

*Approved for tabling.*



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

ELEVENTH PARLIAMENT - THIRD SESSION - 2015

*BW  
SNA  
17/11/15*

*Paper Laid  
By the hon. chairperson  
Departmental Committee  
on Administration and  
National Security  
Hon. Asman Kamara  
on Tuesday*

DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

*17/11/2015  
[Signature]*

REPORT ON INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE TERRORIST ATTACK

DIRECTORATE OF COMMITTEE SERVICES,  
CLERK'S CHAMBERS,  
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,  
**NAIROBI**

NOVEMBER, 2015





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## ABBREVIATIONS / ACRONYMS

A-I-E	- Authority to Incur Expenditure
AMISOM	- African Union Mission in Somalia
GTTC	- Garissa Teachers Training College
GUC	- Garissa University College
KDF	- Kenya Defence Forces
KMTC	- Kenya Medical Training College
MRC	- Mombasa Republican Council
NSC	- National Security Council



## **I.0 PREFACE**

On behalf of the Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security and pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order 199(6), it is my privilege and honour to present to the House the Report of the Committee on its investigations into the Garissa University College terrorist attack.

The investigations were necessitated by the tragic terrorist attack on the Garissa University College on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2015 that led to the massacre of 147 Kenyans. Following the attack serious concerns were raised by the public, through the media, on the capacity of security agencies to respond to terror attacks in built up areas particularly where hostages are involved. The Committee in its Sitting held on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2015, resolved to conduct investigations into the matter with a view to recommending measures to improve the response of all agencies and the general public to similar unfortunate incidents.

### **I.1 Mandate of the Committee**

The Committee is established pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order No.216 with the following terms of reference:-

- (i) study and review all legislation referred to it;*
- (ii) make reports and recommendations to the House as often as possible, including recommendation of proposed legislation;*
- (iii) to investigate, inquire into, and report on all matters relating to the mandate, management, activities, administration, operations and estimates of the assigned Ministries and departments;*
- (iv) to study the programme and policy objectives of Ministries and departments and the effectiveness of the implementation;*
- (v) to study, access and analyze the relative success of the Ministries and departments as measured by the results obtained as compared with their stated objectives;*
- (vi) to investigate and inquire into all matters relating to the assigned Ministries and departments as they may deem necessary, and as may be referred to them by the House or a Minister;***

### **I.2 Committee Membership**

The Committee comprises the following Members:

1. The Hon. Asman Kamama, MGH, OGW, MP - **Chairperson**
2. The Hon. Alois M. Lentoimaga, MP- **Vice Chairperson**

3. The Hon. Ababu Namwamba, EGH, MP
4. The Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP
5. The Hon. Alice Wahome, MP
6. The Hon. Zakayo K. Cheruiyot, MP
7. The Hon. Timothy W. Wetangula, MP
8. The Hon. Patrick Ole Ntutu, MP
9. The Hon. Ali Isaack Shaaban, MP
10. The Hon. Samuel Moroto, MP
11. The Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP
12. The Hon. Francis K. Mwangangi, MP
13. The Hon. Rashid J. Bedzimba, MP
14. The Hon. David Gikaria, MP
15. The Hon. Mohamed Shidiye, MP
16. The Hon. Jane Machira, MP
17. The Hon. Ibrahim Abdi Saney, MP
18. The Hon. Joseph O. Ndiege, MP
19. The Hon. Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP
20. The Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) John K. Waluke, MP
21. The Hon. Wanjiku Muhia, MP
22. The Hon. Akuja ProtusEwesit, MP
23. The Hon. Joseph M. Kahangara, MP
24. The Hon. Ahmed Abdikadir Ore, MP
25. The Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP
26. The Hon. George Theuri, MP
27. The Hon. James Bett, MP
28. The Hon. Benard Shinali, MP

### **I.3 Meetings and visits**

The Committee held two meetings with the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government and the Director General, National Intelligence Service. The Committee also formed a Sub- Committee comprising of four Members led by Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP, it included Hon. Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP, Hon. Benard Shinali, MP and Hon. Mohamed Shidiye, MP that was tasked to undertake a field visit in Garissa County. The Sub- Committee undertook the fact finding visit on 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. During the field visit the Committee held meetings with the Regional Coordinator, North Eastern Region, Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee, Local Leaders and the Management of Garissa University College.

### **I.4 Committee General Findings, Observations and Recommendations**

Having held meetings, undertaken a fact finding visit and considered submissions, the Committee observed that the Garissa University attack would have been prevented had



operatives' ability to move from the camp to Nairobi and other parts of the Country. The huge refugee population had also contributed to environmental degradation particularly in areas within Dadaab.

Rampant corruption in the Police Service had made citizens to be reluctant to provide information on Al Shabaab, fearing information leakage that would threaten their personal security. This led to limited community participation in the fight against terrorism.

The Committee recommends that Inspector General of Police, through the Director of operations in the National Police Service, should assume command of all internal security operations. The Kenya Defence Forces should be deployed only as a last option.

The National Police Service should also decentralize the RECCE Squad operations to County Headquarters, in areas which are vulnerable to terrorist attacks such as the North East Eastern and Coast regions. This will reduce the duration taken by the unit to respond to incidents of serious crime in areas far from Nairobi.

Further the Government should renegotiate the deployment of troops in Somali to ensure that Kenya Defence Forces take charge of AMISOM operations in areas along the Kenya- Somali border to protect national interest by creating a buffer zone and ensure that Al Shabaab militants do not operate freely in the region to launch attacks on targets in Kenya.

The Police Training Curriculum should be modernized to ensure that all police officers are adequately trained in new and emerging techniques such as fighting in build- up areas or in close Quarter Battle, to be able to effectively counter terrorism and related crimes. The Government should also equip police officers to levels commensurate with the level of insecurity facing the Country.

The Government should also initiate a public awareness sensitization programme on safety and evacuation skills, particularly targeting students in all schools and colleges.

Finally the Government should initiate a multi-pronged anti- terrorism and anti- radicalization strategy involving all stakeholders through the establishment of partnership with the public, religious and elected leaders, community leaders and the media. This would ensure that the citizenry in the Country particularly North Eastern and Coast regions are actively involved in the fight against terrorism and radicalization.

necessary steps been taken. According to evidence submitted to the Committee the Garissa County Intelligence Security Committee had received numerous intelligence reports on impending terrorist attacks, targeting learning institutions within Garissa town. In addition evidence submitted by the Garissa University College management and also by one member of the County Security Committee indicated that only two police officers were on duty at the University when the attack occurred.

The Committee further observed that the County Security Committee and the University management did not conduct proper security surveys within targeted institutions, in the wake of intelligence reports on possible terror attacks. Had the surveys been done, security gaps such as heavily grilled hostel windows would have been identified and remedial measures instituted to mitigate the effects of any terrorist attacks.

The Committee established that Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government had not provided adequate budgetary allocation to officers serving in the Counties and Sub Counties. The Committee established that Deputy County Commissioners received approximately Ksh 300,000 in Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIEs) per quarter in the first two quarters of the 2014 /15 financial year. However the allocation had been increased during the last quarter of the same financial year with the County Commissioners receiving Ksh 750,000 in that quarter.

The Committee was also informed that Somali citizens had encroached on Kenyan territory along the buffer zone between Mandera and Burahawa. The Committee was informed that beacons for border point 1 were intact but those for border point 3 and 4 had been removed. Some Somali citizens had also constructed structures in the buffer zone.

The Committee further established that Mandera was the preferred transit point used by Al Shabaab to transport weapons into the Country as indicated by evidence submitted to the committee on the planning and transportation of weapons used in the attack. This would be attributed to the large number of Al shabaab militia along the Kenya /Somali border between Mandera and Elwak. The area was reportedly under the command of the Ethiopian Forces serving in AMISOM. However the Ethiopian soldiers are not actively engaged in the region making it a safe haven for the Al Shabaab militia.

Refugee camps were reportedly being used by Al Shabaab and their sympathisers to plan and launch terror attacks. The large population in the camps had also made it difficult for government agencies to determine genuine refugees from suspected militia. Rampant corruption in the camps, particularly in the issuance of permits to facilitate the movement of the refugees from the camps to seek medical treatment in Nairobi contributed to Alshabaab



### **1.5 Adoption of the Report**

We Members of the Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security have pursuant to Standing Order 199 adopted this report on investigations into the Garissa University College terrorist attack and affix our signatures to confirm our approval and confirm its accuracy, validity and authenticity on 28<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. (As per appendix I)

1. The Hon. Asman Kamama, MGH, OGW, MP - **Chairperson**
2. The Hon. Alois M. Lentoimaga, MP- **Vice Chairperson**
3. The Hon. Ababu Namwamba, EGH, MP
4. The Hon. Jane Machira, MP
5. The Hon. Zakayo K. Cheruiyot, MP
6. The Hon. James Bett, MP
7. The Hon. Benard Shinali, MP
8. The Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP
9. The Hon. George Theuri, MP
10. The Hon. Samuel Moroto, MP
11. The Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP
12. The Hon. Francis K. Mwangangi, MP
13. The Hon. Rashid J. Bedzimba, MP
14. The Hon. David Gikaria, MP
15. The Hon Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP
16. The Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) John K. Waluke, MP
17. The Hon. Wanjiku Muhia, MP
18. The Hon. Ahmed Abdikadir Ore, MP

### **1.6 Acknowledgement**

**Mr. Speaker,**

The Committee wishes to sincerely thank the Offices of the Speaker and the Clerk of the National Assembly for the support extended to it in the execution of its mandate.

I take this opportunity to thank all the Members of the Committee for their patience, sacrifice, endurance and hard work during the long sitting hours under tight schedules which enabled us to complete the tasks within the stipulated period.

The Committee wishes to record its appreciation for the services rendered by the staff of the National Assembly attached to this Committee. Their efforts made the work of the Committee and the production of this Report possible.

The Committee is also grateful to all the witnesses/ general public who made submissions and presentations before the Committee during the meetings and fact finding visit. Their contributions gave the Committee the much needed insights into the issues under investigations and possible solutions.

Finally, it is now my pleasant duty, on behalf of the Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security to present this report to the House pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order 199(6).

Signed.......... Date.....

**Hon. Asman Kamama, MGH, OGW, MP**

**Chairperson, Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security**



## **WAY FORWARD**

In addition to the measures put immediately after the Garissa Campus attack, the Government will sustain the programmes that have been ongoing in the Country since the threat of terrorism became a challenge. These include;

- Enacted the Security Laws Amendment Act in December 2014 that strengthened Kenya Legislation to deal firmly with Terrorism and Radicalization
- Construction of Perimeter Fence and other complementing surveillance systems along the Kenya Somalia border. Constriction of the initial 50 kilometres stretch is underway from border point 1 towards border point 29/Kiunga
- Fastracking voluntary repatriation of Somalia refugees
- Kenya is planning to host a Regional Summit in May 2015 on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Violent extremism/radicalization has proved to be a key system used by the terrorist to recruit locals to coordinate and mount attacks in the country.
- Enhancement of inter-agency coordination to strengthen institutional synergy;
- Enhanced security vigilance within and around strategic installations and facilities;
- Sustained ground, aerial and maritime surveillance along the Kenya- Somali border;

**WHETHER SECURITY AGENCIES RECEIVED PRIOR INTELLIGENCE ON THE TERROR ATTACK AND IF SO HOW IT WAS ACTED ON**

18. It has been confirmed there was prior intelligence to the attack which were directed to Garissa Teachers College, Garissa University College, Catholic Church, Garissa Polytechnic, Shops at Bulla-Sheikhs owned by non locals and Naivas Garissa during the month of March, 2015.

19. In mitigation to the threats, the County Security team had deployed as follows:-

Garissa University	- 4 Officers
Garissa TTC	- 4 Officers
Catholic Church	- 4 Officers
Garissa MTC	- 4 Officers
Garissa KPLC	- 4 Officers
Garissa Hospital	- 4 Officers
Governor's Office	- 4 Officers
Naivas Supermarket	- 4 Officers
Garissa Bridge	- 12 Officers
Other churches during service	- 4 Officers each x 36 churches.

within their areas of jurisdiction are adequately secured. The respective commanders will be surcharged for any act of commission or omission that may result to such attacks.

### **DETAILS OF 4000 KENYAN YOUTHS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN TRAINED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND DEPLOYED IN SOMALI TO FIGHT AL SHABAAB**

15. The Government is focusing on returnees who had been recruited by Al Shabaab and have returned back into the Country due to a number of reasons. These youths are currently our biggest threat since they come from diverse Kenyan communities and are able to plan and execute attacks without being easily detected as was experienced in the Garissa attack. Last week on Friday (24<sup>th</sup> April, 2015), I extended the amnesty to all the youth willing to surrender from Al Shabaab by 15 days.
16. Concerning the above issue I wish to request for more time to interrogate the matter due to its sensitivity and report back to this Committee in camera at an appropriate time.

### **THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF KENYA POLICE AIRWING**

17. Currently Kenya Police Air-wing has one (1) Bell 206 Helicopter which is serviceable and one (1) MI-17 under maintenance. Two (2) MI-17 are awaiting overhaul while two (2) Cessna 208 Caravans are serviceable. A Board of Survey was done on six (6) other aircrafts and they are awaiting bonding

financing or facilitating terrorism and radicalization in the country.

- The Government has established a team to investigate the conduct of individual Police Commanders and administrative officers as well as the performance of the respective security committees responsible for coordination of security in Garissa County and North Eastern Region as a whole. Arising from the preliminary report, the Government has interdicted the Regional Coordinator, North Eastern Region, the Garissa County Commissioner and seven police officers to pave way for investigations.
- Strengthening the capacity of Kenya police counter terrorism rapid response team (*RECCE*)
- Training, Equipping and deploying of County Quick Response Teams on Counter-Terrorism to support the officers on the Ground.
- Deployment of a platoon of RDU around Modika Area to support the Officers on the Ground.
- Equipping and Deployment of two Companies of RBPU near Amuma and Hulugho to patrol and man the Borderline
- Continuous training for officers deployed in North Eastern Region on Counter terrorism skills.
- All County Security and Intelligence Committees have been called upon to heighten their alertness and ensure that all strategic installations which include learning institutions

- Interdiction of Senior Administrative Officers and Police County Commanders in North Eastern Region on 23<sup>rd</sup> April, 2015.
- Appointment of Amb. Mohamud Ali Saleh as the new Regional Coordinator for North Eastern Region w.e.f 29th April, 2015.
- Re-organized all Security Committees in the region through deployment of new County Commissioners to coordinate security and other peace initiatives in the region.
- Appointment of a new set of Regional and County Police Commanders to ensure effective police operations by the Inspector General.
- Ensuring full alertness, continuous briefs, maximum supervision, intensified patrols, intelligence collection, fixed site security and intensified mounted operations in potential areas.
- Enhancement of security alertness and deployment of security officers in all learning institutions and other areas that may be targeted by terrorists.
- Local leaders and the communities in North Eastern region have pledged to cooperate and volunteer information to the Government on persons involved in terrorism and radicalization
- The Government has frozen 86 accounts of individuals, organizations and financial institutions suspected to be

- The windows were grilled making it difficult even for the students themselves to escape from the attack.
- b) Lack of a clear command structure as to who was in-charge of the operation and guidelines spelling out the same.
- c) Limited capacity in field combat as most of the officers have not undergone such trainings, or fighting in build-up areas or Close Quarter Battle.
- d) Lack of appropriate equipment such as night vision, telescopic sights, Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) and bullet proof vests.
- e) Age factor also posed an operational challenge as most of the officers are aged between 36 and 58 years. This made it difficult for the officers to swiftly respond to the attack.
- f) Some officers have overstayed in the County, making them inefficient, less active and demoralized.
- g) The number of officers on the ground is insufficient taking into account the daily threats on targeted areas.
- h) Lack of stand-by contingent to respond to emergencies since all officers are deployed to specific areas every day.

**MEASURES PUT IN PLACE TO ENSURE SIMILAR INCIDENTS ARE RESPONDED TO IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE**

14. Following this attack the Government has scaled up security measures which include;



the Operation Command Centre to chart the way forward for the rescued students. The college Administration and the County Security team categorized the rescued students in terms of personal particulars.

12. The Cabinet Secretary led the entire team on Friday, 3<sup>rd</sup> April, 2015 at around 0600 hours in talking to the survivors, assuring them of the Government's commitment towards their welfare and transport arrangements to their respective destinations.
13. Bodies of those killed in the attack were moved to Nairobi by use of three military Aircrafts. The survivors of the attack were moved to their respective destinations by use of 20 National Youth Service buses on 4<sup>th</sup> April 2015 under the Escort of Administration Police Officers.

### **CHALLENGES FACED BY SECURITY AGENCIES IN THE RESCUE OPERATION**

- a) Nature of the Hostel Buildings at the University posed a major challenge during the rescue operation. Some of the weaknesses noted include;
  - The access to the Hostel was only by two entrances,
  - The cubicles were congested with six students each.

Various activities and consultative meetings were held in efforts to coordinate the rescue mission. The Regional Operation Command Centre acted as the Operation Centre where briefings were generated.

8. At around 1.30 p.m., the RECCE squad arrived and occupied the first floor and managed to proceed to the ground floor of the Elgon Hostel where hostages (students) were being held. At this time KDF ceased fire by tactically handing over to the RECCE team. A decision to accommodate all the rescued students at the KDF grounds was arrived at around 1740 hours.
9. The operation went on but unfortunately an officer from RECCE Company was injured and passed on at the Provincial General Hospital Garissa. At about 1920 hours the RECCE team completed the operation by killing all the terrorists. The total number of students rescued was placed at 558.
10. A mop-up operation was conducted and confirmed that the fatalities were 151, categorized as follows (*142 students*), 1 KDF Solder, 1 AP Officer, 1 GSU (*RECCE Company*) Officer, 2 Civilian Guards and 4 terrorists.
11. The Cabinet Secretary led a consultative meeting comprising of the County Security team, the College Administration and

students. By this time, the suspected terrorists had taken position on top floors of Mt. Elgon Hostel. At around 0630 hours the terrorists fatally shot two officers (1 KDF & 1 Administration Police Service) and injured one Kenya Police Service (KPS) Officer.

4. The rescue operation continued with KDF special teams undertaking the storming activity while the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) and Rural Border Police Unit (RBPU) provided cover. The general duty officers acted as outer cordon by conducting searches and taking rescued students to safer places at the same time taking the injured to Hospital.
5. Between 0730 hours and 0830 hours humanitarian aid from the Red Cross and AMREF teams arrived. The teams commenced the transportation of the injured to Hospital and moving those critically injured to Nairobi for specialized treatment.
6. At the same time, the Red Cross team had started to mount tents, toilets, washrooms and providing other essential services within the KDF Camp where all the rescued students were being held for screening, treatment and counselling.
7. The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, accompanied by the Inspector General of Police, arrived in Garissa at around 1030 hours.

**BRIEF TO THE CABINET SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY, AT CONTINENTAL HOUSE, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS ON 30<sup>th</sup> APRIL 2015**

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1. Garissa University College came under attack on Thursday, 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015, at about 0550 hours by suspected Al-shabaab Terrorists who forced entry through the main gate by shooting dead two civilian guards who were manning it. Around this time, some students had woken up for morning prayers while some were proceeding for morning studies.

**THE CONDUCT OF THE OPERATION**

2. When the suspected terrorists struck, four Police Officers deployed at the University that night returned fire but the terrorist managed to enter by shooting indiscriminately and eventually got to the Hostels and Lecture Halls. The attackers found members of the Christian Union (CU) in one of the Lecture Halls and shot indiscriminately at them.
3. Following the fierce exchange of fire and tactics employed by the attackers, the four officers called for reinforcement whose response was obtained promptly. Officers drawn from the Kenya Defence Forces (*KDF*), National Police Service (*NPS*) and Kenya Prisons Service came to the rescue of the

# APPENDIX IX

## Submissions by the Cabinet Secretary Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government

# APPENDIX IX

Submissions by the Cabinet Secretary  
Ministry Of Interior and Coordination of  
National Government







We thank you in advance and look forward to a positive feedback soonest possible. Attached is a list of all PSSP Students and a copy of the previous letter.

Yours Faithfully,

FOR PSSP STUDENTS

NAME

TITLE



SIGN

ABDIFATAH ISSACK

CHAIRMAN

FREDRICK OWINO ACHIENG

SECRETARY

  
.....  
  
.....

**Copy to:**

- ✓ *The Principal Garissa University College*
- ✓ *Vice Chancellor Moi University*
- ✓ *Cabinet Secretary of Ministry Of Education Science and Technology*
- ✓ *The Majority Leader of National Assembly and the MP of Garissa Township*
- ✓ *The Governor Garissa County*
- ✓ *Council Chairman, GUC*



**THE PSSP STUDENTS  
GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,  
P.O. BOX 1801-70100,  
GARISSA.  
TEL: 0724544374, 0720445144**

**07.08.2015**

**THE CHAIRMAN,  
PARLIAMENTARY SECURITY COMMITTEE**

Dear Sir,

**RE: CONTINUITY OF PSSP PROGRAM AT GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE**

Following the unfortunate attack of our beloved students in Garissa University College on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2014 where we lost 147 innocent lives. The government ordered an indefinite closure of the institution. We condemn this heinous act of terrorism.

Sir, after the incident all the regular students were transferred to the mother university Moi University Eldoret, all the teaching and non- teaching were also relocated to Eldoret but since then some have reported back to Garissa University. The bitter part of it is that the PSSP students of the university have been completely neglected and since the incident no communication has been given on the way forward concerning the PSSP students. All our efforts to seek clarification from the management of Garissa University and the Moi University went unanswered. This issue has added trauma on the PSSP students.

Sir, we note with great concern that our fellow students who were transferred to Moi University and Mombasa campus have sat for their end of semester exams.

Our request to the Committee is as follows:

- ❖ We request to be allowed to sit for the end of semester exams not later than September 2015.
- ❖ To be allowed to continue with our learning at Garissa University College, this is due to the fact that 45 PSSP students are ready to continue with the learning and some of our lecturers have agreed to lecture if requested to do so at Garissa University.
- ❖ We request to be issued with our academic transcript for previous semesters.

In view of this, sir bearing in mind that we have already paid the required fees to Garissa University College and a full semester is already lost and we don't have any intention to waste another semester.







8. The religious leaders call upon the government and all related agencies to ensure that Garissa University College and M.T.C. are re-opened without further delay.
9. The Religious leaders call upon the Government to ensure that there are enough teachers in all schools and support the recruitment and training of local teachers.

#### Local political leaders

1. The religious leaders Call upon political leaders of the county to always solve their differences amicably and work together.
2. To execute well their leadership role by participating in solving community conflicts and clan disputes.
3. Ensure equitable and fair distribution of resources.
4. Fully involve the community in development activities and show transparency in the same.

#### Religious leaders

1. The Religious leaders join other Kenyans in declaring war on terrorism and assure them of their commitment to spearhead peaceful co existence amongst Kenyans.
2. The Religious leaders support the effort of de-radicalization of the youth and urge the government to partner with them in the process
3. Religious leaders to spearhead in ensuring the best way of addressing terrorism and its negative effects to people and Islam.
4. Take their active role in de-radicalization by clarifying the correct teachings of Islam.
5. Support the effort of the government to fight against alcohol and drug abuse.

#### The general public

1. Be vigilant and cooperate with security agencies
2. Report any suspicious activities/persons to the relevant authorities
3. Support the implementation of the **nyumba kumi** initiative
4. Support the government, political leaders and religious leaders in fighting against crime.

SUPREME COUNCIL OF KENYA MUSLIM  
GARISSA COUNTY  
P. O. Box 66 - 70100 GARISSA

Date: 7-8-2015







بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

“واعتصموا بحبل الله جميعا ولا تفرقوا”

المجلس الأعلى لمسلمي كينيا

**SUPREME COUNCIL OF KENYA MUSLIMS  
GARISSA COUNTY OFFICE**

P. O. Box 66 - 7100, Tel: +254 46 2102402

Email: supkemgsa@yahoo.com

Date: 07/08/2015

To: The Parliamentary Committee on security

**PRESENTATION BY GARISSA COUNTY MUSLIM RELIGIOUS LEADERS**

Following various consultative forums conducted by the Garissa county religious leaders under the stewardship of SUPKEM-Garissa branch, the following key resolutions were brought forth which are addressed to different government agencies and other stakeholders as follows

**To the government**

1. The religious leaders condemn the habit of kidnapping and extrajudicial killings which are taking place in the county and strongly demand from the concerned government agencies to immediately shun these unacceptable actions and instead respect the rule of law.
2. Call upon the Government to move with speed and solve clan disputes between communities in the county and the region by clarifying boundaries and mobbing up illegal firearms.
3. The government should secure the boundaries with Somalia by ensuring enough security and provide enough resources.
4. Security agencies should build trust and partnership with the public in their effort of fighting crime.
5. Commend the Government in its campaign to fight against alcohol and call upon it to extend the same campaign against mirraa and other drugs.
6. Call upon the government to address the misuse of social media such as face book to create conflicts among communities and those found guilty of such an offense be prosecuted.
7. To tackle corruption issues and those found guilty be brought before the rule of law.

SUPREME COUNCIL OF KENYA MUSLIM  
GARISSA COUNTY  
P. O. Box 66 - 7100 GARISSA

Date: 7-8-2015



## **APPENDIX IX**

**Memorandum from Supreme Council  
of Kenya Muslims, Garissa County  
office**



**FMA GSA SECURITY SURVEY FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS /SCHOOLS AND CHURCHES CORRECT AS AT**  
**11/2/2015.....AUG 15**

SER NO	INSTITUTION	POLICE DEPLOYMENT	PRIVATE SY GUARD	FENCE	
1	KRA Offices	13 (6 day 7 night)	Livingstone - 3 Radar - 4	Concrete Wall but can be accessed, plans underway to electrify the fence	
2	GSA University College	8 (4 during the day 4 night)	4	Barbed/Mesh Wire, Live Fence – easily breached	
3	KMTC	12 (6 day 6 night )	4		
4	NEP Technical	6	4		
5	MKU	-	2		
6	TEC TRG College	12 (6 day 6 night)	4		
7	ACK/7 <sup>TH</sup> Day Adventist	No security but Sundays Police are send 3 for each church	2		
8	GSA County High	8 (4 day 4 night)	1		
9	GSA High School	6 (3 day 3 night )	1		
10	NEP Girls High School	2 (day)	1		
11	Ummusalama Sec School (Bulla Power)	2 (day)	1		
12	Iffin Girls High School	3 (day)	1		
13	Garissa Academy Primary and Sec (Private)	3 (day)	1		
14	Getuni Primary and Secondary (Private)	2 (day)	1		
15	Mnara primary and Secondary School(Private)	2(day)	1		Concrete wall but can be accessed from outside



**FMA GSA SECURITY SURVEY FOR PUBLIC & INSTITUTION AND UN AGENCIES CORRECT AS AT**


**6.6...AUG 15**

<b>SER NO</b>	<b>INSTITUTION</b>	<b>POLICE DEPLOYMENT</b>	<b>PRIVATE SY GUARD</b>	<b>FENCE</b>
1	GSA PROV HOSP	3 (Permanent)	4 BM SY	Barbed Wire Fence but very porous
2	GUEST HOUSE	2	4	Barbed Wire Fence and wall
3	KENGEN	8 (4 by day, 4 by night)	1	Barbed Wire Fence, but can be accessed
4	AVIATION	4 (day and night)	N/A	Barbed Wire Fence, but can be accessed
5	IEBC	4 ( 2 by day and 2 by night)	1 (BM)	Concrete Wall but can be accessed
6	GAWASCO	4 (2 by day and 2 by night)	2	Nil
7	EACC	8 (day and night)	2	Concrete Wall but can be accessed
8	KEMSA	4 (day and night)	2	Concrete Wall but can be accessed
9	WFP	5 (day and night)	3	Concrete Wall
10	UNICEF	2	3	Concrete Wall

## APPENDIX VIII

### Brief on Security survey on Strategic Installations in Garissa Town





**GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE**  
(A Constituent College of Moi University)  
**OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL**

P.O. BOX 1801-70100 Garissa, Kenya TEL:0773827763 E-mail: [garissauniversity@gmail.com](mailto:garissauniversity@gmail.com) Website: [www.guc.ac.ke](http://www.guc.ac.ke)

---

REF: GUC/P/EC/14/VOL.1

DATE: 9<sup>th</sup> January, 2015

The County Commissioner  
Garissa County  
P.O. Box 2  
Garissa

Dear Sir,

RE: **INSECURITY RISK AROUND THE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE**

The above matter refers.

As you may be aware, most of our students are from outside Garissa County and due to the recent insecurity in the country, and particularly neighboring counties, most of them are still in fear of their security as they are returning from holidays.

This has been further worsened by internal and external people/forces instilling more fear and creating tension amongst students.

Please take any necessary action to confidence on the security in and outside the University College is restored as soon as possible to avert exodus of the students from the University.

Kind regards.

Yours faithfully,

**Prof. Ahmed O. Warfa, PhD**  
**Ag. Principal**





**GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE**  
(A Constituent College of Moi University)  
OFFICE OF THE PRINCIPAL

P.O. BOX 1801-70100 Garissa, Kenya TEL:0773827763 E-mail: [guc@mu.ac.ke](mailto:guc@mu.ac.ke) Website: [www.guc.ac.ke](http://www.guc.ac.ke)

---

REF: GUC/P/EC/24/VOL.1

DATE: 16<sup>th</sup> March, 2015

The County Commissioner,  
Garissa County  
P.O. Box 2  
Garissa

Dear Sir,

**RE: CREATION OF A POLICE POST AT GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE**

In reference to the above, I write to request for creation of a police post at Garissa University College.

This will help enhance and beef up security on campus. There are four police officers currently deployed to the University College, as well as police patrols around the college at night.

I would appreciate if you take this as a matter of urgency and consider our request.

Yours faithfully

**Prof. Ahmed O. Warfa, PhD**  
**Ag. Principal,**

**Cc:** *Cabinet Secretary, MOEST*  
*Principal Secretary, MOEST*  
*Vice Chancellor, Moi University*  
*County Education Officer*

## APPENDIX VII

Garissa University College Letter to  
the Garissa County Commissioner

SECRET

COUNTY COMMISSIONER - GARISSA

NAME: J.K. KIRKDA

+ SIGNATURE: [Signature]

DATE: 01-04-2015

COUNTY POLICE COMMANDER- GARISSA

FOR NAME: COMMUNAL POLICE SERVICE  
SIGNATURE: [Signature] DATE: 01-04-2015

FOR COUNTY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICER

NAME: SIMON TOO COUNTY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICER  
SIGNATURE: [Signature] DATE: 01-04-2015

COUNTY ADMINISTRATION POLICE COMMANDER

FOR NAME: MORRIS BROWN  
SIGNATURE: [Signature] DATE: 01-04-2015

COMMANDING OFFICER - MILITARY DETACH

NAME: Lt Col J.R. Kowalski  
SIGNATURE: [Signature] DATE: 01/04/2015

SECRET

SECRET

SECURITY BRIEF

SERIAL NO.8/2015

TERRORISM/ALSHABAAB PLAN ATTACK

Further to Security Brief Serial NO.7/2015 there are reports that on Friday 27<sup>th</sup> March 2015 eight (8) Al Shabaab operatives led by ABDIRAHMAN MAALIM ABDI OMAR- an ABDALLA clansman were dispatched to KENYA from SANTARO in SOMALIA near the KENYAN border. The group is planning to carry out a series of attacks on churches, social places frequented by non locals including bars and pool dens as well as institutions dominated by non locals within Garissa town during the Easter Holiday period. The possible routes they will use are;

- i. SANTARO-HIDA-HANTARAKU RIGO- SANTUR-WARAQ-BUTHE-GUBATU ILEN-FAFI-GARISSA.
- ii. SANTARO-HIDA-HANTARAKU RIGO-SANTUR-WARAQ-BUTHE-INA YASIN-AMUMA-HAGADERA REFUGEE CAMP.

Elsewhere about twelve (12) Al Shabaab operatives were sent to conduct reconnaissance survey on KDF and RAS KIAMBONI BRIGADE camps in KOLBIO and KUDA. The operatives have set up a temporary operational base in NAMBARE near KITHINGO area within WARDEIJABA in Hulugho Sub County.

*It is prudent to heighten security especially in Garissa town during the Easter Holidays when the operatives intend to conduct attacks. Furthermore action needs to be taken against the operatives camping in WARDEIJABA.*

SECRET

SECRET



**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**

Telegrams: SECINTEL  
Telephone: 046-2103393  
Fax:  
When replying please quote  
Ref. No. and Date

COUNTY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR,  
GARISSA COUNTY,  
P. O. Box 18-70100  
GARISSA  
Kenya

INT/SF. 35/1 Vol. 7 (8)

1<sup>st</sup> April, 2015

TO:

CSIC MEMBERS

GARISSA

**SECURITY BRIEF**

**SERIAL NO. 8/2015**

Forwarded herewith, please find Security Brief no. 8/2015 for:-

- Information
- Action
- Reaction

  
(LEONARD KOSGEI)

For: COUNTY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR  
GARISSA

COPY NO. 1. C.C. - GARISSA  
2. CPC GARISSA  
3. CDP  
4. CIPC  
5. C.O. - MILITARY DETACHMENT  
6. DIRECTLY INTERNAL  
7. RIC  
8. CIC

SECRET

# APPENDIX VI

Security Brief No.8/2015



SECRET

**SECURITY BRIEF**

**SERIAL NO.7/2015**

**TERRORISM/ALSHABAAB PLAN ATTACKS**

There are reports that ABDULAHIBRAHIM alias ABDIMALIK, an Al Shabaab operative from Abdalla clan (Rer Mahamed sub clan) of mobile number-0711980296 and +252617374637 directed an unknown number of his operatives in Warable and Kamuthe areas of FAFI Sub County to launch attacks within the County. The operatives are planning to stage attacks at Garissa Teachers Training College, GARISSA University College, Garissa Catholic church and unspecified shops owned by non-locals in Bulla Sheikh on an unspecified date.

Elsewhere Al Shabaab militias at GODONDOWE camp are planning to embark on an operation dubbed '*Nihaya*' (*last stretch*) on Kenyan towns along the border when the rains start. The operation is meant to destabilize the towns so as to pressurize the government to withdraw Kenyan troops in Somalia. The areas likely to be targeted include ARABIA, FINO, DAMASA and LAFEY in Mandera County. In Garissa County, areas likely to be targeted include AMUMA, HULUGHO, and BOTHAI.

The group is taking advantage of the rainy season when there is plenty of food and water and also when the roads are impassable for security personnel to pursue them.

***In view of the above it may be necessary to review security measures in all potential targets for pre-emptive action.***

SECRET

SECRET



**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**

Telegrams: SECINTEL  
Telephone: 046-2103393  
Fax:  
When replying please quote  
Ref. No. and Date

COUNTY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR,  
GARISSA COUNTY,  
P. O. Box 18-70100  
GARISSA  
Kenya

30<sup>th</sup>

March, 2015

INT/SF. 35/1 Vol. 7 (7)

TO:

CSIC MEMBERS

GARISSA

SECURITY BRIEF

SERIAL NO. 7/2015

Forwarded herewith, please find Security Brief no. 7/2015 for:-

Information

Action

Reaction

(LEONARD KOSGEI)

For: COUNTY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR  
GARISSA

COPY NO. 1. C.C. - GARISSA  
2. CPC-GARISSA  
3. CCIO  
4. CAPC  
5. CO - MILITARY DETACHMENT  
6. DIRECTOR INTERNAL  
7. R/C  
8. CC

SECRET

# APPENDIX V

Security Brief No.7/2015

traders for carrying police officers on the vehicle to track JIROW in an attempt to arrest him.

*In view of the above it may be prudent to take preemptive measures to avert attacks.*

COUNTY COMMISSIONER – GARISSA

NAME: J. K. KIRINYA

SIGNATURE: *[Signature]* DATE: 3/11/15

COUNTY POLICE COMMANDER- GARISSA

NAME: BENJAMIN ONLOUSE

SIGNATURE: *[Signature]* DATE: 3/13/2015

COUNTY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION OFFICER

NAME: MICHAEL COUNTY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS OFFICER  
P. O. Box 2, GARISSA

SIGNATURE: *[Signature]* DATE: 03/03/2015

COUNTY ADMINISTRATION POLICE COMMANDER

NAME: CHARLIE DUBOIS

SIGNATURE: *[Signature]* DATE: 04/03/15

COMMANDING OFFICER – MILITARY DETACH

NAME: NG'ARIBA P. CATHARIN

SIGNATURE: *[Signature]* DATE: 04/03/15

**SECURITY BRIEF**

**SERIAL NO. 3/2015**

**TERRORISM / AL-SHABAAB PLANS TO ATTACK NAIVAS  
SUPERMARKET**

Information received indicates that AL-shabaab is planning to attack NAIVAS Supermarket in Garissa using suicide bombers on unspecified date. Other soft targets remains Garissa teachers college and Garissa University college owing to larger population on none locals.

Elsewhere Al-shabaab is planning to intensify attacks in North Eastern and Coast Regions in the month of March, 2015 especially during Easter holidays at the same time to engage Kenya Defence Forces ) (KDF) bases in Damasa and Khadija Haji in Gedo region in Somalia. Also militia targets KDF convoy in the North Eastern Region.

**INTERTIBAL TENSION / BORANA VS SOMALI**

There is simmering tension between Borana and Somali (Aulian) following an incident on Monday 2<sup>nd</sup> March, 2015 at Malka Dakaa a border village between Lagdera Sub county and Isiolo County where about forty (40) armed Borana youth attacked Aulian over water resources in Waso Nyiro River. The Aulian crossed into Isiolo to search for water for their livestock, hence attracting the wrath of the Borana.

**ORGANIZED CRIME / BANDIT THREATS TO KILL**

ABDULLAHI MATHEY alias JIROW of contact number 0705-773642 a bandit operating in areas of Kulan and Dadaab has threatened to kill NUR AHMED BADIL and ABDULLAHI ISSACK HARUN both mirra

SECRET

INT/SF. 35/1 Vol. 7 (3)

3<sup>rd</sup> March, 2014

TO:

CSIC MEMBERS


GARISSA

SECURITY BRIEF

SERIAL NO.3/2015

Forwarded herewith, please find Security Brief no. <sup>3 2015</sup> 07/2014 for:-

- Information
- Action
- Reaction



(PHILIP SUM)

For. COUNTY INTELLIGENCE COORDINATOR  
GARISSA

COPY NO. 1. CC - GARISSA  
2. CNTY COMMANDER  
3. CNTY CID  
4. CNTY AP  
5. O.C. - MILITARY DETACHMENT  
6. DIRECTOR INTERNAL  
7. RIC  
✓ RIC

SECRET

# APPENDIX IV

Security Brief No.3/2015



SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No:

1. *The Secretary - National Security Advisory Council*
2. *The Principal Secretary - Interior*
3. *The I.G. - National Police Service*
4. *The Chief of Defence Force*
5. *The Director General - National Intelligence Service*
6. *The Deputy I.G. - Kenya Police Service*
7. *The Deputy I.G. - Administration Police Service*
8. *The Director of Criminal Investigations*
9. *The Joint Security Secretariat*
10. *The Joint Regional Security Committee*
11. *The County Commissioner*
12. *The County Police Commander*
13. *The County Intelligence Coordinator*
14. *The County Criminal Investigations Officer*
15. *The County Administration Police Commander*
16. *The Commanding Officer - Military Branch, GARISSA*
17. *Director, Internal Division*
18. *Director, Analysis and Production*
19. *CSIC WAJIR*
20. *CSIC ISIOLO*

SECRET

SECRET

track down ALSHABAAB operatives and other criminal bandits from Somalia at the entry routes and water points in their respective areas.

**MIN. NO.15/2015- Human trafficking**

On human trafficking the chairman pointed out that there was need for senior officers preferably members of inspectorate and above to be incharge of roadblocks at the same time make impromptu changes by deploying different security organs/agencies to man the roadblocks and conduct thorough screening on human traffickers in order to curb the influx of aliens and possible terror suspects.

**Action: CSIC Members**

**MIN NO. 16/2015 – A.O.B.**

There being no other business, the meeting adjourned at 1435 hours.

Date of Next Meeting:.....

Chairman: **MIIRI NJENGA**

Signature.....

Date: 13/3/2015

Secretary: **OSMAN ALASOW**

Signature.....

Date: 13/3/15

SECRET

SECRET

- Tension simmering between SOMALIS (AULIAN) of MADOGASHE and the BORANAS of ISIOLO County over grazing during this drought spell in the recent past.

The committee agreed that the earlier decision by CSIC on SHELLDUB to remain enforced and that no new settlement will be established. The committee noted with concern that Constituency Development Fund (CDF) and County development projects were being taken to disputed areas by politicians thus causing inter-clan feud. The team observed that it will not be viable to take such projects to disputed areas before the border is determined by Independent Electoral Commission (IEBC) or the worrying communities come to common terms.

**Action: CSIC Members**

**MIN. NO.14/2015 Nyumba Kumi concept**

The Chairman stressed the need to form a County peace committee at the same time, empower the chiefs in fighting terrorism and all sorts of crimes. Religious, local leaders and clan elders will also be engaged toward positive approach in fighting crime in order to make security a county own process. The peace committee will represent all clans, tribes, women and youths in Garissa town. In the process Governor, Senator and Members of Parliaments (MPs) will be brought on board in decision making on peace building and conflict resolutions. The chairman said Chiefs are the most vulnerable to terror attacks by virtue of their position as representatives of National Government at the sub location Level yet they are not provided with security or even armed. The committee recommended that chiefs be either armed or provided with KPR particularly at the border areas. This will help them to

SECRET

5. A.O.B

**MIN. NO.12/2015– Terrorism**

Following terror threats the chairman reiterated the need to increase the strength of security personnel guarding NAIVAS Supermarket, Kenya Medical Training College (KMTC), Garissa Teachers Training College (GTTC) and Garissa University Colleges (GUC) among other places frequented by non-locals like churches. He urged the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to share information and investigate terror suspects and foreign Nationals arrested. Officer incharge Garissa Main Prison was advised to monitor the activities of four (4) terror remand prisoners posing threat to the camp so that they do not radicalize other inmates.

**Action: CSIC Members**

**MIN. NO.13/2015 – Inter-clan tension**

The chairman emphasised the need to identify all hot spots and inciters to conflict saying no tangible development could be realized in un insecure environment and identified the following as hot spots among other places;

- SHELLDUB and KAWANJA YARE between FAFI Sub County and DADAAB Sub County disputed by AULIAN and ABDWAK clans.
- AQALAAR between LAGDERA and WAJIR South Constituencies where MAKABUL clan of WAJIR County and AULIAN of GARISSA County are at loggerhead

2

SECRET

SECRET

Ref: INT/SF. 37 Vol. 1 (24)

Appreciation No: 4/2015

COPY NO. 13

GARISSA COUNTY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE  
(CSIC) MEETING HELD ON MONDAY 9<sup>TH</sup> MARCH 2015 BETWEEN  
1030 HOURS AND 1430 HOURS AT CC'S BOARDROOM, GARISSA

PRESENT

1. NJENGA MIIRI	CC	Chairman
2. CHRISTOPHER MUTHEE	CAPC	Member
3. BENJAMIN ONGOMBE	OCPD(rep CPC)	Member
4. KENEDY LIMERIA	DCIO (rep CCID)	Member
5. STEPHEN KIPLAGAT	PRISON INCHARGE	Member
6. JULIOUS KOBIA	IMMIGRATION	Member
7. LT.Col.J.R.KAMARY	CO MILITARY DETACH	Member
8. OSMAN ALASOW	CIC	Secretary

OPENING REMARKS

The Chairman opened the meeting with a word of prayer and expressed his plans to make Garissa more peaceful while appealing to members to be part of the process. The members welcomed the new County Commissioner and promised to fully support him.

AGENDA

1. Terrorism
2. Inter-clan tension
3. Peace building and Nyumba kumi concept
4. Human trafficking

SECRET

# APPENDIX III

Garissa County Security Intelligence  
Committee Meeting Appreciation No:  
4/2015

- The Bodaboda, Taxis drivers and other business community agreed that they would work closely with the security agents and adhere to the laws and regulations that control their respective businesses. They promised to share relevant security intelligence as appropriate.
- Formation and training of a Quick Response Team (QRT) at Kanyonyo AP Training Institution has been done.
- Operationalize of operation centre at Garissa has been done.
- Crack down on businesses run by non-Kenyans.

#### d) Way Forward

Considering the nature of terror threat and general security situation in the region, the following action points are very important:

- 1) Boosting security strength in the County, by fastracking deployment of more officers into the County.
- 2) The on-going recruitment of KPR's should urgently be finalized for their subsequent deployment to boost security in the County.
- 3) Re-opening of closed Administration Police Camps like Galmagalla, Fafi AP Camp, Dujis AP Camp among others.
- 4) Re-opening of the two closed learning institutions i.e. KMTC and Garissa University before September 2015.
- 5) Repatriation of refugees from Dadaab complex needs to be fastracked.
- 6) Allocation of fuel for leased vehicles needs to be increased.

- ✎ Security Committee meeting with Chiefs/Assistant Chiefs – 8<sup>th</sup> June 2015
- ✎ Security Committee meeting with Youth leaders – 15<sup>th</sup> June 2015.
- ✎ Security Committee meeting with women leaders – 16<sup>th</sup> June 2015.
- ✎ Security Committee meeting with Religious leader/Elders – 17<sup>th</sup> June 2015.
- ✎ Consultative meeting of CSIC with Taxi/Bodaboda and Matatu operators – 26<sup>th</sup> June 2015.

**Note: During these meetings various issues were raised and were addressed as appropriate. Some of the suggestions agreed upon as way forward in ensuring that security and peace is maintained within Garissa region include the following:-**

- The youths agreed to website as a social platform for positive interaction.
- Members agreed on the need for the public to work closely with the security agents especially in sharing intelligence and other security information.
- Muslim religious leaders agreed to cooperate, unite and work closely with the Christian leaders with the sole aim of ensuring the region is peaceful.
- Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs agreed to roll down to the grassroots the Nyumba Kumi Initiative and Community Policing in their respective administrative areas.



### c) Measures Taken

All Security Committees within the county have worked very closely with each other in ensuring timely and appropriate measures are put in place to ensure security is maintained. The **measures** taken include the following among others:

- 1) We have carried out security assessment on all learning institutions both public and private, hospitals and vital government installations.
- 2) Appropriate deployment of security officers in all learning institutions, hospitals and government installations putting more efforts on those that are targeted.
- 3) All major cut-lines have been identified and accorded regular police patrols.
- 4) Nyumba Kumi initiative and Community Policing has been re-activated and households categorized in clusters.
- 5) All hotels and lodges within Garissa town have been profiled and a consultative meeting was held on 28<sup>th</sup> April, 2015 with their respective owners.
- 6) For effective management of security, Garissa town has been divided into five policing zones or sectors.
- 7) Madrasas, Duksis, Tahfiids and other religious institutions within the County have been profiled as appropriate.
- 8) The following mediation meetings have been held within the county:-
  - 1) Consultative meeting of CSIC with Hotels/Lodges/Bar operators/Business community – 25<sup>th</sup> April, 2015

## **2) Al-Shabaab terror threats.**

There have been reports of increased presence of Al-Shabaab operatives in the entire county especially in Dadaab, Fafi and Hulugho Sub-Counties.

Two cases can be sited where they visited Kubasulo and Yumbis centres and threatened Chiefs and KPRs among other incidences.

## **SITUATION REPORT**

### **a) Security Brief**

Since 15<sup>th</sup> of April, 2015 the County has enjoyed relative calmness without experiencing any major security incident.

It is also important to note that as a County Security team, we are on very high alert and working in close collaboration considering the fact that the region is a terror target zone by Al-shabaab militia group.

### **b) General Intelligence**

Persistent intelligence reports received regularly indicate that Al-shabaab operatives are still determined to carry out attacks within the region. Their major areas of interest are learning institutions, hospitals government buildings, security installations and also to kill and cause harm on non-locals. They also target security officers as well as Senior government officers within the region.

## **THE GENERAL SECURITY OVERVIEW**

### **GARISSA COUNTY – DATED 14<sup>TH</sup> JULY 2015**

#### **ADMINISTRATIVE BRIEF.**

The County borders Somalia to the East, Wajir County to the North, Isiolo County to the West and Tana River County to the South.

It has seven (7) Sub-Counties and 22 Wards/Divisions. It has 96 locations and 144 Sub-locations.

#### **SECURITY BRIEF**

The County is generally calm and peaceful save for basically two security challenges that are:

- ✚ Inter-clan conflicts
- ✚ Al-Shabaab and terror threats.











##### 1) Inter-clan conflicts.

Inter-clan conflicts are centered around competition for resources mainly water and pasture.

The second contributor is issue of electoral and Administrative boundaries.









# APPENDIX II

## Submissions by the Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee

14.	The Hon. Samuel Moroto, MP	
15.	The Hon. Benard Shinali, MP	
16.	The Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP	
17.	The Hon. Francis K. Mwangangi, MP	
18.	The Hon. Rashid J. Bedzimba, MP	
19.	The Hon. Ibrahim Abdi Saney, MP	
20.	The Hon. Joseph O. Ndiege, MP	
21.	The Hon. Regina Nthambi Muia, MP	
22.	The Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) John K. Waluke, MP	
23.	The Hon. Akuja Protus Ewesit, MP	
24.	The Hon. Ahmed Abdikadir Ore, MP	
25.	The Hon. David Gikaria, MP	
26.	The Hon. Timothy W. Wetangula, MP	
27.	The Hon. Wanjiku Muhia, MP	
28.	The Hon. George Theuri, MP	

We Members of the Departmental Committee on Administration and National Security have pursuant to Standing Order 199 adopted this report on investigations into the Garissa University College terrorist attack and affixed our signatures to confirm our approval and confirm its accuracy, validity and authenticity

DATE: 28<sup>th</sup> August 2015 TIME: 10: AM VENUE: FLAMENGO HOTEL

S/NO.	NAME	SIGNATURE
1.	The Hon. Kamama Asman, MGH,OGW,MP – <b>Chairperson</b>	
2.	The Hon. Alois M. Lentoimaga, MP – <b>Vice-Chairperson</b>	
3.	The Hon. Ababu Namwamba, EGH, MP	
4.	The Hon. Alice Wahome, MP	
5.	The Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP	
6.	The Hon. Mohamed Shidiye, MP	
7.	The Hon. Jane Machira, MP	
8.	The Hon. Joseph Kahangara, MP	
9.	The Hon. Zakayo K. Cheruiyot, MP	
10.	The Hon. James Bett, MP	
11.	The Hon. Patrick Ole Ntutu, MP	
12.	The Hon. Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP	
13.	The Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP	

# APPENDIX I

## ADOPTION LIST

# APPENDIX I

## Adoption List




- (xv) Sensitization of the media on objective reporting and the negative effects caused by airing or publishing stories propagating Extremist ideologies.
- (xvi) Enhancement of intelligence gathering and sharing through the community policing initiative – *“NyumbaKumi.”*
- (xvii) Mounting multi-security agency security operations under African Union (AU) Initiatives targeting various militias in Somalia.
- (xviii) Cooperation and sharing of information with regional countries and other global liaison partners such as UN, AU, IGAD and EAC.
- (xix) Monitoring closely the growing drive by terror groups to establish links with local criminal gangs such as MRC.

The Committee resolved to visit Garissa County to gather more information on the matter.

**MIN.NO.73 /ANS/2015 - ADJOURNMENT OF THE MEETING**

There being no other business the meeting was adjourned at 2.50 pm and the next meeting will be held on notice.

Signed.....  
 (Chairperson)

Date.....*28<sup>th</sup> August 2015*.....

- (xi) Deployment of a platoon of RDU around Modika areas to support officers on the ground.
- (xii) Equipping and deployment of two Companies of the RBPU near Amuma and Hulugho to patrol and man the borderline.
- (xiii) Continuous training for officers deployed in the North Eastern Region on Counter terrorism skills.
- (xiv) All County Security and Intelligence Committees had been instructed to enhance alertness and ensure that all strategic installations, including learning institutions were adequately secured.

### Way forward

The following measures were suggested to address the threat posed terrorism:-

- (i) Enforcement of the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 that strengthened legislation dealing with terrorism and radicalization.
- (ii) Construction of Perimeter Fence and other complementing surveillance systems along the Kenya Somalia border. Construction of the initial 50 km stretch is underway from border point 1 towards border point 29/Kiunga.
- (iii) Fast-tracking of voluntary repatriation of Somalia refugees.
- (iv) Enhancement of inter-agency coordination to strengthen institutional synergy.
- (v) Enhanced security vigilance within and around strategic installations and facilities.
- (vi) Sustained ground, aerial, and maritime surveillance along the Kenya-Somali border.
- (vii) Nurturing the goodwill of local leaders and communities in the affected areas to win their cooperation in the war against terror.
- (viii) Continuous collaboration with Muslim leaders to counter terrorism and extremists narratives.
- (ix) Enhancement of Implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 that provides the legal framework to fight terrorism.
- (x) Strengthening of the Financial Reporting Centre at the Central Bank of Kenya to analyze financial transactions and investigate the financing of terrorism.
- (xi) Increased investment in security sector to fasttrack police reforms, establishment of the National Police Service Command and Control System, Forensic Laboratory and retooling of security agencies.
- (xii) Application of technology in border control, passenger profiling and screening procedures of persons entering and leaving the country.
- (xiii) Enhancement of meetings of the Boarder Commissioners' and Administrators Committees along our common borders.
- (xiv) Establishment of partnership programs with private establishments such as hotels, learning institutions and shopping malls to improve their physical security through awareness programs and the exchange of threat and vulnerability assessments.

- Kenya Power Lighting Company-Garissa - 4 officers
- Garissa Hospital - 4 officers
- Governor's office - 4 officers
- Naivas Supermarket - 4 officers
- Garissa Bridge - 12 officers
- Churches (during service) - 4 officers each x 36 churches.

The Committee established that the Kenya Police Air wing had one (1) Bell 206 Helicopter, which was serviceable and (1) MI-17 which was under maintenance. Two (2) MI-17 were awaiting overhaul while two (2) Cessa 208 caravans were serviceable. A Board of Survey had been done on six (6) Aircrafts which were awaiting bonding.

The Cabinet Secretary informed the Committee that the Government had scaled up security measures, as follows:-

- (i) Interdiction of Senior Administrative Officers and Police County Commanders in the North Eastern Region on 23<sup>rd</sup>, April, 2015.
- (ii) Appointment of Amb. Mohamud Ali Saleh as the new Regional Coordinator for North Eastern Region with effect from 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2015.
- (iii) Re- organized all Security Committees in the region through deployment of new County Commissioners to coordinate security and other peace initiatives in the region.
- (iv) Appointment of a new set of Regional and County Police Commanders to ensure effective police operations by the Inspector General.
- (v) Ensuring full alertness, continuous briefs, close supervision, intensified patrols, intelligence collection, fixed site security and intensified mounted operations in potential areas.
- (vi) Enhancement of security alertness and deployment of security officers in all learning institutions and other areas that may be targeted by the terrorists.
- (vii) The Government had frozen 86 accounts of individuals, organizations and financial institutions suspected to be financing or facilitating terrorism and radicalization in the Country.
- (viii) The Government had established a team to investigate the conduct of individual Police Commanders and Administrative Officers as well as the performance of the respective security committees responsible for coordinating security in Garissa County and North Eastern Region. Arising from the preliminary investigations report, the Government had interdicted the Regional Coordinator North Eastern Region, the County Commissioner, Garissa and seven police officers to pave way for investigations.
- (ix) Strengthening the capacity of the Kenya police counter terrorism rapid response team.
- (x) Training, Equipping and deployment of County Quick Response Teams on Counter Terrorism to support the officers on the ground.

around 1030 hours. Various activities and consultative meetings were held to coordinate the rescue effort.

- (v) At around 1:30 pm the RECCE squad arrived and occupied the first floor of Mt Elgon Hostel, where the hostages (students) were been held. KDF ceased fire and tactically handed over to the RECCE squad.
- (vi) A mop up exercise was conducted and confirmed that the fatalities were 151, categorized as follows 142 students, 1 KDF soldier, 1AP Officer, 1 GSU ( RECCE Company), 2 Civilian Guards and 4 terrorists. 558 students were rescued.
- (vii) The bodies of the victims were moved to Nairobi by use of three military Aircrafts. The survivors were transported to their respective destinations by use of 20 National Youth Service buses on 4<sup>th</sup> April, 2015 under the escort of Administration Police Officers.

The Committee was informed that security officers were faced with the following challenges during the rescue operation:-

- (i) **Nature of University Hostels:** Access to Hostel was only through two entrances. The cubicles were congested with six students occupying each room. The windows were also grilled, making it difficult for the students to escape from the attack.
- (ii) **Lack of a Clear Command Structure:** There was no clarity as to who was in charge of the operation and guidelines spelling out the same were not clear.
- (iii) **Limited Capacity in Field Combat Skills:** Many of the officers involved in the operation had not been trained in fighting in build- up areas or in close Quarter Battle.
- (iv) **Lack of Appropriate Equipment:** Security lacked appropriate equipment such as night vision, telescopic sights, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) and bullet proof vests.
- (v) **Age Factor:** Many officers involved in the operation were aged between 36 and 58 years. This made it difficult for them to swiftly respond to the attack.
- (vi) **Low Morale among Police Officers:** Some Officers had also overstayed in the County, making them inefficient, less active and demoralized.
- (vii) **Insufficient Establishment:** The number of police officers in the County was insufficient taking into account the level of terror threat in the region.
- (viii) **Lack of stand – by contingent to respond to emergencies** since all officers were deployed to specific areas on a daily basis.

The Cabinet Secretary confirmed to the Committee that prior intelligence indicating that terrorists were targeting Garissa University College, Garissa Teachers College, Catholic Church, Garissa Polytechnic shops at Bulla- Sheiks own non locals and Naivas supermarket during the month of March had been provided to security agencies in the County. The County Security team had deployed Police Officers as follows:-

- Garissa University College - 4 officers
- Garissa Teachers Training College - 4 officers
- Garissa Medical Training College - 4 officers

4. The Hon. Nicholas Ng'ikor

**MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

- |                           |   |   |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| 1. Hon. Joseph Nkaisserry | - | Cabinet Secretary                       |
| 2. Mr. Victor Okioma      | - | Secretary, National Administration      |
| 3. Mr. Mwenda Njoka       | - | Communications Director/Interior        |
| 4. Mr. Simon Karanja      | - | Personal Assistant to Cabinet Secretary |

**NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

- |                       |   |                               |
|-----------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| 1. Ms. Hellen Lokwang | - | Third Clerk Assistant         |
| 2. Mr. Salim Lorot    | - | Legal Counsel II              |
| 3. Mr. Eugene Apaa    | - | Research & Policy Analyst III |

**MIN.NO. 70 /ANS/2015** - **PRELIMINARIES**

The Chairperson called the meeting to order at 11.30 a.m. Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP prayed

**MIN.NO. 71 /ANS/2015** - **CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES**

The item was deferred to the next meeting.

**MIN.NO.72 /ANS/2015** - **MEETING WITH THE CABINET SECRETARY FOR INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ON THE GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE TERROR ATTACK**

The Cabinet Secretary informed the Committee as follows:-

- (i) Suspected Al - Shabaab terrorists attacked Garissa University College on Thursday 2<sup>nd</sup> April at around 0550 hours. The attackers shot dead two civilian guards at the main gate and forcefully gained entry into the University compound.
- (ii) When the terrorists struck, four Police Officers deployed at the University returned fire but the terrorists managed to enter the University Compound by shooting indiscriminately and eventually found their way to the hostels.
- (iii) Following the attack, officers drawn from the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Police Service Commission and Kenya Prisons Service responded. However by the time the officers reached the scene the terrorists had taken positions on the top floor of Mt. Elgon Hostel. An exchange of fire ensued and at around 0639 hours the terrorists fatally shot two officers (1 KDF and 1 Administration Police) and injured one Kenya Police Service Officer.
- (iv) The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, accompanied by the Inspector General of Police arrived in Garissa at

**MINUTES OF THE 19<sup>TH</sup> SITTING OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY HELD ON THURSDAY 30<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 2015 IN COMMITTEE ROOM, 4<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR CONTINENTAL HOUSE, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS AT 10.00 A.M.**

**PRESENT**

1. The Hon. Asman Kamama, MGH, OGW, MP - Chairperson
2. The Hon. Alois Lentoimaga, MP - Vice Chairperson
3. The Hon. Ahmed Abdikadir Ore, MP
4. The Hon. Zakayo Cheruiyot, MP
5. The Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP
6. The Hon. Benard Shinali, MP
7. The Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP
8. The Hon. James Bett, MP
9. The Hon. Joseph Ndiege, MP
10. The Hon. George Theuri, MP
11. The Hon. Protus Akuja Ewesit, MP
12. The Hon. Rashid Bedzimba, MP
13. The Hon. Mohamed Shidiye, MP
14. The Hon. Ibrahim Abdi Saney, MP
15. The Hon. Ababu Namwamba, MP
16. The Hon. Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP
17. The Hon. Samuel Moroto, MP
18. The Hon. Wanjiku Muhia, MP
19. The Hon. Patrick Ole Ntutu, MP

**ABSENT WITH APOLOGY**

1. The Hon. Joseph Kahangara, MP
2. The Hon. David Gikaria, MP
3. The Hon. Jane Machira, MP
4. The Hon. Alice Wahome, MP
5. The Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP
6. The Hon. Regina Nthambi Muia, MP
7. The Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) J. K. Waluke, MP
8. The Hon. Timothy Wetangula, MP
9. The Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP

**IN ATTENDANCE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

1. The Hon. Joyce Emanikor
2. The Hon. Mohamed Elmi
2. The Hon. Christopher Nakuleu



However, the recruitment exercise faced a number of challenges: Chief among them; some unemployed Kenyan of Somali origin including those in the refugee camps took advantage and enlisted in the exercise with the perception that it was a UN- recruitment exercise. The exercise was also politicized in the North Eastern region and Mogadishu because of cross border clan politics. The other challenge was desertion of the recruits caused by alleged promises of hefty salaries.

The Kenyan Government together with the Somali Officers embarked on a vetting exercise to rid Kenyans from the training camps. About 360 youths, mostly from Ijara Constituency were removed and transported back to their homes. In February, 2011, two thousand five hundred (2500) recruited graduated and were deployed in two fronts namely Doble and Burahache to fight Al Shabaab.


MIN.NO. 76 /ANS/2015

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ADJOURNMENT OF THE MEETING

There being no other business, the meeting was adjourned at 1.10 pm. The next meeting will be held on notice.

Signed.....



(Chairperson)

Date.....

28<sup>th</sup> August 2015

(iv) Omar Dahir Orai – Escaped to Somalia on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2015-08-15

The National Intelligence Service stated that it provided intelligence to the relevant security agencies on the plans by Alshabaab to launch attacks in Garissa and provided the following chronology on the same:-

- (i) On 3<sup>rd</sup> March, 2015, Security Brief No.3, indicating that Al- Shabaab militias planned attacks on Naivas Supermarket, Garissa Teachers Training College and Garissa University College was circulated to all Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee members.
- (ii) On 9<sup>th</sup> March, 2015, Garissa County Security Committee held a meeting where the threats against Garissa Teachers Training College and Garissa University College were discussed. During the meeting, it was resolved that security personnel guarding Naivas Supermarket, Kenya Medical Training College and Garissa University College, among other places frequented by non –locals be increased.
- (iii) On 30<sup>th</sup> March, 2015, a Security Brief No.07/2015, indicating that Abdullahi Ibrahim aka Abdimalik, from Fafi Sub- County had dispatched some operatives to attack Garissa University College and other three other targets in Garissa, was circulated to all County Security Intelligence Committee members.
- (iv) On 1<sup>st</sup> April, 2015 , another Security Brief No. 08/ 2015 was generated and circulated, indicating further plans by Al- Shabaab terrorists to attack social places frequented by non- locals as well as institutions of learning during the Easter Holidays.
- (v) On 2<sup>nd</sup> April ,2015, four attackers stormed Garissaa University College killing at least one hundred and forty seven (147) students, two security guards, one (1) Regular Police Officer, One(1) RECCE Company Officer, one(1) Rapid Deployment Unit(RDU) Officer and three (3)Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Officers.

The Committee was informed that the Kenyan Government, following a request from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and within the framework of the Kenya- Somali Technical Co- operation Agreement, trained four battalions of two thousand five hundred Somalia recruits from Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo. The objective was to create a buffer zone on the Kenya- Somali border in response to the security problems resulting from the conflict in Somalia. The Committee was further informed that the training was approved by the National Security Council (NSC).

The Committee further established that in August 2009, 36 Somali Officers undertook a training of trainers' course at the Kenya Wildlife Training school in Manyani. The Officers were to train, head and command the recruits. Upon completion of the course the Officers were dispatched to undertake recruitment of trainees. The recruits from the Lower and Middle Juba were assembled in Manyani while those from Gedo region were assembled in Kamanga Archers Post for training. The training was supposed to be held near the Somali border but due to insecurity the venue was changed to Kamanga and Manyani training camps respectively.

6. Mr. William Maiyo - Intelligence Officer

#### **NATIONAL ASSEMBLY**

1. Mr. Leonard Machira - First Clerk Assistant  
2. Ms. Hellen Lokwang - Third Clerk Assistant  
3. Mr. Salem Lorot - Legal Counsel II  
4. Mr. Eugene Apaa - Research and Policy Analyst III

#### **MIN.NO. 74 /ANS/2015 - PRELIMINARIES**

The Vice Chairperson called the meeting to order at 10:20 a.m. Prayers were said.

#### **MIN.NO. 75 /ANS/2015 - MEETING THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ON THE GARISSA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE TERROR ATTACK**

The National Intelligence Service informed the Committee as follows:-

##### **Garissa University College terrorist attack**

- (i) The Garissa University College terrorist attack was conducted by the Alshabaab Amniyaat (Intelligence wing), sanctioned by Abdi Muse aka Habil Alsomal and coordinated by Mustaf Ato and Maalim Abbas
- (ii) The terrorists started planning the attack in February, 2015 when Maalim Badi, an associate of Mustaf Atooo conducted surveillance on the College and shared the outcome with Ato in early March, 2015.
- (iii) The four attackers assembled in Garissa by 31<sup>st</sup> March, 2015 and commenced the attack between 0500 and 0530 hours.
- (iv) Of the four confirmed attackers, only one (1) had been positively identified as Abdirahim Abdullahi Mohamed, a University of Nairobi trained lawyer, who left the University without graduating in 2013. He was also a former student at Wamy High School in South B Estate Nairobi.

##### **The Attackers**

The Committee was informed that four terrorists were involved in the attack as follows:-

- (i) Abdirahim Abdullahi Mohamed aka Ahmed ( leader)
- (ii) Khaled Hassan Issack aka Jafar( Abdirahim's close associate)
- (iii) Muhamad (Identity unknown)
- (iv) Zaraqawi (Identity unknown)

##### **The Facilitators/Logisticians**

The Committee was informed that the following individuals facilitated the attack:-

- (i) Hassan Adan Hassan – Moved weapons from Mandera to Garissa
- (ii) Mohamed Abdi Abikar - Moved weapons from Mandera to Garissa
- (iii) Sahal Diriye Hussein aka Zakariya- Garissa based facilitator(arrested)

**MINUTES OF THE 20<sup>th</sup> SITTING DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY HELD ON TUESDAY 7<sup>TH</sup> MAY 2015 AT 4<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR, CONTINENTAL HOUSE AT 10.00 A.M.**

**PRESENT**

1. The Hon. Asman Kamama, MGH, OGW, MP - Chairperson
2. The Hon. Alice Wahome, MP
3. The Hon. Jane Machira, MP
4. The Hon. James Bett, MP
5. The Hon. Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP
6. The Hon. Samuel Moroto, MP
7. The Hon. Benard Shinali, MP
8. The Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP
9. The Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP
10. The Hon. Ibrahim Abdi Saney, MP
11. The Hon. Regina Nthambi Muia, MP
12. The Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) J. K. Waluke, MP
13. The Hon. Protus Akuja Ewesit, MP
14. The Hon. Wanjiku Muhia, MP
15. The Hon. George Theuri, MP

**ABSENT WITH APOLOGY**

1. The Hon. Alois Lentoimaga, MP - Vice Chairperson
2. The Hon. Ahmed Abdikadir Ore, MP
3. The Hon. Mohamed Shidiye, MP
4. The Hon. Timothy Wetangula, MP
5. The Hon. Joseph Ndiege, MP
6. The Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP
7. The Hon. Zakayo Cheruiyot, MP
8. The Hon. Ababu Namwamba, MP
9. The Hon. Joseph Kahangara, MP
10. The Hon. David Gikaria, MP
11. The Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP
12. The Hon. Rashid Bedzimba, MP
13. The Hon. Patrick Ole Ntutu, MP

**IN ATTENDANCE**


**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE**

1. Mr. Alex Muteshi - Director Counter Terrorism Coordination
2. Mr. Richard Ogeti - Legal Officer
3. Ms. Rosemary Ochieng - Analyst
4. Ms. Rose Nyawira - Analyst
5. Mr. Micah K. Chirchir - Intelligence Officer



MIN.NO. 162 /ANS/2015 - ADJOURNMENT OF THE MEETING

There being no other business the meeting was adjourned at 12.30 p.m.

Signed.....

(Chairperson)

Date.....

- (xi) Government should initiate an affirmative recruitment of teachers in the region to replace the Teachers Service Commission employed teachers who had been transferred from the region.
- (xii) The Government should initiate a multi-pronged anti- terrorism and anti-radicalization strategy involving all stakeholders through the establishment of partnership with the public, religious and elected leaders, community leaders and the media. This would ensure that the citizenry in the Country particularly North Eastern and Coast regions are actively involved in the fight against terrorism and the twin challenge of radicalization.
- (xiii) The Government should streamline the transfer and deployment of Police Officers in the Country to address Low Morale among Police Officers caused by overstaying in one station for long, making them inefficient, less active and demoralized.

**2. Report on investigations into alleged irregularities in the disbursement of funds to civil society groups by the National Authority for the Campaign against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA)**

The Committee adopted the report on investigations into alleged irregularities in the disbursement of funds to civil society groups by the National Authority for the Campaign against Alcohol and Drug Abuse (NACADA) with the following recommendations:-

- (i) The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission should conclude investigations into the irregular procurement of consultancy services for the disbursement of KES.99 million to Civil Society Organization by National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse board (NACADA) in the 2013/14 financial year and ensure that culpable officers are prosecuted.
- (ii) The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission should conclude investigations into the procurement of media services by National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse board (NACADA), amounting to KES. 47 million, without any tendering process during the 2013/14 financial year and ensure that culpable officers are prosecuted.
- (iii) The National Authority for the Campaign Against Alcohol and Drug Abuse board should be dissolved and a new board be appointed to restructure the institutional framework of the organization to ensure that the board and the secretariat deliver on their respective mandate.



- (ii) The Government should ensure that Senior Administrative Officers and Police County Commanders in the North Eastern Region who were interdicted following the attack are prosecuted for criminal negligence.
- (iii) The Government should initiate a public awareness sensitization programme on safety and evacuation skills, particularly targeting students in all schools and colleges.
- (iv) The Government should reopen the Garissa University College, Garissa Medical Training College, Garissa Teachers Training College and Garissa Technical Training College. However the Government is also duty bound to ensure that meticulous and effective security arrangements are made before the institutions are reopened.
- (v) The Government should account for all Kenyans who were trained in Manyani in 2009 and were deployed in Somali to assist the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia within the framework of the Kenya-Somali Technical Co-operation Agreement. Those who do not cooperate should be prosecuted under military law.
- (vi) The Government should renegotiate the deployment of troops in Somali to ensure that Kenya Defence Forces take charge of AMISOM operations in areas along the Kenya- Somali border to protect national interest by create a buffer zone and ensure that Al Shabaab militants do not operate freely in the region to launch attacks on targets in Kenya.
- (vii) The Police Training Curriculum should be modernized to ensure that all police officers are adequately trained in new and emerging techniques such as fighting in build- up areas or in close Quarter Battle, to be able to effectively counter terrorism and related crimes. The Government should also equip police officers to levels commensurate with the level of insecurity facing the Country.
- (viii) The National Police Service should decentralize the RECCE Squad operations to County Headquarters, in areas which are vulnerable to terrorist attacks such as the North East Eastern and Coast regions. This would reduce the duration currently taken by the unit to respond to incidents of serious crime in areas far from Nairobi
- (ix) The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Authority should conduct investigations on alleged corruption in the issuance of movement permits in the refugee camps and ensure that all culpable government officers are prosecuted.
- (x) The Government should fast track the recruitment of two hundred Police Reservists per County, within the North Eastern region, to supplement security agencies in enforcing law and order.

**(o) 27<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 27<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Humphrey Njuguna MP and Hon. Zakayo Cheruiyot MP respectively.

**(p) 31<sup>st</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 31<sup>st</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Ababu Namwamba MP and Hon. Shabaan Isaack MP respectively.

**(q) 32<sup>nd</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 32<sup>nd</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Samuel Moroto MP and Hon. Shabaan Isaack MP respectively.

**MIN NO.160 /ANS/2015 – MATTERS ARISING**

**(i) Under Minutes of the 11<sup>th</sup> sitting MIN. NO.39/ANS/2015.**

The Committee resolved to form a subcommittee to discuss the issue of allocation of more funds to fund measures to address famine with the relevant Cabinet Secretary.

**(ii) Under Minutes of the 13<sup>th</sup> sitting MIN. NO.47/ANS/2015.**

Members noted that elected leaders from the North Eastern region need to take a leading role in addressing the perceived segregation on non-local teachers.

**(iii) Under Minutes of the 31<sup>st</sup> sitting MIN. NO.111 /ANS/2015.**

The Committee observed that no allocation had been set aside to facilitate the operations of the Kenya Police Reservists. The Members also emphasized the need for the National Police Service to fully implement the medical cover for police officers

**MIN.NO. 161 /ANS/2015 - ADOPTION OF REPORTS**

**1. Report on the investigations into the Garissa University College Terrorist attack**

The Committee adopted the report on the investigations into the Garissa University College Terrorist attack with the following recommendations:-

- (i) The Inspector General of Police, through the Director of operations in the National Police Service, should assume command of all internal security operations. The Kenya Defence Forces should be deployed only as a last option.

**(f) 16<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 16<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed by Hon. Jane Machira, MP and seconded by Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) John Waluke, MP.

**(g) 17<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 17<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP and Hon. James Bett, MP respectively.

**(h) 19<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 19<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Zakayo Cheruiyot and Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP respectively.

**(i) 20<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 20<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed by Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) John Waluke, MP and seconded by Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP.

**(j) 21<sup>st</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 21<sup>st</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Humphrey Njuguna and Hon. Hon. James Bett, MP respectively.

**(k) 22<sup>nd</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP and Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP respectively.

**(l) 23<sup>rd</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Shaaban Isaack and Hon. Grace Kiptui MP respectively.

**(m) 25<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 25<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. James Bett, MP and Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP respectively.

**(n) 26<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 26<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Samuel Moroto MP and Hon. Grace Kiptui MP respectively.

## IN ATTENDANCE- NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

1. Mr. Leonard Machira - First Clerk Assistant
2. Ms. Hellen Lokwang - Third Clerk Assistant
3. Mr. Mohamed Boru - Third Clerk Assistant
4. Mr. Eugene Apaa - Research and Policy Analyst III
5. Mr. Abdi Salat - Sergeant At Arms

## MIN.NO. 158 /ANS/2015 - PRELIMINARIES

The Chairperson called the meeting to order at 10.00 a.m with a prayer from Hon. James Bett MP.

## MIN.NO. 159 /ANS/2015 - CONFIRMATION OF MINUTES

The Committee confirmed minutes of previous sittings as follows:-

### **(a) 11<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 11<sup>th</sup> Sitting were confirmed as the true proceedings of the meeting having been proposed by Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP and seconded by Hon. (Maj. Rtd.) John Waluke, MP.

### **(b) 12<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 12<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP and seconded by Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP respectively.

### **(c) 13<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 13<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Alois Lentoimaga, MP and Hon. Zakayo Cheruiyot, MP respectively.

### **(d) 14<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 14<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP and Hon. James Bett, MP respectively

### **(e) 15<sup>th</sup> Sitting**

The minutes of the 15<sup>th</sup> Sitting were proposed and seconded by Hon. James Bett, MP and Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP respectively.

**MINUTES OF THE 44<sup>TH</sup> SITTING OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON  
ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY HELD ON 28<sup>TH</sup> AUGUST, 2015 AT  
FLAMINGO HOTEL, MOMBASA AT 10.00 A.M.**

**PRESENT**

1. The Hon. Asman Kamama, MGH, OGW, MP - Chairperson
2. The Hon. Alois Lentoimaga, MP - Vice Chairperson
3. The Hon. Wanjiku Muhia, MP
4. The Hon. Grace Kiptui, MP
5. The Hon. George Theuri, MP
6. The Hon. Ahmed Abdikadir Ore, MP
7. The Hon. Zakayo Cheruiyot, MP
8. The Hon. Humphrey Njuguna, MP
9. The Hon. Francis Mwangangi, MP
10. The Hon. (Maj. Rtd) J. K. Waluke, MP
11. The Hon. Patrick Ole Ntutu, MP
12. The Hon. Benard Shinali, MP
13. The Hon. Joseph Lekuton, MP
14. The Hon. James Bett, MP
15. The Hon. Ababu Namwamba, MP
16. The Hon. Rashid Bedzimba, MP
17. The Hon. Shaaban Ali Isaack, MP
18. The Hon. Jane Machira, MP
19. The Hon. Samuel Moroto, MP

**ABSENT WITH APOLOGY**

1. The Hon. Alice Wahome, MP
2. The Hon. Joseph Ndiege, MP
3. The Hon. Mohamed Shidiye, MP
4. The Hon. Protus Akuja Ewesit, MP
5. The Hon. Regina Nthambi Muia, MP
6. The Hon. David Gikaria, MP
7. The Hon. Joseph Kahangara, MP
8. The Hon. Ibrahim Saney, MP
9. The Hon. Timothy Wetangula, MP



# MINUTES

- 9. The Government should renegotiate the deployment of troops in Somali to ensure that Kenya Defence Forces take charge of AMISOM operations in areas along the Kenya- Somali border to protect national interest by creating a buffer zone and ensure that Al Shabaab militants do not operate freely in the region to launch attacks on targets in Kenya.**
  
- 10. The Police Training Curriculum should be modernized to ensure that all police officers are adequately trained in new and emerging techniques such as fighting in build- up areas or in close Quarter Battle, to be able to effectively counter terrorism and related crimes. The Government should also equip police officers to levels commensurate with the level of insecurity facing the Country.**
  
- 11. The Government should initiate a public awareness sensitization programme on safety and evacuation skills, particularly targeting students in all schools and colleges.**
  
- 12. The Government should initiate a multi-pronged anti- terrorism and anti- radicalization strategy involving all stakeholders through the establishment of partnership with the public, religious and elected leaders, community leaders and the media. This would ensure that the citizenry in the Country particularly North Eastern and Coast regions are actively involved in the fight against terrorism and radicalization.**

## 5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee made the following recommendations:-

1. **The Inspector General of Police, through the Director of operations in the National Police Service, should assume command of all internal security operations. The Kenya Defence Forces should be deployed only as a last option.**
2. **The Government should ensure that Senior Administrative Officers and Police County Commanders in the North Eastern Region who were interdicted following the attack are prosecuted for criminal negligence.**
3. **The National Police Service should decentralize the RECCE Squad operations to County Headquarters, in areas which are vulnerable to terrorist attacks such as the North East Eastern and Coast regions. This will reduce the duration taken by the unit to respond to incidents of serious crime in areas far from Nairobi.**
4. **The Government should reopen the Garissa University College, Garissa Medical Training College, Garissa Teachers Training College and Garissa Technical Training College. However the Government is also duty bound to ensure that meticulous and effective security arrangements are made before the institutions are reopened.**
5. **The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Authority should conduct investigations on alleged corruption in the issuance of movement permits in the refugee camps and ensure that all culpable government officers are prosecuted.**
6. **The Government should fast track the recruitment of two hundred Police Reservists per County, within the North Eastern region, to supplement security agencies in enforcing law and order.**
7. **The Government should streamline the transfer and deployment of Police Officers in the Country to address Low Morale among Police Officers caused by overstaying in one station for long, making them inefficient, less active and demoralized.**
8. **The Government should account for all Kenyans who were trained in Manyani in 2009 and were deployed in Somali to assist the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia within the framework of the Kenya- Somali Technical Co-operation Agreement. Those who do not cooperate should be prosecuted under military law.**

5. It is likely that a number of the attackers who were part of a large group of militia dispatched from Somali to carry out attacks in learning institutions and other strategic installations were still hiding within the County or in other parts of the Country as they have not been apprehended.
6. Mandera appeared to be the preferred transit point used by Al Shabaab to transport weapons into the Country as indicated by evidence submitted to the committee on the planning and transportation of weapons used in the attack. This would be attributed to the large number of Al shabaab militia in areas along the Kenya /Somali border between Mandera and Elwak. The area was reportedly under the command of the Ethiopian Forces serving in AMISOM. However the Ethiopian soldiers are not actively engaged in the region making it a safe haven for the Al Shabaab militia.
7. Four months after the terror attack on Garissa University College, the Government had not provided adequate logistical and strategic support to security agencies in the region to ensure that similar incidents were prevented or at least effectively contained within the shortest time possible. The Regional County Security Committee still did not have a Helicopter or light aircraft to facilitated prompt response to security situations. The officers also lacked modern and appropriate equipment such as night vision, telescopic sights, bullet proof vests and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).
8. Refugee camps were reportedly being used by Al Shabaab and their sympathisers to plan and launch terror attacks. The large population in the camps had made it difficult for Government agencies to determine genuine refugees from suspected militia. Rampant corruption in the camps, particularly in the issuance of permits to facilitate the movement of the refugees from the camps to seek medical treatment in Nairobi contributed to Alshabaab operatives' ability to move from the camp to Nairobi and other parts of the Country. The huge refugee population had also contributed to environmental degradation particularly in areas within Dadaab.
9. The Government had not effectively implemented a multi-pronged strategy involving the public, religious leaders and the media to counter terrorism and the twin challenge of radicalization. The Government seemed to depend entirely on a militarized approach to addressing the issue. A multi prolong approach would ensure that the citizenry in the North Eastern region were actively involved in the fight against terror.
10. Rampant corruption in the National Police Service had made citizens to be reluctant to provide information on Al Shabaab, fearing information leakage that would threaten their personal security. Hence limiting community participation in the fight against terrorism.

- (ii) Allow the students to continue learning at the University as both the privately sponsored students and lectures were ready to continue with studies.
- (iii) Issue academic transcripts for previous semesters to the students.

#### 4.0 COMMITTEE OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

From the meetings with witnesses and public hearing the Committee observed that:-

1. The Garissa University attack would have been prevented or at least limited to very few casualties had necessary steps been taken. According to evidence submitted to the Committee the Garissa County Intelligence Security Committee had received numerous intelligence reports on impending terrorist attacks, targeting learning institutions within Garissa town. The County Security Intelligence Committee held a meeting on 9<sup>th</sup> March 2015 and resolved that the strength of security personnel guarding Naivas Supermarket, Kenya Medical Training College (KMTTC) Garissa Teachers Training College (GTTC) and Garissa University College (GUC) among other places frequented by non- locals be increased. This appeared not to have been effected. In addition evidence submitted by the Garissa University College management and also by one member of the County Security Committee indicated that only two police officers were on duty at the University when the attack occurred.
2. The County Security Committee and the University management did not conduct proper security surveys within targeted institutions, in the wake of intelligence reports on possible terror attacks. Had the survey been done, security gaps such as heavily grilled hostel windows would have been identified and remedial measures instituted to mitigate the effects of any terrorist attacks.
3. The Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government had not provided adequate budgetary allocation to officers serving in the Counties and Sub Counties. The Committee established that Deputy County Commissioners received approximately Ksh 300,000 in Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIEs) per quarter in the first two quarters of the 2014 /15 financial year. However the allocation had been increased during the last quarter of the same financial year with the County Commissioners receiving Ksh 750,000 in that quarter.
4. Somali citizens had encroached on Kenyan territory along the buffer zone between Mandera and Burahawa. The Committee was informed that beacons for border point 1 were intact but those for border point 3 and 4 had been removed. Some Somali citizens had also constructed structures in the buffer zone.



## Summary of Memoranda received during the field visit

During the field visit to Garissa County the Committee received memoranda from the following organizations:-

- (i) Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Garissa County office
- (ii) Garissa University College, Garissa Privately Sponsored Students

### I. Memorandum from Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Garissa County office

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, Garissa County office made the following presentations urging the Government to:-

- (i) Urgently resolve clan disputes in the County by clarifying boundaries and mopping up of illegal firearms;
- (ii) Secure the boundary with Somali by deploying enough resources and security personnel;
- (iii) Build trust and partnership with the public in the fight against crime;
- (iv) Address the issue of usage of social media to propagate crime;
- (v) Tackle corruption in government agencies;
- (vi) Re - open Garissa University College, Garissa and Garissa Medical Training College without further delay; and
- (vii) Ensure that there are enough teachers in all school and support the training of local teachers.

### 2. Memorandum from Garissa University College, Garissa Privately Sponsored Students

The students made the following presentations urging the Government and Moi University to:-

- (i) Allow the students to sit for end of semester examinations not later than September,2015

- (iii) The terrorists had taken the students hostage in Mt Elgon hostel where they started shooting at the officers from the second floor washing rooms, killing one KDF officer. Access to Mt Elgon was difficult as its doors were locked and the windows were grilled.
- (iv) The operation commanders then decided to use a tanker to insert troops into the hostel but as they tried to gain entry one of the terrorists who were holed up in the third floor threw a grenade at the officers injuring five of them.
- (v) At around 11:00 am Special Forces joined the rescue operation.
- (vi) The RECEE Squad arrived at the scene at around 12:00 noon. The team spent two hours to check the drawings of the university hostels and being briefed by the officers leading the operation. The operation ended at 5pm.

### **Command and Control**

The Committee was informed that the Commanding Officer Forward Maintenance Area, Garissa Area Military Camp assumed overall Command and Control of the operation and all security agencies reported to him. Whereas Command and Control was maintained, communication remained a challenge as there were not enough Radios that could be used by all the agencies.

### **Challenges Encountered in the Operation**

- (i) **Communication:** Communication among the security officers involved in the rescue operation remained a challenge as there were not sufficient Radios/ Motorolas that could be used by all officers especially the AP and RDU for command and control. The commander relied on their cell phones to communicate.
- (ii) **Screening of Survivors:** Screening of the students was challenging as most of them had no identification cards. This necessitated the need to rely on fellow students for identification.
- (iii) **Utilization of Intelligence:** Despite the numerous intelligence reports on an impending attack on learning institutions in Garissa town, the utilization of the information remained a challenge. This was clearly seen in the case of the University College where only 2 police officers were deployed instead of 4 or a section as earlier promised by the County Police Commander. When the attackers struck it was suspected that only two police officers were guarding the University. The other two may have run away or may not have been on duty allowing the attackers to perpetuate the killings undeterred.

- (vi) Nyumba Kumi initiative and Community policing had been reactivated and households categorized into clusters.

### **Challenges facing the Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee**

- (i) **Insufficient Police Establishment:** The number of police officers in the County was insufficient taking into account the level of terror threat in the region. The police officers were currently overstretched.
- (ii) **Poor Communication network.** The Committee heard that the communication network within the County was poor and security officers would not share information on a timely basis to facilitate quick response to security situations.

### **3.7 Submissions by the Officer in charge of Forward Maintenance Area, Garissa**

#### **Area Military Camp**

The Officer informed the Committee that:-

- (i) The unit offered logistical support to KDF operations in the North Eastern region and Somali. It also assisted in the maintenance of law and order.
- (ii) Intelligence information on possible terror attacks targeting, Garissa University College, Garissa Teachers Training College, Garissa Medical Training College and Naivas Super Market had been circulated to the County Security Committee and the matter was discussed in a meeting where it was resolved that the number of police officers guarding the institution be enhanced.
- (iii) Only two Administration police officers were guarding the institution at the time of the attack.

#### **The Garissa University College Terror Attack**

- (i) The officer informed the Committee that on the morning of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2015, at around 5:45 am he received a call from the Sub county Administration Police Commander informing him that there was an attack on Garissa University College. The unit quickly responded and arrived at the scene at 6:00 am.
- (ii) The Soldiers and the Police started the rescue operation by approaching the scene from the southern direction which seemed safe and then proceeded to secure Tana hostels and the Prefabs and also cordoned off the southern side of the hostels.

- (vi) The Principal of Garissa University College, had shared with them concern on the university's vulnerability to a possible terrorist attack and that they had advised him to write to the County Commissioner to request for more police officers to be deployed at the college to enhance security.
- (vii) The leaders recommended that the Government initiates an affirmative recruitment of teachers in the region to replace teachers Service Commission employed teachers who had been transferred from the region.
- (viii) The residents also alleged that many people had been abducted by persons who identified themselves as police officers. However the suspects had not been taken to Court to answer to any charges and that they could not be traced, leaving their families in agony.

### **3.6 Meeting with the Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee**

The Committee held a meeting with the Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee on Friday 7<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. During the meeting the Committee was informed that the Government had initiated the following measures to enhance security in the County:-

- (i) The Security Committee had conducted security surveys in learning institutions, hospitals and vital Government installations within Garissa and recommended remedial measures to improve security in the institutions.
- (ii) Security officers had been deployed in all learning institutions, hospitals and other Government institutions on a 24 hours basis and police patrols had been enhanced.
- (iii) All hotels and lodges within Garissa town had been profiled and security agencies had held meetings with hotels and lodging operators to ensure that all customers checking in to the facilities produced identification papers and their records were properly kept.
- (iv) The County Security Committee had established a command and control centre, manned by officers from all security formations, to coordinate emergency response. The centre however required funding to facilitate its modernization.
- (v) Madras, Duksis, Tahfiids and other religious institutions had been profiled.

guards deployed at the gate. The terrorists proceeded to the Kitchen but were unable to gain access as the doors were locked or ignored the area as nobody was inside the facility. They then massacred members of Christian Union conducting prayers in one of the class rooms and then moved to Tana Hostel before holding hostages in Mt Elgon hostel, where 124 students were later killed.

- (vi) The terrorists lured the students from Mt Elgon hostel rooms by promising that they would not harm the female students. However they assembled the students in the open space within the hostel and shot them dead.
- (vii) Although four (4) police officers had been assigned to provide security in the University, at the time of time attack only two Administration Officers were present. The other two either did not report to duty or deserted duty by the time the attack occurred.

### **3.5 Meeting with Local Leaders in Garissa town**

The Committee held a meeting with Local Leaders on Friday 7<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. During the meeting the Committee was informed that:-

- (i) The residents complained that issuance of National Identity cards in the region was slow, with many youths having to wait for several years before they were issued the document. This led to frustration and made some of the youth to be lured into joining Al Shabaab terror group.
- (ii) The residents also urged the Government to fast-track the repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab refugee camp. They further informed the Committee that the large refugee population in Fafi and Dadaab had led to depletion of natural resources such as underground water, forcing the residents to encounter difficulties in accessing water.
- (iii) Learning in public schools had been adversely affected by the transfer of non-local trained teachers from the region. Non –local teachers working in private schools had continued to provide services as their counterparts in public schools sought to be transferred out of the region due to security concerns.
- (iv) The residents alleged that on the night of 1<sup>st</sup> /2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015 there were no police patrols in Garissa town. They further indicated that officers stayed at the police station on the particular night.
- (v) Garissa town had only one police station. Thus limiting interaction between the residents and the police officers.



where the number of refugees was estimated to be 200,000 compared to nearly 90,000 inhabitants. The influx of refugees had further exacerbated insecurity in the region and in the rest of the Country. The Committee heard that refugee camps had been infiltrated by Al- Shabaab terror networks.

- (v) **Corruption:** Rampant corruption especially on road blocks manned by police officers had contributed to Al Shabaab militants ease in transporting weapons to areas targeted for attack. The Regional Coordinator also informed the Committee that the issuance of permits to refugee authorising them to leave the refugee camps to seek treatment was riddled with corruption. He added some of the refugees who acquire the permits would be terrorists. However the Committee established that the issuance of the permits had been suspended.
- (vi) **Large concentration of Al Shabaab militia near Mandera:** A large number of Al Shabaab militia had concentrated in areas along the Kenya /Somali border near Mandera that are not actively manned by AMISOM forces. The area was reported to be under the command of the Ethiopian Forces serving in AMISOM. However the Ethiopian soldiers are not actively engaged in the region making it a safe haven for the militia.

### 3.4 Meeting with the Management of Garissa University College

The Committee held a meeting with the Dean of students, Garissa University College on Friday 7<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. During meeting the Committee was informed that:-

- (i) The University was established in August 2011 through Legal Notice No. 116
- (ii) At the time of the terror attack the University had a student population of 1,006 students, 629 male and 377 female.
- (iii) The University had received Intelligence reports on a possible attack by Al Shabaab four days before the attack and the management convened a student gathering to sensitize the students to be vigilant. The Committee also heard that on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2015, some students received SMS messages indicating an impending terror attack targeting the University but this was taken as an April fool's day joke.
- (iv) The Garissa University College Principal had written to the County Commissioner seeking more security officers to be deployed at the University to mitigate the threat but the request was not adequately considered.
- (v) On the night of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2015, at around 5:30 am terrorists attacked the College, they gained entry through the University main gate. They fatally shot two civilian

been appointed by H.E the President to coordinate security agencies in the region.

- (iv) The Government had also enhanced cross border patrols.

### **Challenges faced by Security Agencies in the Region**

The Regional Coordinator informed the Committee that Security Agencies in the North Eastern region were faced with the following challenges:-

- (i) **Inadequate Resources:** The National Government, specifically the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government had not provided adequate budgetary allocation to officers serving in the Counties and Sub Counties. The Committee established that Deputy County Commissioners received approximately Ksh 300,000 in Authority to Incur Expenditure (AIEs) per quarter in the first two quarters of the 2014 /15 financial year. However the allocation had improved during the last quarter of the same financial year with the County Commissioners receiving Ksh 750,000 in the quarter. The Committee was also informed that the Police and National Government Administrative Officers had no allocation to facilitate gathering of intelligence to ensure multi sources of intelligence to supplement intelligence gathered by the National Intelligence Service. The Committee further established that the Government had not provided any aircraft to the Region to facilitate prompt response to emergencies including possible terror attacks as promised in the aftermath of the attack on the Garissa University College.
- (ii) **Poor Coordination among Security Agencies:** The Committee was informed that at the time the attack occurred there was mistrust between the Regular and Administration Police. The Committee further heard that cases of indiscipline among police officers had been witnessed with some officers not taking orders from their superiors in total disregard of the chain of command.
- (iii) **Encroachment along the Kenya Somali border:** The Committee heard that Somali citizens had encroached on Kenyan territory along the buffer zone between Mandera and Burahawa. The beacons for border point 1 are intact but those for point 3 and 4 have been removed. The Committee further heard that some Somali citizen had constructed structures in the buffer zone.
- (iv) **Large Influx of Refugees:** The Committee was informed that continued insecurity in Somali had led to a large influx of refugees to the North Eastern region with the refugees out numbering Kenyan citizens in some areas such as Fafi Constituency,

to undertake recruitment of trainees. The recruits from the Lower and Middle Juba were assembled in Manyani while those from Gedo region were assembled in Kamanga /Archers Post for training. The training was supposed to be held near the Somali border but due to insecurity the venue was changed to Kamanga and Manyani training camps respectively.

However, the recruitment exercise faced a number of challenges: Chief among them; some unemployed Kenyan of Somali origin including those in the refugee camps took advantage and enlisted in the exercise with the belief that it was a UN- recruitment exercise. The exercise was also politicized in the North Eastern region and Mogadishu because of cross border clan politics. The other challenge was desertion of the recruits caused by alleged promises of hefty salaries.

The Kenyan Government together with the Somali Officers embarked on a vetting exercise to rid Kenyans from the training camps. About 360 youths, mostly from Ijara Constituency were removed and transported back to their homes. In February, 2011, two thousand five hundred (2,500) recruits graduated and were deployed in two fronts namely Doble and Burahache to fight Al Shabaab.

### **3.3 Meeting with the Regional Coordinator, North Eastern Region**

The Committee held a meeting with the Regional Coordinator, North Eastern Region on Friday 7<sup>th</sup> August, 2015. During meeting the Committee was informed that the Government had initiated the following measures to enhance security in the region:-

- (i) Security agencies had enhanced sharing of intelligence information and ensured prompt action on the same. The Committee was further informed that through the exchange of information fifty (50) suspected terrorists had been arrested in the region during the preceding two months.
- (ii) The Government had embarked on the recruitment of two hundred Police Reservists per County, within the region, to supplement Government security agencies in enforcing law and order. The three County Governments in the region had also set aside KES two hundred (200) million to provide allowances for the Reservists. The National Government on the other hand would train them and provide firearms, uniforms and food rations. The supervision of the Reservists would however be a prerogative of the National Government.
- (iii) Command and control within the police had been improved and both the Regular and Administration Police were working in tandem with enhanced synergy. The Committee further established that Amb. Mohamud Ali Sahel had

- (iii) On 30<sup>th</sup> March, 2015, a Security Brief No.07/2015, indicating that Abdullahi Ibrahim aka Abdimalik, from Fafi Sub- County had dispatched some operatives to attack Garissa University College and other three other targets in Garissa, was circulated to all Garissa County Security Intelligence Committee members.
- (iv) According to Situation Report, Serial Number 38/2015 of 24<sup>th</sup> February, 2015 unidentified Al Shabaab operatives entered Garissa town planning to carry out terror attacks within the town on an unspecified date. In addition, seven (7) people were seen surveying Garissa Teachers Training College on 21<sup>st</sup> February, 2015. The College had over five hundred (500) non local students and teaching staff.
- (v) On 30<sup>th</sup> March, 2015 Situation report Serial No 62/2015 was circulated to members of Garissa County Security Committee. It indicated that about thirty Alshabaab operatives fleeing from Damajaley in Somalia were heading towards Liboi, Garissa County. They were planning to attack Amuma or Hosingo. Garissa University College and Garissa Teachers College were also targeted for attacks by Al Shabaab operatives who were within the vicinity, about 30kms away.
- (vi) On 1<sup>st</sup> April,2015 , another Security Brief No. 08/ 2015 was circulated, indicating further plans by Al- Shabaab terrorists to attack social places frequented by non-locals as well as institutions of learning during the Easter Holidays.
- (vii) On 2<sup>nd</sup> April ,2015, four attackers stormed Garissaa University College killing at least one hundred and forty seven (147) students, two security guards, one (1) Regular Police Officer, One(1) RECCE Company Officer, one(1) Rapid Deployment Unit(RDU) Officer and three (3)Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Officers.

### **On the Issue of Somalia Soldiers Trained Kenya in 2009**

The Committee was informed that the Kenyan Government, following a request from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and within the framework of the Kenya- Somali Technical Co- operation Agreement, trained four battalions of two thousand five hundred Somalia recruits from Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo. The objective of the exercise was to create a buffer zone on the Kenya- Somali border in response to the security problems resulting from the conflict in Somalia. The Committee was further informed that the training was approved by the National Security Council (NSC).

The Committee established that in August 2009, 36 Somali Officers undertook a training of trainers' course at the Kenya Wildlife Training school in Manyani. The Officers were to train, head and command the recruits. Upon completion of the course the Officers were dispatched

- (xiii) Establishment of partnership programs with private establishments such as hotels, learning institutions and shopping malls to improve their physical security through awareness programs and the exchange of threat and vulnerability assessments.
- (xiv) Sensitization of the media on objective reporting and the negative effects caused by airing or publishing stories propagating extremist ideologies.
- (xv) Enhancement of intelligence gathering and sharing through the community policing initiative – **“Nyumba Kumi.”**
- (xvi) Mounting multi-security agency security operations under African Union (AU) Initiatives targeting various militias in Somalia.
- (xvii) Cooperation and sharing of information with regional countries and other global liaison partners such as UN, AU, IGAD and EAC.
- (xviii) Monitoring closely the growing drive by terror groups to establish links with local criminal gangs such as MRC.

### **3.2 Meeting with the Director General National Intelligence Service**

The Committee held a meeting with the Director, Counter Terrorism Coordination, who represented the Director General, National Intelligence Service, on Tuesday 7<sup>th</sup> May 2015. The Director informed the Committee that the Garissa University College terror attack was conducted by the Amniyaat (intelligence) wing of Al- Shabaab. It was sanctioned by Abdi Muse aka Habil Al Somali and coordinated by Mustaf Ato and Maalim Abbas.

#### **Planning and Execution of the Attack**

The Committee was informed that Al-Shabaab started planning for the attack in February 2015, when Maalim Badi, an associate of Mustaf Ato conducted surveillance on Garissa University College and other targets within Garissa town. He then shared the outcome of the surveillance with Ato in early March, 2015.

The Committee established that in mid-March, 2015 Mustaf Ato sent money to a facilitator in Garissa to obtain weapons and ammunitions from Jilib. The facilitator used two associates of Mustaf Ato named Hidig and Abu Ali to transport the weapons to Mandera. Hidig then assigned four individuals, Sahal Diriye Hussein, Mohamed Abdi Abikar, Hassan Aden Hassan and Omar Dahir to ferry the weapons to Garissa.



On 24<sup>th</sup> March, 2015 the first pair of attackers led by Khaled Hassan Issack aka Jafar arrived in Mandera. They then proceeded to Garissa on 26<sup>th</sup> March, 2015. By 31<sup>st</sup> March, 2015 all the four attackers assembled in Garissa. They left their abode on 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015 and entered Garissa University College between 05:00 and 05:30 hours.

### **The Attackers**

The Committee was informed that four terrorists were involved in the attack as follows:-

- (i) Abdirahim Abdullahi Mohamed aka Ahmed ( leader)
- (ii) Khaled Hassan Issack aka Jafar( Abdirahim's close associate)
- (iii) Muhamad (Identity unknown)
- (iv) Zarqawi (Identity unknown)

Of the four confirmed attackers only one (I) had been positively identified as Abdirahim Abdullahi Mohamed, a University of Nairobi trained lawyer, who left the University without graduating in 2013. He was also a former student at Wamy High School in South B Estate Nairobi.

### **The Facilitators/Logisticians**

The following individuals facilitated the attack:-

- (i) Hassan Adan Hassan – Moved weapons from Mandera to Garissa
- (ii) Mohamed Abdi Abikar - Moved weapons from Mandera to Garissa
- (iii) Sahal Diriye Hussein aka Zakariya- Garissa based facilitator(arrested)
- (iv) Omar Dahir Orai – Escaped to Somalia on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2015-08-15

### **Chronology of Intelligence reporting on impending Terrorist attacks targeting learning institutions in Garissa**

- (i) On 3<sup>rd</sup> March, 2015, Security Brief No.3, indicating that Al- Shabaab militias planned attacks on Naivas Supermarket, Garissa Teachers Training College and Garissa University College was circulated to all County Security Intelligence Committee members.
- (ii) On 9<sup>th</sup> March, 2015, Garissa County Security Committee held a meeting where the threats against Garissa Teachers Training College and Garissa University College were discussed. During the meeting, it was resolved that security personnel guarding Naivas Supermarket, Kenya Medical Training College and Garissa University College, among other places frequented by non –locals be increased.

## **Suggested Way forward**

The following measures were suggested to address the threat posed by terrorism:-

- (i) Firm enforcement of the Security Laws Amendment Act, 2014 that strengthened Legislation dealing with terrorism and radicalization.
- (ii) Construction of Perimeter Fence and other complementing surveillance systems along the Kenya Somalia border. Construction of the initial 50 km stretch is underway from border point I towards border point 29/Kiunga.
- (iii) Enhanced security vigilance within and around strategic installations and facilities.
- (iv) Sustained ground, aerial, and maritime surveillance along the Kenya-Somali border.
- (v) Fast-tracking of voluntary repatriation of Somalia refugees.
- (vi) Enhancement of inter-agency coordination to strengthen institutional synergy.
- (vii) Continuous collaboration with Muslim leaders to counter terrorism and extremists narratives.
- (viii) Enhancement of Implementation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 that provides the legal framework to fight terrorism.
- (ix) Strengthening of the Financial Reporting Centre at the Central Bank of Kenya to analyze financial transactions and investigate the financing of terrorism.
- (x) Increased investment in security sector to fast-track police reforms, establishment of the National Police Service Command and Control System, Forensic Laboratory and retooling of security agencies.
- (xi) Application of technology in border control, passenger profiling and screening procedures of persons entering and leaving the country.
- (xii) Enhancement of meetings of the Border Commissioners' and Administrators Committees along our common borders.

- (vi) Enhancement of security alertness and deployment of security officers in all learning institutions and other areas that may be targeted by the terrorists.
- (vii) The Government had frozen 86 accounts of individuals, organizations and financial institutions suspected to be financing or facilitating terrorism and radicalization in the Country.
- (viii) The Government had established a team to investigate the conduct of individual Police Commanders and Administrative Officers as well as the performance of the respective security committees responsible for coordinating security in Garissa County and North Eastern Region. Arising from the preliminary investigations report, the Government had interdicted the Regional Coordinator North Eastern Region, the County Commissioner, Garissa and seven police officers to pave way for investigations.
- (ix) Strengthening the capacity of the Kenya police counter terrorism rapid response team.
- (x) Training, Equipping and deployment of County Quick Response Teams on Counter Terrorism to support the officers on the ground.
- (xi) Deployment of a platoon of Rapid Deployment Unit around Modika area to support officers on the ground.
- (xii) Equipping and deployment of two Companies of the Rapid Border Patrol Unit near Amuma and Hulugho to patrol and man the borderline.
- (xiii) Continuous training for officers deployed in the North Eastern Region on Counter terrorism skills.
- (xiv) All County Security and Intelligence Committees had been instructed to enhance alertness and ensure that all strategic installations, including learning institutions were adequately secured.

## **Whether Security Agencies received prior intelligence on the terror attack and if so how it was acted on**

The Cabinet Secretary confirmed to the Committee that prior intelligence indicating that terrorists were targeting Garissa University College, Garissa Teachers College, the Catholic Church, Garissa Polytechnic, shops at Bulla- Sheiks owned by non-locals and Naivas supermarket during the month of March, 2015 had been provided to security agencies in the County.

## **Operational Capacity of the Kenya Police Service Air wing**

The Committee established that the Kenya Police Air wing had one (1) Bell 206 Helicopter, which was serviceable and one (1) MI-17 which was under maintenance. Two (2) MI-17 were awaiting overhaul while two (2) 208 caravans were serviceable. A Board of Survey had been done on six (6) Aircrafts, which were awaiting bonding.

## **Measures put in place to ensure similar incidents are responded to in the shortest time possible**

The Cabinet Secretary informed the Committee that following the attack the Government had scaled up security measures to ensure that similar attacks were thwarted. These measures included:-

- (i) Interdiction of Senior Administrative Officers and Police County Commanders in the North Eastern Region on 23<sup>rd</sup>, April, 2015.
- (ii) Appointment of Amb. Mohamud Ali Saleh as the new Regional Coordinator for North Eastern Region with effect from 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2015.
- (iii) Re- organized all Security Committees in the region through deployment of new County Commissioners to coordinate security and other peace initiatives in the region.
- (iv) Appointment of a new set of Regional and County Police Commanders to ensure effective police operations by the Inspector General.
- (v) Ensuring full alertness, continuous briefs, close supervision, intensified patrols, intelligence collection, fixed site security and intensified mounted operations in potential areas.

- (vii) The bodies of the victims were moved to Nairobi by using three military Aircrafts. The survivors were transported to their respective destinations by use of 20 National Youth Service buses on 4<sup>th</sup> April, 2015 under the escort of Administration Police Officers.

### **Challenges faced by Security Agencies in the rescue Operation**

The Committee was informed that security officers were faced with the following challenges during the rescue operation:-

- (i) **Nature of University Hostels:** Access to the hostels was only through two entrances. The cubicles were congested, with six students occupying each room. The windows were also grilled, making it difficult for the students to escape from the attack.
- (ii) **Lack of a Clear Command Structure:** There was no clarity as to who was in charge of the operation and guidelines spelling out the same where not clear.
- (iii) **Limited Capacity in Field Combat Skills:** Many of the officers involved in the operation had not been trained in fighting in build- up areas or in close Quarter Battle. Making it difficult for them to effectively contain the situation.
- (iv) **Lack of Appropriate Equipment:** Security officers in the region lacked appropriate equipment such as night vision, telescopic sights, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) and bullet proof vests.
- (v) **Age Factor:** Many officers involved in the operation were aged between 36 and 58 years. This made it difficult for them to swiftly respond to the attack.
- (vi) **Low Morale among Police Officers:** Some Officers had also overstayed in the County, making them inefficient, less active and demoralized.
- (vii) **Insufficient Police Establishment:** The number of police officers in the County was insufficient taking into account the level of terror threat in the region.
- (viii) **Lack of stand – by contingent.** There was no stand by team of police officers to respond to emergencies since all officers were deployed to specific areas on a daily basis.

injustices and seek to elicit local population support as illustrated in the Mpeketoni video.

- (iv) **MRC:** Alshabaab is reportedly keen to ride on the MRC agenda with more radical MRC splinter groups warming up to Al Shabaab.

### **3.0 MEETINGS**

#### **3.1 Meeting with Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government**

The Committee held a meeting with the Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government on Thursday 30<sup>th</sup> April 2015. The Cabinet Secretary informed the Committee as follows:-

- (i) Suspected Al - Shabaab terrorists attacked Garissa University College on Thursday 2<sup>nd</sup> April, 2015 at around 05:50 hours. The attackers shot dead two civilian guards at the main gate and forcefully gained entry into the University compound.
- (ii) When the terrorists struck, four Police Officers deployed at the University returned fire but the terrorists managed to enter the University compound by shooting indiscriminately and eventually found their way to the hostels.
- (iii) Following the attack, officers drawn from the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), National Police Service and Kenya Prisons Service responded. However by the time the officers reached the scene the terrorists had taken positions on the top floor of Mt. Elgon hostel. An exchange of fire ensued and at around 0639 hours the terrorists fatally shot two officers (1 KDF and 1 Administration Police).
- (iv) The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, accompanied by the Inspector General of Police arrived in Garissa at around 1030 hours. Various activities and consultative meetings were held to coordinate the rescue effort.
- (v) At around 13:30 hours the RECCE squad arrived and occupied the first floor of Mt Elgon hostel, where the hostages (students) were been held. Kenya Defence Forces officers (KDF) ceased fire and tactically handed over to the RECCE squad.
- (vi) A mop up exercise was conducted and confirmed that the fatalities were 151, categorized as follows ;142 students, 1 KDF soldier, 1 IAP Officer, 1 GSU ( RECCE Company), 2 Civilian Guards and 4 terrorists. 558 students were rescued.



## 2.0 BACKGROUND

Although many of the security threats facing Kenya are mainly from criminal gangs and armed bandits. The threat posed by Al Shabaab has significantly increased in recent years partly due to the Country's deployment of its troops in Somali as a response to frequent incursions by Al Shabaab militia in the North Eastern and Coastal regions and the threat it posed to the Country's strategic and economic interests. This deployment was meant to create a buffer zone on the Kenya /Somali border to reduce the movement of Al Shabaab operatives into the Country.

Al Shabaab militia has transformed its self from a rag- tag unit into wider terrorist unit with networks outside Somali. Al Shabaab attacks on civilian targets in Kenya have also increased. Major incidents involving the group include the 2013 Westgate Mall siege, the Mpeketoni attack, an attack on quarry workers in Mandera and the Garissa University College attack.

### Al Shabaab Networks

The networks flow from Somalia to the North East region, Coast, Nairobi and onwards to the rest of the Country. The three main networks are interrelated and operate with the support of local groups in different parts of Kenya particularly in North Eastern (Wajir, Mandera and Garissa), Mombasa, South Coast, Kilifi, Lamu, Kwale, Marsabit and Isiolo. The three networks are as follows:-

- (i) **Amniyats:** This is the Intelligence wing of Al Shabaab and is known for its technical expertise. The group appears to have invested heavily in its intelligence gathering capabilities as a strategy to modernize the militia's operations and planning. Foreigners play a leading role in Al shabaab intelligence operations and planning. Members of the network are believed to be better educated and more experienced and well connected. This group was responsible for the Westgate, Mandera and the Garissa University College attacks
- (ii) **Jabha Units:** The group is made up of militia numbering in their hundreds under a regional commander. They are currently assembled near the Kenya border (Mandera, Garissa, Wajir).
- (iii) **Jaysh Ayman:** They are an elite unit under the command of Maalim Ayman and composed of mainly ideologues that fight mainly for religion. They are believed to handle the hardest assignments such as the protection of the Alshabaab strong hold of Jilib and are responsible for external attacks especially in the kenyan coast using Boni forest as an hideout. They have recruited MRC youths utilizing historical

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