily, and the whole of the balance of maize for export which is K.2/K.3 will be sent to Egypt.

No matter what attitude the U.K.C.C. may take up as to the technical position regarding their contract the spirit of the contract has been faithfully adhered to in every respect.

I enclose herewith Schedule of Rainfall at Hoey's Bridge, Kitale, Njoro and Nakuru for 1939, 1940 and 1941. These figures show unprecedented rain during the latter months of the life of the maize in the field and to this heavy rainfall no doubt is attributable the smallness of the yield and the inferior quality of the grain.

Infestation of weevil has been very much higher than normal owing to the unprecedented rainfall resulting in humid atmosphere favourable to the development of weevil and much of the crop was already weevily on the field.

Yours faithfully,

G. C. GRIFFITHS.

ESTIMATED POSITION, FEBRUARY-APRIL, 1942

DELIVERIES

Month	Kavirondo	Central Province and Other Native Areas	European
	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
February	55,000	22,000	35,000
March	60,000	19,000	35,000
April	50,000	28,000	25,000
	165,000	69,000	95,000
Less expect to export ..	45,000	—	20,000

Total available for local consumption 120,000 + 69,000 + 75,000
Equals 264,000 bags

ESTIMATED MONTHLY CONSUMPTION—

Flour mill requirements	8,000	bags
Zanzibar	8,000	„
Military	18,000	„
Civil	61,000	„

Total Monthly 95,000 bags × 3 = 285,000 bags

SHORTAGE .. 21,000 bags

ESTIMATED POSITION, MAY-JULY, 1942

DELIVERIES

Month	Kavirondo	Central Province and Other Native Areas	European
	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
May	40,000	28,000	25,000
June	30,000	28,000	25,000
July	20,000	28,000	25,000

Total available for local consumption 90,000 + 84,000 + 75,000
Equals 249,000 bags

Estimated local consumption at 95,000 bags monthly .. 285,000

Shortage 36,000 bags

TOTAL SHORTAGE, FEBRUARY-JULY, 1942—57,000 BAGS

ORIGINAL ESTIMATE END OF SEPTEMBER, 1942

CROP

Months	Kavirondo	Central Province and Other Native Areas	European
August-March	<i>Bags</i> 400,000	<i>Bags</i> 300,000	} 400,000
March-July	200,000	150,000	
TOTAL ..	600,000	450,000	400,000

Total local consumption estimated 70,000 bags monthly.

ACTUAL POSITION—1st AUGUST, 1941 to 31st JANUARY, 1942

DELIVERIES

DELIVERIES—	<i>Bags</i>	<i>Bags</i>
Kavirondo	319,802	
Central Province and Other Native Areas	151,699	
Europeans : September-January	141,685	
„ August	25,000	
		638,186
Railed for Export end of January : Native	72,000	
European	41,128	
		113,128
Total Local Consumption		525,058
Military Consumption		130,294
Civil Consumption, including Flour Mill Requirements ..		394,764

EQUALS MONTHLY : 65,794 BAGS

APPENDIX J

MAIZE CONTROL,

P.O. Box 921, Nairobi.

9th June, 1942.

INSTRUCTIONS TO REGISTERED TRADERS

1. Registered traders will purchase maize at the trading centre or market for which they are registered and where an agricultural inspector is stationed, they will purchase only such maize as has been duly passed by the inspector. The responsibility of seeing that the maize is dry, clean and of fair average quality rests with the purchaser himself. Where registered traders consider that the agricultural inspector is passing maize which is too wet or not of fair average quality they will at once notify the nearest agricultural officer.

2. The price to be paid to the native producer shall be that fixed by the Control from time to time for the particular market or centre at which a registered trader is operating.

3. It is essential that every registered trader shall receive from the agricultural inspector an inspection pass, as this is a document necessary to be supplied to the Maize Control before payment will be made for maize.

4. The maize will be stored by the registered trader at his own risk and expense, awaiting disposal instructions from the Control.

5. The registered trader shall pack all maize in good, sound, unpatched, serviceable second-hand bags, or in cases where instructed to do so, in new bags, and he will be responsible for seeing that all bags are properly sewn. No stitch in the sewing should be more than one inch long.

6. Every bag of maize shall weigh, on delivery to the Railway or Railway depot, not less than 203 lb. gross.

7. The Regulations provide that the registered trader may only dispose of maize purchased by him in accordance with the directions of the Maize Controller. As it is the intention of the Maize Controller only to deal in maize in 10-ton lots, those registered traders who are unable to deal with the Controller in 10-ton lots may arrange to supply their maize to the Controller through another registered trader, but it is first necessary that the nearest Control depot should be advised of this transaction.

8. Although the Control may, at certain railway stations, own control godowns or have an agent with a godown, it is the duty of the registered trader, if required to do so, to place the maize purchased by him on rail, the price to be paid to the registered traders for maize being based on an f.o.r. price.

9. Registered traders railing maize direct on the instructions of the Control will be held responsible for any claims from buyers incurred through loss of bags in transit, short weight, or for any charges which may be made in connexion with inferior packing or weight. If, however, the railway weight certificate is obtained at the time of railment, then this certificate will be accepted as final as regards the weight of the consignment.

10. Where deliveries are made to a Control depot or agent, the registered trader will obtain a receipt for such deliveries, but he must have handed to the Control agent or depot the inspection pass at the time of delivery, and the fact that he has so handed over the inspection pass will be notified on the receipt.

11. Where maize is railed under the instructions of the Control direct to a purchaser, the registered trader shall forward two copies of the waybill, together with the railway weight certificate if one has been obtained, and the inspection pass, to the nearest Control depot.

12. In cases where there are no agricultural inspectors, the entire responsibility is thrown on to the registered trader to see that the maize he buys is dry, clean, and fair average quality of maize, otherwise he is bound to be mulcted expenses in connexion with inferior delivery, and it will be necessary for him to give such proof as the Control may desire that the consignment of maize was purchased in any particular market or trading centre.

13. Where maize is delivered to a Control railway depot or agent, such depot manager or agent will reject any bags of maize weighing less than 203 lb. gross, or if maize is not packed in sound, unpatched, serviceable second-hand bags, or if the maize is not up to what is recognized fair average quality. The Control depot or agent will have the right to weigh the whole or such portion of the consignment as he thinks necessary to satisfy him as to the correct weights of the maize delivered, but not less than 5 per cent of every consignment will be weighed.

14. Registered traders are responsible for satisfying themselves that they receive clear, concise disposal instructions of maize to be railed on behalf of the Control. Any expenses incurred or failure to carry out the instructions given to the registered traders shall be a charge against the registered traders themselves.

15. It is the duty of registered traders to keep the nearest Control depot or agent informed of the stocks of maize they have in hand for disposal daily, or as frequently as they consider it necessary. It is to be realized that difficulty is likely to be experienced in obtaining railway trucks at short notice. Therefore registered traders must keep the nearest Control authority advised of their probable railroad requirements as far ahead as possible in order that undue delay will not be experienced in handling maize.

16. Payment will be made to registered traders by the Control against duplicate copies of waybills, together with agricultural inspector's pass and, where obtainable, railway weight certificate. Where maize is delivered to Control railway godowns, the duplicate receipt, accompanied by the agricultural inspector's pass, will be forwarded by the Control depot to the Control Officer, who will make payment. Where delivery is made to one of the Control agents, payment will be made by the agent to the registered trader in accordance with the receipt issued by him. Payment for delivery of maize in the Kavirondo area will be made by cheque from Kisumu. Thus, cheques will be sent out daily on receipt of the necessary documents. Payment in areas where agents are engaged will be made by arrangement with the agents. In the Central Province payment will be made by the Control by cheque issued by the Thika or Nairobi Control office. Payment in the Rift Valley will be made by cheque from the Rift Valley Control office, probably situated in Nakuru, and in the Coast area by cheque, issued from Mombasa.

17. Every registered trader, as has been previously stated, shall pay to the native producer the amount advised by the Controller to be paid to natives for the particular marketing or trading centre in which the maize is purchased. This price is the price for net maize without the container. The registered trader shall receive for the maize on delivery to the Control or the Control agents or, when placed f.o.r. in accordance with the foregoing instructions, the price paid to the native to which will be added the price to be advised later for the cost of gunnies and an amount to be determined later for transport from the market or trading centre to the nearest railway station, and an additional fifty cents per 200 lb. net maize. This fifty cents represents the payment to the registered trader for the whole of the duties he performs in connexion with the purchase, packing, storing, shrinkage and delivery of the maize. In cases where a registered trader is unable to deliver to the Control in 10-ton lots, and decides to send the maize purchased by him to the Control through another registered trader, then the fifty cents allowance will be divided by arrangement between the two registered traders, but under no consideration will the Control pay more than fifty cents for the services of the registered trader or traders. Payment, of course, will only be made to the individual registered trader who actually delivers the maize to the Control, Control agent or who places maize on rail on the instructions of the Control.

18. It is hoped to be able to have maize moved regularly as it comes on to the market, but circumstances may arise necessitating the registered trader holding maize for a period not exceeding one month. If maize is held for more than a month after written notice has been served on the Controller, Control depot or the agent, then the Controller will consider the question of making a small shrinkage allowance to registered traders who have been forced to hold the maize because of the inability of the Controller to accept delivery.

19. It may be necessary for the Controller to arrange and issue all gunnies to registered traders, in view of the shortage of gunnies. When gunnies are so issued to registered traders for the packing of maize, they shall be used for this purpose only and no allowance will be made to the registered trader for the gunnies. In view of the petrol and tyre difficulties now being experienced, it is possible that the Controller may have to arrange transport for registered traders, and where the transport is so arranged by the Control, then no allowance will be made to the registered trader for transport.

20. All traders are reminded of the necessity of regularly cleaning out their stores and treating them for weevil. Local agricultural officers have been requested to inspect traders' stores and report if they are not found to be properly cleaned and free from weevil.

Registered traders are advised to keep this copy of the instructions as further copies are unobtainable.

APPENDIX K

MAIZE DEPOTS

The Kenya Farmers' Association (Co-op.), Ltd., has endeavoured for some years to persuade Government to introduce some form of Maize Control, and having failed in their endeavours decided to go into the native reserves and to trade in maize with the object of obtaining control of the whole of the maize in the Colony and thus be in a position to push up the local price to export-parity or above that figure, also to make a profit on the native maize, such profit to go to subsidizing the European-grown maize.

This policy resulted in the Association making a profit out of its trading in native maize and also in raising the price to the consumer and thus obtaining a higher price for European-grown maize sold in the Colony.

Thus the gap between the price paid to the producer and that paid by the consumer has been widened to the amount of this profit. The Government has now guaranteed the European producer Sh. 9 per bag for his maize and introduced Control with the view to controlling all maize grown in the Colony. The introduction of Control will eliminate the speculation in maize and to some extent the trading in maize or the number of hands maize passes through from the producer to the consumer.

The non-native producer cannot expect to obtain the Government guaranteed price and also a profit through trading in native maize. Any profit in the purchase and sale of native maize should accrue to the Maize Control and be used at the discretion of the Government. Maize in the past has been bought from the native by a native or Indian trader, who, in turn, has sold to a larger trader, who then has sold to a general trader in maize who may have been a miller or a retailer or have sold to the miller or retailer. Often maize has passed from one large trader to another and back to the former trader.

There is no doubt that the introduction of Control will result in at least one of the links of the chain being cut out and the gap between the producer and consumer reduced; this is justifiable if ever the principle of organized marketing is to be accepted.

The basis of a co-operative society or co-operative selling is to cut out the trading link of the middleman, thus bringing the producer closer to the final consumer and giving the producer the benefit of the middleman's profit.

For Maize Control to give to the producer and consumer the benefits which all forms of Maize Control have been designed to give, then it must of necessity operate on the lines of a compulsory co-operative society. The functions of trade are to supply to the consumer the produce of the producer. If owing to circumstances and the evolution of trade of a particular commodity the number of links through which goods pass between the original seller and the final purchaser are greater than is necessary, thereby resulting in too high a price to the purchaser, then the unnecessary hands through which the goods pass should be eliminated when the State takes part in the trade.

In this week's Official Gazette Rules have been introduced with the express purpose of enabling a limited number of licensed vegetable purchasers to handle native-grown vegetables, eliminating a number of traders and reducing the number of links in the chain, thereby increasing the price to the producer and reducing the price to the consumer.

Dealing with the Maize Control, the Government has guaranteed the grower Sh. 9 per bag for his maize. There is a school of thought who consider that the native should receive the same guarantee. In any case, as the result of the guarantee, the price to the consumer will be increased considerably above that which he has paid during the past few years and it must be the duty of the Control to see that so far as possible the gap between the producer and the consumer is maintained at as low a figure as practicable. The Controller will be responsible for operating

the Control. It will be a difficult job under the most advantageous circumstances and an impossible one if he is forced to operate it in a manner which he considers will not result in the greatest efficiency, nor is it likely that anyone of sufficient ability to equitably operate the Control would accept the responsibility if tied to Control through a system he did not consider most likely to lead to success.

It has been suggested that the Controller should appoint agents to act for him at certain points to be decided by the Board. If this procedure were adopted the rights of individuals to be those agents would have to be given due consideration.

At all points on the Railway there are merchants dealing in maize; they sell to each other and to merchants at various points in the Colony, and were an endeavour to be made to determine the amount of trade each merchant handled during the past year it would be found that the figures would represent two or three times the amount of maize actually railed, and yet all the claims would be justified. My experience in Potato Control satisfied me that the only practical method of determining the agent at any point would be to allow all the traders at that point to form a syndicate and appoint one of their number to operate the syndicate as agents for the Control, thus the Controller is likely to have forced upon him as an agent some trader whom he would consider quite unsuitable.

There is keen competition between traders in all trading centres and in every one there is some form of outstanding quarrel which would prevent unanimity in the appointment of an individual or firm as agents. There are therefore bound to be some traders opposed to the agent whoever is appointed. The agents at the various points would not desire to do the work of agent at cost and would expect some remuneration for services and would be expected to pay some sort of dividend to the other members of the syndicate. This profit would be at the expense of either the producer or the consumer. The quantity of maize passing through agencies at various points will vary, and whilst an agency might make money where large quantities passed through a particular point, the same remuneration would result in a loss where a small quantity were passed through another point. This would mean that the remuneration to agents would have to vary from point to point, dependent upon the amount of maize passed through the point.

It is not difficult to imagine the problems with which the Controller would be faced with an agent, at say Yala, whom he found unsatisfactory, thus requiring the appointment of another agent. The rather complicated accounts and returns would all have to be explained to a new agent, who in turn might fail to give satisfaction. An enormous amount of work has been entailed in changing the agents operating under the Potato Control, and the total number of bags handled has been only 190,000 bags, and these received at a relatively small number of points. With over a million bags of maize to handle, at a very large number of points, the problem becomes almost unsurmountable.

The maize trade is practically all in the hands of Indian traders, and experience shows that extreme antagonism exists amongst traders; they would not oppose Control depots, but would oppose one of their number being appointed. If Maize Control is to be a success, then it must have the support and not the opposition of the traders. It is to be realized that at the more important points large numbers of traders will be supplying the Control agent or depot and the hold-up in changing an agency would lead to enormous congestion and trade difficulties.

The Controller must have his own staff at all important points so that at a moment's notice he can replace an unsatisfactory employee with a fully trained man well acquainted with the system and the work entailed; the right of direct responsibility for the engagement and discharge of the individual responsible for carrying out the work is the only way in which the Controller can enforce the necessary discipline to bring about efficiency, even under the system of Control depots; at the more important points difficulties are bound to arise and changes of staff be found necessary, but these will be negligible when compared with any system of agencies. It has always been an axiom that if the manager of the business is to be responsible for the business he must have the right to select his own staff

and manage in his own way, and no other procedure could lead to success. Depots run by the Control would operate at cost as the charges would be against the pool, and at the points where large quantities of maize were handled the cost would be very low indeed.

Under the system of Control envisaged the producer would sell to his normal trader, that trader would hand to the Control, the Control would sell to the normal trader or miller, who would trade in the usual way.

One of the most severe complaints against the Potato Control is that the agents at various points are also retailers in potatoes, purchasers strongly object to the price at which they sell, knowing the price they pay the native for potatoes, but not realizing that there are numerous expenses interposed which they have to pay. It is a fact that, were agents employed, they all would be millers and/or traders and retailers of maize. Experience has shown that the other traders in the township, although they may have agreed to their appointment, would always feel that agents had a trading advantage over them and would very soon demand a change. The operating of depots by the Controller at all large points will effect economy in the handling of maize, thus leaving a larger return to the producer and/or reducing the price to the consumer and must result in more efficient management.

APPENDIX L

SUGGESTIONS FOR SIMPLIFYING MAIZE CONTROL WHILE
RETAINING ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS

The basic price for native-grown maize should be fixed by Maize Control at railhead markets and possibly at certain main consuming markets, e.g. Kericho, in the same way as the price for European-grown maize is fixed free on rail; a price differential to be fixed for maize bought "in bags" or "without bags".

Allow free sale within each district in native reserves, except that Provincial or District Commissioners should also fix minimum prices at other markets within their district, allowing for transport and other costs. These would be local arrangements and would not affect Maize Control.

All maize for sale outside the district must be sold to licensed "maize buyers". These "maize buyers" would all act to some extent as agents of Control and have the sole right of selling maize outside native areas. The "maize buyers" would buy at the basic price and sell at a "maize buyers'" selling price fixed by Control. It would be in their interests to look out for, and inform ~~against~~, any illegal sellers.

Licensed "maize buyers" would be required to keep books and render returns to Control as necessary of all maize purchased and sold and of stocks held.

By limiting licensed "maize buyers" to firms of repute and literacy Control would be more workable.

Employers whose land adjoins native areas might be given special licences to buy maize from native producers for their own use, but not for resale. They would be required to buy at the basic price, keep records and submit returns of purchases and stocks.

Squatters on European farms would be required to sell surplus maize either to their landlord or to licensed "maize buyers" at the basic price. If the landlord bought maize from his squatters surplus to his own requirements he would be required to obtain a special licence to sell such maize and submit returns of purchases, sales and stocks. He would sell at the "maize buyers'" selling price as fixed by Control.

Squatters in forest areas would be required to sell maize to licensed "maize buyers" at the basic price.

Note.—It might be necessary for Maize Control to vary the basic price and the selling price for squatter-grown maize bought at a distance from the Railway.

"Maize millers" and "maize meal distributors" would also be licensed. They would be free to buy maize from any licensed "maize buyers" or maize meal from "maize millers". In appropriate cases, e.g. in squatter areas, "maize millers" could also be licensed as "maize buyers". Similarly, licensed "maize meal distributors" could also in appropriate cases be licensed as "maize buyers". Licensed "maize millers" and "maize meal distributors" would be required to keep books and to render returns as necessary to Maize Control of all maize and maize meal purchased and sold and of stocks held.

Between the "maize buyers'" selling price and the maximum price of maize meal *fixed for each district* no prices should be fixed, thus allowing free trade and competition. "Maize millers" and "maize meal distributors" should only be permitted, in war-time, to sell in accordance with any maize rationing schemes authorized by the Commodity Distribution Board for employed labour, natives in townships and native maize importing areas, e.g. Masai and Kiambu.

If it is decided that Maize Control should pay a higher price for the whole or part of the European-grown maize crop, whether to cover "holding expenses" or for other reasons, all licensed "maize buyers" in whatever category would be required to pay to the Maize Control a small cess on each bag of maize purchased (except in the case of landlords buying maize from their own squatters *for their*

own use). This cess would be allowed for in the "maize buyers'" selling price. All licences would be granted for a limited period and, in addition to other penalties, licensed "maize buyers" defaulting would not be re-licensed.

Maize Control would purchase all European-grown maize which it may be decided to purchase at a price higher than the basic price, through the agency of the K.F.A. If on, say, 1,000,000 bags of native-grown maize the Control received a small cess per bag, this would enable Control to sell European-grown maize, purchased at a price somewhat higher than the basic price, competitively on the market. If the reasons for paying a higher price for a quantity of European-grown maize are agreed to be sound, no objection can be taken to the principle of raising a cess on the re-selling price of maize bought at the basic price.

The K.F.A. would sell in the ordinary way as "maize buyers" and "maize meal distributors" any European-grown maize in excess of the fixed quantity purchased by Maize Control at a price higher than the basic price, paying on such excess the appropriate cess to Maize Control.

Maize Control would maintain a stock of an agreed quantity of maize to meet an emergency. It would buy maize from, and supply maize to, the neighbouring territories as necessary; it would secure Military supplies; it would, when necessary, arrange any export of maize should such be desirable.

To enable it to do so Maize Control should have the power to take over any stocks held by "maize buyers" at the "maize buyers'" selling price less the cess, and, when necessary, from "maize millers" and "maize meal distributors" at a margin above their proved cost. To meet any local shortage Maize Control would release maize from its stocks or direct the sale of "maize buyers'" surpluses. "Maize buyers" unable to dispose of their stocks should have the right to sell them to Control at any time at a price which would allow of a smaller profit than the ordinary "maize buyers'" selling price.

Note.—If in any Province it is agreed to "fund" part of the price for native grown maize for land rehabilitation, this could be done by decreasing the price to be paid by "maize buyers" and increasing the cess payable to Maize Control by a like amount.

INDEX

ALL REFERENCES ARE TO PARAGRAPHS

	<i>Paragraph</i>
Acknowledgments	217-221
Agricultural policy	132-140, 144
Recommendations	138, 139, 144
Inter-relation with a nutrition policy	131-133, 138, 144
Recommendations	138, 144
Bacon, shortage of, reasons for	91
Beans, shortage of, reasons for	88
Butter—	
Rationing of farm	50
Shortage of, reasons for	100
Commission—	
Evidence given before	5
Memoranda submitted to	5
Sittings of, places and dates	2
Committees—	
Agricultural Indebtedness	23
Agricultural Production and Settlement Board	39, 128
Bowing	20, 116
East African Civil Supplies Board	36
" " Civil Defence and Supply Council	37, 38
" " Economic Council	34
" " Production Committee	36
" " Production and Supply Council	38
" " War Supplies Board	35
Economic Development	114, 155
Kenya Defence and Supply Council	37
Kenya Supply Board	40
Kenya and Uganda Civil Defence and Supply Council	37
Maize Inquiry	156
Production and Man Power	125
Recommendation	125
Reserve Foodstuffs	13
Settlement and Production Board	39
To consider operation of Maize Control	164
Commodity Distribution Boards—	
Functions of, <i>re</i> statistics	45
Kenya, functions of	42
Nairobi and Mombasa	42
Contracts for maize—	
Cancellation of, by Maize Control	168
U.K.C.C., 400,000 tons (October, 1941)	27, 78
U.K.C.C., 100,000 tons (May, 1942)	85, 185-187, 191
European crop, to prevent shortage of maize	114
Recommendation	114
Controls—	
Establishment of	40
Methods of	41
Director of Produce Disposal—	
Information required by	46
Relationship with Controllers	44
District Production and Man Power Committees—	
Procedure <i>re</i> production programmes	125
Usefulness of	125
Recommendation	125
Drought resisting crops, planting of	136
Eggs, shortage of, reasons for	89
Estimates—	
1942-1943 maize crop	185, 187, 189-192
1942-1943 maize crop, revision of	191
1942-1943 maize crop, further revision of	192
European crop, method of estimating	128
Native crop, method of estimating	130

INDEX—(Contd.)

	Paragraph
Export of maize—	
Exportable surplus, policy <i>re</i>	116, 117, 158
Recommendation	117
From districts	76, 77, 141
Recommendation	141
Newspaper article of 25th September, 1942, <i>re</i>	210
To Tanganyika and Uganda, 1940-1942	63
Values of prior to 1914-18 War	20
Food shortage—	
Aversion of, if foreseen	85
Bacon, reasons for	91
Beans, reasons for	88
Butter, reasons for	100
Effect of, on native labour	146, 147, 151
Effect of, in Native Reserves	152
Eggs, reasons for	89
Fowls, reasons for	89
Ghee, reasons for	90
K.F.A. warnings of	29-32
Main reasons for	80-82
Maize—	
Agricultural machinery, effect on production through lack of	69
Black marketing	67, 68
European production, decline in	23, 54
Increased consumption of	57, 58, 80-82, 190
Potato blight, effect on shortage of	64, 65
Purchases of, just prior to Control	61
Rains, long, effect of prolongation on shortage of	17, 66
Rains, short, effect of failure on shortage of	17, 18
Stock, feeding of, to	59, 60
Stocks with traders and millers on 1st July, 1942	62
Meat, reasons for	92, 93
Native views on	71-77
Potatoes, reasons for	101
Prevention of (<i>See Prevention of Food Shortage</i>).	
Reasons for, advanced by witnesses	52
Rice, reasons for	102
Scope and extent of	12
Sugar, reasons for	99
Vegetables, fresh, reasons for	104
Wheat, reasons for	87
Fowls, shortage of, reasons for	89
Ghee—	
Rationing of, complaint <i>re</i>	49
Shortage of, reasons for	90
Guaranteed prices of crops	126
Recommendation	126
Increased production drive—	
Effect of	55, 84
Grants to assist	55
Government's policy <i>re</i> , 1941 and 1942	26-28
K.F.A.—	
Employees of, friction with Maize Control servants	180
Employees of, resignations of	206-209
European maize, deliveries to during 1927-1942	22
European maize, method of estimating crop	128
Maize Control scheme, memorandum <i>re</i>	157
Pool pay-out on maize, 1927-1942	22
Warnings of maize shortage	29-32
Labour, native—	
Effect of food shortage on	146, 147, 151
Inefficiency of, due to unbalanced diet	143
Numbers in employment, increase in	58, 80
Land tenure in Native Reserves	140

INDEX—(Contd.)

	<i>Paragraph</i>
Machinery, agricultural—	
Lack of	69
Pooling system	69
Maize—	
Basic minimum price of	124, 158
Recommendation	124
Breaking and clearing grants, etc.	55
Consumption of, increase in	57, 58, 80-82, 190
Crop seasons	25
Deliveries to Control in July, August, September, 1942	81, 179, 190
Deliveries to K.F.A., 1927-1942.	22
Distribution of, amongst traders and millers	181
Distribution of, by Maize Controller not unfair	211
Distribution of, by special officer	174, 182, 183
European producing areas	21
European crops and yields, 1919-1943	21
European production, decline in	23, 54, 116
European production, discouragement of	54, 55
European production, indispensability of	23, 114, 158
Recommendation	114
Estimates of 1942-1943 crop	185, 187, 189, 192
Estimating European crop	128
Estimating native crop	24, 114, 130
Exports, to Tanganyika and Uganda, 1940-1942	63
Exports, values of prior to 1914-18 War	20
Export of, from districts	76, 77, 141
Recommendation	141
Export of, newspaper article of 25th September, 1942, <i>re</i>	210
Exportable surplus, policy <i>re</i>	116, 117, 158
Recommendation	117
Guaranteed minimum return per acre	55
Marketing of, pre-Control	160
Native crop, decline in 1942 production	56
Native crop, increase in over period of years	23, 24, 133
Problem of, described	115
Purchases of, just prior to Control	61
Shortage of, at a Kericho mill	184
Shortage of, main reasons for	80-82
Shortage of, warnings by K.F.A.	29-32
Stock, feeding of, to	59, 60, 116
Stocks with traders and millers on 1st July, 1942	62
Maize Board—	
Decisions of, <i>re</i> shortage in July, 1942	62
Estimations by, of 1942-43 maize crop	185, 187, 189-192
Rationing of maize, considerations <i>re</i>	191-193
Maize Control Scheme—	
Agents, places where appointed	166
Agents versus servants	166, 180
Amendments to, by Maize Control Regulations, October, 1942	170
Committee to consider operation of	164
Criticisms of—	
Black marketing	67, 68, 176
Complications of	178
Contracts, cancellation of	168
Date of commencement	179
European price subsidized by native price	119, 172
Maize Controller, wide powers of	170
Price difference, European and native maize	119, 120, 171, 172
Squatter maize, treatment of	169
Traders' commission	176, 177
Difficulties of	159
Native maize quota, impossibility of fixing	157, 159
Physical possession of maize, designed to obtain	167
Prices under, particulars of	119
Reasons for	163

INDEX—(Contd.)

	<i>Paragraph</i>
Maize Control Scheme—(Contd.)	
Salient features of	165
Servants, places where appointed	166
Shortage of maize, designed to deal with	173, 181
Simplification of, suggestions for	213–215
Squatter maize, treatment of	169
Statistics of maize consumption, designed to obtain	174
Trader's commission, fixation of	177
Wholesale trade, maintenance of	166
Maize Controller—	
Appointment of	185
Distribution of maize by, not unfair	211
Negotiations with Messrs. Mitchell Cotts and Company Ltd.	199–205
Powers of, under Maize Control Scheme	164, 165, 170
Man Power, lack of, effect on maize production in Native Reserves	75
Meat—	
Ante-mortem examination of animals	98
Condemned for human consumption	94, 95, 97
Recommendations	95, 97
Immature animals, slaughtering of	96
Shortage of, reasons for	92, 93
Native Betterment Fund	170
Native Reserves—	
Effect of food shortage in	152
Land tenure in	140
Loss of soil fertility in	115, 134
Money wealth in war-time, increase of	80
Profiteering in	152
Native views on food shortage—	
Cash crops, production of	73
Drought resisting crops, insufficiency of	73, 74
Export of, foodstuffs from districts, prohibition of	76, 77
Food reserves, lack of	73
Man power, insufficiency of	75
Native maize, low prices of in 1941	72
Nutrition—	
Inter-relation with agricultural policy	131–133, 138, 144
Recommendation	138, 144
Protective foodstuffs	142, 145
Policy <i>re</i>	144
Recommendation	144
Undue prominence of maize in native diet	142
Wimbi, advantages of, as a food	144
Ordinances, Rules, etc.—	
Compulsory Service Ordinance, 1939	27
Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1938	8
Defence Regulations, 1939	40
Defence (Control of Maize) Regulations, 1942 61, 165, 173, 174, 177, 181, 185, 207	
Defence (Control of Maize) (No. 2) Regulations, 1942 46, 170, 173, 174, 191, 195	
Defence (Employees' Maize Ration) Regulations, 1943	147
Defence (Increased Production of Crops) Regulations, 1942	39, 55
Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) Order in Council, 1939	40
Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1940	40
Essential Commodities (Control of Distribution) Regulations, 1943	42, 46
Imperial Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940	40
Increased Production of Crops Ordinance, 1942	39, 44, 46, 55, 125, 126
Increased Production of Crops (Guaranteed Minimum Returns and Grants) Rules, 1943	55
Maize Control Bill, 1936	156
Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance, 1935	160, 165, 178
Mombasa Municipality (Inspection, Storage and Sale of Food) By-laws, 1929	97
Native Authority Ordinance, 1937	136
Native Foodstuffs Ordinance (<i>Cap.</i> 135, Revised Edition)	76, 141

INDEX—(Contd.)

	<i>Paragraph</i>
Ordinances, Rules, etc.—(Contd.)	
Native Lands Trust Ordinance, 1938	8
Statistics Ordinance (<i>Cap.</i> 31 of Revised Edition)	127
Statistics (Amendment) Ordinance, 1926	127
Organization—	
East African	34-38
Kenya	39-42
Undivided responsibility essential	46
Recommendation	46
Pigs, feeding of maize to	60
Potatoes—	
Blight, effect on maize shortage	64, 65
Shortage of, reasons for	101
Prevention of food shortage—	
Drought resisting crops, planting of	136
European maize, indispensability of	114
Recommendation	114
Export of maize from districts in Coast Province	141
Recommendation	141
Export of maize overseas, policy <i>re</i>	116, 117
Recommendation	117
Price policy	124, 126
Recommendations	124, 126
Storage—	
Financing of	111
Recommendation	111
General	107, 108, 113
Maize and other suitable foodstuffs	109
Recommendation	109
Transportation of food reserve to and from	112
Recommendation	112
Type and Siting of	110
Recommendation	110
Wimbi	109
Recommendations	109
Price of crops, guaranteed, policy <i>re</i>	126
Recommendation	126
Price of maize—	
Basic minimum, fixation of	124, 158
Recommendation	124
Effect on certain other agricultural industries	122
European crop, guaranteed price of	27, 163
European crop, prices of, 1927-1942	22
European/native crops, prices of, comparison between	118, 119, 171
European/native crops, prices of, disparity between	119, 120, 172
Native crop, fixation and announcement of Sh. 4/90 per 200 lb.	84, 118, 179
Native crop, low prices in 1941, effect of	56
Policy, present, <i>re</i> fixation of	121
Recommendation	121
Profiteering in Native Reserves	152
Production and Man Power Committees	125
Recommendation	125
Production programme for European farmers, procedure <i>re</i>	125
Profiteering in Native Reserves	152
Provincial Development Boards	139
Recommendation	139
Rainfall—	
Climatic zones in the Colony	15
Long rains in 1942, effect of prolongation of	17, 18, 66
Short rains in 1942, effect of failure of	17, 18
Short rains in 1942, extent below normal	17
Short rains in 1942, forecasts of	17
Weather forecasts	19
Recommendation	19

INDEX—(Contd.)

	Paragraph
Rationing—	
Farm butter	50
Maize, consideration of, by Maize Board	191
Maize, restoration of 2 lb. ration	153
Recommendation	153
Maize, to certain industries	147
Native, no fixed Colony standard	47
Interim Recommendation	47
Registration of maize consumers	174, 182
Registration of natives in Mombasa	48
Recommendation	48
Selected shops in Mombasa	48
Schools	51
Recommendations, list of	216
Repatriation of natives to Native Reserves	148-150
Recommendation	150
Rice—	
Production of	103
Recommendation	103
Shortage of, reasons for	102
Schools, rationing of	51
Soil fertility, decrease in	115, 134
Squatter maize, treatment of, under Maize Control Scheme	169
Statistics—	
Collection and dissemination of	43, 44, 127-129
Recommendations	44, 129
Commodity Distribution Boards, collection of, by	45
Lack of	43-45, 80, 127-129, 174, 181, 193
Stock, feeding of maize to	59, 60, 116
Storage—	
Financing of	111
Recommendation	111
General	107, 108, 113
Maize and other suitable foodstuffs	109
Recommendation	109
Transportation of food reserve to and from	112
Recommendation	112
Type and siting of	110
Recommendation	110
Wimbi	109
Recommendations	109
Sugar, shortage of, reasons for	99
Terms of reference	1
Interpretation of	9
Vegetables, fresh, shortage of, reasons for	104
Wheat, shortage of, reasons for	87
Wimbi—	
Nutritional value of	144
Storage of	109
Recommendations	109
Witnesses—	
Administrative Officer—	
Criticism of native maize price	179
Criticism of maize traders' commission	177
Assistant to Maize Controller, maize allocations	181
Chairman, K.F.A., memorandum by K.F.A. re control of maize	157
Chairman of Maize Board—	
Cancellation of maize traders' orders	183
Lack of confidence in Maize Controller not justified	196
Maize production estimates	190
Rationing of maize	191, 192
Chief Koinange, food shortage in Kiambu Reserve	73
Couldrey, Mr., cancellation of maize traders' orders	183

INDEX—(Contd.)

	<i>Paragraph</i>
Witnesses—(Contd.)	
Director of Agriculture—	
Estimating native maize crop coming on to market	114
Increased production drive	84
Lack of statistics of maize consumption	57
Land tenure in Native Reserves	140
Native agricultural policy	135
Optimum production of native maize	133
Rainfall in 1942, effect of failure of	17
Director of K.F.A. expression of lack of confidence in Maize Controller	197
Director of Medical Services, protective foodstuffs	145
Director of Meteorological Services—1942 short rain forecasts ..	17
Director of Produce Disposal—restoration of 2 lb. maize meal ration	153
Managing Director of Messrs. Mitchell Cotts & Co. Ltd.—	
Conditions of a certain directorship	204
K.F.A. leaving Native Reserves	203
Maize Controller—	
Appreciation of maize situation in July, 1942	62
Increased consumption of maize	57
Lack of maize consumption statistics	174
Maize Control, internal and export prices	154
Rationing of maize	191
Resignations of K.F.A. staff	208
Traders' and millers' stocks	62
U.K.C.C. 100,000 ton contract	186
Written note of 10th February, 1942	83, 86
Medical Officer, nutritional value of wimbi	144
Number of	5
Senior Agricultural Officer, Nyanza—	
Agents versus servants	180
Repatriation of natives to Native Reserves	149
Wollen, Mr., registration of maize consumers	183
Written note of 10th February, 1942	78-80, 83, 85, 86, 188
Analysis of figures contained therein	79