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REPUBLIC OF KENYA



NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

EIGHTH PARLIAMENT – FOURTH SESSION

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

AND FOREIGN RELATIONS

ON A

FACT FINDING MISSION TO SIERRA LEONE

MAY 18 TO MAY 27, 2000

June, 2000

CONTENTS

	Page
1. Map of Sierra Leone	iii
2. Abbreviations	iv
3. Membership of the Delegation	v
4. Preface	1
5. Background	5
6. Lome Peace Accord and Deployment of UNAMSIL	7
7. Deployment of Kenya Troops (KENBATT 5).....	9
8. Delegation Meetings and Visits	12
9. Observations and Recommendations	28
10. Conclusions	29
11. Appendices	31 - 35

MAP OF SIERRA LEONE



ABBREVIATIONS, INITIALS AND ACRONYMS

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CDF	Civil Defence force, a pro-government militia
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOMOG	Ecowas Monitoring Group
FC	Force Commander
KENBATT	Kenya Battalion
RUF	Revolutionary united Front
SG	UN Secretary General
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SRSG	Special Representative to Secretary General also head of mission
UNAMSIL	UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
ZAMBATT	Zambia Battalion

MEMBERSHIP OF THE DELEGATION

LEADER:

Hon. Julius L. Ole Sunkuli , EGH, MP, Minister of State office of the President.

MEMBERS OF DEFENCE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Hon. David Musila, MP,	Chairman, Defence and Foreign Relations Committee, Member for Mwingi South (KANU)
Hon. (Dr) Mukhisa Kituyi, MP	Member for Kimilili, Ford Kenya (FK)
Hon. Samwel Poghisio, MP	Member for Kacheliba, (KANU)
Hon. Paul S. Kihara, MP.	Member for Naivasha, (DP)
Hon. Odeny Ngure, MP	Member for Rarieda, (NDP)
Mr. J.N. Bundi	Secretary to the delegation

ARMED FORCES

Lt. Gen. D.I. Opande, Vice-Chief of General Staff
Col. B.Y. Haji
Lt. Col. N. Kigotho
Lt. Col. P. T. Ibeere
Mr. Bogita Ongeru, Public Relations Officer, DOD
Captain F. Lenges

PRESS CORPS

Mr. Joseph Towett, KBC
Mr. Eric Shimoli, Daily Nation
Mr. Francis Githae, KTN
Ms. Faridah Karonei KTN
Mr. Mohamed Duba, Standard
Mr. Martin Masai, Kenya Times

P R E F A C E

Following reports of loss of life and the taking hostage of some members of the Kenyan contingent of the UN peace keeping force in Sierra Leone by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Departmental Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations held several consultative meetings to deliberate on the events unfolding in Sierra Leone and on the way forward. The anxiety on the actual working conditions of our men became even more pronounced when the first injured Kenyan soldiers arrived for specialised treatment at the Armed Forces Memorial Hospital, Nairobi. On May 5, 2000, the Committee held meetings with the Minister of State in the Office of the President in-charge of Defence , the Hon. Julius Ole Sunkuli, and later with H.E. Daniel T. arap Moi the Commander in-chief of the Armed Forces and the President of the Republic of Kenya. In light of the scarcity of information available, and considering the gravity of the matter, it was agreed that a team representing the Committee and the Minister in-charge of Defence leave on a fact-finding Mission to Sierra Leone and report to the House. The trip was planned to take place on May 10, 2000 but it was not possible due to the political and security situation in Freetown. The situation later improved and it was possible for the delegation to depart for Sierra Leone on May 18, 2000 and return on May 27, 2000. In the intervening period the Minister kept the Committee informed on the developments in Sierra Leone. The principal and specific purposes for the trip were the following:-

- (1) Empirically find out the conditions and the environment under which Kenyan soldiers serving with UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone were operating.
- (2) Establish the circumstances under which a large contingent of the Kenyan forces came to be engaged in combat with RUF rebels.

- (3) Assess any possible support necessary to free Kenyan officers and men that were taken hostage.
- (4) Meet with key regional and Sierra Leone players on the Sierra Leone crisis with a view to creating an informed opinion on the tenability of peace along the lines of the Lome Peace Accord and UN Security Council Resolution 1270.
- (5) Carry out any further investigation with a view to strengthening the Committee's recommendations to Parliament on the future of Kenya's peace keeping forces in Sierra Leone.

On 16th May 2000, the Committee visited the injured soldiers who were receiving treatment at the Armed Forces Memorial Hospital where Members got detailed account of what the men at the frontline were going through. On May 17, 2000 the Committee attended a formal briefing by Senior Military Officers led by the Chief of General Staff at Defence Headquarters on the situation in Sierra Leone before their departure on May 18,2000.

The business in West Africa started with a meeting with Al-Haji Lamido, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nigeria at his office in Abuja, on May 19, 2000. The Committee Proceeded to Monrovia, Liberia where they held a meeting with President Charles Dhankay Taylor and his Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs. In Sierra Leone, the Committee met the UNAMSIL force commander, Major General V.K. Jetley, the Special Representative of the UN. Secretary-General, Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji and the UNAMSIL forces Chief of Staff Col. F.N. Fundi.

Among the Sierra Leonean leaders, the Committee met H.E. Dr. Al-Haji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, President of Sierra Leone, Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koromah, former President of Sierra Leone, Head of Armed

Forces Revolutionary Council and chairman of the peace consolidation Commission; and the Deputy Minister in-Charge of Defence, Chief Norman Hinga.

The Committee also had occasion to be the first foreigners to meet Corporal Foday Sayban Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) since his capture by Pro-government forces. This meeting took place in his solitary confinement cell at a maximum security prison. The Committee visited Kenyan soldiers at their new base outside Lungi. They also visited the injured and sick soldiers at the CHOITARAM UN Referral Hospital in Freetown.

More than half of the Kenyan contingent in Sierra Leone had been based at Makeni where they were encircled by the RUF rebels. Early in May, these soldiers broke the siege and fought their way North to Kabala near the Guinean border 70 Km from Makeni. The Committee flew by helicopter over hostile territory to meet these soldiers.

During their stay in Sierra Leone, the Committee Members also visited the amputees camp for people whose arms and feet were chopped off by combatants. The Committee witnessed the consequences and extent of brutality visited upon civilians. The Committee visited the UN debriefing centres outside Lungi international Airport where they met freed Kenyan and other UN soldiers whose freedom they had helped to negotiate. The visit ended with a meeting with Col. EKT Donkoh Ghanian Minister for Defence, in Accra.

The Committee records its appreciation to the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces H.E. Daniel T. arap Moi, CGH, M.P. for his cooperation and logistical support especially for availing a Kenya Airforce Aircraft for use by the Committee.

Similarly, the Committee is grateful to the Minister of state in the office of the President, Hon. J. L. Sunkuli for his cooperation since the crisis began and for his able co-ordination of the delegation during the trip.

The Committee Members appreciate the cooperation they received from the Department of Defence, and especially from the Vice-Chief of General Staff Lt. General D. I. Opande whose past experience in UN peace keeping missions and personal contacts with influential personalities within the West Africa region greatly eased the chores before them.

The Committee would also like to extend its appreciation to the office of the Clerk and particularly to Mr. J. N. Bundi for assisting in co-ordinating the programme and also for recording the proceedings of all meetings.

The Committee's appreciation is also extended to members of the Press for keeping the country constantly informed about the situation in Sierra Leone and the activities of the Committee.

2.0 BACKGROUND ON SIERRA LEONE:

2.1 Geography

Sierra Leone is largely a swampy country with a Plateau in the north and high terrain in the South. The country is washed by several rivers the most important of which include the Kaba, Rokel, Jang, Sew and Moa. The mean annual temperature is 27° c with a rainfall of 2032 mm.

Much of Sierra Leone's wealth is derived from mineral resources. One of the world's largest producer of diamonds, the country is also rich in Chrome, Bauxite, Iron Ore, Titanium Ore, Gold and Rutile.

The population of Sierra Leone is 4,400,000 and is predominantly black cleavaged into 20 different ethnic groups which include Mende, Temne and Creoles (descendants of freed African slaves).

The economy is based on agriculture and mining. Late 1980s budget figures showed a revenue of about \$98.5 million per annum.

2.2 History

The British established a colony at Freetown in 1787 for slaves repatriated from England and the United States. The Sierra Leone Company administered the colony until 1808 when it became a British Crown colony. The colonial rulers set up a protectorate over the hinterland of Freetown in 1896. The country became independent in 1961 with **Sir Milton Margai** as the first Prime Minister. He died in 1964 and was replaced by his younger brother Sir Albert Margai, a former Minister for Finance. In the 1967 elections, Mr. Siaka Stevens was elected Prime Minister in disputed elections. The Army staged a coup and formed a National Reformation Council. The civilian government was restored in a Second Army revolt in 1968 and Siaka Stevens returned to power.

Sierra Leone was declared a Republic in April 1971 with Siaka Stevens as the President. In 1978, the country became a one party state and slumped into an economic slowdown.

In 1980 Maj. Gen. Joseph Saidu Momoh was sworn in as President and a new multiparty constitution was adopted in 1991. Momoh was ousted by Captain Valentine Strasser who was himself ousted by Brig. Julius Maada Bio in 1994.

In 1996 elections were to be held as scheduled but fighting broke out shortly before the polls opened. This fighting was blamed on the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh.

The RUF agreed to a cease-fire in March 1996 and to a meeting with the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by Brig. Bio.

2.3 The major players in the Sierra Leone crisis:

2.3.1 **ECOMOG** ECOMOG forces were deployed in Sierra Leone in August 1990 as a force to stabilize the situation. The estimated initial strength was 15,000 which was slowly reduced to 4,000 as they reverted to UN peacekeeping role. Over the past month ECOMOG Forces have doubled under UNAMSIL.

2.3.2 **The Revolutionary United Front (RUF):** RUF's strength is estimated at 18,000, they have been the largest rebel force and were responsible for the collapse of the Lome-Agreement. They are blamed for causing atrocities against civilians and for taking UN soldiers hostage. They control all the diamond areas and receive logistical support from Liberia.

2.3.3 **The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)** The AFRC is under Lt. Col. Johnny Paul Koroma who came to power in Sierra Leone after overthrowing President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. It is composed of about 8,000 Ex-Republican Sierra Leone Forces (RSLF).

2.3.4 **The Mercenaries** Several mercenary groups have been employed by various mining conglomerates to offer protection and escort to their mining expatriates. The Mercenary outfits have several Helicopter gunships and number about 2500.

2.3.5 **The Civil Defence Forces (CDF)** Comprise loosely uncoordinated ethnic based vigilantes predominantly from the Kamajor, Tamaboros, Donsors and Kapras. All CDF's are under the umbrella of government forces and adhere to the Lome Agreement. The CDF are relatively poorly armed lacking formal military training and have loose informal command and control structure. The CDF has been largely blamed for recruiting child soldiers.

3.0 **LOME PEACE AGREEMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMSIL**

3.1 **Lome Peace Agreement**

The Lome Peace Agreement of July 1999 provided for:-

- (a) The creation of a broad based government of National Unity.
- (b) Creation of a commission for the consolidation of peace to supervise the implementation of the Peace Agreements.
- (c) Establishment of a commission to manage strategic resources, national restructuring and development to be chaired by Foday Sankoh in his capacity as Vice President of Sierra Leone.
- (d) Pardon of Sankoh and complete amnesty for any crimes committed by members of the fighting forces in the 1990's conflict.
- (e) Review of the present constitution of Sierra Leone and holding of elections in line with the constitution to be directed by National Electoral Commission.

3.2 **Deployment of UNAMSIL and its mandate**

The United Nations Military Assistance in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established under UN Security Council Resolution 1270 of October 22, 1999, which also took into consideration all previous resolutions on peace making efforts in Sierra Leone. This followed the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement in July 1999.

Following this resolution, ECOWAS reviewed the mandate of ECOMOG to include peace keeping and the protection of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and other UN personnel.

According to Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999), UNAMSIL has the following mandate:-

- To cooperate with the government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the implementation of the accord.

- To assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan.
- To establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone including disarmament, demobilization and re-integration reception centres.
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel.
- To monitor adherence to the cease-fire agreement of 18 May, 1999.
- To encourage the parties to create confidence building mechanisms and support their functioning.
- To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
- To support the operation of United Nations civilian officials, including the special Representative of the Secretary General and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers.
- To provide support, as requested, to elections which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone.
- The special representative to the Secretary General is Ambassador Adedeji while the Force Commander is Maj. Gen. Vijey Kumar Jetley.

4.0 DEPLOYMENT OF KENYA TROOPS (KENBATT 5)

Upon request by the United Nations to provide assistance in Sierra Leone, a Kenyan Battalion KENBATT 5 left for Sierra Leone in November 1999 and deployed, to its area of operations on 17th January 2000. The Battalion Headquarters was set up at Makeni and a few kilometres away were established the bases of A and D companies. About 30 kilometres south of Makeni, the bases of B and C companies were set in the opposite sides of Magburaka township. Two platoons were deployed to man the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Centres which were established in Makeni and Magburaka. This programme was however, frustrated by RUF rebels who prevented the troops from effectively carrying out their mission as stipulated in their mandate.

4.1 The experience of Kenyan Troops (KENBATT 5)

- (a) **January 04, 2000** an incident took place in which an officer lost a fragmentation jacket when he attempted to negotiate for free passage to Makeni from Freetown.
- (b) **January 14, 2000** an officer and five men were ambushed by Ex-SLA combatants. They took away from our troops an assortment of weapons, ammunition and personal effects.
- (c) **January 17, 2000** RUF combatants blockaded KENBATT 5 at Lunsar. It took the intervention of the UN Force Commander to have the blockade lifted.
- (d) **January 30, 2000** KENBATT 5 troops had a stand off with RUF rebels at Magburaka helicopter landing area. The RUF were demanding advance notification of any landing.

The situation returned to normal after the RUF commanders apologized for all the foregoing incidents. However, on 28 April 2000, the situation began to deteriorate starting with a scuffle between ECOMOG troops and Ex-SLA rebels. The situation then developed as follows:

- (a) **April 30, 2000** a Nigerian soldier was shot and seriously wounded when he refused to surrender his weapon. His unit was forced to surrender by a larger Ex-SLA force.

- (b) **May 01, 2000** - RUF harassed UN Military personnel and destroyed part of the DDR Camp guarded by Kenya Troops. Consequently, exchange of gunfire ensued with the subsequent detention of personnel by RUF from 16 countries including Kenya.

- (c) **May 02, 2000** - RUF surrounded a Kenyan Guarded Camp at Magburaka and demanded the surrender of all weapons. The Kenyans refused and a heavy exchange of fire ensued in the location of B Company. Three of our soldiers were injured and the RUF threatened to overrun the location of B Company. In response, the Force Commander dispatched the Indian Quick Reaction Force to reinforce it. He also dispatched two Zambian Companies under the command of Brigadier Mulinge to reinforce Makeni. The first one made it to its destination while the latter was encircled and taken hostage before arriving at Makeni after being misled by the RUF. On the same day at Makeni, eight of our men went missing together with five vehicles.

The situation remained tense with the UN abandoning the DDR programme and concentrating on self-protection. The RUF continued to surround the Kenyan Battalion positions and continued harassment by firing at them. This exposed the troops to a lot of stress and it was obvious that it was just a matter of time before the RUF launched a major offensive. It became quite clear that a break out from encirclement would be inevitable.

May 09, 2000. KENBATT 5 broke out of the encircled position in Makeni and Magburaka. The troops in Magburaka went East to Mile 91 and Bumbuna. Those at Makeni headed north to the safety of SLA held areas. The Unit had to continuously fight its way through RUF defences and ambushes thereby exposing the troops to more danger. In the process, several vehicles and equipment broke down while the Unit was under attack and had to be abandoned. In one incident, an Armoured Personnel Carrier plunged into the River Rokel in a manouvre to avoid fire with all its crew of two officers and nine men. Following the accident, two of the men walked the whole distance to Kabala while two of the men were crushed by the APC and are recorded as missing in action. The rest were taken hostage by the RUF but have since been released. Most of the Battalion made it to Kabala while one Company made it to Bumbuna. The fourth company went South to the Mile 91 and was later airlifted to Hastings (Freetown). As at the time of the visit all the troops that made it to Kabala awaited evacuation except for the injured who were flown to Freetown for treatment. All hostages have since been released.

4.2 Missing, Wounded and Abducted Soldiers

On May 01, 2000 the RUF raided a DDR Centre manned by the Kenyans, arrested and detained a Malaysian Military observer. A Kenyan Major and two of his men who went to negotiate the freedom of the observer were also held and taken hostage by the RUF Forces. In the ensuing fracas, two Kenya soldiers, Private Yunis and Lance Cpl Wanyama were wounded and are reported as missing in action.

On May 04, 2000 the UN Force Commander dispatched the whole Zambian Battalion to break siege in Makeni. The Battalion accompanied by Brigadier Mulinge and Sergeant Yatich were seized and taken hostage 20 minutes before they could reach the besieged Kenyans.

On May 09, 2000 during the breakout from Makeni and on the way to Kabala, an APC with two officers and nine men tumbled into a river while evading enemy fire. Two men swam out and walked all day to rejoin their colleagues in Kabala. Seven of the remaining nine were taken hostage by the RUF forces while the others Cpls Wabuge and Kamande are listed as missing in action.

In the process of breaking out from Makeni, through treachery and blackmail another fourteen men were taken hostage by the RUF.

In total four Kenyans were reported as missing in action while twenty six were taken hostage and have since been released. During the same period a total of twenty three Kenyans were wounded. Twelve were repatriated to Kenya for proper medical care, while nine were admitted at the Choitaram UN referral hospital in Freetown Sierra Leone. The remaining two, who were seriously wounded were awaiting evacuation to Europe for specialised medical treatment.

5.0 DELEGATION MEETINGS AND VISITS

5.1 MEETING WITH HON. SULE LAMIDO, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS , FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA IN ABUJA, NIGERIA , MAY 19, 2000

The Hon. Sunkuli thanked the Minister for finding time to meet the delegation. He informed the Minister that Kenya was proud that Nigeria is back to democratic rule and wished them success as they rebuild the economy. Hon. Sunkuli said that Kenya and Nigeria should continue to cooperate to ensure that Africa does not continue to be ravaged by poverty and other ills such as disease, famine, wars and conflicts. The conference against malaria recently held in Nigeria was an eye opener and, further avenues to enhance cooperation should be initiated and made to work..

The Hon. Sunkuli informed the Minister that Kenya had 868 men in Sierra Leone and Kenyans were concerned with their safety and success of the peace keeping mission. Hon. Sunkuli further informed the Minister that his delegation had stopped over in Abuja to exchange views on the situation in Sierra Leone and discuss how best the conflict can be resolved amicably . The decision to stop over in Abuja was significant because Nigeria is closer to Sierra Leone and has commanded the ECOMOG force in that country.

In response, the Hon. Lamido informed the Committee that Nigeria began operating in Sierra Leone during the reign of General Abacha who sent the army to restore peace in Sierra Leone because he owned a petrol refinery business which he felt was being threatened by civil unrest. All Nigerians appreciated that the peace enforcement was essential but nobody understood what they were fighting for. This operation cost Nigerians more than \$9 Billion US dollars and more than 500 lives.

The Minister further informed the meeting that peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone is very important because continued unrest will lead to an exodus of refugees to Nigeria. Nigeria is therefore willing to assist in restoring peace.

Nigeria is willing to participate under the United Nations but not under ECOMOG because the UN is already there, and is willing to offer any number of men .

Hon. Lamido was concerned that the UN is very poor in peacekeeping in Africa and does not show the same aggressiveness as was seen in Bosnia. He drew the attention of the meeting to the fact that Britain intervened to evacuate her nationals

leaving the other members of the Commonwealth to suffer and die. White members of the Commonwealth are therefore more important than the rest.

On the arrest of Sankoh, Hon. Lamido informed the Committee that Sankoh is very important to the rebels for them to be organized. The UN require Sankoh because they need someone to negotiate with, but people in Sierra Leone want him dead for the suffering he has caused them.

As regards the operations of the force commander and as to whether troops got into difficulty because of the errors by the force commander where sometimes he sent troops which could not defend themselves against the rebels, and whether Nigeria should not command the peace keeping operations in Sierra Leone, the Minister said that a country that provides the largest number of troops should command. He further said that Nigeria understands the terrain, the psychology of the people and has experience. India on the other hand has no political will and commitment to lead and win.

On whether the Lome Accord should not be revised, the Minister said that the principle should be maintained, but clauses that are inoperable should be revised and a full reassessment made.

As to whether Sankoh should not be tried for Human Rights abuses, the Minister said that if Sankoh is eliminated, the psychology of the rebels will be affected. They may go berserk in the absence of a leader. On the supply of arms to the rebels, the Minister said that all were concerned that this is aggravating the problem and blamed it on self pride and national parochialism.

On President Taylor, the Minister said that he was now enhancing relations with Nigeria and that they are negotiating on how to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone.

On whether the British would be obliged to serve under Pan-African leadership, the Minister observed that, the UN is now recognizing the role of Nigeria and other African leaders. Nigeria should be accepted by the Community of nations and should not be seen as bossing their way around their neighbours. The citizens of Nigeria also need to support the decision to participate in the peace keeping mission.

5.2 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CHARLES TAYLOR AT THE EXECUTIVE MANSION, MONROVIA LIBERIA ON MAY 19, 2000 AT 8.00 P.M.

The Hon. Sunkuli thanked the President for agreeing to meet the Committee and for his efforts in peace keeping in Sierra Leone and particularly for negotiating for the release of hostages many of who are Kenyans.

The Hon. Sunkuli informed the President that they had met him to seek his advice on how to end the crisis in Sierra Leone and on the way forward to ensure peace reigns in Sierra Leone and the entire region.

H.E. President Taylor said he would soon visit Kenya privately and wants to go on a wildlife safari because he loves nature and wildlife.

The President was full of praise for General Daniel Opande because he was instrumental in the peace process in Liberia.

The President informed the meeting that he had plans to decorate Brigadier Mulinge when he is finally released for demonstrating professionalism because he declined to be released until all men under his command were set free. He said Brigadier Mulinge was truly a professional soldier. He further said that all men may be released by the following day.

On the Lome Accord, the President said that all parties had flouted the Agreement and that all members should return to the drawing board. He further said that although Sankoh was arrested, Kabah's was for all practical purposes a transitional government.

On peace enforcement in Sierra Leone, he asserted that it would not work in Sierra Leone because the guerrillas have a lot of ammunition and arms captured from the UN. They also are very experienced in fighting in the forest where there are no roads or bridges and men have to go through the jungle on foot.

He further informed the meeting that the RUF have fought for more than 8 years. They are seasoned fighters and with the coming rains it would be impossible to defeat them.

The President advised that the UN should not resort to peace enforcement because a lot of men will lose their lives and facilities will go to waste. He said that the Americans and British want to leave Africans to go and kill each other.

He informed the Committee that Americans had even refused to provide logistical support to transport the released hostages.

The President also informed the Committee that before any decisive action is taken, Sierra Leone and Liberia should participate fully, otherwise there will be no meaningful progress. The neighboring countries who are members of the ECOWAS should also participate fully in the peace keeping and revisit once again the Lome Accord which should be enforced without favour. He further informed the meeting that the rules of engagement should be followed to the letter.

On trying Sankoh for humanitarian crimes, he informed the Committee that President Kabah had also committed a lot of crimes and should also be tried. In addition all leaders who have participated in coups and counter coups and they are plenty in ECOWAS region should all be tried.

He further said that since the Lome Accord will be the basis for re-negotiation, Mr. Sankoh, who is a signatory to the Accord, must be present at the negotiations.

The President posed a question, which was not answered; who, should hold Sankoh? Is it the UN, UK, ECOWAS, President Kabah or Mr. Koroma?

On whether a big force should be necessary to bring peace to Sierra Leone, the President said that Nigeria and Guinea had over 15,000 men in the area and no peace was achieved. For any success, he re-affirmed that countries that understand Sierra Leone like Liberia must participate.

As to whether the hostages could be released to the Kenyan delegation, the President said he would make arrangements to release all hostages while the delegation was in the country.

On his part, the Minister for Foreign Affairs reiterated the statement by the Head of state that force cannot bring about peace and disarmament. It has not worked in Somalia, Sri Lanka etc. Personal contacts are the best way out to restore lasting peace.

The President concluded by informing the Committee that he will arrange for a meeting between MPs from Kenya and Liberia on the following day and also decorate General Opande for his services in Sierra Leone. Note: This meeting did not take place.

5.3 MEETING WITH FORCE COMMANDER UNAMSIL MAJOR GENERAL V.K. JETLEY IN FREETOWN ON 20/5/2000

Major General V.K. Jetley informed the Committee that when UNAMSIL was formed, Kenya and Indian Battalions were the first to arrive. It was expected that there would be a total of six battalions with an average strength of 775 men each but Kenya brought 868 men and India 820 men. Other than Kenya and India, other battalions did not have sufficient facilities and therefore could not operate effectively.

He informed the delegation that UNAMSIL was established under a Security Council Resolution to keep peace, to establish disarmament and demobilisation centres and to provide security for disarmament and to patrol all the camps. UNAMSIL was brought in on the understanding that there was peace in the country which was not the case therefore complicating operations because the UNAMSIL was not equipped and prepared to enforce peace. UNAMSIL and ECOMOG were supposed to be complimentary and operate together but ECOMOG was not cooperative and could not reveal their strength and operations. From February, 2000 ECOMOG begun withdrawing, leaving UNAMSIL with a much bigger area to cover than they were logistically prepared for.

Kenyan troops were deployed at Makeni and Magburaka but the RUF under Chairman Sankoh could not allow them to advance to these locations and set roadblocks and resistance forces on the road. The RUF forces insisted that they could only allow military observers and not other armed troops. After negotiation with the cease-fire Committee, the troops managed to push their way to those locations but the RUF begun to dictate where the troops should be deployed. The troops encountered even more problems because the RUF refused to be disarmed.

Beginning April, 2000, the troops began encountering even more problems as the rebels began encircling the camps and demanding firearms. In Magburaka and Makeni operations were made totally impossible as several men were taken hostage by the rebels and ammunition was confiscated. As at May 02, 2000 there were 357 UN troops held as hostages by RUF. 6 APC, 48 tanks and 1 vehicle were captured by the RUF.

The taking of hostages and capturing of arms complicated matters because the forces were not equipped to fight. The orders were therefore that the troops return to base for further briefing because the operations had taken a course that was not anticipated. On the way forward as the UNAMSIL was unable to keep peace,

General Jetley said that UNAMSIL should take stock of their facilities and go back to the negotiating table to check the way forward for Sierra Leone.

On why the General concentrated Indian troops in one specific area and split Kenyan troops into units that were not capable of sustainable defence, the General said that there was agreement and consensus with the UNAMSIL Commanders, the RUF and Chairman Sankoh. The decision on deployment, he added, were well thought and were made collectively and it was not anticipated that RUF would renege on the agreement to be disarmed.

On the role of ECOMOG, the General informed the meeting that ECOMOG was to provide security in all places while UNAMSIL was to assist in disarmament and peace keeping.

On whether there was sufficient information to allow deployment of UNAMSIL troops, the General said that the assumption was that there was peace and therefore the only available military intelligence was only through interaction with the people. The General also said that there was no logistical support to assist the troops in the field as UNAMSIL was ill-equipped and even as at the date of the meeting some military facilities had not yet been received. The General finally said that the priority for UNAMSIL was to have all hostages released, return of arms and equipment captured and then allow the parties to the Lome Accord re-examine the agreement before any further move.

In response to questions, the General also said there was no military solution to an organised insurgency. It can only be solved by negotiation for change of the hearts of combatants and their leaders.

5.4 VISIT TO AMPUTEES CAMP, FREETOWN 20/5/200

The Camp comprise over 100 victims whose arms and feet has been slashed mercilessly by the rebels for refusing to support them. The victims suffered single and double amputations. The Committee spoke to several inmates of the camp who gave an account of horrifying experiences at the hands of the rebels who cut their hands and feet using axes. The victims were occasionally asked to choose cutting of the arm at the wrist or at the elbow (short or long sleeve) by drunken and drugged combatants.

The visit allowed the Committee to witness the brutality war can cause to the citizens and the difficult task ahead for the future government of Sierra Leone in rehabilitating both the rebels and the traumatised victims.

5.5 VISIT TO CHOITARAM UN REFERRAL HOSPITAL, FREETOWN SIERRA LEONE ON 20/5/2000

The delegation visited the sick and injured at the hospital and was able to get first hand account of those who were involved in clashes with the rebels.

Some of the soldiers were released hostages who had fallen sick because of drinking filthy water and eating unhygienic food at the hands of the rebels. The injured hostages were held without being given medical attention and by the time they were released their conditions had deteriorated terribly.

The delegates were able to get a full account of the conflict between the combatants and the UNAMSIL, their behaviour, conduct, nature of arms used and their organisational structure. Shockingly, even those hospitalised were in high spirits and were ready to resume their peacekeeping roles after being discharged from hospital. They were not prepared to go home until the operation was over.

5.6 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR OLUYEMI ADENIJI, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL (SRSG) AND HEAD OF UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL) ON 21/5/2000 AT UNAMSIL HEADQUARTERS, FREETOWN SIERRA LEONE

Ambassador Adeniji appeared before the Committee accompanied by Mr. Omar Sey, Chief of Political Affairs and Ambassador Michael Onanaiye Special assistant to the SRSG.

In his opening remarks, the Hon. Julius L. Ole Sunkuli , MP, Minister of State, Office of the President informed the SRSG that since the deployment of KENBATT 5 to Makeni and Magburaka where they met resistance from rebels and combatants leading to loss of arms and equipment and taking hostage of our soldiers by the rebels, the Kenya Parliament and citizens have raised concern over the safety and working conditions of Kenyan soldiers. To get a full assessment of the conditions of the men in Sierra Leone, the Government of Kenya, therefore, dispatched a delegation comprising members of the Defence and Foreign Relations Committee and military chiefs on a fact finding mission to Sierra Leone to assess the situation on the ground and report back to Parliament and Government .

The Minister further informed the SRSG that before arrival in Sierra Leone the delegation had held a meeting with the Foreign Minister of Nigeria on the operations of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, where Nigeria had two battalions on the

ground. He was of the view that Sierra Leone should be free as soon as possible, and that Nigeria was willing to continue to participate in the peacekeeping process under the United Nations. The Minister also informed the SRSG that the delegation had met Charles Dhankey Taylor, President of Liberia who had also given his views on the conflict in Sierra Leone. President Taylor had played a great role in the release of hostages from the RUF forces.

The Minister requested the SRSG to ensure that equipment lost during the exchange of fire with the RUF was replaced so that the Kenyan soldiers can continue participating in the mission to liberate Sierra Leone.

The Minister requested the UN to decide whether it would be involved in peace keeping or peace enforcement and that they provide the men with facilities to operate effectively without endangering their lives. On his part, the SRSG informed the Committee that he was happy that Member states had sacrificed their meager resources to keep peace. He was concerned that those who have resources had refused to assist Africa while they are very active in other parts of the world. He commended Kenya for being the first force in the UNAMSIL to appear in Sierra Leone and with the best equipment. On the Lome Accord, the SRSG said that Article 16 called for the creation of UNAMSIL and for the operation of UNAMSIL alongside the ECOMOG. One of the parties to the Accord, the RUF accused ECOMOG and particularly Nigeria of being a party to the conflict. However, ECOMOG could not continue their presence in Sierra Leone because they did not have sufficient resources, and the UN refused to support them. The ECOMOG therefore began to withdraw as the UNAMSIL was being deployed to their locations away from Freetown.

As the UNAMSIL was moving to their areas of deployment, the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh mobilized opposition against UNAMSIL accusing them of being a neo-colonialist force that was invited by President Kabah to harass him. In Makeni and Magburaka particularly, Mr. Sankoh rebuked publicly the Kenyan soldiers and the UN, and from there on all UN forces began facing hostility in their locations. As they moved to their locations they had to break road blocks and barriers set-up by armed rebels. Several UNAMSIL staff were injured and equipment lost. Guinea and Zambia soldiers lost all their equipment and their men were taken hostage.

The SRSG informed the Committee that under the UN Mandate, Chapter 7 of the UN charter allows for self defense and protection of civilians. He said that rebels taking arms from the UNAMSIL should be met with appropriate resistance and

that he would support and defend such activities. He advised the UNAMSIL to break all the road blocks set on the way as this was within their mandate.

The SRSG further informed the meeting that the activities of Mr. Sankoh and the RUF has helped rally the whole of the UN and ECOMOG against them and that there were plans after taking stock of what the UNAMSIL had lost, to draw new strategies.

On whether the UN will compensate for the arms captured by the rebels, the SRSG said that he had asked the Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone to ask President Taylor who shelters the RUF to return all the equipment taken from the UNAMSIL because they belonged to individual nations and not UNAMSIL. The SRSG further informed the delegation that ECOWAS had also insisted on the equipment being returned to the countries they were stolen from.

As to why UNAMSIL deployed Kenyan soldiers to the risky locations, the SRSG said at the moment of deployment the situation was peaceful but there was change of heart by Sankoh and RUF which was not anticipated.

On accusations that, UNAMSIL was only disarming the RUF and not the other rebels, the SRSG said, all the other rebels had agreed to disarm other than RUF. He said that over 20,000 arms had been received from other groups.

On the strength of Sankoh and RUF, the SRSG said that RUF as a party cannot win an election and that is one reason why they are causing trouble. He further said that Sankoh is dishonest and wants to be President and does not care what it will take to be President.

On whether Sankoh is using hostages to enhance his bargain for power, Adeniji said that Sankoh's influence has dwindled completely and that hostages are being released without his knowledge.

On deployment, the SRSG was reminded that the Kenyan troops were deployed in five different locations in Makeni and Magburaka without sufficient equipment and adequate back up by the other UNAMSIL forces. He informed the Committee that at the time of deployment the RUF was in disarray and had not organized their plot.

On the future of UNAMSIL, the SRSG said that the peace keeping would continue in accordance with Cap.6 of the UN Charter and that soldiers will be concentrated in same locations and not to be dispatched too thinly on the ground.

5.7 MEETING WITH THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HON. SAM MBANYA IN HIS OFFICE, FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE ON MAY 21, 2000

The Minister appeared before the Committee accompanied by Chief Captain (RTD) Norman Hinga, Assistant Minister for Defence, Sierra Leone.

The Hon. J.L. Sunkuli, informed the Minister that Kenya will continue to assist Sierra Leone until peace is restored. The Minister further said that he had led the delegation to observe the working conditions of the soldiers. He further said that Kenya would like to be considered part of the community that helped restore peace in Sierra Leone. On his part the Hon. Sam Mbanya said that he was grateful to Kenya because when request for assistance by UN was made, Kenya was the first to send troops.

Mr. Mbanya informed the delegation that the conflict in Sierra Leone had persisted for along time and that two Presidents had dealt with it. He further informed the meeting that even after signing the Abidjan Agreement in November 1996 and the Lome Accord in July 1999, the conflicts and rebellion by the RUF have never stopped. They have continued to maim and kill innocent civilians. The rebels have resorted to barbaric behavior of dismembering and amputating civilians.

Mr. Mbanya said that although the Lome Convention was signed and had instruments that ensured peace for the country, the RUF disregarded it and continued to visit atrocities on civilians. When UNAMSIL was brought in to keep peace, the RUF refused to cooperate and took several hundreds of UNAMSIL soldiers hostage and stole their equipment. They now release hostages when they choose to but no arms captured are released.

Mr. Mbanya finally told the delegation that the UN seems more concerned with Sankoh and not those he had tortured and held hostage, the welfare of the people and management of mines. He said that the government had given amnesty up to July 07, 2000 to all the rebels to surrender their arms but there were reports of some rebels making further recruitment, re-arming and re-deploying .

5.8 **MEETING WITH H.E. PRESIDENT DR. AHMAD TEJAN KABBAH
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL LODGE ON MAY 21, 2000 IN
FREETOWN**

The Hon. Sunkuli informed the President that the delegation had visited the Kenyan contingent following attacks by the RUF. He additionally said his delegation had also come to show solidarity with the people of Sierra Leone during this trying period. He was sorry for the Sierra Leoneans and Africans for he said the killing of civilians and attacks on soldiers should not have taken place. He told the President that the delegation had toured most places in Sierra Leone and was astonished at the atrocities visited on the civilians, loss of life, amputation of limbs which has not been witnessed any where in the world. He further told the President that Kenya had no intention of withdrawing her soldiers during this trying moment but would like the men to be accorded all necessary support so that their contribution could be meaningful.

President Kabbah informed the delegation that he was grateful to President Moi for sending troops to help liberate Sierra Leone from the rebels. When Kenyans were taken hostage he wrote to President Moi apologising for the incident. He informed the delegation that the rebels were enemies of Sierra Leone and the sooner they were brought to justice the better.

The President further informed the delegation that in the interest of peace the Government had extended amnesty to all the rebels which they have not taken advantage of and have concentrated on releasing UN hostages piecemeal. Although this is a good gesture, all hostages and their equipment should be returned unconditionally.

On the role of Sankoh in the conflict, the President informed the delegation that under the power sharing arrangement in the Government of National Unity, Sankoh was Chairman of Mines Commission. All mineral wealth was to be used for the good of the country and particularly the development of rural areas. Before the Commission could begin operations, Sankoh continued to exploit the mineral wealth for his private use and arming the RUF to protect the diamond mines.

On the role of Sankoh in the future negotiations, the President said that they would involve Sankoh or anybody from the party hierarchy who commands respect and has a following.

On whether there was reliable alternative leadership in RUF, the President said that some of the key supporters of Sankoh had begun abandoning him which was

worrying because there was no organised leadership in the RUF, and the rebels were still terrorising civilians.

On whether Sankoh should be tried for crimes against Sierra Leonians, he said that the citizens would like Sankoh lynched but he would like him to be given a fair trial which is not possible in Sierra Leone. The President proposed a tribunal based in a neutral country to try Sankoh and all suspects that have infringed humanitarian rights.

5.9 MEETING WITH LT.COL. JOHNNY PAUL KOROMA , HEAD OF AFRC AND CHAIRMAN OF PEACE CONSOLIDATION IN HIS RESIDENCE IN FREETOWN ON MAY 21, 2000

Lt. Col. J.P. Koroma informed the delegation that it was unfortunate that people who had come to restore peace in Sierra Leone had been abducted, and some killed. He said that the Government was still persuading the RUF to release all the peace keepers. He also informed the delegates that they will continue to negotiate with RUF because only a small group is committed to the war.

Lt. Col. Koroma's strategy to end the war was to ensure that government gains full control of mining areas because the rebels would not get resources to fuel the war.

On why the Government has to negotiate with Charles Taylor for the release of hostages, he said that Taylor had a lot of influence over the rebels and would be useful not only in negotiating the release of the hostages but also in enforcing the peace agreement. He said that even after all the fighting, the opposing groups have to sit and agree on the way forward on the Lome Accord . Lt.Col. J. P. Koroma further informed the Committee that the Accord is shaky, and to implement it, all the parties should negotiate and make it workable.

On alternative leadership in the RUF, Mr. Koroma said that he cannot identify any strong and influential leadership. He proposed the name of one Lawrence Wamadia as possible leader that could lead the rebels to the negotiating table but ruled out General Issa because peace cannot be won by fighting. He said that it was only the leaders and citizens who can consolidate peace.

On what would happen to RUF if Sankoh was not in the scene, Mr. Koroma said that Sankoh had no clout in leadership, but could rally the rebels to fight and loot.

On the role of the UN in peacekeeping, he told the Committee that the peace keepers should defend themselves, push the rebels, resist all attacks before they

can resume their neutral role. He said that it was unthinkable for a soldier whether from the UN, or anywhere to allow anyone to take his firearm or damage any military equipment.

5.10 **MEETING WITH MR. FODAY SANKOH, LEADER RUF AND CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES, NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN HIS PRISON CELL IN FREETOWN SIERRA LEONE ON MAY 21, 2000**

Foday Sankoh informed the delegation that he stands for peace, and blamed the breaking of the Lome Accord on his arrest.

Mr. Sankoh also informed the delegation that it was not the policy of the RUF to take Kenya soldiers hostages. He said that RUF field commanders acted without his authority, and that this is not unusual in guerilla warfare.

On release of hostages, Mr. Sankoh claimed he would have released the hostages but was arrested while in the process of releasing them.

Pressed on to reveal where the hostages were, he was inconsistent. He said he knew where all were hidden, later he said some were lost.

On what message he wanted to give Kenyans, he said that he was apologetic for the abduction and taking of Kenyans hostages. Kenya he said should not leave Sierra Leone until peace is restored.

5.11 **MEETING WITH MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, CHIEF CAPT. (RTD) NORMAN HINGA IN HIS OFFICE AT FREETOWN SIERRA LEONE ON MAY 21, 2000**

The Minister informed the delegation that Foday Sankoh is not to be trusted. He had confused all the parties and is the cause of all the problems in Sierra Leone and with the UNAMSIL.

The Minister further informed the delegation that he was ready to fight the RUF, and the first strategy is to take possession of all the diamond mining areas, to ensure the rebels have no resources to fuel the war. He said the rebels can be fought successfully if there were sufficient arms and equipment for the government forces.

On whether it was possible to win a guerilla war as it had proved difficult elsewhere, he informed the Committee that the problem in Sierra Leone is a guerilla uprising with a difference because the rebels have no organised leadership command and have no ideology and are not coordinated. The defence Minister blamed Taylor for the conflict because he supported the rebels by allowing them to train and establish bases in Liberia. The Minister said he plans to chase the rebels towards the border with Liberia. As the government pushes the rebels to the Liberian border, the UN forces should follow, disarm, and rehabilitate the combatants.

On the time frame, the Minister said two weeks would be sufficient. The delegation was not convinced it would be possible in two weeks given the current strength of the rebels after acquiring arms and equipment from Guinea, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, etc.

5.12 MEETING WITH THE MINISTER FOR DEFENCE, COL.E.K.T. DONKOH IN ACCRA, GHANA ON THURSDAY, MAY 25, 2000

Col. E.K. T. Donkoh appeared before the Committee accompanied by Lt. General Akafa, Chief Defence Services, Brigadier, C.A. Okae COS, Headquarters, Brigadier Adu-Amangor - Director General Intelligence, and Mr. S.S. Snaka of the Ministry of Defence.

The Hon. J.L. Sunkuli informed the Minister that the Kenyan delegation had made a stop-over in Ghana to exchange views on the situation in Sierra Leone where both countries have troops and where the men have been faced with resistance from the rebels leading to loss of life and property and taking soldiers as hostages, a rare encounter during UN peace keeping missions. The Hon. Sunkuli said he had toured the positions to which the men have been deployed and their morale is high because they know they have a role to play in liberating Sierra Leone. Hon. Sunkuli also informed the Minister that he had met president Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Lt. Colonel Paul Koroma and Mr. Foday Sankoh, the leader of RUF. Hon. Sunkuli observed that the biggest weakness in Sierra Leone was that Government occupies a small territory while the rebels occupies most of the territory and areas rich in diamonds. Hon. Sunkuli also informed the Minister that he had met the SRSG who confirmed that the mandate of UNAMSIL is insufficient and that a new mandate should be negotiated which should include peace enforcement.

On his part, Col. Donkoh informed the delegation that Kenya and Ghana have long standing relation since independence and should continue to exchange ideas

particularly on tourism where Kenya has made a lot of development. He said that Ghana and Kenya have played crucial role in peacekeeping in Liberia and also had contributed to UNAMSIL. He sympathized with Kenya for the losses incurred in Sierra Leone.

He informed the delegation that he had been to Abuja with the Regional Chiefs of Staff to review the situation in Sierra Leone and advise the Heads of State who will be meeting later to decide on the fate of Sierra Leone and the operations of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL. At their meeting in Abuja, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that the UNAMSIL mandate should include peace enforcement and the force to be enlarged to include all the ECOWAS states, and under the command of one of the ECOWAS countries. The Minister informed the delegation that a firm decision has to be taken on how to defeat the RUF and force their leaders to the negotiation table like ECOMOG had done with Liberia. The Minister also said that Sankoh has no central command and so the best thing is to destroy RUF and do business with the emerging leadership, because a lot of the rebels belong to RUF because of coercion and terror.

The Minister was confident that with a strong force from ECOMOG and operating under the command of one of their own, the RUF would be weakened and forced to negotiate for peace. On whether Nigeria being the largest force could not create conflict between the SRSF and force commander, the Minister informed the meeting that this would be discussed, and a solution would be found.

As to whether the peace enforcement would involve the troops from Sierra Leone doing the actual combat and then the UNAMSIL keeping peace in the conquered areas, the Minister said the forces should fight and take initiative from the rebels because the government of Sierra Leone is too weak and their fire power cannot match the rebels. They will require to be equipped properly and given reinforcement to fight the rebels.

The Committee was further informed that the Sierra Leone people would support the use of force against Sankoh and RUF, and that RUF gets support from Liberia and Guinea Bissau because they trade in diamonds. The two countries also train RUF forces. The Committee was also informed that there were unconfirmed reports that mercenaries were training and arming the RUF. Some of the mercenaries are from South Africa, Serbia, Ukraine and Burkina Faso.

On whether Kenya would make a contribution if the mandate of UNAMSIL was changed to peace enforcement, the Hon. Sunkuli said that he personally supported

the principle to help free Sierra Leone from the rebels and to assist in ensuring a strong capable government is installed.

Finally, Hon. Sunkuli requested the Minister for Defence to help Kenya recover equipment that were taken or damaged by the rebels. The Minister promised to assist.

6.0 OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The visit to Sierra Leone and other West African countries gave an opportunity to the Committee to meet influential political leaders with interest in the political and economic developments in Sierra Leone. This enhanced the Committee Members' capacity to understand the dynamics of the Sierra Leone crisis which enabled them to make informed opinions on the causes of the breakdown in the peace process, the damage the conflict had inflicted on the citizens, the way forward to end the crisis and the possible role that Kenya can play in the process.

6.2 The role of UNAMSIL in the peace keeping process in Sierra Leone was predicated on the parties to the Agreement keeping peace and honouring their commitment. Lack of commitment by some parties to the Lome Peace Agreement led the UNAMSIL to fail from the start because the RUF refused to disarm and instead disarmed the Guinean soldiers, and continued to visit hostilities upon KEBATT 5 and other UN soldiers. There was absolutely no goodwill from the RUF and they did not fulfil the requirements in the Lome Peace Accord.

6.3 Whereas there was agreement within UNAMSIL that no forces would deploy until sufficient Members and equipment had arrived, the sudden withdrawal of ECOMOG led to premature deployment of the Kenyan forces to protect the military observers. It appears to the Committee that it would have been safer and more logical to withdraw the military observers rather than to hurry the deployment of KENBATT 5 to hostile territory.

6.4 The events of the first 10 days of May, 2000 show clearly the price paid for the weak co-ordination and information flow between Force Headquarters and UN troops in the field in Sierra Leone. When RUF rebels attacked and surrounded Kenyan soldiers on 1st and 2nd of May, they took advantage of the thin spread of the Kenyans and light weaponry at their disposal.

On 4th May, ZAMBATT was dispatched to reinforce the Kenyans at Makeni. They were all taken hostage before they could reach the township. The Indian Quick Reaction Force was sent to reinforce the Kenyan soldiers at Magburaka.

Although the Commanding Officer KENBATT 5 had agreed with the UN F C in Freetown that the Kenyan forces would break the siege on the evening of 9th and break south as a joint force later that night, the F C later ordered the QRF to leave Magburaka for Mile 91 hours before Kenyan forces had concentrated. This led to

the splintering of Kenyan forces with one company going south with the Indians, another company breaking North-east from Magburaka to Bumbuna, and those in Makeni having to break north and fight to reach Kabala.

The change in orders by the UN FC caused Kenyans substantial loss in casualties and equipment which will have to be replaced by the Kenyan taxpayer.

6.5 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme (DDR) did not take off in the areas under the control of RUF which included the areas under KENBATT 5. Whereas in the non-RUF areas over 20,000 arms were surrendered, in the RUF strongholds only a negligible number of arms were surrendered.

6.6 The Committee observed that the ECOWAS countries especially Nigeria and Ghana are moving towards peace enforcement and have committed additional troops to serve under UNAMSIL.

7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1 The plunder of the mineral wealth of this otherwise rich country has by and large been the source of internal rebellion and ethnic animosity. There are no ideological or political differences and the fighting is basically to control the mineral wealth, thereby amassing wealth and controlling the country.

7.2 When the UN intervened to keep peace after the signing of the Lome' Peace Accord, it did not provide sufficient facilities including the vital logistical support to deal with skirmishes which they were forced into by the rebels.

- 7.3 Even though the Lome Peace Accord had certain flaws, with goodwill of all signatories, it could still bring peace to Sierra Leone. However, non-adherence by the RUF rebels led by Mr. Sankoh was responsible for the breakdown of the entire Accord. This is evidenced by the fact that DDR programme went on smoothly other than in the RUF controlled areas.
- 7.4 The recent experiences of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone point to the need of the UN to formulate strategies for peace enforcement which appears the only way to save Sierra Leone from self-destruction.
- 7.5 The Kenyan military contingent should continue to be in Sierra Leone as long as conditions permit. The decision as to whether the troops should engage in peace enforcement which may involve actual combat is a matter to be debated and agreed upon.
- 7.6 KENBATT 5 deserve to be commended for their bravery, discipline and professionalism displayed during the encirclement and attacks by the RUF forces and in their general performance in Sierra Leone. Despite the set back suffered by our forces, they were found to be in very high morale and ready to continue serving under UNAMSIL. No doubt the visit by the Members of the Committee enhanced their morale and commitment to serve.
- 7.7 The fact-finding mission to Sierra Leone represents an important first step in bringing the activities of the Department of Defence under the ambit of parliamentary governance. The Committee proposes that future commitments of Kenya troops on international duty be undertaken after consultation with the relevant Committee of Parliament.

THE HON. DAVID MUSILA, MP
CHAIRMAN,
DEFENCE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SIGNED



DATE

12th June, 2000

APPENDICES

APENDIX I

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS THE KENYA DELEGATION HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH

1. The Hon. Al-Haji Sule Lamido, - Minister for Foreign Affairs, Federal Republic Nigeria
2. Ambassador Onabu, Director of Political Affairs - Ministry for Foreign Affairs Nigeria
3. H.E. Charles Dhankay Taylor, - President of Liberia
4. Hon. Monie R. Captain, - Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liberia
5. Hon. Daniel Chea, - Minister for Defence, Liberia
6. Major-General Vijey Kumar Jetley, - Force Commander UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone
7. Lt. Colonel Leonard Ngondi, - Commanding Officer, KENBATT 5, Sierra Leone
8. Col. F.N. Fundi - Chief Staff Officer (UNAMSIL) Sierra Leone
9. Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, - Special Representative Of Secretary General (SRSG) and Head of United Nations Mission In sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
10. Ambassador Michael Onaniye, - Special Assistant SRSG
11. Mr. Omar Sey, - Chief of Political Affairs (UNAMSIL)

12. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. - President of the Republic, of Sierra Leone
13. The Hon. Sam Mbanya, - Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sierra Leone
14. Chief (Capt)(Rtd) Norman Hinga - Minister for Defence, Sierra Leone
15. Lt. Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma - Head of AFRC and peace Consolidation Commission, Sierra Leone
16. Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, - Head of RUF and Chairman of the Mines Commission, Sierra Leone
17. Colonel E.K.T. Dankoh, - Minister for Defence Republic of Ghana
18. Lt. General, A. Kofia, - Chief Defence Services, Ghana
19. Brigadier C.A. Okae, - Director-General Intelligence Services, Ghana
20. Brigadier Adu-Amafo, - Director-General Intelligence Services
21. Mr. S. S. Snaka, - Ministry of Defence Headquarters Ghana
22. Medical Officer incharge UNAMSIL Hospital, Freetown Sierra Leone
23. Chairman, amputees camp Freetown Sierra Leone.

APPENDIX II

COMMITTEES ITINERARY

The Committee visited West Africa from May 18, 2000 to May 27, 2000 and conducted formal meetings with Heads of State, Ministers and UN representatives in Sierra Leone. In addition, the delegation visited the Kenbatt 5 troops in Kabala and the sick at the UN referral Hospital in Freetown. Meetings and visits by the delegation were as follow:-

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| - Thursday, May 18, 2000 | - Departure Nairobi for Sierra Leone |
| - Friday, May 19, 2000 | - Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Nigeria |
| - Friday, May 19, 2000 | - Meeting with the President of Liberia |
| - Saturday, May 20, 2000 | - Meeting with the Forces Commander UNAMSIL, Freetown, Sierra Leone |
| - Saturday, May 20, 2000 | - Visit to amputees camp, in Freetown |
| - Saturday, May 20, 2000 | - Visit to UN referral Hospital, Freetown |
| - Sunday, May 21, 2000 | - Meeting with the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) |
| - Sunday, May 21, 2000 | - Tour of Kabala Military Camp and meeting with commanding officer Kenbatt 5 |
| - Sunday, May 21, 2000 | - Meeting with the President of Sierra Leone |
| - Sunday, May 21, 2000 | - Meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sierra Leone |
| - Sunday, May 21, 2000 | - Meeting with the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council |

(AFRC), Sierra Leone

- Sunday, May 21, 2000
 - Sunday, May 21, 2000
 - Thursday, May 25, 2000
 - Friday, May 26, 2000
- Meeting with Corporal Foday Sankoh in his prison cell, Freetown, Sierra Leone
 - Meeting with the Minister for Defence, Sierra Leone
 - Meeting with the Minister for Defence, Ghana
 - Return to Nairobi, Kenya