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REPORT

OF

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE DISAPPEARANCE AND MURDER OF THE LATE MEMBER FOR NYANDARUA NORTH, THE HON. J.M. KARIUKI, M.P.

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MR. Speaker,

On Friday, 14th March, 1975 the National Assembly passed the following Resolution:

THAT, this House being extremely disturbed by the manner of the disappearance and murder of our late colleague, the Member for Nyandarua North (Mr. J.M. Kariuki), resolves to appoint a Select Committee to conduct an investigation on the circumstances of the said disappearance and murder and to report to the House its findings with a view to securing and preserving evidence relevant to bringing to justice those concerned before such evidence is destroyed and that the said Committee be conferred with powers under Section (9) of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, and that the following Members should be the Members of the said Committee:

- Hon. E.W. Mwangale, M.P. (Chairman)
- Hon. Mrs. G. Onyango, M.P.
- Hon. J.M. Shikuku, M.P.
- Hon. H.C. Wariithi, M.P.
- Hon. J.M. Seroney, M.P.
- Hon. B. Nabwera, M.P.
- Hon. C.W. Rubia, M.P.
- Hon. K.S. Mwavumo, M.P.
- Hon. J.K. Mulwa, M.P.
- Hon. M.W. Mwithaga, M.P.
- Hon. Dr. J. Muriuki, M.P.
- Hon. J.M. Gachago, M.P.
- Hon. D.M. Amin, M.P.
- Hon. Dr. J. Kitonga, M.P.
- Hon. J. Nyamweya, M.P.

CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

"It takes more than a National Anthem, however stirring, and a National Coat of Arms, however distinctive, a National Flag, however appropriate, a National Flower, however beautiful, to make a Nation."

- J.M. Kariuki.

1.1. The Select Committee which has come to be known as the Select Committee on the death of the Hon. J.M. Kariuki, M.P. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Committee') has held 46 meetings and interviewed 123 witnesses, some of them more than once.

1.2. At the very outset the Committee invited the Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs who is also the Leader of Government Business (the Hon. D.T. arap Moi, E.G.H., M.P.), the Attorney General (the Hon. Charles Njonjo, E.G.H., M.P.) and the Minister of State in the Office of the President (the Hon. Mbiyu Koinange, E.G.H., M.P.) to a meeting to discuss how best to secure the co-operation of the police and the administration with the Committee in its investigations. The Vice President and the Attorney General responded to the invitation and a useful exchange of views took place. Unfortunately, the Minister of State did not attend and did

and did not send any apologies for his failure to respond to the Committee's written invitation. The Committee also visited the scene near Ngong where the body of JM was found by the Masai on 3rd March, 1975, Hilton Hotel where he was last seen alive, and Makongeni Police Station where JM's watch was found on 18th March, 1975 by a small boy. A sub-committee of the Committee also visited the CID Headquarters on Tuesday, 20th May, 1975, but were not allowed to inspect the investigation files on the murder of JM and the investigation files on the bomb explosions, one of which killed 27 wananchi at Nairobi on 1st March, 1975 the day before the disappearance of JM from the Hilton Hotel.

1.3. Although the Committee's terms of reference did not include investigation into bomb explosions, the last two of which occurred in Mombasa long after the disappearance and death of JM and after the Committee had started its investigations, the Committee, for reasons which will be stated later in this report, is satisfied that there was some connection between the murder of JM and the bomb blasts.

1.4. The Committee started its work, as expected, with a good deal of enthusiasm supported overwhelmingly by public opinion. This enthusiasm, however, was soon dampened by a growing and sobering realisation that the murder of JM was no ordinary



murder. The Kenya Police Force under its Commissioner, Mr. Bernard Hinga, instead of regarding the Committee's work as complementary to its own and the Committee as its ally in the task of leaving "no stone unturned" to uncover the whole truth about the murder of JM, chose instead, from the very outset, the path of non-cooperation and a determined cover-up exercise. Lack of co-operation manifested itself in ways ranging from the hostility and rudeness of Mr. Mungai, the Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police in charge of Rift Valley Province (where the bullet-ridden body of JM was found), to that of junior officers who either took refuge in the Official Secrets Act or were unwilling to disclose what they knew without the permission of their immediate superiors.

1.5.

The District Commissioner of Nyandarua (Mr. Thuo) must be regarded as a key figure in establishing the existence of a determined cover-up exercise. The Committee called Mr. Thuo to give evidence in the hope of establishing the background and political motivation for the murder of JM. When he appeared to give evidence and was examined, his attitude was negative and hostile and the Committee is satisfied, not only that he did not tell the truth as he must have known it but also that he was not a truthful witness.

1.6.

It should be noted that the police who knew in advance that the Committee was going to Makongeni Police Lines where JM's watch had been found (on 18th March, 1975) chose the same day (25th April, 1975) to publish rewards of Shs.400,000/- for information concerning bomb blasts and the murder of JM. Whether this was a coincidence or not, remains to be seen.

1.7.

It is now three months since the third of the five bomb blasts killed 27 wananchi at the O.T.C. Bus Depot on 1st March, 1975 and JM was murdered on 2nd March, 1975. The JM investigation team, led by Senior Superintendent Sokhi, and the team investigating the bomb blasts at Nairobi and Mombasa have testified before the Committee that they have not found any suspects who could be arrested and brought to trial. Both investigations are being carried on under the direction of the Director of CID (Mr. Nderi). The Committee finds it difficult to believe that the combined CID and Special Branch forces of the Kenya Police (hitherto claimed to be the best in Africa) have not been able in three months to trace the kidnapers and murderers of a politician of the stature of the late JM, and against whom it has been established to the satisfaction of the Committee that the CID were trying to concoct evidence linking him with the bomb blast which killed 27 wananchi. The Committee also finds it difficult to believe that the same combined forces have, during the same time, not been able to trace the persons behind bomb blasts in places as far apart as Nairobi and Mombasa even though the last one at Nairobi resulted in 27 deaths. The Committee, therefore, has been left with no alternative but to draw the painful but necessary inference that investigations so far carried out by the police have neither been thorough nor genuine, and that the police know who the culprits actually are but are unwilling to proceed against them.

1.8.

There is reason to believe that the prompt action of the National Assembly in appointing the Committee before the funeral of JM saved the country from civil war. Public

opinion, in any event, was relieved that they did not have to take the law into their own hands. Prayers were offered for the success of the Committee in bringing out the truth. One of the newspapers, however, warned against expecting too much from the Committee. Subsequent events have justified this warning, for it did not take the Committee long to realise that it had taken on a formidable task. Since there had been no similar investigation conducted by a select committee of Parliament, the Committee had no precedent to fall back on. The Committee, therefore, had to take time devising its rules of procedure.

1.9. The CID team supposed to be investigating the same murder struck first. Knowing that the first logical place to start investigations was Hilton Hotel, from where JM disappeared, the police rounded up all likely persons who could have witnessed what happened to JM, both in and outside Hilton Hotel. Such witnesses were picked up and held in custody for questioning. In fact, one such witness was picked up as early as the morning of Friday, 7th March, 1975 when the disappearance of JM was made known to the world through the National Assembly.

1.10. The technique of the CID team in respect of anyone suspected to have witnessed anything material to the disappearance of JM, including persons involved (who have been established by the Committee to have been police officers) was to harass, threaten, intimidate and even (contrary to Section 74 of the Constitution) torture them. Witnesses called by the Committee to testify to events at Hilton Hotel on the evening of 2nd March, 1975 were found to have passed through the hands of

the police and made statements to the police which there was reason to believe they were frightened to change or enlarge upon when they appeared before the Committee. Police officers who had been connected with the investigation proved so hostile and un-cooperative that a good deal of the Committee's time was wasted in investigating the investigators instead of the actual murder. In order to test the credibility of witnesses the Committee asked for the production of statements previously made by them to the police. The police, contrary to Section 13 of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act refused to produce these statements. There was a material witness whom the Committee wanted to interrogate, but the Committee was unable to get hold of him and the police assured the Committee that he had left the country and had not returned. It later turned out he was, to the knowledge of the police, all the time in Nairobi. This witness was examined by the Committee only a few days ago.

1.11.

Of late, a campaign has been mounted to discredit the Committee by making it appear as if it had concluded its investigations, but because members of the Committee had been bribed or that they wanted to prolong their sittings to draw more allowances they were purposely delaying publication of their report. If it were not for the fact that the public are gullible and can swallow such cheap propaganda, it would be easy to dismiss such allegations as a lot of rubbish. As one of the Committee members said in the House last week, the police are paid and are better equipped to conduct such investigations. This campaign should therefore be directed at them to apprehend the culprits and bring them to justice. Sufficient has

been said in this preamble to show that the work of the Committee has been hampered at every stage by interference with witnesses and by hostility and lack of co-operation on the part of the police, all of which appear to constitute a massive and determined cover-up campaign.



## CHAPTER II - BACKGROUND

- 2.1. The late Member for Nyandarua North, the Hon. Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, came to grief on the night of 2nd March, 1975 when he was ruthlessly murdered, and his body left, in Ngong Hills about thirty miles from Nairobi. Since his tragic death, much has been said and written about the fallen hero. It is not the intention of this survey to bore the readers by details regarding his eventful life history. Rather, the intention is to present in a nutshell a few features relating to his early life and his socio-political career.
- 2.2. Mr. J.M. Kariuki (hereinafter referred to as 'JM') was born on 21st March, 1929 at Kabati Forest in the Rift Valley Province of Kenya where his parents had migrated and settled from their home in Nyeri, Central Province, the year before. He was educated at Karima and Kerugoya schools before joining the King's College, Budo, in Uganda.
- 2.3. At the outbreak of the Mau Mau uprising, JM was a card-carrying member of the Kenya African Union (K.A.U.). An active and promising young politician, he successfully persuaded many of his friends to accede to the political party. In June, 1953 he embarked on a lucrative hotel business in Nakuru. It was there that he learned of untold horrors, such as castration of men, experienced by political detainees at Kwa Nyangwethu screening camp. He was moved by these tales as a result of which he began influencing leaders of the screening elders in order to save potential victims.
- 2.4. He was later detained under the Emergency Regulations from 1953 to 1960. During his days in the detention camps, he

displayed remarkable qualities of humanity, leadership courage. Various incidents illustrate these qualities. In instance, when JM was at Kowop detention camp he protested against harsh and humiliating treatment of the detainees by one of the officers in charge. The harshness included being required to seek permission to go to the lavatory. He wrote a letter of the District Commissioner requesting him to visit the camp and carry out an investigation. The Commissioner agreed and consequent upon his visit the situation was rectified. At Manyani Camp, he asked for a Visiting Committee to witness the human suffering therein. As a result of this complaint he received twenty-four strokes of the cane. When the Committee eventually paid a visit to the camp, his presentation of grievances on behalf of his colleagues earned him twelve strokes and a seven days' solitary confinement. Subsequently he sent his complaints direct to the Colonial Office.

2.5. Other examples of his humane service include promoting a spirit of co-existence and friendliness among the detainees; fostering harmonious relationships between the warders and his associates; educating illiterate detainees and writing letters for them; manifesting kindness to all while adopting an uncompromising attitude towards the authorities if the welfare of his colleagues demanded it. As Miss Margery Perhan puts it in Mau Mau Detainee: "But the root cause of Mr. Kariuki's defiance of the authorities seems to have been his determination to prove that he and his associates in defiance were not in the grip of some remedial obsession but pursuing logical and irrevocable political aims."

2.6. After he was released from detention, he went to Oxford University where he wrote his widely-read autobiography Mau Mau Detainee, first published in 1963. On returning to

Kenya he became Mzee Kenyatta's private secretary. When the country held its general elections in 1963, he contested the Aberdares Constituency (the present Nyandarua District) seat and was returned to Parliament with an impressive majority. In 1964 the National Youth Service was formed and he became its Leader. While Leader of the organization he visited Ethiopia where he attended a Seminar of the International Secretariat for Volunteer Service. He went to the United States in 1965 to study economic conditions there, with particular emphasis on the Anti-poverty Programme. He travelled extensively in Africa, Asia and Europe as well.

2.7. JM also became the Chairman of the Betting and Lotteries Licensing Board and helped many wananchi to acquire betting machines. During his chairmanship, the Board contributed significantly to various Harambee projects in the country.

2.8. On 1st July, 1968 he was appointed an Assistant Minister for Agriculture. After the 1969 General Elections he became an Assistant Minister for Tourism and Wildlife. Worthy of note at this juncture is that before the preceding (1969) elections he came out with his "Ol' Kalou Declaration" which, for the first time, introduced Preliminary Elections into our electoral system. After last year's elections (1974) he was dropped from Government.

#### JM's Convictions

2.9. Economic and Social Justice. It is characteristic of the developing nations that the greatest wealth is in the hands of the privileged few while the masses are impoverished. But a stable social order cannot be built on the poverty of millions. Frustrations born of poverty and socio-economic inequalities

breed turmoil and violence. Hence, the first priority in any democratic developing country is economic prosperity coupled with the eradication of social and economic disparities.

- 2.10. JM openly and courageously advocated the quest for social justice and equal opportunities for all. He strove for "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". With reference to the Kenya of today, he remarked: "A small but powerful group of greedy, self-seeking elite in the form of politicians, civil servants and business men has steadily but very surely monopolised the fruits of independence to the exclusion of the majority of the people. We do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars."
- 2.11. JM's philosophy with regard to the distribution of wealth is contained in the foregoing excerpt. Although he was a man of good means, he cherished the ideal. After all, socialism is ultimately an attitude of mind and a millionaire could be a staunch socialist. JM gave generously to many charitable causes.
- 2.12. Land. Kenya as an agricultural country, the paramountcy of the land question cannot be overemphasized. Indeed, it was the pivot of the liberation crusade during the colonial era.
- 2.13. The Colonial Government had created a system which allowed unlimited ownership of land by the minority white population. Thus, a relatively few settlers grabbed tracts of some of the best land in the country while Africans smarted under overcrowding and unemployment. This system was fundamentally intolerable to the African population which closed its ranks to protect its inalienable rights and human dignity. A prolonged and bloody Mau Mau war ensued which resulted in the achievement of political independence.

2.14. JM vehemently spoke out against our system of unrestricted land acquisition, a system merely bent on replacing the white settlers with black settlers. Protested he: "I believe firmly that substituting Kamau for Smith, Odongo for Jones, and Kiplangat for Keith does not solve what the gallant fighters of our Uhuru considered an imposed and undesirable social injustice." He prescribed the introduction of a land ceiling as a partial solution. This would necessitate the amendment of Section 75 of the Kenya Constitution which has hitherto been prostituted. In his resoluteness and fixity of purpose he appealed to his constituents thus: "No, do not return me to Bunge (Parliament) if you expect that I will change my convictions on the land question; on the repayment of loans on land which we fought for and what is our God-given right; and on the necessity of land-ceiling legislation."

2.15. National Unity. In the emergent nations, the real problem is that of forging national consciousness and identity from a number of separate ethnic groups. This demands that the government administration should transcend ethnic particularism and lay a firm foundation for common citizenship and nationhood.

2.16. Speaking on this subject in the Kenya context, JM had this to say: "This is a deplorable state of things. Nepotism and tribalism have set in and are greatly assisted by the inequalities I have talked about above. These are evil and must be condemned in no uncertain terms. We must all join hands to eliminate them and restore credibility to public life. We must strive to ensure that the next generation will not blame us for having failed to correct the strains of public life."



2.17. Miscellaneous. He advocated the idea of improving rural life in order to halt the population drift into urban areas. On housing, JM severely criticised the handling of the tenant-purchase house scheme which enables opportunists to grab a string of houses using different names. "The convenience of registering the properties in different names is to hide under the facade of certain legal technicalities and legal fiction ... Greed has led people to abandon the sense of fairness which ought to be the guiding force in all public affairs.", he asserted.

2.18. With regard to education, he subscribed to the noble notion of fair distribution of educational opportunities throughout the country. Academic institutions, particularly universities, have an important role to play in developing countries as centres of enlightenment with facilities for independent thought, opinion and action. There is nonetheless a disturbing tendency in this country to unjustifiably express hostility towards our University. JM deprecated the occasional indefinite closures of this institution which are neither conducive to the long-term national interest nor a lasting solution to the institutional problems.

2.19. JM and neo-colonialism were not comfortable bed-fellows. According to him, colonial ~~masters~~ are to be found in Government ministries "dressed in a new cloak labelled 'Economic Adviser to such-and-such a ministry or to so-and-so' ... they advise us in their interests and we follow them like sheep."

2.20. The preceding paragraphs only provide a bird's-eye view of JM's political convictions and activities.

2.21. That he had fallen out with the authorities became obvious during the life of the Second Parliament. Though an Assistant

Minister for Tourism and Wildlife during the period, he did not hesitate to point out candidly, and sometimes bluntly, the ills afflicting our society. On its part, the Government banned nearly all his political and non-political meetings on "security grounds". A notable incident in this respect was the cancellation of his 42nd birthday party on 21st March, 1971 to which many dignitaries had been invited. On 8th January, 1972 a meeting in his constituency which was to be attended by Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament was disallowed on grounds of public security. In utter indignation he remarked in Parliament: "This anti-JM campaign is now bordering on stupidity and constituting an encroachment on the constitutional and human rights of the people whose interest I have sworn to represent." He therefore took refuge in Parliament where his speeches were privileged.

2.22. When the election spell came in 1974, his relationship with the authorities had reached, it seems, rock-bottom. All but one of his political campaign meetings were cancelled for, to use one of the hazy expressions, "security reasons". Thus, the other candidates, aided and abetted by the situation, had an unfair advantage over him. However, JM's grassroots popularity proved unshakable: he did not have to campaign. He, nevertheless, published a poster reminding his constituents that he was still a candidate. He also compiled and published a pamphlet entitled J.M. Kariuki Speaks His Mind which crystallized his political aspirations and strategy.

2.23. On polling day, JM stunned his opponents when he retained his seat with a total of over 16,000 votes. His two rivals polled just about 5,000 votes. This resounding victory, despite desperate efforts to unseat him, increased his popularity as a man of the people throughout the Republic.

Bombs

- 2.24. Towards the close of the month of February, 1975 the whole nation was thrown into panic and confusion by a series of bomb explosions which appeared to follow a well-laid pattern. (The fragments of the bombs so far exploded suggest that the manufacture of the bombs, aside from their different sizes, is the same .) The first blast occurred in a lavatory at the Starlight Nightclub, the second at the Information Bureau near the Hilton Hotel and the third, in which twenty-seven people lost their lives, at the O.T.C. bus station on 1st March, 1975. Similar incidents were reported at Mombasa thereafter. These episodes were accompanied by bomb hoaxes.
- 2.25. Early this year, one CID informer, who for some time had been one of JM's hangers-on, called at the CID Headquarters, Nairobi. He informed them that he had learnt that JM knew something about the bomb blasts. Accordingly, he was requested to keep close to JM so as to gather more information. The informer had been charged in court with defrauding a local bank and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on 28th February, 1975. Because of the bomb blasts that occurred at the bus terminal on the night of 1st March, 1975 this informer was released from jail on bail, pending an appeal, on 2nd March, 1975, allegedly to assist the authorities in their investigations. This was an unusual arrangement since 2nd March, 1975 was a Sunday when courts were not sitting. His mission was specifically to follow JM throughout that day.
- 2.26. Having carefully considered the evidence and the demeanour of the informer, the Committee is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was being used by some CID officers to try to

implicate JM in the bomb blasts. It would seem to us that the informer was determined to exchange his fabricated information for clemency in the fraud case. Strangely enough, the informer was the only source of information designed to connect JM with the explosion. But the CID appear at first to have placed a high degree of confidence in what he was saying. Later on, however, the CID and the Special Branch confirmed to the Committee that they had no concrete evidence to connect JM with the bomb blasts.

CHAPTER III - JM's MOVEMENTS FROM 28TH FEBRUARY, 1975  
TO THE TIME OF HIS DEATH

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- 3.1. The evidence as to J.M. Kariuki's movements from Friday, 28th February, 1975 to 2nd March, 1975 inclusive may be set out in some detail.
- 3.2. At about 3.30 p.m. on Friday, 28th February, 1975 one Macharia of INTRAV Agency at the Hilton Hotel accompanied Mrs. Terry Kariuki and JM to JM's house to look for a business letter thought to be there. Mrs. Terry Kariuki left the house with the driver for Gilgil and did not return until Sunday, 2nd March, 1975. JM and Mr. Macharia stayed in the house for about two hours and then Mr. Macharia borrowed JM's car to go to the centre of Nairobi, leaving JM asleep. He promised to return the car by 7 p.m. He drove to the Hilton Hotel where he stayed until about 6.45 p.m. and then drove off to deliver the car to JM's house. After going a short distance he saw in his mirror that a white Volvo car driven by Mr. Shaw of KPR was following him. He decided to go to the New Stanely Hotel, and did so, staying there for about ten minutes talking with friends. He noticed that Shaw was still following him. He went round the island at the junction of Kenyatta Avenue and Uhuru Highway, Shaw still following. Mr. Macharia parked the car in Government Road and walked about. He saw Mr. Shaw drive to the Ambassadeur Hotel, whereupon he returned to the car and drove to JM's house where he found JM still sleeping. Mr. Macharia expressed doubts regarding JM's safety whereupon JM said that he knew whether he was safe or not and did not require to be warned.



- 3.3. At about 7.30 p.m. JM drove to the Hilton Hotel where Mr. Macharia left him at about 8 p.m.
- 3.4. There is no evidence as to JM's movements between 8 o'clock and 9.30 p.m., at which time he was at the house of Betty Mukande from where he drove Betty and Millicent Njeri to Parklands. It is not known what he did thereafter but he probably went, as he usually did, to the Casino.
- 3.5. On Saturday, 1st March, 1975 JM woke up at about 10.30 a.m. when he found several persons waiting at the house for the purpose of buying his car, a Peugeot 404, number KNW 716. It was arranged that the purchaser should return in the afternoon with cash.
- 3.6. At about 11 a.m. JM spoke by telephone to his sister, Rahah Mwaniki. His daughter says that some time during the morning JM went to hospital for a short time for treatment for his leg.
- 3.7. JM was met by Mr. Macharia at the Hilton Hotel at about 11.30 a.m. but did not stay there. However, there is evidence that JM lunched at the Hilton Hotel with Mr. Mwangi of the Nairobi Cinema, after which he went home and received payment for the car. This was at about 4.30 p.m.
- 3.8. In the evening JM attended an engagement party at a friend's house at Karen where he stayed until about 11 p.m. He is said to have been in a very happy frame of mind at the party. He went from there, travelling alone, to town where he heard of the bus bombing and went to the scene. Later he went to the Casino.

- 3.9. At the Casino he was spoken to by Ben Gethi, Commandant of the G.S.U., who states that he bought JM a drink. Ben Gethi states that he left JM at the Casino at about 1.30 a.m. on Sunday morning, 2nd March, 1975.
- 3.10. The same morning, at about 9.30 to 10 a.m., Ben Gethi went to JM's house. He gives no reason for such a visit except that it was a social call which seems strange in view of the fact that he had only left JM at the Casino early that morning. He walked into JM's bedroom although JM was still sleeping, having arrived home at about 5.30 a.m. He left after a few minutes. Mrs. Nyambura Kariuki stated that she telephoned JM from Gilgil at his house later that morning and he told her that Ben Gethi had been to see him and had arranged to meet him that evening.
- 3.11. At about 11.30 a.m. a telephone conversation took place between JM and one Peter Kinyanjui, alias Mark Twist. This man is a criminal of the worst possible character. He purported to be a close friend of JM but according to himself was spying upon JM as a police informer. The telephone call was made by Mr. Peter Kinyanjui from the office of Mr. Nderi at CID Headquarters. Mr. Nderi is the Director of Criminal Investigations. The telephone call was an abortive attempt to get JM to state something which might be construed as corroborating the spy's allegation that JM was a party to all the bombing incidents which had taken place. Even Mr. Nderi stated that the police have no reason to believe that JM had any part in the bombing; and so far as Mr. Peter Kinyanjui sought to implicate JM in the bombing incidents, his evidence is rejected.

- 3.12. The Committee entirely rejects all the evidence on bombings given by Mr, Peter Kinyanjui as untrue. Further comment on this man appears elsewhere in this report. All that can safely be said is that this man was employed by the police to follow JM on that day but with no results of value to anyone.
- 3.13. At about 12.30 p.m. JM went to the Hilton Hotel where he gave a cheque for Shs.4,000/- for which he requested cash. He received only Shs.1,000/- which was all that was available with the cashier. The balance was to be paid in the evening.
- 3.14. At about 1 o'clock AM, with one Mr. Bichanga of the Hilton Hotel, listened to the news, sitting in JM's car outside the hotel, after which JM had lunch in the hotel. There is evidence that just before lunch he spoke for a moment to a Mr. Young of the KPR.
- 3.15. After lunch JM went to the Ngong races, probably arriving at about 2.30 p.m. Witnesses stated that Ben Gethi was also at the races. Although Ben Gethi denies being at the races on that day, one witness gave evidence that after the second race he saw JM and Ben Gethi together. Later he saw JM on the stand and Mr. Gethi sitting with another African in a Mercedes car, whilst two Europeans stood outside the car. As the witness was leaving a short time later, he saw Ben Gethi coming in the gate. The Mercedes had gone. The witness travelled by bus to the town and on the way, near the A.S.K. he saw the same Mercedes parked with another car off the road. The other car was a green Peugeot 504. Later he saw the

Mercedes again standing near the taxis outside the Hilton with Ben Gethi sitting alone inside it.

3.16. Apparently JM travelled from the races, passing Adam's Arcade at about 6 o'clock at which time he was seen to pass by Mrs. Terry Kariuki and Mrs. Ongudi who were shopping at the Arcade. When these ladies arrived at JM's house he was not at home. He had been home, changed his clothes, and gone out again.

3.17. JM arrived at the Hilton and parked his car at an inconvenient angle near the main entrance to the hotel. He entered through the shop of Sapra Studio. He collected his balance of Shs.3,000/-. A witness who states that he was a friend of JM suggested that they have tea together, whereupon they went into the coffee shop and sat at a table just inside the door. Whilst they were having tea, Mr. Ben Gethi came to the table, spoke a few words to JM and went out. JM told this witness that Ben Gethi had telephoned earlier, asking to see him between 8 and 9 o'clock that evening. JM then followed Mr. Ben Gethi out. Another witness stated that JM and Mr. Ben Gethi spoke together, standing near the lifts. Other witnesses spoke of seeing Mr. Ben Gethi speaking to JM at the table, and one stated that he walked with them to the entrance on his way home. This man is a fairly high-ranking official of the Hilton Hotel. Another hotel employee stated that he saw JM and Mr. Ben Gethi leave the hotel together by the main entrance and walk towards Mama Ngina Street.

3.18. Mr. Ben Gethi admitted that he had spoken to JM in the coffee room but stated that he left JM there at the table and went away by himself.

3.19. Another witness who had been stated by a police officer to be believed the actual murderer of JM, gave evidence which conflicted in important respects with that set out above, except that he also supported the admitted fact that Mr. Ben Gethi spoke to JM at the table. After very careful consideration of this man's evidence as a whole, the Committee concluded that this witness, who is a notorious criminal, was seeking to protect himself by making out that two senior police officers were present in the coffee room at the relevant time. One of these was the police officer who regarded the witness as the murderer or one of the murderers. It was decided that no reliance could be placed upon the evidence of this witness.

3.20. The Committee is satisfied that JM left the hotel with Mr. Ben Gethi.

3.21. From the moment when JM left with Mr. Ben Gethi no evidence has been obtained as to where he went, except that he was murdered in Ngong Hills an hour or two later.

3.22. The postmortem disclosed that five shots had been fired into the body of Mr. Kariuki, causing his death. The time of death, according to the pathologist, was consistent with the murder having been committed at the time of the events at Ngong described by the witnesses who discovered the body.

3.23. The ballistics expert examined five cartridge cases recovered from the place where Mr. J.M. Kariuki's body was found. He gave evidence that three of these were of 7.62 mm calibre



and two were .38 calibre. He also examined one bullet recovered from Mr. Kariuki's body and one recovered from the scene of the crime. The cartridges of 7.62 mm were copper-coated and were, in his opinion, manufactured in either Russia, China or East Germany. He stated that the only firearms which use that ammunition are the Tokarev of Russian make or the 7.63 Mauser Pistol made in Germany. His tests regarding firing pin and ejector markings eliminated the possibility that these cartridges were fired by a Mauser, and he therefore concluded that a Tokarev pistol was used. The .38 cartridges were, in the witness' opinion, also of an Eastern country manufacture. He stated that many makes of weapon can fire such ammunition, but by microscopic examination of the two bullets recovered which were both of .38 calibre, he concluded that by reason of the particular width of the lands they were fired either from a .38 Walther or a .38 Mann, both of German manufacture. He later, however, obtained a Russian Makarov Pistol and found that it also could have been used, but he was unable to obtain any other type of weapon for test purposes, and therefore stated that his views regarding the .38 bullets are not conclusive. All cartridges were automatic pistol ammunition and could not be fired from a revolver.

3.24. The expert's conclusion was that two weapons were used. He stated that the two Tokarev pistols which he tested were obtained from Government, but he did not have the opportunity of testing any others. The cartridges had not been fired from either of the weapons tested by him.

#### CHAPTER IV - EVIDENCE OF COVER-UP

- 4.1. According to the evidence given to the Committee, JM appears to have been prevailed on to leave the Hilton Hotel about 7 p.m. on Sunday, 2nd March, 1975 in the company of the Commandant of G.S.U. (Mr. Ben Gethi) in the presence of Chief Inspector Patrick Shaw of KPR and other police officers. Several vehicles said to be CID are alleged to have been used. No evidence is as yet available to the Committee as to where JM was taken. But there is evidence that Mr. Nderi was seeking evidence to implicate JM with the bomb blasts at Nairobi the last of which killed 27 wananchi the night before. It would appear that Mr. Gethi, whom JM considered a friend, was used to lure him to some place where the murderers were waiting. Later that night, JM was handcuffed or had his hands tied and taken by car to a place near Olosho-Oibor manyatta, behind Ngong Hills, where he was shot and died of five bullet shots. Some Masai school children in a manyatta nearby saw the lights of the vehicle which must have carried JM. Three Masai teenage boys heard the shots but ran away in fear.
- 4.2. On Monday, 3rd March, 1975 two Masai elders, Mr. Musaito ole Tunda and Mr. Meja ole Nchoki, reported to Ngong Police Station that they had found a body of a well dressed male African whom they thought had died of bullet wounds at Olosho-Oibor. Mr. ole Tunda thought the time they reported was between 11 a.m. and 12 noon. Both elders said that they were told to go away and come back at 2 p.m.
- 4.3. The O.C.S. at Ngong Police Station at the time was Inspector Kinyanjui who had as his deputy Acting Inspector Henry Waga

Oganda. On 21st February, 1975 Inspector Francis Ndegwa was transferred to Ngong Police Station to take over from Inspector Kinyanjui but the actual handing-over was not completed until 11th March, 1975.

4.4.

Both Inspectors claimed before the Committee that they were not at the Ngong Police Station when the Masai elders reported finding a body. Inspector Kinyanjui (supported by Inspector Ndegwa) claims to have taken Inspector Ndegwa to Magadi Police Post to hand over to him and that they left Ngong at about noon. Inspector Waga claims that the two Inspectors left at 8 a.m., leaving him in charge. The entry in the O.B. at Ngong Police Station is to the effect that the Masai elders made their report about finding a body at 2.25 p.m. It was claimed there was only one Land Rover at Ngong Police Station and that that had been taken by Inspector Kinyanjui to Magadi. Evidence was given that the D.O. at Ngong secured a G.K. Land Rover to take Inspector Waga and his team to collect the body reported by the Masai elders. What must have happened was that the Masai elders made their report as stated by Mr. ole Tunda between 11 a.m. and 12 noon to either Inspector Kinyanjui or Inspector Ndegwa or to both and that both, suspecting or somehow knowing the body to be that of JM, decided to leave for Magadi, leaving Inspector Waga who had been Inspector Kinyanjui's deputy, to go through the motions of investigating the dead body. When the elders came back from lunch they must have seen Inspector Waga who made the entry in the O.B. The discrepancy between the entry in the O.B., the story of the Masai elders reporting between 11 a.m. and 12 noon, and the discrepancy between Inspector Waga's statement that Inspectors Kinyanjui and Ndegwa

left for Magadi, and that of the two Inspectors that they left around noon, can be explained on the basis of an hypothesis that the Magadi visit, plausible though it was, was arranged to account for the absence of the two Inspectors when the body was brought to the Police Station. What seems to have gone wrong was that Inspector Waga, who gave evidence after returning from the funeral of his wife, forgot the agreed story and the fact that the O.B. entry should have been made around noon instead of 2.25 p.m.

4.5. When Inspector Waga gave evidence he wanted at first to make the Committee believe that he had come straight from home (where he had buried his wife) and that he had not been to Ngong Police Station before his appearance before the Committee. When he was further questioned about details of a signal which he had sent to the OCPD at Kajiado in connection with the discovery of a body by Masai elders, he produced copies of the signals and showed them to the Committee, which he must have collected from Ngong before coming to the Committee.

4.6. Having agreed to take charge of the investigations, Inspector Waga proceeded as it were to break every rule in the book. He proceeded to the scene of the crime and collected the body without taking finger prints or any photographs of the body in question. The reason he gave the Committee for removing the body to Ngong Police Station was that he did it to prevent further decomposition in the sun. According to his own evidence he had left Ngong Police Station to the scene of the crime at about 3 p.m. and brought ~~back~~ the body to the Ngong Police Station at about 4 p.m. According to him, he sat in the

office doing nothing until 5 p.m. when he and Corporal Gitau took the body to the Nairobi City Council Mortuary where it was entered in the register as having been delivered at 5.20 p.m. When cross-examined about what he did in the office between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. he denied having been telephoned or having received telephone calls from either Kajiado or Nairobi. Considering that the body since known to be JM's lay hidden in the mortuary from the evening of 3rd March, 1975 to the afternoon of 11th March, 1975 what Inspector Waga did can be regarded as amounting to concealment of JM's body. On 4th March, 1975 Inspector Waga sent two signals to OCPD, Kajiado. The first signal reported that the body of an unknown and unidentified male African had been found near Ngong and had been collected and taken to the mortuary. No details or description of the body was given to aid identification. The second signal was a request for a visit to the scene of crime by experts. As was only to be expected, the OCPD at Kajiado asked for a detailed description of the body by a signal sent to Ngong on 6th March, 1975. Inspector Waga replied to this signal on 7th March, 1975 giving details which he could have included in his first signal on 4th March, 1975. Inspector Waga also claimed to have instructed Constable Gitau on 6th March, 1975 to go to the Nairobi City Mortuary to take the finger prints of the body recovered from Ngong Hills on 3rd March, 1975. These finger prints were sent to the CRO at the Police Headquarters. These were later returned marked 'untraced'. The evidence is that the finger prints in question were not taken to the Ministry of Labour until the morning of 12th March, 1975 when they were positively identified within ten minutes as belonging to Mwangi Kariuki.

4.7.

When senior police officers concerned with the investigation of JM's murder after 12th March, 1975 were questioned about the conduct of investigations by Inspector Waga, they chose to explain it away on the grounds of negligence or inefficiency. It is possible that if the body of JM had not been discovered by JM's widows and Members of Parliament, the police had no intention of facilitating the identification of the body, and that after some lapse of time it would have been buried as unclaimed and as unidentified. The Committee could not help but note that whereas relatives of the bomb blast on the 1st March, 1975 were asked through V.O.K. to go and identify the bodies of victims at the mortuary, a similar appeal was not issued by Ngong Police Station in respect of JM's body. The casual manner in which Inspector Waga of the Ngong Police handled what was, in fact, a brutal murder by use of firearms indicated an absence of any desire on the part of the police to conduct any genuine or thorough investigations. By the time the investigation file at Ngong was brought to CID Headquarters on 12th March, 1975 the file contained statements of Mr. Ole Tunda and Mr. Ole Nchoki and hardly anything else.

4.8.

Police handling of the matter of the "disappearance" of JM during the week before the discovery of the body in the Nairobi City Mortuary was farcical from start to finish. From the evidence the Committee is satisfied that the police must have known who took away JM from Hilton Hotel around 7 p.m. on Sunday, 2nd March, 1975, where he was taken to, what happened to him there, and who took him to Ngong Hills. There is evidence that Mr. Ben Gethi was used to make an appointment to have JM at the Hilton Hotel that evening. As if this was not

enough, Mr. Nderi and Mr. Sokhi arranged to have Mr. Peter Kinyanjui (convicted and sent to prison for three years on Friday, 28th February, 1975 for defrauding a bank) released on bail on Sunday morning, 2nd March, 1975 in time to follow him to the Ngong races. There is evidence that Mr. Peter Kinyanjui telephoned JM from CID Headquarters (within the hearing of Mr. Nderi) to confirm that he was going to the races. Mr. Nderi admitted that he had taped the conversation but said that he had destroyed the tape. The CID must have arranged to have him followed from the races. There is evidence that before JM arrived at the Hilton the decks were cleared, as it were, by clearing beggars and other spectators from outside the Hilton so as to reduce the number of persons who might witness what was about to happen.

4.9. It is probable that when the wives and friends of JM, including the Members of Parliament, were worrying about his disappearance, the police knew that he was dead and that his body was in the City Mortuary. The police appear to have been playing for time in the hope that in the confusion caused by the presence in the mortuary of numerous victims of 1st March, 1975 bomb blast, JM's body might be buried as unidentified. There were indications that attempts were being made to get JM's body passed off as that of a 'Luo gangster' because of the missing lower teeth.

4.10. Matters were brought to a head when the widows of JM reported him missing and a question was asked in Parliament about it on Thursday, 6th March, 1975. The Government not being able to give an answer then, the question was deferred to the

following day. Someone in authority appears to have directed newspapers and V.O.K. not to publicise the fact that the disappearance of JM had been raised in Parliament. In any event, the fact that the question had been raised was suppressed and was not included in that evening's V.O.K. news or appear in the papers on Friday morning (7th March, 1975). Mr. Nderi gave evidence that the same day an Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Home Affairs (Mr. Tipis) replied in Parliament that Government were not aware of the whereabouts of JM, he directed Nairobi CID Chief Inspector Kimani to open a missing persons file on JM and to institute inquiries. Chief Inspector Kimani made a few perfunctory inquiries for appearance sake, and when examined before the Committee he admitted that his inquiries were not serious since he did not believe that anything untoward had happened to JM. The same Friday morning CID picked up Mr. Pius Kibathi and had him questioned by Senior Superintendent Kinyua, also of CID. Mr. Kibathi was first cautioned and asked, among other things, to make a statement on his involvement with JM's murder. According to Mr. Kibathi's testimony before the Committee, it would seem that the CID had knowledge of JM's murder since during the interrogation on the morning of Friday, 7th March, 1975 one of the questions he was asked was whether he knew who murdered JM. He claims that this can be found in his signed statement which was taken by <sup>Senior</sup> Superintendent Kinyua. Mr. Kibathi further testified that because he had refused to delete the names of Messrs. Nderi and Shaw, whose presence he had placed at the Hilton Hotel at the time of the disappearance of JM, he was tortured and put away at Kamiti Maximum Prison from where he was released on bail on 9th April, 1975. Later on



he was acquitted. When the sub-committee referred to earlier wanted to peruse through Mr. Pius Kibathi's statement, as had been allowed in the case of Mr. Peter Kinyanjui, Mr. Ndari flatly refused.

4.11. On Saturday and Sunday, the 8th and 9th March, 1975, we have Superintendent Obati of CID visiting JM's residence to look for JM's car which which was suspected to have been involved in the bomb blast of 1st March, 1975. In spite of the appeal from Parliament, the CID were looking for JM's car instead of for JM himself. Obviously they could not be looking for JM because they must have been aware that he had been murdered a week previously and that his body was lying in the City Mortuary.

4.12. When the wives of JM and the Members of Parliament went to the City Mortuary to identify the body of JM at about 5 p.m. on 11th March, 1975 they were obstructed and were not allowed to view the body until about an hour later when Assistant Commissioner Kibera arrived and gave permission. Considering that appeals had gone out through the V.O.K. to the public to identify the victims of 1st March, 1975 bomb blast, there was nothing to suggest that the body of JM could not have been among those of the bomb blast unless the police knew to the contrary. It is, therefore, clear that the police had something to hide and that they did not want the truth to come out.

4.13. After the murder of JM was announced to the Kenya public on the morning of 12th March, 1975, Nairobi CID Headquarters took over the investigation. Mr. Ndari assigned Senior Superintendent

Sokhi to head the investigation team which consisted of Senior Superintendent Kinyua, Superintendents Khan, Obati, Odera and Helen, Chief Inspectors Kimani and Giltrap and others including Shaw. This is clearly a high-powered team but, having examined most of them, it seems to the Committee from the tactics employed by this team of investigators, that they were more interested in suppressing the truth than in uncovering it. For example, Mr. Hassan Gedi was harassed and intimidated by prolonged questioning, a search of his house to discover anything he could be charged with, and by being shown the torture chamber where some unfortunate was being beaten up. He was warned that he might end up in the torture chamber if he did not co-operate. Mr. Githinji, the taxi driver who must have seen what happened to JM outside the Hilton and who took him away, was detained for four days during which he was given the full treatment. He told this to several witnesses and also admitted to the Committee that he went through a gruelling ordeal. This caused him to invent what appears to be an obviously false alibi to account for not being outside the Hilton when JM was taken away.

4.14.

The discovery of JM's watch on top of one of the bathrooms in Makongeni Police Lines by the son of Corporal Bernard Kisaka on 18th March, 1975 revealed the perfunctory nature of the investigations carried out by Senior Superintendent Sokhi's team. As soon as Superintendent Obati received a telephone call from Corporal Kisaka informing him about the finding of JM's watch by his son, Mr. Sokhi, accompanied by Mr. Obati and Mr. Ng'ang'ira, went quickly to Makongeni Police Lines, collected the watch and took statements from Corporal Kisaka and his son. The Committee

was surprised to find that although Makongeni Police Lines housed only 39 policemen, no attempt was made to question them all in order to find out who could have placed the watch there. The Committee also learned that Mr. Sokhi instructed Corporal Kisaka and his son to keep silent regarding the discovery of the watch. Both Mr. Sokhi and Mr. Obati admitted to the Committee that of the 39 policemen in the Lines, not more than six were questioned. Mr. Nderi later informed the Committee that he had reason to believe that Mr. Kibathi had placed the watch in Makongeni Police Lines.

4.15. Mr. Nderi's conduct during the investigations on both bomb blasts and the murder of JM, the testimony he gave to the Committee on the occasions he appeared before it and his demeanour while giving evidence were such as to lead the Committee to conclude that he had something to hide. Noting that the Committee was interested in questioning Mr. Pius Kibathi, Mr. Nderi told the Committee that Mr. Kibathi had left the country either for Uganda or Tanzania when in fact Mr. Kibathi had been all the time in Nairobi, which fact must surely have been known to the police. The responsibility for refusing to allow the Committee to peruse the CID investigation files of the bomb blasts and the murder of JM must be shared equally by Mr. Nderi and Mr. Hinga. When Mr. Nderi was first asked to produce these files he expressed willingness to do so but stated that he required the permission of his superior, Mr. Hinga. He next reported to the Committee that Mr. Hinga had refused permission. The Committee thereupon summoned Mr. Hinga who came before the Committee accompanied by his private lawyer to justify his refusal to comply with the Committee's

request. A compromise was reached later between the Committee, Mr. Hinga and his advocate by which it was agreed that a small sub-committee of the Committee would be allowed to inspect the exhibits and statements recorded in connection with the two inquiries.

4.16.

When the sub-committee went to CID Headquarters, Mr. Nderi showed them the exhibits in the two inquiries and the files for both. But apart from letting the sub-committee read Mr. Peter Kinyanjui's statement in connection with the bomb blast he refused to allow the sub-committee to read any of the statements in either investigation. He claimed that Mr. Hinga had only authorised that the sub-committee be shown the files for the Committee to look at but not to read. This was reported to Mr. Hinga and it was pointed out to him that this was a breach of the compromise reached between himself, his lawyer and the Committee. He promised to get in touch with Mr. Nderi and report back to the Committee. When he appeared before the Committee, this time without his lawyer, he flatly refused to order Mr. Nderi to let the sub-committee read the investigation files. The conclusion of the Committee is that both Mr. Hinga and Mr. Nderi had something which they wished to hide or that they are afraid of the Committee finding out the perfunctory nature of the CID investigations.

CHAPTER V - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 5.1. Mr. Ben Gethi, Commandant of the G.S.U., who is known to be the last person seen by witnesses in the company of Mr. Kariuki when they left the Hilton Hotel together about two hours before the murder must, in view of the falsity of his evidence, be regarded as a person who took an active part in the murder himself, or as an accomplice of the actual murderer or murderers. Mr. Ben Gethi should forthwith be suspended from duty pending fresh investigation.
- 5.2. It was part of the terms of reference to the Committee that it should report to Parliament its findings with a view to securing and preserving evidence relevant to bringing to justice those concerned in the murder of Mr. Kariuki before such evidence is destroyed. The persistent refusal by Mr. Hinga, Commissioner of Police, Mr. Nderi, Director of Criminal Investigations, the Chief Investigating Officer, Senior Superintendent of Police, Mr. Sokhi, and Mr. Mungai, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Rift Valley Province, to co-operate with or assist in any way whatsoever the Committee in its work has made it impossible for the Committee to complete the work entrusted to it to its own satisfaction. It is the opinion of the Committee that no satisfactory investigation has been carried out by the police or is likely to be carried out unless all the above-named police officers are replaced in the Police Force immediately.
- 5.3. Mr. Kinyanjui, Inspector of Police, Mr. Ndegwa, Acting Inspector of Police and Mr. Waga, Acting Inspector of Police, all of Ngong Police Station, acted deliberately or with gross

negligence in the performance of their duties after discovery of the body of Mr. Kariuki in their area to a degree which might have destroyed the possibility of identification of the body and did, in fact, seriously delay such identification. Each officer should be the subject of disciplinary action.

5.4. Mr. George Githii of the Daily Nation was guilty of irresponsible statements in that newspaper in relation to the murder of a Member of Parliament (Mr. Kariuki). He misled Parliament and the nation and delayed early investigation by publishing on 8th March, 1975 a specific statement that Mr. Kariuki was in Zambia. In doing so he did not take any reasonable steps to ascertain the truth or otherwise of such statement which was in fact untrue. Consequently he should be severely censured for irresponsible journalism in this respect.

5.5. One police officer named one of the witnesses as a probable murderer. That witness named two other persons as having been present at the Hilton at the time when Mr. Kariuki left the hotel with Mr. Ben Gethi. The Committee considers that all these three persons must be regarded as suspected of involvement in the murder, a matter which requires thorough investigation.

**These are:**

Mr. Pius Kibathi Thuo

Mr. Peter Gicheru Njau

Mr. Peter Kimani.

In addition, because of his suspicious movements on the material day, Mr. Patrick Shaw of the KPR should also be investigated.

In accordance with evidence received, the Committee considers that the following persons' movements and activities require further investigation:

Mayor of Nakuru, Councillor Silas Mburu Gichua

Councillor of Ol Kejuado County Council (from Ngong Area), John Mutung'u

Mr. Stanley Thuo, District Commissioner, Nyandarua

Deputy Director of the National Youth Service, Waruhiu Itote (General China)


Mr. Evans Ngugi

Mr. Karanja (bodyguard of the Hon. Mbiyu Koinange).

5.6.

The overall conclusion of the Committee is that although a very large number of witnesses were located and interviewed, its inability to place a more conclusive report before Parliament is largely due to the refusal of the heads of police to render any assistance even by disclosing the names of witnesses who might have been of value to the Committee, and consequently the Committee can only conclude that the police investigators do not wish the Committee to make any progress towards the bringing to justice of Mr. Kariuki's murderers.

Nairobi,  
June 3, 1975

Signed: 

HON. E. W. MWANGALE, M.P.  
(Chairman)

REPORT

OF

THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE DISAPPEARANCE  
AND MURDER OF THE LATE MEMBER FOR NYANDARUA  
NORTH, THE HON. J.M. KARIUKI, M.P.

MR. Speaker,

On Friday, 14th March, 1975 the National Assembly passed the following Resolution:

THAT, this House being extremely disturbed by the manner of the disappearance and murder of our late colleague, the Member for Nyandarua North (Mr. J.M. Kariuki), resolves to appoint a Select Committee to conduct an investigation on the circumstances of the said disappearance and murder and to report to the House its findings with a view to securing and preserving evidence relevant to bringing to justice those concerned before such evidence is destroyed and that the said Committee be conferred with powers under Section (9) of the National Assembly (Powers and Privileges) Act, and that the following Members should be the Members of the said Committee:

- Hon. E.W. Mwangale, M.P. (Chairman)
- Hon. Mrs. G. Onyango, M.P.
- Hon. J.M. Shikuku, M.P.
- Hon. H.C. Wariithi, M.P.
- Hon. J.M. Seroney, M.P.
- Hon. B. Nabwera, M.P.
- Hon. C.W. Rubia, M.P.
- Hon. K.S. Mwavumo, M.P.
- Hon. J.K. Mulwa, M.P.
- Hon. M.W. Mwithaga, M.P.
- Hon. Dr. J. Muriuki, M.P.
- Hon. J.M. Gachago, M.P.
- Hon. D.M. Amin, M.P.
- Hon. Dr. J. Kitonga, M.P.
- Hon. J. Nyamweya, M.P.



MINUTES OF THE FORTY-NINTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE  
INVESTIGATING THE DISAPPEARANCE AND DEATH OF THE HON. J.M.  
KARIUKI HELD IN CONFERENCE ROOM 7, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS,  
ON MONDAY, 2ND JUNE, 1975, AT 9.30 A.M.

PRESENT: The following Members of the Committee were present:-

Hon. E.W. Mwangale, M.P. (Chairman).  
Hon. Mrs. G. Onyango, M.P.  
Hon. J.M. Shikuku, M.P.  
Hon. C.W. Rubia, M.P.  
Hon. M.J. Seroney, M.P.  
Hon. Dr. J. Muriuki, M.P.

IN ATTENDANCE: Mr. L.J. Ngugi, Clerk of the National Assembly.  
Mr. H.B.N. Gicheru, Assistant Clerk, National Assembly.  
Mr. P.J. Wilkinson, Q.C.

APOLOGY: Apology for absence was received from the Hon. J. Nyamweya, M.P.

MINUTE 268: Confirmation of Minutes.

Minutes of the meeting held on 31st May, 1975, were confirmed by the Members present and signed by the Chairman.

MINUTE 269: Consideration of Draft Report.

The Committee considered and agreed on the report to be submitted to the House tomorrow.

MINUTE 270: Adjournment.

The Committee adjourned sine die at 11.30 a.m.

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